
ADVERANT

THE DOCUMENTATION · PART 2

Adverant Nexus Alpha

For IT, DevOps and developers



Adverant Limited

Release 1.0.0-alpha.1 · November 2026

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
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PART 2

For IT, DevOps and developers

Installing, licensing, running and building on Nexus, with every command, key and code exact.




PART 2 · CHAPTER 2.1

Architecture

What each service in the Nexus chart owns and which stores sit beneath it, then the rules that hold them together, from identity between services to the path every model call takes.

FOR OPERATORS AND DEVELOPERS

19 MIN READ



When Tomás Reilly finished the first install at Harrow Port Authority, `kubectl -n nexus get pods` showed ten Deployments and seven StatefulSets, plus three CronJobs. The migration Jobs that built the database had already gone, because each one deletes itself when it succeeds. That listing is the whole platform. Learn it, because most day-two questions start with "which of these owns that?"

This chapter answers that for each piece, follows one request through them, then covers the rules they all obey. The rest of Part 2 builds on this picture.



The services and what each one owns

The chart is one Helm chart, `nexus`, version 1.0.0-alpha.1, for Kubernetes 1.33 or later. Every workload runs under its own ServiceAccount, as a non-root user, with all Linux capabilities dropped. Calls into the services that guard identity and keys run over mutual TLS (Transport Layer Security), and the public API (application programming interface) shares a process with the AI (artificial intelligence) router.

Component	Deployment and Service	Service port	What it owns
Console	`nexus-alpha`	3000	The pages people see; serves HTML (Hypertext Markup Language) at the console host
BFF (backend for frontend)	`nexus-alpha-bff`	8080	The console's own data, the menu each person gets, the release register
Auth	`nexus-auth`	9101 (mutual TLS on 8443)	People, organisations, sessions, tokens, API keys, the organisation's model key pool
Gateway	`nexus-gateway`	9092, WebSocket 8093	The AI Provider Router, and the public API edge for REST (representational state transfer) and MCP (Model Context Protocol)
Orchestrator	`nexus-orchestrator`	8080	UNO dispatch: accepting every job and queueing it
Workflows	`nexus-workflows`	8081	UNO execution: the worker that runs queued jobs
GraphRAG	`nexus-graphrag`	8090, WebSocket 8091	Memory: the knowledge graph and retrieval over it
Probitas	`nexus-probitas`	9151 (HTTPS)	Evidence: governance records and the sealed ledger
Skills engine	`nexus-skills-engine`	8095	The skill library; finding and running skills
Keys	`nexus-keys`	8080 (HTTPS, mutual TLS)	Per-organisation keys in OpenBao, custody, the installation identity
Plugins	`nexus-plugins`	9111	The plugin registry and catalogue records; off by default
File processing	`nexus-fileprocess`	9109	Reading uploaded documents and images; off by default

The first ten are required. The last two are optional, switched on with `components.plugins.enabled` and `components.fileprocess.enabled` where an Enterprise install or a domain pack uses them. One more optional service, `nexus-alive` on port 8080, has its own switch, `components.alive.enabled`, and is off by default too. Replicas and resources for each sit under `components.<name>`.

The console is server-rendered pages with no database. It talks to the BFF, and to nexus-auth inside the cluster, never out through the public auth host and back in. It refuses to boot without its edition, which the chart passes as `NEXUS_EDITION` from the one `edition` value. Every member of an organisation works in it according to their role. The administration pages are for owners and admins, and a member who opens one gets the "Not an administrator" page.

The BFF is the console's server half and is built as a plugin of the platform, registered as the product Nexus Alpha. It holds the console's own tables in a separate database, `nexus_alpha`, and it decides which menu groups a person sees. When the console needs work done, the BFF asks the service that owns it.

nexus-auth is written in Go and is the only service that mints tokens. Access tokens live 15 minutes and refresh tokens 12 hours by default (`auth.accessTokenTTL`, `auth.refreshTokenTTL`). It limits each signed-in person to 5,000 requests a minute before answering 429 (`auth.rateLimitPerMinute`). It runs two listeners: the plain one on container port 8080 that the public Ingress reaches, and a mutual TLS one on 8443 that every in-cluster caller must use. It believes `X-Forwarded-For` only from the hops in `proxy.trustedCIDRs`, a list of Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) ranges, which defaults to `10.42.0.0/16`, the k3s pod network. If your ingress controller runs elsewhere, change it. Otherwise every sign-in looks like it came from the controller.

The gateway has two jobs that share one process. Inside the cluster it's the AI Provider Router (the AI switchboard in Part 1 and on the console's pages), the only holder of an organisation's model credentials (more on that below). At the edge it's what `api.<domain>` reaches: REST clients, and MCP clients, whose tokens carry the audience `https://<hosts.api>/mcp` and come from the OAuth 2.1 authorisation server at the auth host (OAuth is the open standard for delegated authorisation).

The orchestrator and workflows together are UNO, the workflow engine. All compute runs through them. The orchestrator accepts a job at `POST /api/v1/dispatch`, answers 202 with a `jobId`, `runId` and `traceId`, and queues it. There is no inline execution path: a client always polls `GET /api/v1/dispatch/{jobId}` or takes a callback. The workflows worker pulls jobs from the queue, four at a time per replica by default (`workflows.concurrency`), and has exactly one HTTP route, `GET /health`.


Probitas is the evidence service. It serves TLS itself, from a certificate the chart issues, and keeps its tables in the `trust` schema with a separate role for the ledger. Its governance features are switched by `probitas.flags`. Several ship in `shadow` mode: the verdict is computed and recorded, and nothing is blocked until you change the flag.

nexus-keys is the platform key service, written in Go. It keeps a key per organisation in an OpenBao key store and rotates them nightly. Its nightly jobs also destroy keys whose holding date has come and export its receipts to a volume of its own. Erasing an organisation's key makes the data locked under it unreadable for good. It also mints the installation identity at the first bootstrap, under `keys.installationName`, and that name is permanent. Choose it carefully: the chart refuses an empty name (`INSTALLATION_NAME_MISSING`) and refuses the name in its own example values (`INSTALLATION_NAME_EXAMPLE`).



WATCH OUT

The key store is sealed to the people named in `keys.custody.recipients`, by the public halves of their age keys. The unsealer's shares and the key store's recovery keys are encrypted to every custodian and kept only as ciphertext. If every custodian loses their private key, nobody can unseal the key store after an unsealer restart. Name at least two custodians and keep their identity files offline.



SCREEN A Community installation's own page shows its version and engine health. It says plainly that no licence is needed. The Enterprise parts of the page are drawn as teasers.

Three public hosts

The chart publishes exactly three host names, which together are the installation identity. Every service refuses to boot without them.

Ingress	Host value	Backend
`nexus-console`	`hosts.console`	`nexus-alpha`, port 3000
`nexus-api`	`hosts.api`	`nexus-gateway`, port 9092
`nexus-auth`	`hosts.auth`	`nexus-auth`, port 9101

The examples in this book use `console.harrow.example`, `api.harrow.example` and `auth.harrow.example`. The Ingresses are plain `networking.k8s.io/v1` objects with one rule each, path `/`. TLS at the edge follows `tls.mode`: `existing` (a Secret you made, named in `tls.existingSecret`), `cert-manager` (a ClusterIssuer you run, named in `tls.clusterIssuer`) or `none` (TLS ends in front of the cluster). The chart adds no redirect of its own, so an ACME (Automated Certificate Management Environment) HTTP challenge reaches your solver unchanged. Chapter 2.11, Variations: external stores, TLS and ingress, covers each mode.

Nothing else is exposed. The data stores, OpenBao and every internal service listen only inside the namespace.




FIGURE The components of a Nexus installation and the stores beneath them.

A request, end to end

Here's what happens when Aoife Brennan, head of IT at Harrow, opens the console and asks the assistant a question about this month's berth schedule.

1. Her browser loads `https://console.harrow.example`. The `nexus-console` Ingress sends it to `nexus-alpha` on port 3000.
2. She signs in with her passkey. The sign-in pages talk to `nexus-auth` through `auth.harrow.example`, and nexus-auth mints her an access token carrying her user, her organisation and, when her session has one, her business unit.
3. The console's server calls the BFF, which checks her token and asks nexus-auth whether her organisation holds the product and whether her role is admitted. It answers with the menu groups she may see.
4. Her question goes from the BFF to the orchestrator's dispatch route, with her organisation and user taken from the verified token. The orchestrator answers 202 and puts the job on a queue in Valkey.
5. A workflows worker takes the job. The skill it runs is resolved by the skills engine, and retrieval over Harrow's documents goes to GraphRAG, which reads Neo4j, Qdrant and its PostgreSQL schema.
6. The model call goes to the AI Provider Router at `/internal/ai/chat`. The router picks the provider and model from Harrow's own key pool and routing policy, makes the call with Harrow's key, and returns the completion.
7. The result lands on the job's run row. The BFF reads it and the console draws the answer, with its citations.

The service-to-service hops carry projected service tokens, the ones into nexus-auth, nexus-keys and Probitas run over TLS from the installation's own certificate authority, and every data access in steps 4 to 6 is fenced to Harrow's organisation in the database itself. The sections below explain both.




FIGURE One assistant question, from the browser to the model provider and back.

The data tier

Nexus ships its own signed copy of every store, with the source offer for each in the bundle. Each was chosen for its licence as much as its function.

Store	Version	Licence	Why it's there	Port	Default volume
PostgreSQL with PostGIS and pgvector	PostgreSQL 16, PostGIS 3, pgvector 0.8	PostgreSQL Licence; PostGIS GPL-2.0-or-later	The system of record for every service; PostGIS for map data; pgvector for vectors kept beside rows	5432	50 GiB
Valkey	8.1	BSD-3-Clause	The UNO job queues and short-lived caches, such as nexus-auth's API key cache	6379	5 GiB
Neo4j Community Edition	5.26	GPL-3.0	The knowledge graph GraphRAG builds and walks	7687 (Bolt)	20 GiB
Qdrant	1.15	Apache-2.0	Vector search for GraphRAG and the skills engine	6333 (HTTP), 6334 (gRPC remote	10 GiB

				procedure calls)	
SeaweedFS	4.48	Apache-2.0	Object storage for files, compatible with Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3)	8333	50 GiB
OpenBao	2.6	MPL-2.0	The key store and its unsealer, for nexus-keys	8200	5 GiB and 1 GiB

Some choices replaced something more familiar. Valkey stands in for Redis 7.4, whose current licences the release refuses. MinIO is AGPL-3.0, so the object store is SeaweedFS. GraphRAG reaches Neo4j Community Edition over Bolt, a network protocol, and the services reach PostGIS over the PostgreSQL protocol, so the GPL stays with each of them. OpenBao is the Linux Foundation's fork of Vault from before Vault's licence change.

Every store runs with authentication on and generated credentials: a password for Valkey, an API key for Qdrant, access keys for SeaweedFS.

Each of the five stores under `dataTier` runs in the cluster (`mode: in-cluster`, the default) or is one you already operate (`mode: external`, with `external.host` and a Secret named by `external.existingSecret`). For an external PostgreSQL, set `sslmode` to `verify-full` or `verify-ca`, and put the server's certificate authority (CA) certificate in that Secret; chapter 2.11, Variations: external stores, TLS and ingress, has the details.

```yaml
# harrow-values.yaml (Helm values): Harrow's own PostgreSQL, every other store in the cluster
dataTier:
  postgres:
    mode: external
    sslmode: verify-full
    external:
      host: pg.harrow.example
      existingSecret: harrow-postgres
```

The OpenBao pair is the exception: it always runs inside the installation, because the custody Job initialises it there.

> **WATCH OUT**
> An external PostgreSQL must not already have a role called `nexus` with SUPERUSER or BYPASSRLS. The bootstrap Job checks, stops with "role nexus exists with SUPERUSER or BYPASSRLS on this server", and changes nothing. Membership in such a role would defeat the isolation described below, so the fix is on your server.



Identity between services

Nexus runs without a service mesh. Mutual TLS comes from a local certificate authority (CA) the chart creates through cert-manager, which must be installed first (v1.21.3 is tested).

A self-signed Issuer makes one CA certificate, `nexus-local-ca`, ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) P-256, valid ten years. A second Issuer signs with that CA. Every workload that calls a TLS server inside the installation gets its own client certificate, named `<service-account>-client-tls`, valid 90 days and renewed 15 days before expiry. Its only name is a uniform resource identifier (URI) in the SPIFFE identity form:

```
spiffe://cluster.local/ns/<namespace>/sa/<service-account>
```

Each workload finds the CA's public certificate as `ca.crt` in its own certificate Secret. No pod mounts the CA's key, and you don't need trust-manager.

Three services verify callers by certificate. nexus-auth does it on its second listener, port 8443, and every in-cluster caller dials that one. nexus-keys does it on its only listener. Probitas serves TLS from its own certificate, `nexus-probitas-tls`, which it re-reads when cert-manager renews it. None trusts an `X-Forwarded-Client-Cert` header.

Each workload also gets one-hour Kubernetes tokens at `/var/run/secrets/nexus`, one per service it calls, with that service as the audience. The ConfigMap `nexus-service-identities` maps each `<namespace>/<service-account>` to a service or plugin name, and a workload missing from it has no identity and is refused. The orchestrator and Probitas check these tokens with the Kubernetes API. Of the running services, only those two hold `system:auth-delegator` or have an API token mounted; the one other workload with a token is the custody Job that runs at install.

Network policy closes what identity doesn't. The chart starts from default deny, then admits traffic between the installation's own pods, DNS (Domain Name System), the ingress controller's namespace (`networkPolicy.ingressNamespace`, `kube-system` by default) to the three public Services, and the API server for the two token reviewers. The OpenBao pods carry a different label from the rest of the platform, so the open in-namespace rule doesn't reach them: only nexus-keys, its Jobs and the custody Job get through, on port 8200. Anything else a workload must reach outside the namespace, such as your mail relay, goes in `networkPolicy.externalEgressCIDRs`, which is empty by default.



TIP

When an internal call fails with a TLS error, check the caller's certificate first: `kubectl -n nexus get certificate` shows whether each one is ready.



Migrations and the schema ledger

Migrations run as Helm hooks, on `post-install` and `pre-upgrade`. A post-install hook runs after the release's Deployments have been created. So on a first install the services start while their schemas don't exist yet, and they'd crash-loop against a database with no role, no password and no tables. Nexus avoids that with a ledger.

The hooks run in weight order, and Helm waits for each Job before the next weight starts:

Weight	Hook	What it does
−30	`nexus-migrations-env` and prerequisites	Creates the hook-only Secret with the migrator's credentials, and everything the custody Job reads
−20	`nexus-db-bootstrap`	Creates the `nexus` and `nexus_alpha` databases, the migrator role, every service's runtime role, the extensions and the ledger
−15	`nexus-openbao-custody-init`	Initialises the key store and unsealer and mints the installation identity
−12	`nexus-graphrag-migrations`	GraphRAG's schema, which owns objects nexus-auth's baseline refers to
−10	`nexus-auth-migrations`	The identity schema
−5	orchestrator, gateway and Probitas migrations	Their schemas; Probitas checks the auth tables exist first
0	`nexus-alpha-bff-migrations`	The console's own database

Each migration Job has `backoffLimit: 0`, so a failed migration fails the install.

The ledger is one table, `nexus_release.schema_applied`, with a row per chain and image digest. Each hook writes its row only after its migration runner has returned. Every Deployment that uses PostgreSQL carries an init container, `wait-for-schema`, which reads that table as a role allowed to read nothing else (`nexus_ledger_reader`) and waits until every chain it depends on shows a row for this release's image. Then the service starts. The workflows worker waits for the orchestrator's chain, since it shares that database, and the skills engine waits only for the bootstrap.

It polls every 3 seconds (`schemaWait.intervalSeconds`) and gives up after 1,800 (`schemaWait.timeoutSeconds`) with a line naming the chains still missing. The service's own container never starts against a wrong schema.

```bash
kubectl -n nexus logs deploy/nexus-gateway -c wait-for-schema
```

This is why you must never run `helm install --wait`. With `--wait`, Helm waits for the Deployments before it runs the post-install hooks, and the Deployments wait for the hooks. Neither moves. Install without it and wait afterwards; chapter 2.6, Installing Community on Kubernetes, gives the exact command.



Isolation on three axes

Every read, write, tool call and skill dispatch in Nexus is scoped on three axes.

Axis	Field	What it separates
Tenant	`organization_id`	One organisation from another, a hard boundary
Owner	`owner_user_id`	One person's things from everyone else's, even inside one organisation

Unit	`business_unit_id` A subdivision of an organisation, optional

The owner axis surprises people. A mailbox or a personal notebook is private to its owner even from colleagues in the same unit with the same role. An administrator sets policy and doesn't read content.

The axes come from the authenticated request and from nowhere else. No environment variable, header, query parameter or path segment can set them. A request body that names an organisation is refused with `TENANT_NOT_A_PARAMETER`. A surface that can't state which tenant, owner and unit a row belongs to refuses with 403 `SCOPE_PREDICATE_MISSING`, and the body lists which axes resolved and which didn't. It never falls back to a wider read.

That holds in two places at once.

In the database. Every service connects as its own runtime roles: `nexus_auth`, `auth_app` and `auth_platform` for the identity service, `nexus_probitas` and `nexus_probitas_ledger` for Probitas, and `nexus_gateway`, `nexus_graphrag`, `nexus_skills`, `orchestrator_app`, `workflows_app` and the rest for the others. None is a superuser or has BYPASSRLS. None owns the tables it uses either, so every row-level security (RLS) policy applies to it. The roles share a group, `nexus_runtime`, that grants connection and schema use and no table rights at all; each service is granted its own tables by its own migrations. The tenant settings that RLS policies read can only be set through each service's `bind_scope` function, which runs as its owner. The bootstrap revokes `set_config` from everyone else, and the orchestrator and Probitas refuse to start if their runtime role could call it directly (Probitas names that `DB_ROLE_SETS_SCOPE_DIRECTLY`). The only superuser connections in the whole install belong to the bootstrap Job and the BFF's provisioning step.

In the shared scoped-query primitive. Every repository in the platform and every plugin built on the SDK (software development kit) inherits one fence that builds the SQL predicate from a resolved scope. Its scope function takes the verified identity and has no organisation parameter, so a caller can't pass one in, and no route can opt out.

There's exactly one crossing of the tenant boundary, and it's narrow: a recorded grant. Two people at the organisation holding the rows record which organisation may read which tables, and until when. Every read runs in a read-only transaction and is logged in both tenants. Owners and administrators never read across, and the reader can't widen a grant.



The AI path

Callers express wishes. The AI Provider Router owns the credential and makes the final choice.

Every model call in Nexus goes through the router's `/internal/ai/*` routes, and the router admits only named callers. The chart sets three lists on the gateway:

Routes	Who may call
Chat and chat streaming	nexus-orchestrator, nexus-workflows, nexus-skills-engine
Embeddings and rerank	nexus-graphrag, nexus-skills-engine, nexus-workflows
Everything else, including tool execution	nexus-orchestrator, nexus-workflows

A call with no caller identity is refused with 403 `MISSING_CALLER_IDENTITY`, and a caller not on the list with 403 `UNAUTHORIZED_CALLER`. Plugins aren't on any list, and that's deliberate: a plugin's model calls happen on its behalf, through UNO dispatch.

What a caller may send is a wish: a preferred provider and model, plus a capability profile such as a minimum context length or tool use. The router honours a wish only when the organisation has that provider enabled and credentialed; otherwise it substitutes, first within the same provider, then across the organisation's other providers. A capability profile only filters, and a data-residency requirement in it is hard. When nothing fits, there's no fallback model: the caller gets 422 `MODEL_CAPABILITY_UNAVAILABLE` or 422 `NO_PROVIDER_FOR_ROLE`, with a remediation string the console shows to an administrator.

The keys belong to the organisation. Each organisation's administrators put their own provider keys into its pool from the console, and the router resolves them at call time. No model key is a chart value and none ships with Nexus. An organisation with no key gets no AI answers, and the console says so plainly; nothing fills the gap from somewhere else.

Two chart values shape the router. `ai.localProvider.baseUrl` names an OpenAI-compatible model server you run, routed like any other provider. `ai.installationHosts` lists your model servers on private names, which the router counts as inside the installation. GraphRAG embeds through the router too, as the organisation whose content it is. The default embedding model runs in the cluster without a graphics card; hosted embeddings are each organisation's choice.



No telemetry

Nothing leaves an installation unless you send it. The chart's `telemetry.enabled` value can only be `false`; the schema refuses anything else. The data tier's own reporting is off too: Neo4j's usage report and Qdrant's telemetry are disabled in the chart.


With `networkPolicy.enabled` on, the default, no pod can reach the internet unless you list the destination in `networkPolicy.externalEgressCIDRs`. A hosted model provider is one such destination, and so is your mail relay.

The same rule changed one default you'll notice. nexus-auth's CAPTCHA for sign-ups needs an internet service, so on an installation it's off, and a stranger's sign-up waits for an administrator's approval (403 `SIGNUP_REQUIRES_APPROVAL`). The screen that blocks sign-ups from hosting networks is off too, because it needs licensed databases Nexus doesn't ship. You lose that screening.



NOTE

An Enterprise installation that is air-gapped sends Adverant one signed usage statement a year. It holds counters only, with no identities. An administrator reads it before sending it. Nothing about it is automatic. Chapter 2.13, Licences, covers it.




SCREEN On Enterprise, the health page shows the cluster under Nexus: how busy each part is and how much capacity is left, with each warning beside what to do about it.

Editions under the hood

How Community and Enterprise are built from one product, how a licence switches feature groups on at run time, what a Community install shows for an Enterprise page, and what that means for the images you pull and the extensions you build.

FOR OPERATORS AND DEVELOPERS

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Two lines in a values file decide which edition an installation runs:

```yaml
# harrow-values.yaml (Helm values): the edition of this installation
edition: enterprise
enterprise:
  enabled: true
```

They must agree. Set `edition: community` with `enterprise.enabled: true` and the chart stops with "edition=community but enterprise.enabled=true: they must agree". Set `edition` to anything other than `community` or `enterprise` and it stops with `NEXUS_EDITION_INVALID`. Those two values choose which images the installation takes. What those images then switch on is the licence's business, at run time, one feature group at a time.

This chapter takes that apart: what the editions contain, how one product becomes two builds, how a licence turns into a yes or a no inside a running service, and what that means when you build something of your own. Chapter 1.6, Editions and licences in plain terms, has the buyer's view; this is the engineer's.



The edition matrix

Everything in this chapter comes from one file, the edition matrix. It lists 97 capabilities and gives each a tier. Adverant generates the licence catalogue and the console's menu rules from it, along with the boundary between open and closed code. When the matrix moves, all of those move together.

There are three editions.

Edition	Licence	Where it runs
Community	Apache-2.0, open source, free	Your hardware, or Adverant cloud
Team	Adverant Enterprise licence	Adverant cloud: Community plus the Team set
Enterprise	Adverant Enterprise licence, per feature group	Your hardware, or Adverant cloud

An installation runs one of two: the chart's `edition` value accepts only `community` and `enterprise`. Team is a cloud edition, and Enterprise holds the Team set as well, so on your own hardware the Team capabilities (the work panel docked beside every record, shared notebooks, memory policy for the organisation and the rest) come with Enterprise.

Enterprise itself is layered. The **Enterprise base** is the closed core: several organisations and business units, single sign-on enforcement with SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) and directory sync, custom roles with four-eyes approvals, long audit retention, data protection, the operator pages and cluster management. On top of the base sit **add-ons**, each licensed separately, and **domain packs**. The first add-on in the table, AI Gateway at scale, spreads the AI (artificial intelligence) router's load across replicas and providers.

Add-on	Also needs
AI Gateway at scale	Base
Model factory	Base
Ideas	Base
Calls and voice	Base
Mail	Base
Other firms and walls	Base

Notebook studio	Base
Map and GeoAI	Base
Data connectors	Base
Agent-to-agent	Base
Decision rooms and sealed records	Base
Revenue operations	Base
Storefront / white-label	Base
Nexus Edge	Base
Mobile apps	Base
Workforce	Base; agents on edge devices also need Nexus Edge, approvals on a phone also need Mobile apps
Shield	Base
Sandboxes	Base
Quality (NexusQA)	Base

There are ten domain packs:

- Insurance
- Banking and payments
- Capital markets and asset management
- Government and public sector
- Healthcare
- Life sciences
- Critical infrastructure and energy
- Defence and security
- Legal and professional services
- Logistics and maritime

Every pack needs the Enterprise base, and five of them also need an add-on. The Insurance pack needs Decision rooms and sealed records. So does the Capital markets and asset management pack. The Legal and professional services pack needs those two plus Mail. Logistics and maritime needs Map and GeoAI. In the Defence and security pack, platform alerts also need Nexus Edge. Any pack's phone screens also need Mobile apps. Chapter 1.7, Domain packs and verticals, says what each contains.

Feature groups

The unit a licence names is the **feature group**. There are 32: the Community floor, the Team set, the Enterprise base, one per add-on and one per pack. Every capability belongs to exactly one, so a

licence that lists "Enterprise base, Map and GeoAI, Logistics and maritime" says precisely which capabilities this installation may run.

Tier	Capabilities
Community	36
Team	6
Enterprise base	18
Add-ons	23
Domain packs	14

Grant scope

Each licensed capability has a grant scope, which says what a grant attaches to.

- Tenant scope covers the parts people work in: Ideas, Mail, Revenue operations, the packs. The licence makes them available to the installation, and they're then switched on or off per organisation and per business unit. A new organisation never inherits an "everything on" state.
- Deployment scope covers the five things that belong to the installation as a whole: licence import with the artefacts it fetches, the Enterprise delivery forms, the operator pages, cluster management and Nexus Edge.

Community capabilities have no grant scope at all. They need no licence.

An administrator can narrow what the licence allows, for an organisation or a unit. Nobody can widen it from inside the installation.




FIGURE The editions as layers, with the licence document as the only authority.

One product, two builds

There is one Nexus codebase. The Community build is its open-source export, and the Enterprise build is that export plus closed modules.

A boundary list assigns every tracked file to an edition. Mostly it does so by naming the capability a file implements, and the file's edition follows from that capability's tier: a Community capability makes a Community file, and anything Team, base, add-on or pack makes an Enterprise file. Files

that ship in neither edition are listed with a reason. One rule cuts across the rest: every module's database migrations ship in both editions. So a Community database and an Enterprise database have the same schema, and moving an installation from one to the other is a change of what's switched on, with no data to migrate.

The Community export carries Apache-2.0 headers and a NOTICE file, and every package in it is licensed Apache-2.0, except third-party code that keeps its own licence (MIT, BSD and others) and is copied as it was, and a few software development kit (SDK) and command-line interface (CLI) packages that keep their own MIT licence. The Enterprise build is licensed under the Adverant Enterprise licence. Its terms allow use only under a written licence, for the term, deployments and feature groups that licence names. The prohibition on reverse engineering explicitly keeps the rights EU law gives you to study software and to decompile it for interoperability.

The licence line

Enterprise code reaches Community through one package only: `@adverant/nexus-spi`, the service provider interface (SPI). It's Apache-2.0 and holds interfaces and type guards, with no runtime logic of its own.

Export	What it is
`RouteModule`	A licensed route module: its id, its feature group, the bodies it reads, and `register(app, ctx)`
`SpiApp`	The part of the host's HTTP app a module touches: `use`
`SpiContext`	What the host hands a module: the product gate and scope guard, the licence reader, the scoped-query pool, upstream addresses, platform clients
`SpiRuntime`	The plugin SDK (software development kit) values the host hands a module
`SpiPlane`	The screen groups and screen reads a licensed plane adds
`ScreenModule`	A console's licensed screen group: its routes, screens and menu
`GrantCheck`	The check a licensed module runs on its own feature group

A check in the build enforces the line. Inside the Enterprise code, an import from the Community package scopes (`@adverant/` and `@adverant-nexus/`) fails the build unless it's `@adverant/nexus-spi` or an Enterprise package. So does a relative import that climbs out of the repository, a `file:`, `link:` or `workspace:` dependency pointing outside it, a Git URL naming a Community repository, and a Go `replace` that points outside it. Across the line, coupling is a network protocol or a module loaded at start, never shared source. The SPI even carries its own pinned copy of the plugin SDK's type declarations, because the SDK is a Community package that the line doesn't admit; the host hands a module the SDK's runtime values instead.

Build profiles

The console and the BFF (backend for frontend) are compiled with a build profile, which fixes the classes of code inside the image. The Community profile holds Community code; the Enterprise profile holds Community and Enterprise code. Each refuses to start when its profile holds code the installation's edition doesn't. The BFF says so with `PROFILE_OUTSIDE_EDITION` and names the image to deploy instead. You can't put an Enterprise console on a Community installation by retagging an image.




FIGURE How one source tree becomes two editions.

How a licence switches feature groups on


A licence is a signed document. Adverant signs every licence with two independent keys, and nothing else on the installation decides what's licensed. You import it through the console's Licence pages, with `nexusctl licence import <file>`, or by posting the document to `https://<hosts.auth>/api/v1/installation/licence`. A licence is never a chart value and never a mounted file. Chapter 2.13, Licences, covers import and renewal, and each state a licence passes through.

The check that matters runs inside each closed module, on that module's own feature group, before it answers. That's the `GrantCheck` contract from the SPI:

```typescript
type GrantCheck = (featureGroup: string) => Promise<{ entitled: boolean; code?:
"LICENCE_LOCKED" }>;
```

The check lives in the closed module because a check written in open-source code could simply be deleted. A forged licence counts as no licence. A module whose feature group the licence doesn't name answers with `LICENCE_LOCKED`.

The modules themselves are checked too. nexus-keys holds the release's signed parts manifest and the key that signed it. It checks every compiled module against that manifest at start-up and again every night at 03:53 UTC. A module whose signature doesn't match is never loaded, and the signed copy it would have replaced keeps running; the operator pages show it with `MODULE_SIGNATURE_INVALID`.



SCREEN The compiled parts page lists each licensed module with its feature group, version and signature check. A changed copy that failed its check appears as a refusal plate, and the signed copy kept running.

Above the module check sits the display layer, which decides how a capability appears to each person. It combines the licence's grants with the organisation's plan and the person's role, and every control ends up in one of four states.

State	What the person sees
Entitled	The control, drawn normally
Teaser	The control greyed with a lock; opening it explains what it is and who can turn it on


Hidden	Nothing; used only for things this person's role mustn't know exist, such as another person's private mailbox
Refused with a code	A refusal plate naming the code, when someone tries an act that isn't allowed

The licence also has states of its own as it nears and passes its end date. Two rules hold in every one: a licence never stops running work, and security fixes are never withheld.

What Community shows for an Enterprise page

A Community installation keeps the shape of the product. The menu has the same rows as Enterprise, and the Enterprise ones (Ideas, Decisions, Mail, Calls, Other firms, Agents, Policies, Compliance) are drawn greyed with a lock icon. Nothing is hidden to make the edition look complete, and nothing nags.

Opening a locked row shows a teaser. For Ideas it reads "Ideas is part of Enterprise", then one paragraph on what Ideas does, then "Who can turn it on: your administrator, through a licence from Adverant". It offers two buttons, "Ask your administrator" and "See what it does". There's no price. Opening the page loads nothing and sends nothing, and the promotion is shown once.



SCREEN A locked area on Community names who can turn it on and what Community already gives you. The row stays in the menu, greyed with a lock, so the product looks the same in both editions.

Typing the address of an Enterprise-only page lands somewhere useful, too. The Community console knows the addresses of the pages it doesn't hold, and sends any of them to its edition page, inside the normal frame with the menu. The page draws the locked-feature plate:

OUTPUT


```
LICENCE_LOCKED
This page is part of Nexus Enterprise. This installation runs Nexus Community,
so the page is not here and nothing was read.
```

```
- To use it, the installation needs Nexus Enterprise: an administrator can ask Adverant about it
- Every page this installation holds is in the menu
```

The code is there for reference; the sentences are for the person reading it.

The floor

Some things are never paywalled, in any edition, under any licence state: administration and security basics, tenant separation, data export, signing out, and every refusal screen. A Community installation has all of them. An Enterprise installation whose licence has ended keeps them too: the Enterprise artefacts stop being offered, and the Community floor and data export remain. You can always get your data out.



SCREEN Importing a licence on a Community installation shows what will be fetched, what changes and what is kept, before anything happens. The button reads "Fetch and switch on", and nothing is fetched until it's pressed.



Images by edition

Every image in a release is listed, by digest, in the chart's image lock, and the lock itself belongs to one edition. The chart checks each image it renders against the lock and against the edition you asked for. A Community install takes only Community images. Ask it for anything else and it stops: "a community install takes only community images". An Enterprise lock holds the Community images plus the Enterprise builds.

That matters for where you pull from. Community images are public, at `registry.adverant.ai/nexus/<service>@sha256:…`. Enterprise images come from the same registry with a pull token, which you get from the "Pull tokens and install commands" page of your Adverant account. A Community installation never needs that token, and never holds a byte of closed code.

The upgrade path keeps the installation. When a Community administrator imports an Enterprise licence, the console reads and verifies it, then shows the parts it will fetch (the compiled modules and the packs and add-ons the licence names) with their sizes. Each part is checked against the Adverant release key, and the groups are switched on one at a time. People and files stay as they are, and so do workflows and channels, because the schema was already the same. Chapter 2.7, Installing Enterprise and applying a licence, walks through it on Kubernetes; air-gapped sites import the same parts from media, as chapter 2.10, Air-gapped installation, describes.



Delivery forms and protection classes

Nexus ships in six delivery forms, which the matrix calls SKUs (stock-keeping units). The five other than Edge share one signed bundle and differ in packaging and in how the licence arrives.

SKU	What it is	How the licence arrives
`saas`	Adverant cloud	Issued with the subscription
`onprem-connected`	Helm onto your own Kubernetes	Pulled by the installation over its outbound connection
`airgap`	The same bundle, imported offline	Imported as a file, with a signed usage statement once a year
`self-serve-image`	A machine image in your own cloud account	The image itself carries only Community and evaluation licences; Enterprise modules arrive once a licence is issued, including one bought through the cloud's store
`appliance`	Hardware built by an original equipment manufacturer (OEM), who is its manufacturer of record	An Enterprise licence; the appliance is one of its delivery forms
`edge`	Nexus Edge, the payload on satellites and drones, or on vessels and vehicles	One licence per platform or fleet, long-lived, valid while offline

Protection is the other half of delivery, and it's worth being plain about. Once code runs on hardware you control, no technique makes it unreadable. So Adverant sorts its code into protection classes and decides, for each delivery form, how far each class may travel. There are four levels:

Class	What it means
P1, never shipped	The logic runs at Adverant; the installation holds a signed client.
P2, sealed	A confidential virtual machine (VM) that you can't log into, on hardware you can't touch.
P3, hardened native code	Compiled, stripped and built per licensee. It raises the cost of reading the code from hours to weeks.
P4, readable	Ordinary JavaScript or TypeScript, as open source is.

Protection class	Adverant cloud	Connected on-prem	Air-gap	Nexus Edge
Open source (all of Community)	P4	P4	P4	P4
Highest-value code: idea scoring, the sealed-record store's core, the routing policy engine, the Insurance pack's four decision engines	P1	P3, or P2 as an Adverant-sealed confidential VM in your cloud tenancy	P3	Not shipped

Closed server modules that decide: pack server code, the mobile gateway	P1	P3	P3	Not shipped
Defence and security pack server code	P1	P3	P3	P3
Nexus Edge payload code	Not shipped	Not shipped	Not shipped	P3
Readable client definitions: phone apps, pack phone screens	P4	P4	P4	P4

Two consequences follow. Nothing protected ships in a phone app: every rule and prompt stays at the server. And value carried in prompts, rubrics or agent chains is readable by whoever runs the model it's sent to. Where your organisation owns the model, that value is protected by the licence contract and nothing else. Every shipped TypeScript image is bundled and minified with no source maps, which is tidiness more than protection.




What this means when you build an extension

Your extension sits on the same line as Adverant's own modules. Almost all of this chapter applies to it.

Isolation, identity and the AI path come with the platform in both editions. A plugin built with `@adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk` inherits the scoped-query fence, the token verifier and UNO dispatch, whichever edition it lands on. Chapter 2.19, The rules every extension inherits, lists them.

Edition gating works the same way for you. A plugin declares its feature ids in its manifest's `entitlements` block (`featureIdPattern` , plus a short `alwaysOn` list kept for health checks and the settings page) and asks the platform for a verdict before it serves a gated surface. The verdict is never a bare boolean. `ENTITLEMENT_DENIED` (403) means the platform answered no. `ENTITLEMENT_UNREACHABLE` (502) means there was no answer, and your plugin must refuse rather than assume, because an outage read as "not entitled" quietly downgrades every customer at once. Cache a yes briefly and never cache a refusal.

On Community, a developer gets the same starting templates as Enterprise, for plugins and lenses as well as skills and workflows. Each developer works in a development space with data branches on the one server, and the code lives in GitHub. Domain-pack and platform templates are Enterprise. So is time-boxed elevation of access from an IDE (integrated development environment): on Community there's no separate production to raise your access into, and the console says so with `PASS_TIER_REQUIRED` .



SCREEN Building on Community offers the same templates as Enterprise on one server, with the code in GitHub. The page names what Enterprise adds and refuses elevated access with a plain reason.


An extension that uses only Community seams runs on either edition unchanged. One that depends on an add-on, Mail for instance, shows as locked wherever the licence doesn't name that group. Chapter 2.25, Building for each edition, shows how to structure an extension for both, and how to test it against each.

Planning an installation

What a Kubernetes install of Nexus needs before you type a command, how big it is, and the two decisions you can't take back, the installation name and the key custodians. It ends with Harrow Port Authority's filled-in planning worksheet.

FOR OPERATORS

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When we installed Nexus at Harrow Port Authority, the commands took an afternoon. The planning took a week, and most of that week went on two questions that have nothing to do with Kubernetes: what we would call the installation, and which people would hold its recovery keys. Both answers are permanent. Everything else in this chapter can be changed later with a values file and a `helm upgrade`.

I'm Tomás Reilly, the platform engineer at Harrow. Harrow runs two installations. This chapter plans the connected one in our corporate network, where we piloted Community first. The port's operations network, which has no route to the internet, got its own install later; chapter 2.10, Air-gapped installation, covers it. This chapter is what I wish I'd had on the first morning: the cluster Nexus expects, the names it answers to, how much it asks of your nodes, and the decisions to settle with your head of IT before the install. It closes with the worksheet Aoife Brennan, our head of IT, signed off before we started. Chapter 2.4, Getting and verifying a release, covers fetching and checking the release, and chapter 2.5, Preflight with nexusctl, checks your cluster against everything here.



What the cluster must have

Nexus installs as one Helm chart, `nexus`, version `1.0.0-alpha.1`. The chart carries the platform services and their data tier, and it refuses to install on a cluster that is missing the pieces below.

Requirement	What Nexus expects	Why
Kubernetes	1.33 or later. Tested on k3s `v1.33.6+k3s1`	The chart's `kubeVersion` is `>=1.33.0-0`, and `helm install` enforces it
cert-manager	`v1.21.3`, installed before Nexus	The chart makes its own local certificate authority (CA) and the certificates its services use to talk to each other
Helm	v4 (we used v4.3.1)	Helm 4 waits for the chart's hook Jobs by default, which the install depends on
A storage class	One marked default, or one you name in `storage.className`	Every data store claims a persistent volume
An ingress class	One marked default, or one you name in `ingress.className`	The three public addresses are plain `networking.k8s.io/v1` Ingresses
Ports 80 and 443	Open on the ingress controller, as a LoadBalancer or NodePort Service	People reach Nexus through the ingress controller
Architecture	`linux/amd64` or `linux/arm64` nodes	Every image is built for both

Two things are absent from that table on purpose. Nexus needs no service mesh: mutual TLS (mTLS, Transport Layer Security in both directions) between services comes from the chart's local CA through cert-manager. The chart has an `istio.enabled` key that defaults to `false`, and you should leave it there. Nexus also needs no admission policy engine of its own.

On your workstation you'll want `kubectl`, Helm v4, `cosign` v3 for checking signatures, `age` for making custodian keys, and `nexusctl`, the Nexus operator's command-line interface (CLI). Chapter 2.4, Getting and verifying a release, says where each Nexus download lives.



NOTE

k3s ships the Traefik ingress controller in the `kube-system` namespace, and the chart's defaults assume it. If your ingress controller runs somewhere else, set `networkPolicy.ingressNamespace` to that namespace. The chart's network policy only lets that one namespace reach the three public Services.



Three addresses

Every installation answers on three host names. The chart calls them the installation identity, and every service refuses to start without them.

Values key	Harrow's name	What answers there
`hosts.console`	`console.harrow.example`	The console, the web application people sign in to
`hosts.api`	`api.harrow.example`	The gateway, which serves the application programming interface (API) and routes every artificial intelligence (AI) request
`hosts.auth`	`auth.harrow.example`	The sign-in service, `nexus-auth`

`global.domain` holds the domain the three sit under, `harrow.example` for us. Each host is a full name in its own right and may sit under any domain you control. We kept all three under one domain because one certificate could then cover them.

Create a Domain Name System (DNS) record for each of the three, pointing at your ingress controller's address. Do it before preflight. `nexusctl preflight` looks each name up from your workstation and fails the install if any of them has no record, because a person can't reach a name that doesn't resolve.




FIGURE How the three public names reach the services behind them.



Choosing how TLS ends

The chart's `tls.mode` decides who holds the certificates for the three public addresses. There are three choices, and you can change between them later with an upgrade.

tls.mode	You provide	What the chart does

`existing` (the default)	A Kubernetes TLS Secret in the `nexus` namespace, named in `tls.existingSecret`	All three Ingresses use that one Secret
`cert-manager`	A ClusterIssuer you run, named in `tls.clusterIssuer`	Annotates each Ingress so cert-manager issues `nexus-console-tls`, `nexus-api-tls` and `nexus-auth-tls`
`none`	Something in front of the cluster that ends TLS, such as your own load balancer	Renders the Ingresses with no TLS section

With `existing`, one certificate serves all three hosts, so it must name all three, either as three subject alternative names or as a wildcard for your domain. We used a certificate from Harrow's internal CA. Preflight reads the Secret before you install and warns when its certificate ends within 30 days.

With `cert-manager` and an Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) issuer, the chart adds no redirect of its own, so a `/.well-known/acme-challenge/` request on port 80 reaches the solver untouched. Don't add an HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect at your ingress controller that runs before the challenge path; a certificate that can't renew fails quietly, weeks later.

Whatever you choose for the public edge, the services inside the namespace always talk over TLS from the chart's local CA. That part isn't a choice, and it's why cert-manager is a prerequisite even when `tls.mode` is `existing` or `none`.



What leaves the cluster, and what doesn't

The chart renders a default-deny network policy for the `nexus` namespace. After that, only these flows are allowed:

- traffic between Nexus pods inside the namespace;
- DNS lookups to the cluster's DNS service;
- the Kubernetes API server, for the few services that review workload tokens;
- the ingress controller's namespace, to the three public Services;
- any Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) ranges you list in `networkPolicy.externalEgressCIDRs`.

That last list is empty by default. If you'll use a mail relay or a model server outside the cluster, its range goes there. Telemetry is off and stays off: the schema only accepts `telemetry.enabled: false`, and the data stores' own usage reporting is switched off too.

The chart reads the API server's addresses from the cluster when you install. If your account can't read the `kubernetes` Endpoints in the `default` namespace, give them yourself in `networkPolicy.apiServerCIDRs`, as `/32` ranges. `proxy.trustedCIDRs` names the pod network your ingress controller sits on, so `nexus-auth` knows whose `X-Forwarded-For` header to believe. The default, `10.42.0.0/16`, is k3s's pod network.



Sizing

The chart's default requests add up to about 2.05 central processing unit (CPU) cores and 6.7 GiB of memory. That's what the scheduler reserves; the limits are higher, and the data stores grow into them as you add people and files.

Part	CPU requested	Memory requested
Nine platform services (console, backend for frontend (BFF), auth, orchestrator, workflows, gateway, graphrag, probitas, skills engine)	1.1 cores	2.6 GiB

The key service, `nexus-keys`	0.05 cores	64 MiB
PostgreSQL	0.25 cores	1 GiB
Neo4j	0.25 cores	2 GiB
Valkey, Qdrant and the object store together	0.25 cores	640 MiB
The two OpenBao servers of the key store	0.15 cores	384 MiB

The default volumes add up to 142 GiB:

Store	Values key	Default size
PostgreSQL 16 with PostGIS 3 and pgvector 0.8	`dataTier.postgres.size`	50Gi
Object store (SeaweedFS)	`dataTier.objectStore.size`	50Gi
Neo4j 5.26 Community Edition	`dataTier.neo4j.size`	20Gi
Qdrant	`dataTier.qdrant.size`	10Gi
Valkey	`dataTier.valkey.size`	5Gi
The key store and its unsealer	`keys.openbao.storage.keystore`, `keys.openbao.storage.unsealer`	5Gi and 1Gi
Key-service receipts	`keys.receiptsStorage`	1Gi

For a single node, plan on 8 vCPU, 32 GiB of random-access memory (RAM) and a 250 GB solid-state drive (SSD). For an evaluation, 4 vCPU, 16 GiB and 200 GB will do. The installer disk image refuses a machine with less than 16 GiB of memory (see chapter 2.9, The installer disk image), and I'd treat that as the floor everywhere.

Graphics nodes are optional. Without a node that offers a graphics processing unit (GPU), the assistant answers through a hosted model, using the organisation's own key. Preflight reports that as a warning, never a failure. Chapter 2.14, AI providers and models, covers both routes.



TIP

Preflight works out the release's need from the chart and your values file, then compares it with the allocatable CPU and memory of every node that is Ready, not cordoned and not tainted away. If you raise sizes under `components` or `dataTier`, run preflight again before you install.

Each store can also run outside the cluster: set `dataTier.<store>.mode` to `external` and name its host and a Secret. An external PostgreSQL needs a superuser account for the install's bootstrap and a certificate Nexus can verify. Chapter 2.11, Variations: external stores, TLS and ingress, covers that. If you keep them in the cluster, put them on a storage class with real disks behind it. The database is the part you'll miss most if a node's local disk dies.



The installation name is permanent

`keys.installationName` is what operators call this installation. It must match `^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$`: a lower-case letter, then up to 62 lower-case letters, digits or hyphens.

The first time the key store starts, it mints the installation's identity under this name, and that identity is fixed for good. A licence from Adverant is issued for that identity, so a licence made for one installation is refused on another with `LICENCE_OTHER_INSTALLATION`. Renaming would mean a new installation, a new identity and new licences.

The chart has no default for the name. It refuses an install with none (`INSTALLATION_NAME_MISSING`) and refuses the example name from its own example values files (`INSTALLATION_NAME_EXAMPLE`). Preflight reports both before you get that far.

At Harrow we spent longer on this than I'd like to admit. We settled on `harrow-port-authority` : it names the organisation, says nothing about which cluster it runs on, and will still be true when the hardware is replaced. Avoid names like `prod-k3s-2` that describe today's machines.



Key custody

Nexus keeps every organisation's keys in its own key store, inside the cluster. You don't operate it day to day, but you do decide, before install, who can bring it back after a restart. This is the decision that costs the most if you get it wrong.

The key store is two OpenBao servers. The main one, `openbao` , holds the keys and unseals itself through a second, smaller one, `openbao-unsealer` . The unsealer is sealed with Shamir's scheme: five shares, any three of which open it. When you install, a custody Job initialises both servers inside the cluster. In that Job's memory, it encrypts the unsealer's shares and the key store's recovery keys to every custodian you name, stores only the ciphertext (in the Secrets `openbao-unseal-shares-encrypted` and `openbao-recovery-keys-encrypted`), and revokes both root tokens before it finishes. No plain share ever reaches a disk or a log.

After any restart of the unsealer's node, the unsealer starts sealed. The key store waits for it, and nothing that needs a key works until a custodian unseals it. That takes one decryption with the custodian's own private key. The procedure is in chapter 2.15, Day two: operating Nexus.



WATCH OUT

If every custodian's private key is lost, the shares can't be decrypted, the unsealer stays sealed, and the key store can't be unsealed. Nothing that needs a key will work again, and neither you nor Adverant can recover it. Name more than one custodian, keep each private key offline, and write down who holds which.

Making a custodian key

A custodian is named by the public half of an `age` key, called its recipient. Each custodian makes their own key on their own machine and gives you only the recipient:

```bash
age-keygen -o custodian.key
```

The file's `# public key:` line is the recipient, beginning `age1` . A custodian with a Mac can keep the key in the Mac's Secure Enclave instead, so the private half never leaves the chip and every use asks for a fingerprint:

```bash
age-plugin-se keygen --access-control=any-biometry -o custodian.key
```

That recipient begins `age1se1` . The custody Job encrypts to five forms of recipient: `age1` (X25519), `age1tag1` and `age1tagpq1` (tag), `age1pq1` (hybrid post-quantum), and `age1se1` (Secure Enclave). It refuses any other plugin form, such as `age1yubikey1` ; name that key in one of the accepted forms instead.

The chart checks each recipient when it renders. A mistyped one fails its bech32 checksum and is refused, so nothing is ever sealed to a key nobody holds. If someone pastes a private key into the list by mistake, the chart refuses it without echoing it back. The example recipient in the chart's own values files is refused too (`KEYS_CUSTODIAN_EXAMPLE`); nobody holds its private half.

How many custodians

Every share is encrypted to every custodian, so any one custodian can unseal alone. More custodians means more ways to recover and more people who can each act alone. We chose three at Harrow: Aoife, me, and a Secure Enclave key on a spare laptop that lives in the port's safe. Two is the least I'd accept. One is a single point of failure that will, sooner or later, be on holiday when a node restarts.



Choosing the edition

`edition` is `community` or `enterprise`, and `enterprise.enabled` must agree with it. The chart refuses a mismatch, and it refuses any edition that isn't one of the two.

The edition also decides which images you install. Each chart package carries an images lock, the list of every image by digest, for one edition. A Community install takes only Community images. An Enterprise install takes the Enterprise lock, which is the Community images plus the Enterprise builds, and pulls with a pull token from your Adverant account. Chapter 2.4, Getting and verifying a release, explains the lock, and chapter 2.2, Editions under the hood, explains what each edition holds.

You don't have to decide for good. A Community installation moves to Enterprise in place, keeping its people, files and history; chapter 2.7, Installing Enterprise and applying a licence, shows how. We ran Community for the pilot at Harrow and moved six weeks later.


The licence is never part of this plan. It isn't a chart value or a mounted file: you import it after the install, through the console, `nexusctl` or the API.



Choosing the delivery form

Form	When it fits	Chapter
Helm chart from `registry.adverant.ai`	Your own Kubernetes cluster, with a route to the registry	2.6 and 2.7
`nexusctl install`	The same cluster, with preflight and the signature check run for you	2.6
`nexusctl install --single-node`	One machine, where `nexusctl` sets up the cluster too	2.8
The installer disk image	A bare server or virtual machine (VM) you'd rather not prepare by hand	2.9
The offline bundle	No route out at all; images and chart come on a disk	2.10

The chart is the same in every form. What changes is who makes the cluster and where the images come from.



SCREEN This is the release page in the Adverant account. Notice the plain statement of what an alpha release promises, the size and signature beside every file, and the offline commands for checking a download.



The planning worksheet

This is Harrow's, as Aoife signed it off. Copy the left two columns and fill in the right one for your own installation.

Decision	Values key or command	Harrow Port Authority
Kubernetes and version	(preflight reads it)	k3s v1.33.6+k3s1, three nodes
Kube context for the install	`--context`	`harrow-prod`
Namespace	`--namespace`	`nexus`
Edition	`edition`, `enterprise.enabled`	`community` for the pilot, then `enterprise`
Image registry	`global.imageRegistry`	`registry.adverant.ai`
Domain	`global.domain`	`harrow.example`
Console address	`hosts.console`	`console.harrow.example`
API address	`hosts.api`	`api.harrow.example`
Sign-in address	`hosts.auth`	`auth.harrow.example`

TLS at the edge	`tls.mode`, `tls.existingSecret`	`existing`, Secret `harrow-public-tls` from Harrow's internal CA
Ingress class	`ingress.className`	`traefik`
Ingress namespace	`networkPolicy.ingressNamespace`	`kube-system`
Storage class	`storage.className`	`local-path`
Data stores	`dataTier.<store>.mode`	All `in-cluster`, default sizes
Outbound ranges	`networkPolicy.externalEgressCIDRs`	The mail relay's range only
Installation name (permanent)	`keys.installationName`	`harrow-port-authority`
Custodians (permanent in effect)	`keys.custody.recipients`	Three: Aoife Brennan, Tomás Reilly, the safe laptop (`age1se1`)
Graphics nodes	(preflight reads it)	None for the connected pilot; hosted model with Harrow's own key
First administrator	`nexusctl claim-code --administrator`	`aoife.brennan@harrow.example`

Two rows on that sheet can't be undone: the installation name, and the custodians in the sense that losing them all loses the key store. Get those two signed off by someone with the authority to say yes. Everything else is a values change.

With the worksheet done, go to chapter 2.4, Getting and verifying a release, and fetch the release.

PART 2 · CHAPTER 2.4

Getting and verifying a release

Where each part of a Nexus release lives, how Enterprise images are fetched with a pull token, and how to prove every image, chart and download came from Adverant unchanged, offline, before you install anything.

FOR OPERATORS

15 MIN READ



Every image in a Nexus release is signed by Adverant's release key, and every image is named by its digest, never by a tag. The chart will only render images listed by digest in its own images lock. Put together, that means you can prove, on your own workstation and with no connection to anyone, that what you're about to run is exactly what Adverant built.


At Harrow Port Authority we checked everything before the first install. It took about twenty minutes, and most of that was the loop over the images. This chapter walks the same path: where each part of the release lives, the pull token for Enterprise images, the images lock, the `cosign` checks with their exact commands, and what to do when a check fails.



Where the release lives

Address	What you fetch there
`registry.adverant.ai`	The platform images, at `registry.adverant.ai/nexus/<service>@sha256:<digest>`, and the Helm chart, at `oci://registry.adverant.ai/nexus/charts/nexus`
`https://downloads.adverant.ai/nexus/1.0.0-alpha.1/`	The release public key and its fingerprint, the `nexusctl` binaries, and the offline bundles
`https://account.adverant.ai`	Your Adverant account: Downloads, Pull tokens and install commands, Deployments, and the licence pages

Community images and the Community chart are public; you can pull them without signing in. Enterprise images are pulled with a pull token from your account, and the Enterprise chart and bundle are on the account's Downloads page, which follows your licence.



SCREEN Downloads in the Adverant account, by version and channel. Each file carries its checksum and signature beside it, and parts outside the licence stay listed, greyed, with the reason.



Read the release notes before anything else

The release notes ship inside every bundle as `docs/RELEASE-NOTES.md`, listed in its `SHA256SUMS`, and the same notes are on the release page in your account. Read them before you install or upgrade. For `1.0.0-alpha.1` they're short. It's the first release, so a fresh install has none of the upgrade points they describe, and the known-issues list says nothing in it affects a fresh install that follows the documented steps. Later releases list each known issue with the version that fixes it.

The release page also says, in three lines, what an alpha release promises: features may change before the first stable version, an upgrade keeps your data and takes a backup first, and security fixes arrive within 7 days. We printed that page and put it in the change record at Harrow, because it's the closest thing to a support statement the change board would ask for.



Step 1: get the release key, and check it by a second route

Everything below rests on one file: Adverant's release public key. A key that came from the same place as the thing it vouches for proves very little, so check its fingerprint against a copy that reached you some other way.

1. Download the key from the release's folder on Downloads.

```bash
curl -fsSLO https://downloads.adverant.ai/nexus/1.0.0-alpha.1/release.pub
```

2. Work out its fingerprint. The fingerprint is the SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 256) of the key file itself.

```bash
sha256sum release.pub
```

On macOS, `shasum -a 256 release.pub` gives the same answer.

3. Compare it, character by character, with the fingerprint printed in your contract with Adverant and in the release notes. Downloads publishes the fingerprint too, but that copy came by the same road as the key, so it isn't the check.

If any character differs, stop. Don't install, and don't go looking for another copy of the key on the internet. Open a support request from your account and quote what you saw.

> TIP
> Keep the checked key somewhere that outlives your laptop, such as your team's password manager or configuration repository. You'll need the same key for every upgrade this year, and you'll want to know it's the one you checked.



Step 2: get nexusctl

`nexusctl` is the Nexus operator's command-line interface (CLI). It runs on your workstation and reads your cluster through your kubeconfig. Downloads offers four builds:

File	Platform
`nexusctl-linux-amd64`	Linux on Intel or AMD
`nexusctl-darwin-arm64`	macOS on Apple silicon
`nexusctl-darwin-amd64`	macOS on Intel
`nexusctl-windows-amd64.exe`	Windows

Beside each file is its signature bundle, the same name with `.sigstore.json` on the end. Check the binary before you run it:

```bash
curl -fsSLO https://downloads.adverant.ai/nexus/1.0.0-alpha.1/nexusctl-linux-amd64
curl -fsSLO https://downloads.adverant.ai/nexus/1.0.0-alpha.1/nexusctl-linux-amd64.sigstore.json
cosign verify-blob --key release.pub --insecure-ignore-tlog=true \
  --bundle nexusctl-linux-amd64.sigstore.json nexusctl-linux-amd64
```

```output
Verified OK
```

Then put it on your path and ask its version:

```bash
install -m 0755 nexusctl-linux-amd64 /usr/local/bin/nexusctl
nexusctl version
```

From here on, `nexusctl verify` can do the file checks for you. Chapter 2.5, Preflight with nexusctl, covers its main job, preflight.

Why the flag says "insecure"

Every `cosign` command in this chapter carries `--insecure-ignore-tlog=true`. Nexus releases are signed with Adverant's key and recorded in no public transparency log, so that checking a release never needs a connection to anyone, Sigstore included. By default `cosign` insists on a log entry; the flag tells it to rely on the key alone. Without it, the check fails like this:

```output
Error: not enough verified log entries from transparency log: 0 < 1
```


When the flag is set, `cosign` still prints the sentence "Existence of the claims in the transparency log was verified offline". That's fixed wording in `cosign`; there is no log entry behind it. The signature check against the key is real, and it's the part that matters.

Step 3: a pull token, for Enterprise

Enterprise images sit behind a pull token. You make one in your account, on Pull tokens and install commands:

1. Press **Add a token**.
2. Say which cluster it is for, what it may fetch, and when it ends.
3. Press **Copy the token** and paste it straight into wherever you keep credentials, because the page shows it only this once.

Each token is limited to what it may fetch and has an end date. Withdrawing one stops new pulls at once; images a cluster already pulled keep running. We made one token per cluster at Harrow, so withdrawing the test cluster's token never touches production. A Community installation needs no token at all; you only make one when you move to Enterprise, and you can make it the same day.



SCREEN Pull tokens in the Adverant account. Each token shows what it may fetch, who made it and when it ends; a new token is shown once, and withdrawing one stops new pulls without stopping anything already running.

The chart has no pull-secret value. Your nodes pull the images, so the token belongs to the nodes' container runtime. On k3s, add the registry to `/etc/rancher/k3s/registries.yaml` on every node and restart k3s there:

```yaml
# /etc/rancher/k3s/registries.yaml (on every node)
configs:
  "registry.adverant.ai":
    auth: {username: "<registry-user>", password: "<pull-token>"}
```

`<registry-user>` is the registry user name in your Adverant invitation, and `<pull-token>` is the token you copied. The file holds a credential, so keep it readable by root only.

On a managed cluster whose nodes don't read that file, copy the images into a registry your nodes already trust and set `global.imageRegistry` to it; every node must trust that registry's Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificate. Chapter 2.11, Variations: external stores, TLS and ingress, covers that, and chapter 2.10, Air-gapped installation, covers the same copy for a site with no route out.



Step 4: read the images lock

A Nexus chart never names an image by tag. It names each one by the digest of its multi-platform index, taken from the images lock, a file the chart carries as `files/images.lock.json`. The offline bundle carries the same lock as `release/images.lock.json`.

Pull the chart and unpack it to read the lock:

```bash
helm pull oci://registry.adverant.ai/nexus/charts/nexus --version 1.0.0-alpha.1
tar -xzf nexus-1.0.0-alpha.1.tgz
jq -r '.version, .edition' nexus/files/images.lock.json
```

```output
1.0.0-alpha.1
community
```

The lock's top level says which release and which edition it belongs to. Each entry under `images` describes one image:

Field	What it holds
`svc`	The service, such as `nexus-auth` or `nexus-postgres`
`index`	The `sha256:` digest of the image's index, which covers both `linux/amd64` and `linux/arm64`
`edition`	`community`, `enterprise`, or `all` for the data tier
`kind`	`service`, `migrations`, or `data-tier` for the five data stores and OpenBao
`verified`	When the release build verified its signature and attestations

The chart renders every image as `<global.imageRegistry>/nexus/<svc>@<index>`. So with `global.imageRegistry: registry.adverant.ai`, the sign-in service is `registry.adverant.ai/nexus/nexus-auth@sha256:` followed by 64 hex characters, and nothing in the cluster can swap it for something else with the same name.

The lock is per edition. A Community lock lists only images whose edition is `community` or `all`. An Enterprise lock lists those plus the Enterprise builds. The chart checks this every time it renders, and refuses rather than guessing:

What the chart says	Why
`edition=enterprise but enterprise.enabled=false: they must agree`	The two edition values in your values file disagree
`files/images.lock.json is the community lock; this install is edition enterprise`	You're installing Enterprise from the Community chart, or the other way round
`image nexus-auth is not in files/images.lock.json`	The chart and its lock don't belong together; fetch the chart again
`image ... is in the lock but was never verified by build-all`	The lock entry has no verification time; don't install from it
`NEXUS_EDITION_INVALID`	`edition` is empty or not one of `community` and `enterprise`
`RELEASE_VERSION_MISSING`	The lock names no version

List every image and digest in one go:

```bash
jq -r '.images[] | "\(.svc) \(.index)"' nexus/files/images.lock.json
```

Step 5: verify every image's signature

Each image index is signed, and so is each platform manifest inside it. Verify by digest, straight from the lock, so you check exactly what the chart will run:

```bash
jq -r '.images[] | "\(.svc)@\(.index)"' nexus/files/images.lock.json |
while read -r ref; do
  cosign verify --key release.pub --insecure-ignore-tlog=true \
    "registry.adverant.ai/nexus/$ref" > /dev/null && echo "OK $ref" || echo "FAILED $ref"
done
```

Every line should start with `OK`. On our link the loop took a few minutes, most of it spent waiting on the registry. It reads only the signatures and fetches no image layers, which makes it cheap to repeat after every upgrade. A `FAILED` line means stop: the next section says what each message means.

For one image on its own, drop the redirect and read what `cosign` checked:

```bash
cosign verify --key release.pub --insecure-ignore-tlog=true \
  registry.adverant.ai/nexus/nexus-auth@sha256:<digest>
```

```output
The following checks were performed on each of these signatures:
  - Existence of the claims in the transparency log was verified offline
  - The signatures were verified against the specified public key
```

`<digest>` is the 64 hex characters from the lock's `index` for that image. Enterprise images need your pull token for this check, as they do for any pull from the registry.




FIGURE What vouches for what, from the key you checked to the pods that run.

Both platforms, and what to keep

Each image index holds two platform manifests, `linux/amd64` and `linux/arm64`, and each of them is signed too. `cosign verify` succeeds on the index digest and on either platform digest, so a

cluster of mixed nodes is covered by the same check. To see the two platforms behind an index, ask the registry for the raw index:

```bash
docker buildx imagetools inspect registry.adverant.ai/nexus/nexus-auth@sha256:<digest> --raw
```

Its `manifests` list names one `amd64` entry and one `arm64` entry.

Keep the output of the loop above with your change record, next to the fingerprint you checked. When someone asks, months later, how you know the cluster runs what Adverant shipped, that file and the lock's digests answer it. Our auditor at Harrow asked exactly that question, and the answer took a minute.



Step 6: read the attestations

Each image also carries two signed attestations, made from the image at build time: a software bill of materials (SBOM) and a provenance statement.

The SBOM is in Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX) form, one per platform, so an index carries two. It lists every package in the image with its licence. Before release, those licences are checked against a deny list; no Community image carries GNU Affero General Public License (AGPL), Server Side Public License (SSPL), Redis Source Available License (RSAL) or Business Source License (BUSL) code. The provenance statement is Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts (SLSA) v1. It names the source commit the image was built from, the digests of the base images, and the build tools and their versions, so an image traces back to the reviewed source without asking Adverant.

Both are checked against the release key you already hold:

```bash
cosign verify-attestation --key release.pub --insecure-ignore-tlog=true \
  --type spdxjson registry.adverant.ai/nexus/nexus-auth@sha256:<digest>
cosign verify-attestation --key release.pub --insecure-ignore-tlog=true \
  --type slsaprovenance1 registry.adverant.ai/nexus/nexus-auth@sha256:<digest>
```

The `spdxjson` check prints two results, one for each platform's SBOM. To see everything attached to an image without verifying it, use `cosign tree`:

```bash
cosign tree registry.adverant.ai/nexus/nexus-auth@sha256:<digest>
```

It lists one signature bundle, two `spdx.dev/Document` attestations and one `slsa.dev/provenance/v1` attestation. Asking for a type the image doesn't carry, such as `--type cyclonedx`, fails with `none of the attestations matched the predicate type: cyclonedx`. That failure is correct; the release attaches SPDX, not CycloneDX.



Step 7: verify the chart and the downloads

The chart in the registry is signed on its OCI digest (OCI is the Open Container Initiative, the image and artefact format registries use). `helm pull` prints the digest it pulled; check that digest the same way as an image:

```bash
cosign verify --key release.pub --insecure-ignore-tlog=true \
  registry.adverant.ai/nexus/charts/nexus@sha256:<chart-digest>
```

For a chart file you downloaded, or for the offline bundle, `nexusctl verify` checks the file against the Adverant release key:

```bash
nexusctl verify nexus-1.0.0-alpha.1.tgz
```

A good result ends by naming the Adverant release key and the start of its fingerprint. Compare those groups with the fingerprint you checked in step 1.


The offline bundle is one uncompressed tar file per edition, `nexus-alpha-1.0.0-alpha.1-community.tar` or `nexus-alpha-1.0.0-alpha.1-enterprise.tar`, with a `.sha256` file beside it. Inside, it holds:

Path	What it is
`release/images.lock.json`	The images lock for that edition
`release/facts.json`	The release facts: version, edition, architectures and the release key's fingerprint
`images/<service>/`	Each image with both platforms, its signature and its attestations
`charts/nexus-1.0.0-alpha.1.tgz`	The chart
`sbom/`	The SPDX SBOM of every image, per platform
`docs/`	The release notes, the air-gap install guide and example values
`SHA256SUMS` and `SHA256SUMS.sigstore.json`	The checksum of every file, and its signature

The release public key is never inside the bundle; a key that ships with the thing it signs proves nothing. Check the whole bundle in two commands, from inside its folder:

```bash
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS
cosign verify-blob --key release.pub --insecure-ignore-tlog=true \
  --bundle SHA256SUMS.sigstore.json SHA256SUMS
```

Every line of the first should end `OK`, and the second should print `Verified OK`. Chapter 2.10, Air-gapped installation, takes the bundle from there: loading the images into your own registry, verifying each one again there, and the bundle's own end-to-end check.



SCREEN How to check a download, in the Adverant account. Two offline checks, a picture of a good result and a bad one, and the release key's fingerprint in groups of four for comparing by eye.



When a signature doesn't verify


Stop. Don't install, and don't change the command until it passes. A failed signature check is the system working: it means the file you have is not the file Adverant signed, or the key you hold is not Adverant's.

What you see	What it means	What to do
`accepted signatures do not match threshold, Found: 0, Expected 1` (exit 1)	The image is signed, but not by the key you gave	Check you used the release key whose fingerprint you checked in step 1
`no signatures found` (exit 10)	Nothing at that digest is signed	Check the digest came from the lock; never verify a tag
`not enough verified log entries from transparency log: 0 < 1`	`--insecure-ignore-tlog=true` is missing	Add the flag; nothing is wrong with the image

`none of the attestations matched the predicate type`	You asked for an attestation type the image doesn't carry	Use `spdxjson` or `slsaprovenance1`
`Error: invalid signature when validating ASN.1 encoded signature`	A downloaded file was changed after it was signed	Download it again
`FAILED` from `sha256sum -c`	A file is not the file that was checksummed	Download it again

If a download fails twice, open a support request from your account and quote the file name and the message. Keep the failing file; your security team may want it.

On an installation that loads releases from disk, the console runs the same checks and refuses a release whose signature doesn't match the installed key, with `MEDIA_SIGNATURE_INVALID`. It says what it checked, in what order, where it stopped, and that nothing was changed: no image loaded, the running version untouched.



SCREEN A release on disk that failed its signature check. Notice the checks in order with the one that stopped it, the expected and found key fingerprints, and the plain statement that nothing was loaded or changed.

WATCH OUT

Never "fix" a failed check by fetching a key from somewhere else, by switching to a tag, or by turning signature checks off. Each of those would make the next check pass for the wrong reason. A release that fails is a release you don't install until Adverant has answered.

Once the key, the images and the chart have all passed, the next step is preflight against your cluster, in chapter 2.5, Preflight with nexusctl.

Preflight with nexusctl

Every check `nexusctl preflight` makes, what each one reads and how it fails, the report it prints and saves, how that report reaches the console's preflight page, and every flag.

FOR OPERATORS

16 MIN READ



Our first preflight at Harrow Port Authority failed four checks, and two of them would have cost us far more than an afternoon. We'd started the values file by copying the chart's example, and preflight refused both the example installation name and the example custodian. Nobody holds that custodian's private key. An installation sealed to it can never be unsealed after a node restart. Preflight caught that in a few seconds, before anything existed to lose.

`nexusctl preflight` reads your cluster and your values file, prints what it found, saves a report, and changes nothing on the cluster. Run it before every install and every upgrade. This chapter covers every check it makes, the report format, where the report goes, and the flags.



Running it

Preflight needs two things: the kube context of the cluster you'll install on, and the values file the install will use. Write the values file first; chapter 2.6, Installing Community on Kubernetes, walks through every key. Then:

```bash
nexusctl preflight --context harrow-prod --values harrow-values.yaml
```

It reads the cluster through client-go with get and list calls only. If your `tls.mode` is `existing`, create the `nexus` namespace and the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Secret before you run it (chapter 2.6, Installing Community on Kubernetes, step 3), or the certificate check reports the Secret missing.

Flag	What it does	Default
`--context <name>`	The kube context to check. Required	none
`--values <file>`	The values file the install will use. Required	none
`--namespace <name>`	Where Nexus installs	`nexus`
`--release <version>`	The release being checked	the bundled chart's own version
`--report-dir <dir>`	Where the two report files are saved	the current folder
`--record <mode>`	`auto`, `always` or `never`: whether to hand the report to this installation's key service, so its installer page shows it	`auto`
`--kubeconfig <file>`	The kubeconfig to read	`KUBECONFIG`, then `~/.kube/config`
`--ca-bundle <file>`	Your own certificate authority (CA) certificates, for a chain the checks should trust	none
`--single-node`	Check one machine for a single-machine install (chapter 2.8, Single-machine installs)	off

The release's floor for Kubernetes isn't typed into `nexusctl`. It reads the lower bound of the chart's own `kubeVersion` from the chart it carries, so the check and `helm install` can never disagree.



What a run prints

Here is Harrow's first run, as it printed:

OUTPUT

```
Adverant Nexus 1.0.0-alpha.1 · preflight · Tue 10 Nov 2026 08:40 · read-only

Failed first
  FAIL  Address (api)            api.harrow.example → no record    people reach Nexus by this
name
        fix  add a DNS record for api.harrow.example that points at the ingress, then run
preflight again
  FAIL  Address (auth)           auth.harrow.example → no record   people reach Nexus by this
name
        fix  add a DNS record for auth.harrow.example that points at the ingress, then run
preflight again
  FAIL  Key custodians           the example custodian of the chart's values-community.yaml and
values-enterprise.yaml (age1u63etg5v…)   the key store seals its recovery keys to them; no one
holds the example custodian's key
        fix  replace it in keys.custody.recipients in harrow-values.yaml with your custodians'
own recipients: each custodian makes a key on their own machine with `age-keygen -o
custodian.key` (the `# public key: age1...` line is the recipient), or `age-plugin-se keygen --
access-control=any-biometry -o custodian.key` for a Secure Enclave key, keeps the identity file
offline, and gives you only the recipient
  FAIL  Installation name        nexus-example, the example name of the chart's values-
community.yaml and values-enterprise.yaml   the first key-store bootstrap mints the installation
identity under it, permanently
        fix  set keys.installationName in harrow-values.yaml to this installation's own name

Warnings
  warn  Graphics nodes           none                  the assistant will need a hosted model
        fix  add a node with a graphics card and its device plugin, or have the assistant use a
hosted model
  warn  Certificate              secret harrow-public-tls not found in nexus   the public
address needs it before people sign in
        fix  create the TLS secret harrow-public-tls in nexus before installing, or change
tls.existingSecret in harrow-values.yaml

Passed
  pass  Kubernetes version       1.33.6+k3s1           needs 1.33 or later
  pass  Nodes ready              3 of 3
  pass  Storage class            local-path (default)
  pass  Resources                24 cores, 93.9 GiB    needs 2.1 cores, 6.7 GiB
  pass  Ingress class            traefik (default)
  pass  Ingress ports            traefik (LoadBalancer) on 80 and 443
  pass  Address (console)        console.harrow.example → 10.20.4.10
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
7 passed · 2 warnings · 4 failed   Install cannot continue until the failures pass.
Nothing was changed. Report saved to preflight-2026-11-10-0840.txt
```

When anything fails, the failures come first, then the warnings, then the passes. Each row shows the outcome, the check's name, what was found, and what it needs; every row that didn't pass has a `fix` line under it. The last two lines are the summary and the report file.

We fixed the values, added the two Domain Name System (DNS) records, created the Secret, and ran it again:

OUTPUT


```
Adverant Nexus 1.0.0-alpha.1 · preflight · Thu 12 Nov 2026 09:02 · read-only

Cluster
  pass  Kubernetes version       1.33.6+k3s1           needs 1.33 or later
  pass  Nodes ready              3 of 3
  pass  Storage class            local-path (default)
  pass  Resources                24 cores, 93.9 GiB    needs 2.1 cores, 6.7 GiB
  warn  Graphics nodes           none                  the assistant will need a hosted model
        fix  add a node with a graphics card and its device plugin, or have the assistant use a
hosted model

Network
  pass  Ingress class            traefik (default)
  pass  Ingress ports            traefik (LoadBalancer) on 80 and 443
  pass  Address (console)        console.harrow.example → 10.20.4.10
  pass  Address (api)            api.harrow.example → 10.20.4.10
  pass  Address (auth)           auth.harrow.example → 10.20.4.10
  pass  Certificate              ends 3 Nov 2027
```

```
Time and keys
  pass  Key custodians            3 custodians
  pass  Installation name         harrow-port-authority
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
12 passed · 1 warning · 0 failed   You can install. Warnings do not block; fix them when you can.
Report saved to preflight-2026-11-12-0902.txt · nothing was changed on the cluster
```

A run with no failures lists the checks under their three headings, Cluster, Network, and Time and keys. Warnings never block. We kept the graphics warning on purpose: on this connected pilot cluster, Harrow's assistant used a hosted model with the port's own key.



SCREEN Preflight in the operator's terminal, with the counts beside it. Notice that every warning has its fix printed under it, and that the run says plainly it changed nothing on the cluster.

Exit codes

Code	Meaning
`0`	The install can go ahead. Warnings don't block
`1`	The install is blocked: at least one check failed
`2`	Preflight couldn't run: the kubeconfig, the context, the values file or the cluster's application programming interface (API) couldn't be read, or a flag was wrong

Scripts should read the exit code, not the words. Ours runs preflight as the first step of every upgrade and stops on anything but `0`.

Run the `nexusctl` of the release you're moving to, not the one you installed with. The requirements come from the chart it carries, so a newer release can raise the Kubernetes floor or ask for more

memory, and only its own `nexusctl` knows. `--release` changes the version the report names; it doesn't change which chart's rules are applied. At Harrow we keep each release's `nexusctl` beside its chart in the change record, so a rollback is checked by the tool that matches it.



Every check

There are eleven checks. Ten of them produce one row each; the address check produces one row per host, so a full run has thirteen rows. Nine checks must pass, and a miss is a failure. Two, the graphics nodes and the certificate, should pass, and a miss is a warning. The last column is the requirement text each row carries into the report; CPU in it is the central processing unit.

Check id	Section	Must pass	Requirement it prints
`kubernetes-version`	cluster	yes	Kubernetes 1.33 or later
`nodes-ready`	cluster	yes	Every node ready
`storage-class`	cluster	yes	A storage class for the data
`resources`	cluster	yes	Enough CPU and memory for the release
`graphics-nodes`	cluster	no	Graphics nodes
`ingress-class`	network	yes	An ingress class for the three addresses
`ingress-ports`	network	yes	The ingress controller open on ports 80 and 443
`address-console`, `address-api`, `address-auth`	network	yes	The console, api or auth address resolves in DNS
`certificate`	network	no	Certificate valid for 30 more days
`custodians`	time-and-keys	yes	The people who hold this installation's recovery keys
`installation-name`	time-and-keys	yes	This installation's own permanent name

kubernetes-version

Reads the API server's version and compares it with the chart's floor. It finds, for example, `1.33.6+k3s1`. Below 1.33 it fails with the fix `upgrade the cluster to 1.33 or later`. If the version string isn't one `nexusctl` can read, it fails rather than guessing.

nodes-ready

Lists the nodes and counts the ones whose `Ready` condition is true, as `3 of 3`. Any node that isn't ready is named, and the fix tells you to bring it back to Ready and read its conditions. A cluster with no nodes at all fails with a hint that the context may point at the wrong cluster.

storage-class

If your values set `storage.className`, the check looks that class up and fails with `<name> does not exist` when it's missing. If they don't, it looks for a class marked default and reports it as `local-path (default)`. With no default it fails with `none marked default`, and the needs column says why that matters: `the database cannot claim a disk`. If two classes are marked default, the cluster gives a new claim the newest, so that's the one reported.

resources

Works out what the release asks for from the chart and your values, then adds up the allocatable central processing unit (CPU) cores and memory of every node that is Ready, not cordoned, and carries no `NoSchedule` or `NoExecute` taint. The chart's pods carry no tolerations, so a tainted node can't run them and doesn't count. A short cluster fails with the exact shortfall, such as

`add nodes with 1 more core and 2.5 GiB more memory, or lower the sizes under components and dataTier in harrow-values.yaml`.

Needs are rounded up and supply rounded down, so the check never flatters you.

graphics-nodes

Looks for a Ready node with a graphics processing unit (GPU) it can allocate, `nvidia.com/gpu`. With none it warns: `the assistant will need a hosted model`. Preflight treats it as advice and never blocks on it, because the assistant can answer through a hosted artificial intelligence (AI) model instead. Chapter 2.14, AI providers and models, covers both routes.

ingress-class

If `ingress.className` is set, the check looks that class up. If not, it looks for exactly one class marked default. Two classes marked default fail too, because the API server then refuses an Ingress with no class. The check is skipped, and its row left out, when `ingress.enabled` is `false`.

ingress-ports

Looks in the namespace named by `networkPolicy.ingressNamespace` (by default `kube-system`, where k3s runs Traefik) for one LoadBalancer or NodePort Service that exposes both 80 and 443. The chart's network policy lets only that namespace reach the three public Services, so an ingress controller anywhere else couldn't serve Nexus even if it were listening. The fix names both ways out: expose the controller there, or set `networkPolicy.ingressNamespace` to where it runs. Skipped when `ingress.enabled` is `false`.

address

Looks up `hosts.console`, `hosts.api` and `hosts.auth` from your workstation, five seconds each, and prints one row per host. A host with no record fails with `<host> → no record`. An unset host fails with `hosts.<key> is not set`. When a name has several addresses, the row shows the first, IPv4 before IPv6, and how many more there are.

certificate

Runs only when `tls.mode` is `existing` and `tls.existingSecret` names a Secret; with `cert-manager` or `none` there's no certificate of yours to read, and the row is left out. It reads `tls.crt` from the Secret in the install namespace and nothing else. A certificate good for 30 days or more passes as `ends 3 Nov 2027`. One ending sooner warns `ends in 9 days`; one already ended warns `ended 4 days ago`. A missing Secret, or one with no certificate in it, warns with the fix.

custodians

Reads `keys.custody.recipients`. With none it fails with the code `KEYS_CUSTODIAN_MISSING`. If any recipient is the example custodian from the chart's own values files, it fails with `KEYS_CUSTODIAN_EXAMPLE`, because no one holds that key and the installation's recovery keys would be sealed to nobody. A pass prints the count, such as `3 custodians`.

installation-name

Reads `keys.installationName`. Unset, it fails with `INSTALLATION_NAME_MISSING`. Set to the example name from the chart's values files, it fails with `INSTALLATION_NAME_EXAMPLE`. A pass prints the name. The needs column says why this one matters more than most:

`the first key-store bootstrap mints the installation identity under it, permanently`.

The last two checks report exactly the codes the chart itself refuses an install with. Preflight just tells you first, before Helm has created anything.



The report files

Every run saves two files in `--report-dir`, named for the time it ran: `preflight-2026-11-12-0902.txt`, the lines as printed with no colour codes, and `preflight-2026-11-12-0902.json`, the same run in a fixed format a program can read. The terminal output and the saved lines come from the same list, so they never differ.

The JSON report follows the schema `nexus.preflight/v1`:

Field	What it holds
`schema`	Exactly `nexus.preflight/v1`
`tool`	An object: `name` (`nexusctl`) and `version`
`release`	The release checked
`ran_at`	When it ran, in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)
`context`	The kube context's name
`values`	The values file's base name only
`read_only`	Always `true`
`checks`	One entry per row: `id`, `section`, `name`, `requirement`, `must_pass`, `outcome` (`pass`, `warn` or `fail`), `found`, `needs`, `fix`, and on a miss with a machine cause, `code`
`counts`	`passed`, `warnings` and `failed`
`can_install`	`true` when nothing failed
`report_file`	The name of the `.txt` file
`transcript`	An object: `title` (`nexusctl preflight`) and `lines`, each line with its `kind` (`prompt`, `ok`, `warn`, `bad`, `note`, `out` or `blank`), its `text` and `at`, and sometimes `marks`

The report is built to be shown before anyone signs in, so it carries no user name, no workstation host name, no file path, no token and nothing from your kubeconfig. `values` is a base name and `context` is the context's name. If a run's report would break any of those rules, `nexusctl` refuses to print, save or hand it over, and says so. A report is at most 256 KiB, with at most 64 checks and 512 characters in any one text field.



TIP

Send the `.txt` file to whoever runs the cluster when a check fails on their side. It needs no explanation, and it carries nothing private about you or your machine.



How the report reaches the console

Preflight's one write is the finished report, handed to the installation's key service, `nexus-keys`, so that the console's installer can show it on its preflight page before anyone has claimed the installation. `--record` decides whether to try:

`--record`	What happens
`auto`	Hands the report over only when the namespace has a `nexus-keys` Deployment
`always`	Insists; preflight exits `2` if there's nothing to hand it to
`never`	Doesn't hand it over

So a run before the first install has nothing to hand to, and keeps the report on your workstation. A run after the install and before the claim records it.


The hand-off uses your own cluster access. `nexusctl` runs `/app/nexus-keys preflight-record` in the `keys` container of a ready `nexus-keys` pod and passes the report on standard input. It's the same as:

```bash
kubectl exec -i -n nexus -c keys deploy/nexus-keys -- /app/nexus-keys preflight-record < preflight-2026-11-12-0902.json
```

The key service checks the report against the same rules `nexusctl` applies and keeps the latest one only. When it's handed over, `nexusctl` prints one more line saying so, and the saved JSON gains a `note` that records the hand-off.

The console's installer reads it from the key service's public route `GET /v1/installation/preflight`. That route answers only while the installation is unclaimed: before any report is recorded it answers `404 RECORD_NOT_FOUND`, and once someone claims the installation it answers `ROUTE_NOT_FOUND` for good, exactly as the claim route does. A report handed over after the claim is refused with `INSTALLATION_CLAIMED`.

On the console, a run with failures appears as "Preflight cannot continue": the counts of failed, warnings and passed, then every check grouped under "Must pass" and "Should pass", with the ones that didn't pass first and the found words beside each. A run with no failures doesn't get that page; the console moves straight on to the claim (chapter 2.12, The first run).



SCREEN The console's page for a preflight run that cannot continue. The failing checks come first, each named in words with what was found, and the install stays blocked until they pass.




FIGURE Where one preflight report goes, from the operator's workstation to the browser.

Access the run needs

Preflight runs as you, with your kubeconfig. The account needs to read:

- nodes, for the version, readiness, resources and graphics checks;
- storage classes and ingress classes;
- Services in the ingress namespace;
- the TLS Secret in the install namespace, when the certificate check runs.

When a read is refused, the row says `could not read <what> (the cluster refused)`, and the fix says which read access to grant. The words never include the server's address or its own error text,

because the report may be shown before sign-in. The hand-off also needs `pods/exec` on the `nexus-keys` pods; without it, `auto` saves the files and prints a warning, and `always` exits `2`.



When preflight itself can't run

Exit code `2` means no report was made. The message on standard error says why:

Message	What to do
`--context is required: the kube context to check`	Add `--context`
`--values is required: the values file the install will use`	Add `--values`
`could not read the values file harrow-values.yaml`	Check the path and the file's permissions
`preflight takes flags only`	Remove the stray argument
`the report breaks its contract and was not printed, saved or handed over`	A field would have carried something private; report it to Adverant with the run's flags
`--record always: there is no nexus-keys Deployment in the namespace nexus to hand the report to`	Install first, or use `--record auto`
`could not hand the report to this installation`	Check your access to exec into `nexus-keys`

A cluster whose API can't be reached also exits `2`. Fix the kubeconfig or the network, and run it again.



NOTE

`nexusctl install` runs these checks again before it changes anything, and stops if any check has started to fail since you last looked. A `helm install` checks the Kubernetes version and the two key-store values itself, with the same codes. Neither stands in for a preflight you've read with your own eyes.

Once preflight ends with `0 failed`, go on to chapter 2.6, Installing Community on Kubernetes, to install Community, or chapter 2.7, Installing Enterprise and applying a licence, for Enterprise.


PART 2 · CHAPTER 2.6

Installing Community on Kubernetes

A numbered install of the Community edition with Helm, from cert-manager to every workload ready, with the values file explained key by key, why there is no --wait, the order the chart's hooks run in, and the nexusctl install route as an alternative.

FOR OPERATORS

18 MIN READ



The install itself is one `helm install`. Everything around it is there so that one command works the first time: cert-manager before it, a values file you've read line by line, and a wait afterwards that knows what to wait for. At Harrow Port Authority we installed Community first, for a six-week pilot, on the three-node k3s cluster from our planning worksheet. The release was running in about twenty minutes, and nobody could sign in until we claimed it, which is how it should be.

This chapter assumes you've done three things already: worked through the planning worksheet (chapter 2.3, Planning an installation), fetched and checked the release (chapter 2.4, Getting and verifying a release), and run preflight (chapter 2.5, Preflight with nexusctl). If any of those is still open, go back. The install refuses most mistakes by name, but a few, like a custodian whose key you've already lost, it can't see.



Step 1: confirm your tools and context

1. Check Helm is version 4.

```bash
helm version
```

   The install relies on Helm 4 waiting for the chart's hook Jobs by default. We used v4.3.1.

2. Point `kubectl` at the cluster on your worksheet, and confirm it.

```bash
kubectl config use-context harrow-prod
kubectl get nodes
```

   Every node should say `Ready`. Preflight checked this already, but a node can drop out between preflight and the install, and it's quicker to see it here.



Step 2: install cert-manager first

The chart makes its own local certificate authority (CA) with cert-manager, and every service talks to the others with certificates it issues: a self-signed Issuer, a ten-year local CA certificate, and short-lived certificates for the services. So cert-manager must be running before Nexus. The release needs v1.21.3, and it needs no trust-manager.

1. Install cert-manager from its own chart, with its custom resources:

```bash
helm install cert-manager <cert-manager-chart> -n cert-manager --create-namespace \
  --set crds.enabled=true --wait --timeout 10m
```

   `<cert-manager-chart>` is the cert-manager v1.21.3 chart from the cert-manager project's own release. Waiting is right here; it's cert-manager's own install, with no hooks that depend on anything else.

2. Wait for its webhook, which every certificate request goes through:

```bash
kubectl -n cert-manager rollout status deploy/cert-manager-webhook --timeout=300s
```

```output
deployment "cert-manager-webhook" successfully rolled out
```

TIP

cert-manager signs its own images with its own key, and you can check them the way you checked Nexus's, with no transparency log:

`cosign verify --signature-digest-algorithm sha512 --insecure-ignore-tlog=true . --key cert-manager-pubkey-2021-09-20.pem quay.io/jetstack/<image>@<digest>`

The key and the steps are on cert-manager's code-signing page.



Step 3: make the namespace and the TLS Secret

With `tls.mode: existing`, the chart expects your certificate as a Kubernetes Secret in the namespace before the install. Transport Layer Security (TLS) for all three addresses comes from this one Secret, so its certificate must name all three hosts.

BASH

```
kubectl create namespace nexus
kubectl -n nexus create secret tls harrow-public-tls \
  --cert=harrow-public.crt --key=harrow-public.key
```

`harrow-public.crt` is the certificate, with its chain, and `harrow-public.key` its private key. If you chose `tls.mode: cert-manager` or `none` in chapter 2.3, Planning an installation, skip the Secret; you can still create the namespace now, or let Helm do it with `--create-namespace` in step 6.



Step 4: write the values file

This is Harrow's values file for the pilot. Every key in it is a key the chart's schema accepts; the schema refuses any other, so a misspelt key fails the install instead of being silently ignored.

YAML

```
# harrow-values.yaml (Helm values, Community)
global:
  imageRegistry: registry.adverant.ai
  domain: harrow.example
hosts:
  console: console.harrow.example
  api: api.harrow.example
  auth: auth.harrow.example
edition: community
enterprise:
  enabled: false
tls:
  mode: existing
  existingSecret: harrow-public-tls
ingress:
  className: traefik
storage:
  className: local-path
networkPolicy:
  ingressNamespace: kube-system
  externalEgressCIDRs: ["10.20.9.25/32"]
keys:
  installationName: harrow-port-authority
  custody:
    recipients:
      - "<recipient-aoife>"
      - "<recipient-tomas>"
      - "<recipient-safe-laptop>"
```

Each `<recipient-...>` is one custodian's public `age` recipient, the `age1...` or `age1se1...` line they sent you. Here is every key we set, and why.

`global.imageRegistry` is the registry your nodes pull from. The chart has no default; it builds every image as `<this>/nexus/<service>@<digest>`. For a connected install, it's `registry.adverant.ai`. If you copied the images into your own registry, it's that host.

`global.domain` is the domain the three addresses sit under.

`hosts.console`, `hosts.api` and `hosts.auth` are the installation's identity: the three names people and programs use. Each must already resolve in the Domain Name System (DNS), which preflight checked.

`edition` and `enterprise.enabled` must agree: `community` with `false`, or `enterprise` with `true`. The chart refuses anything else, and it refuses an edition its images lock wasn't made for.

`tls.mode` and `tls.existingSecret` choose how the public edge gets its certificate. With `cert-manager` you'd set `tls.clusterIssuer` instead, and with `none` neither.

`ingress.className` names the ingress class. Leave it unset to use the cluster's default class.

`storage.className` names the storage class for every data volume. Leave it unset to use the default.

`networkPolicy.ingressNamespace` is the namespace your ingress controller runs in. The default, `kube-system`, is right for k3s's Traefik; we set it anyway so the file says it out loud.

`networkPolicy.externalEgressCIDRs` lists address ranges, in Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) notation, outside the namespace that the services may reach, beyond DNS and the Kubernetes application programming interface (API) server. Ours holds the mail relay's single address; with the list empty, nothing outside the namespace is reachable.

`keys.installationName` is the permanent name the key store mints the installation identity under.

`keys.custody.recipients` lists the custodians' public `age` recipients. The custody Job encrypts every unseal share and recovery key to each of them.

Keys you may need, and keys to leave alone

Key	When to set it
`networkPolicy.apiServerCIDRs`	When the chart can't read the API server's addresses from the `kubernetes` Endpoints. Give them as `/32` ranges
`proxy.trustedCIDRs`	When your ingress controller's pods aren't on k3s's `10.42.0.0/16`
`ai.localProvider.baseUrl`	When the organisation runs its own OpenAI-compatible artificial intelligence (AI) model server (chapter 2.14, AI providers and models)
`ai.installationHosts`	When that model server sits on private names inside the installation
`dataTier.<store>.size`	When a store needs more than its default volume
`dataTier.<store>.mode`	`external` for a store you run yourself (chapter 2.11, Variations: external stores, TLS and ingress)
`components.<service>.replicas`, `components.<service>.resources`	When you size a service up
`auth.rateLimitPerMinute`	When heavy automation needs more than 5,000 requests a minute per person
`schemaWait.timeoutSeconds`	When a slow disk makes first migrations take more than 30 minutes

Leave `istio.enabled` at `false`; Nexus needs no service mesh. Leave `telemetry.enabled` at `false`; the schema accepts no other value. Leave `orchestrator.platformServiceUserId` and `probitas.flags` as the chart sets them.

No credential is ever a chart value. There's no key for a model provider's API key, a mail password or a pull token. The services generate their own internal secrets at install and keep them on upgrade, and each organisation's model keys go into its own key pool from the console after the first run.



WATCH OUT

Don't start from the chart's example values files and forget to change the key-store section. Both examples carry an installation name and a custodian that the chart refuses, `INSTALLATION_NAME_EXAMPLE` and `KEYS_CUSTODIAN_EXAMPLE`, because nobody holds that custodian's private key. We did exactly this on our first attempt; preflight caught it.



Step 5: run preflight against the final file

```bash
nexusctl preflight --context harrow-prod --values harrow-values.yaml
```

The run must end with `0 failed`. Chapter 2.5, Preflight with nexusctl, explains every row. If you changed anything since the last run, even a size, run it again.



Step 6: install, without –wait

```bash
helm install nexus oci://registry.adverant.ai/nexus/charts/nexus --version 1.0.0-alpha.1 \
  --namespace nexus -f harrow-values.yaml --timeout 45m
```

If you didn't create the namespace in step 3, add `--create-namespace`. If you're installing from a chart file you downloaded and checked, put its path in place of the `oci://` reference.

Don't add `--wait`. The chart's database bootstrap runs as a post-install hook, after the release's own resources exist, and it's that hook that gives each service its database role and password. `--wait` would hold the install until every Deployment is Available, and no Deployment can become Available before the hook that it is waiting for has run. The services sit refusing their database logins, and Helm waits for them until the timeout. Without `--wait`, Helm 4 still waits for every hook Job, in order, and that's the wait you want.

When the last hook has finished, Helm prints its summary:

```output
NAME: nexus
NAMESPACE: nexus
STATUS: deployed
REVISION: 1
```

`STATUS: deployed` means every hook succeeded. It doesn't yet mean every service is serving; step 7 waits for that.

What runs, in what order

Helm runs the hooks by weight, lowest first, and waits for each before the next. Every migration Job has `backoffLimit: 0`: a failed migration fails the install and is never retried behind your back. A Job that succeeds is deleted; a Job that fails stays, with its log, for you to read.

Weight	Hook	What it does
−30	Prerequisites	The hook account `nexus-migrations`, the hook-only Secret `nexus-migrations-env` with the generated database credentials, and the custody Job's account, role, configuration and certificate
−20	`nexus-db-bootstrap`	Creates the databases and roles, none of them a superuser and none able to bypass row-level security (RLS); adds the extensions, PostGIS and pgvector among them; creates the release ledger

−15	`nexus-openbao-custody-init`	Initialises the key store and its unsealer, encrypts the shares and recovery keys to your custodians, revokes both root tokens, and mints the installation identity under `keys.installationName`
−12	`nexus-graphrag-migrations`	Lays the graph service's schema first, because the sign-in service's schema refers to objects it owns
−10	`nexus-auth-migrations`	Lays the sign-in service's schema and its two runtime roles
−5	`nexus-orchestrator-migrations` `nexus-gateway-migrations`, `nexus-probitas-migrations`	Each service's own schema; probitas runs after auth because it checks auth's tables first
0	`nexus-alpha-bff-migrations`	Provisions the backend for frontend (BFF) database and its roles, then applies its migrations

Each migration hook ends by writing one row in the release ledger, `nexus_release.schema_applied`: its chain's name and the digest of the image that ran it. It writes that row only after its migration runner has finished without error. The bootstrap Job prints `db-bootstrap: done`; the SQL migration hooks print `schema-ledger: recorded <chain> for this release's image` as their last line. The console's own migration hook, `nexus-alpha-bff-migrations`, records its row the same way and then prints `bff-migrate: done`.




FIGURE The order of a fresh install, with the hooks and the workloads side by side.

How the services wait for their schema

The Deployments start as soon as Helm creates them, while the hooks are still running. A service that started against a database with no role, no password or no schema would crash and restart until the hooks finished. So every Deployment that uses the database carries an init container, `wait-for-schema`, that holds the pod back instead.

It reads the release ledger as `nexus_ledger_reader`, a login that can read that one table and nothing else, and waits until the ledger shows its chains for this release's image digests. It polls every `schemaWait.intervalSeconds` (3 by default), prints its state when it changes and on every twentieth

poll, and gives up after `schemaWait.timeoutSeconds` (1,800 by default) with a failure that names the service.

Deployment	Waits for
`nexus-auth`	`nexus-auth-migrations`
`nexus-orchestrator`, `nexus-workflows`	`nexus-orchestrator-migrations`
`nexus-gateway`	`nexus-gateway-migrations`
`nexus-graphrag`	`nexus-graphrag-migrations`
`nexus-probitas`	`nexus-probitas-migrations`
`nexus-skills-engine`	`nexus-db-bootstrap`
`nexus-alpha-bff`	`nexus-alpha-bff-migrations`

To watch one service's wait as it happens, read its init container's log:

```bash
kubectl -n nexus logs deploy/nexus-auth -c wait-for-schema
```

```output
wait-for-schema: nexus-auth waits for nexus_release.schema_applied (read as nexus_ledger_reader)
to show: nexus-auth-migrations; gives up after 1800s
wait-for-schema: ready after 212s: the release ledger shows nexus-auth-migrations
```

Because the wait is keyed on the image digest, not on a count of files, a later upgrade's pods wait for the new release's rows, and a pod that restarts after a values-only change finds its row at once.



Step 7: wait for every workload

Wait for the Deployments, with a bound:

```bash
kubectl -n nexus wait --for=condition=Available deploy --all --timeout=900s
```

```output
deployment.apps/nexus-alpha condition met
deployment.apps/nexus-alpha-bff condition met
deployment.apps/nexus-auth condition met
deployment.apps/nexus-gateway condition met
deployment.apps/nexus-graphrag condition met
deployment.apps/nexus-keys condition met
deployment.apps/nexus-orchestrator condition met
deployment.apps/nexus-probitas condition met
deployment.apps/nexus-skills-engine condition met
deployment.apps/nexus-workflows condition met
```

Then the StatefulSets. The two key-store servers update only when you delete their pods, and `kubectl rollout status` refuses that update strategy, so wait on the ready count instead:

```bash
for s in $(kubectl -n nexus get statefulset -o name); do
  kubectl -n nexus wait "$s" --for=jsonpath='{.status.readyReplicas}'=1 --timeout=900s
done
```

Each prints `condition met`. On our cluster both waits together took under five minutes after Helm returned.



What ready looks like

```bash
kubectl -n nexus get deploy,statefulset
```

OUTPUT


```
NAME                                  READY   UP-TO-DATE   AVAILABLE   AGE
deployment.apps/nexus-alpha           1/1     1            1           14m
deployment.apps/nexus-alpha-bff       1/1     1            1           14m
deployment.apps/nexus-auth            1/1     1            1           14m
deployment.apps/nexus-gateway         1/1     1            1           14m
deployment.apps/nexus-graphrag        1/1     1            1           14m
deployment.apps/nexus-keys            1/1     1            1           14m
deployment.apps/nexus-orchestrator    1/1     1            1           14m
deployment.apps/nexus-probitas        1/1     1            1           14m
deployment.apps/nexus-skills-engine   1/1     1            1           14m
deployment.apps/nexus-workflows       1/1     1            1           14m

NAME                                READY   AGE
statefulset.apps/nexus-neo4j        1/1     14m
statefulset.apps/nexus-postgres     1/1     14m
statefulset.apps/nexus-qdrant       1/1     14m
statefulset.apps/nexus-seaweedfs    1/1     14m
statefulset.apps/nexus-valkey       1/1     14m
statefulset.apps/openbao            1/1     14m
statefulset.apps/openbao-unsealer   1/1     14m
```

Ten Deployments and seven StatefulSets, every one ready. Alongside them you'll find three CronJobs, `nexus-keys-rotate-epoch`, `nexus-keys-run-schedule` and `nexus-keys-export-receipts`, the key service's nightly upkeep. `kubectl -n nexus get jobs` should list no hook Jobs: the successful ones were deleted.

Two things are worth doing before you leave the terminal. Commit the values file to wherever your team keeps configuration; every upgrade starts from it. And leave the Secret `nexus-generated` alone. The chart generates the internal passwords and keys once, at install, keeps them there, and reads them back on every upgrade, so deleting it would leave the services unable to reach their own data.

Ready means the platform is running and unclaimed. Open `https://console.harrow.example` and you'll reach the installer, not a sign-in page: nobody can sign in until someone claims the installation. That's the first run, in chapter 2.12, The first run.



SCREEN A Community installation's own page once it's claimed: the version running, engine health, disk use, backups and the security-fix promise, with the Enterprise parts shown as teasers that name who can turn them on.



If this fails

Most failures name themselves. Read the message before you change anything.

What you see	Cause	What to do
`INSTALLATION_NAME_MISSING` or `INSTALLATION_NAME_EXAMPLE`	`keys.installationName` is empty or the example	Set your own permanent name
`KEYS_CUSTODIAN_MISSING` or `KEYS_CUSTODIAN_EXAMPLE`	No custodians, or the example one	Set your custodians' own recipients
`keys.installationName ... does not match ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$`	Capitals, dots or a leading digit	Use lower-case letters, digits and hyphens, starting with a letter
`keys.custody.recipients: ...` and a reason	A recipient is mistyped, a private key, or a form the custody Job can't encrypt to	Ask the custodian for their recipient again
`hosts.console is required (the installation identity)`	A host is unset	Set all three hosts
`tls.existingSecret is required when tls.mode is existing`	No Secret named	Set it, or change `tls.mode`
`networkPolicy.apiServerCIDRs is empty and the kubernetes Endpoints could not be read`	Your account can't read the API server's addresses	Give them as `/32` ranges

`global.imageRegistry is required`	The registry is unset	Set it
Helm sits until its timeout; `nexus-auth` logs `password authentication failed`	`--wait` was given	Uninstall and install again without `--wait`
`Error: ... job failed` naming a hook	A migration failed	`kubectl -n nexus logs job/<hook-name>` and read its last lines
A pod stuck in `Init`	Its `wait-for-schema` is still waiting	Read its log: it names the chain it lacks
`wait-for-schema: FAILED`	The chain's hook never wrote its row	Find that hook's failure first
`ImagePullBackOff`	The node can't pull from `global.imageRegistry`	Check the node can reach the registry and, for Enterprise, has the pull token

Every hook that waits for PostgreSQL waits a bounded time and says so, `waiting for postgres (12/60)`, so a stuck database shows in the hook's log within a minute.



WATCH OUT

Once `nexus-openbao-custody-init` has succeeded, the installation's identity exists and its key material is sealed to your custodians. If you need to start again after that, don't delete the key-store volumes or the custody Secrets in the namespace without talking to Adverant support first. The volumes are kept when their pods go, on purpose.



The nexusctl install route

`nexusctl install` does the same install, with the checks around it run for you. It takes the same values file:

```bash
nexusctl install --context harrow-prod --values harrow-values.yaml
```

It runs preflight again and stops if any check has started to fail. It verifies the chart bundle's signature against the release key. Then it installs, waits through the hooks and the workloads, and prints each step with how long it took. `--edition community` states the edition on the command line as well as in the file. `--ca-bundle <file>` adds your own CA certificates, the same as for preflight. To see the `helm` and `kubectl` operations it would run, without running them, add `--explain`:


```bash
nexusctl install --context harrow-prod --values harrow-values.yaml --explain
```

When it finishes, it prints the claim address, a one-time claim code and the installation's fingerprint:

```output
Installed in <time>. Nobody can sign in yet.

  Open   https://console.harrow.example/claim
  Code   <code>          works once, for 30 minutes
  Fingerprint of this installation, to compare in the browser:
         <eight groups of four>
```

The code has three groups and allows five tries; the fingerprint is eight groups of four characters, and the browser shows the same eight groups for you to compare before you claim.



SCREEN The install running in the operator's terminal. Each step prints with its time, and the run ends with a one-time code and the installation's fingerprint; nobody can sign in until the installation is claimed in a browser.



Hand-off to the first run

If you installed with Helm, make the claim code yourself, naming the person who'll be the first administrator:

```bash
nexusctl claim-code --administrator aoife.brennan@harrow.example
```

It runs the key service's own claim-code command in the `nexus-keys` pod with your cluster access, and prints the address, the code and the fingerprint as above. The code works for 30 minutes; run it again for a fresh one.


From here the browser takes over: claim the installation, create the first administrator with a passkey, and work through the six things before anyone signs in. That's chapter 2.12, The first run. If you'll license Enterprise straight away, read chapter 2.7, Installing Enterprise and applying a licence, first, because the licence is one of those six things.

Installing Enterprise and applying a licence

What changes when you install the Enterprise edition, how to request a licence from your Adverant account, the three ways to import it with every refusal code, and how Harrow Port Authority moved its Community pilot to Enterprise in place without losing anything.

FOR OPERATORS

17 MIN READ



An Enterprise installation has two halves, and they arrive by different roads. The Enterprise images come with the Enterprise chart, pulled with a pull token. The licence comes as a signed file from your Adverant account, and you import it into the running installation. Neither half works without the other: images with no licence run at the Community floor, and a licence with no Enterprise images has nothing to switch on.

At Harrow Port Authority we did it in that order, six weeks after the Community pilot in chapter 2.6, Installing Community on Kubernetes. The upgrade to the Enterprise chart took one maintenance window; the licence import took two minutes. This chapter covers both halves. It starts with a fresh install and ends with an existing Community installation moving in place.




FIGURE The two halves of an Enterprise installation and where each comes from.

What differs from Community

Two values, and the chart that reads them.

```yaml
# harrow-values.yaml (Helm values, Enterprise: only these two keys change)
edition: enterprise
enterprise:
  enabled: true
```

Everything else in the values file stays exactly as it was, the installation name and the custodians above all. The two keys must agree, and the chart refuses `edition: enterprise` with `enterprise.enabled: false`, or the reverse.

The edition must also agree with the chart's images lock. Each chart package carries the lock for one edition, and the Enterprise lock lists the Community images plus the Enterprise builds. Point an Enterprise values file at the Community chart and the render stops with `files/images.lock.json is the community lock; this install is edition enterprise`. So the Enterprise install needs the Enterprise chart.

The Enterprise chart and bundle are on the Downloads page of your Adverant account, which follows your licence. The chart file has the same name as the Community one, `nexus-1.0.0-alpha.1.tgz`, so keep the two in separate folders. Check it exactly as chapter 2.4, Getting and verifying a release, describes, against the release key whose fingerprint you checked:

```bash
nexusctl verify enterprise/nexus-1.0.0-alpha.1.tgz
tar -xzf enterprise/nexus-1.0.0-alpha.1.tgz -C enterprise
jq -r '.version, .edition' enterprise/nexus/files/images.lock.json
```

```
1.0.0-alpha.1
enterprise
```
OUTPUT

Then run the signature loop from chapter 2.4, Getting and verifying a release, over `enterprise/nexus/files/images.lock.json`. It covers the Enterprise images as well as the shared ones.



The pull token

Community images are public. Enterprise images need a pull token from the Pull tokens and install commands page of your account, configured for your nodes' container runtime as chapter 2.4, Getting and verifying a release, step 3, shows. On k3s that's a `configs` entry for `registry.adverant.ai` in `/etc/rancher/k3s/registries.yaml` on every node.

Make one token per cluster and give it an end date you'll notice. When a token runs out, running pods carry on, but a pod rescheduled to a node that hasn't got the image yet can't pull it. We put the token's end date in the same calendar as the certificate's.



A fresh Enterprise install

If you're installing Enterprise from the start, follow chapter 2.6, Installing Community on Kubernetes, step by step, with three differences:

1. Put the pull token on every node before step 6.
2. Use the Enterprise values (the two keys above) in step 4.
3. In step 6, install from the Enterprise chart file you downloaded:

```bash
helm install nexus enterprise/nexus-1.0.0-alpha.1.tgz \
  --namespace nexus -f harrow-values.yaml --timeout 45m
```
BASH

Everything after the install command is the same as in chapter 2.6, Installing Community on Kubernetes, and so is the rule about `--wait`: don't use it. If you install with `nexusctl` instead, add `--edition enterprise` to the command:

```bash
nexusctl install --context harrow-prod --values harrow-values.yaml --edition enterprise
```
BASH

When every workload is ready, go through the first run in chapter 2.12, The first run. The licence is one of the six things the console lists before anyone signs in. Until it's imported, the installation runs at the Community floor and every Enterprise area is shown greyed with a lock.




Requesting the licence

A licence from Adverant is issued for one installation's identity, the one the key store minted under `keys.installationName` at install. So the account needs to know which installation you mean before it can issue one.

1. Sign in to your Adverant account at `https://account.adverant.ai`.
2. On the installation, open This installation, then Licence. It shows a one-time code and the installation's fingerprint.
3. In your account, open Claim a deployment and enter the code. Then compare the fingerprint the account received with the one the installation shows, group by group; every group must match.
4. Press the claim button. The installation joins your account's Deployments, with its version and licence state.

5. Adverant issues the licence for that installation. Download the file from your account; it's named after its licence id, `<licence-id>.json`.

A claim code works once and for a short time. If it runs out, the account refuses it with `CLAIM_CODE_EXPIRED`, and the installation shows a fresh one.



SCREEN Claiming a deployment in the Adverant account. The one-time code goes in first, then the fingerprint is compared in groups of four, so nobody can claim an installation they aren't standing in front of.

Two other routes exist, and chapter 2.13, Licences, covers both in full. Appliances and edge kits have no screen to show a code, so they're claimed with a claim key printed on the box, typed in on Enter a claim key or read from the maker's order file. An installation with no route out uses the Offline exchange: it makes a signed licence request file, you carry it to your account, and you carry the licence file back. Once a year it makes a signed usage statement the same way. Every file in the exchange is signed, so a file changed on the way is refused, with `LICENCE_REQUEST_SIGNATURE_INVALID` for a request and `USAGE_FILE_SIGNATURE_INVALID` for a usage file.



SCREEN The offline exchange in the Adverant account. Signed files travel by hand in both directions, and a file changed on the way is refused by name.

What the licence file holds

The licence is a JSON document in the format `nexus-licence/v1`, signed twice by Adverant with two independent keys. You don't need to read it, but it helps to know what's in it when someone asks what you've bought.

Field	What it says
`licence_id`	The licence's own id, a lower-case UUID (universally unique identifier)
`type`	`alpha`, `evaluation` or `commercial`
`licensee`	The organisation's name and Adverant customer id
`scope`	The installation it's for, and any organisations a grant names
`edition`	`enterprise`
`grants`	The feature groups it unlocks, each for the whole installation or for named organisations

`add_ons` and `domain_packs`	Capabilities licensed separately; the Logistics and maritime pack is one
`metric`	How the licence is counted, `named-seat`, `per-core` or `per-environment`, and the quantity
`term`	`starts_on`, `ends_on`, and the days of warning and grace
`matrix`	The version of the edition matrix it was written against
`signatures`	Adverant's two signatures

An evaluation licence lasts at most 30 days, for at most five named people, with no grace. A commercial licence warns 30 days before it ends and then gives 30 days of grace by default. What happens at each step of that ladder is in chapter 2.13, Licences.

The signatures cover the document as Adverant made it. Send it exactly as you received it; don't open it in an editor that might tidy it.




Importing the licence

Only an installation administrator can import a licence: an owner or administrator of the whole organisation that owns the installation, while signed in to it. A full platform administrator can import one too. The licence is never a chart value or a file mounted into a pod. It goes into the sign-in service, `nexus-auth`, which checks it offline against the trust roots built into its own image and records it in one transaction. You can import it three ways, and they all end in the same place.

In the console

During the first run, open Six things before anyone signs in, then Licence. The Import the licence page takes the file: drop it on the page, or choose it. The page checks it offline on the installation itself, then lists the feature groups it opens, with how each is protected and until when. Groups the licence doesn't include stay listed, greyed.

Later, the same import is the **Import a new licence** button on the installation's licence page. When a licence has run out, the restricted licence page offers **Import a renewed licence**.



SCREEN Importing the licence in the console. The file is checked on the installation itself; the page lists what it unlocks by feature group, and a file that fails the signature check is treated as absent, with its code.

With nexusctl

```bash
nexusctl licence import <licence-id>.json
```

`nexusctl` sends the file, unchanged, to the installation's import route as an installation administrator, and reports the licence's state or the refusal code from the table below.

Through the API

The import route is part of the sign-in service's application programming interface (API), on your `hosts.auth` address. The body is the licence document, byte for byte:

```bash
curl -sS -X POST https://auth.harrow.example/api/v1/installation/licence \
  -H "authorization: Bearer <admin-token>" \
  -H "content-type: application/json" \
  --data-binary @<licence-id>.json
```

`<admin-token>` is the access token of a signed-in installation administrator. Use `--data-binary`, never `-d`, which strips line breaks and so changes the bytes you send. The route takes no query string and nothing in the body but the document; a body that tries to name an organisation or a person at its top level is refused before anything is read.

A good import answers `201 Created`. Trimmed, the body looks like this:

OUTPUT

```
{
  "licence": {
    "licence_id": "<licence-id>",
    "state": "licensed",
    "edition": "enterprise",
    "licensee": {"name": "Harrow Port Authority", "customer_id": "<customer-id>"},
    "term": {"starts_on": "2026-12-01", "ends_on": "2027-11-30", "warn_days": 30, "grace_days":
30},
    "groups": ["enterprise-base", "..."]
  },
  "organizations": 1,
  "tenants_without_organisation": 0
}
```

`organizations` counts the organisations on the installation that now hold the licence. `tenants_without_organisation` counts organisations the licence names that this installation doesn't hold.

When the import is refused

A refused import changes nothing: no row is written, and the licence in force, if there is one, stays as it was. The installation's audit log records every attempt, the refused ones included.

Code	Status	What it means	What to do
`LICENCE_SIGNATURE_INVALID`	422	One of Adverant's two signatures is missing or doesn't verify; the file was changed after signing	Ask Adverant for the file again; don't edit it
`LICENCE_FORMAT_INVALID`	422	The file isn't a licence this release can read	Send the file exactly as Adverant gave it
`LICENCE_ROOT_UNKNOWN`	422	It's signed with a key this installation doesn't trust	Ask for a licence signed for this release's trust roots, or upgrade
`LICENCE_MATRIX_MISMATCH`	422	It's written against an edition matrix this release doesn't read, or grants a group this release doesn't know	Upgrade, or ask for a licence written against this release
`LICENCE_OTHER_INSTALLATION`	409	It was issued for another installation	Ask for a licence issued for this installation's identity
`TRANSITION_NOT_PERMITTED`	409	A licence with this id was imported already; each is imported once	Ask Adverant for a new licence if the terms must change
`LICENCE_REVOKED`	403	Adverant has withdrawn this licence	Ask Adverant for a new one
`LICENCE_LOCKED`	403	The licence's term hasn't begun; the Community floor applies until then	Import it again on or after its first day
`RECORD_NOT_FOUND`	404	The installation hasn't been declared yet, so it has no identity to check against	Finish the first administrator's step (chapter 2.12, The first run), then import
`VALIDATION_FAILED`	400	The body was unreadable or over 1 MiB, or a query string was sent	Send the file as the whole body, with no query

One more code can come back on a successful import, as a notice rather than a refusal: `LICENCE_CLOCK_BEHIND_FLOOR` means the installation's clock reads earlier than the latest time it has

already seen, so the licence is read at that later time. Setting a clock back never revives an expired licence. Only a time-reset token that Adverant signs for the installation lowers the floor.



Moving Community to Enterprise in place

This is what we did at Harrow. Nothing is reinstalled and nothing is migrated: it's the same installation, with the same identity and the same data, and more of it switched on. The installation name and the custodians stay exactly as they were; on an upgrade, the custody hook checks the key store is already initialised and does nothing else.

1. Put the pull token on every node, and restart the container runtime there.
2. Fetch the Enterprise chart from Downloads and verify it and its images as above.
3. Change the two values in your existing values file: `edition: enterprise` and `enterprise.enabled: true`. Change nothing else.
4. Run preflight with the new file.

   ```bash
   nexusctl preflight --context harrow-prod --values harrow-values.yaml
   ```

5. Upgrade the release to the Enterprise chart, again without `--wait`.

   ```bash
   helm upgrade nexus enterprise/nexus-1.0.0-alpha.1.tgz \
     --namespace nexus -f harrow-values.yaml --timeout 45m
   ```

   On an upgrade, the hooks run before the new pods roll, and each migration applies only the files it hasn't applied before. The generated secrets are read back from the installation and kept. Helm ends with:


   ```output
   NAME: nexus
   NAMESPACE: nexus
   STATUS: deployed
   REVISION: 2
   ```

6. Wait for the workloads, exactly as in chapter 2.6, Installing Community on Kubernetes, step 7.

   ```bash
   kubectl -n nexus wait --for=condition=Available deploy --all --timeout=900s
   ```

7. Import the licence, by any of the three ways above.
8. In the console, open This installation, then Licence, then Move to Enterprise. The page reads the licence and shows what will be fetched and what will change before anything happens. It also counts the organisation's people and content and marks each as kept. Press **Fetch and switch on**. Each part is checked against Adverant's release key before it's used, and the feature groups switch on one at a time.

Our window was an hour; the work inside it took about twenty minutes, most of it the schema wait while the hooks ran. The pilot's people signed in the next morning to the same workspace, with the Enterprise areas of the menu no longer greyed.



SCREEN Moving a Community installation to Enterprise. The page confirms the licence is genuine and lists what will be fetched before anything is fetched; the organisation's people and files are marked as kept.



WATCH OUT


Don't uninstall Community and install Enterprise fresh to "keep things clean". A fresh install mints a new installation identity, so your claim and your licence belong to the old one, and so does the key material sealed to your custodians. The in-place upgrade keeps all of them.



After the import

The licence page under This installation lists every feature group in the licence with its seats and term. It also says how each part is delivered, for example compiled and licensed for an Enterprise group, or open source for the Community floor. Groups outside the licence stay listed, greyed. Administrators can narrow what a group reaches inside the organisation; nobody but Adverant can widen what a licence grants.

The licence's state is worked out again from the document and the date on every read, so expiry happens without a scheduled job. Everyone on the installation sees the same notice in the console as the end approaches: `LICENCE_ENDS_SOON` from 30 days before the end, then `LICENCE_IN_GRACE` during the grace period. Members see the notice and the dates; only installation administrators see the licence itself. Chapter 2.13, Licences, covers renewal and the expiry ladder.



SCREEN This is the licence page of an Enterprise installation. The figures across the top give seats and the term; below them, every feature group is listed with how it is protected, and the groups outside the licence stay greyed.

If this fails

What you see	Cause	What to do
`edition=enterprise but enterprise.enabled=false: they must agree`	Only one of the two keys was changed	Change both
`files/images.lock.json is the community lock; this install is edition enterprise`	The Community chart was used	Use the Enterprise chart from Downloads
`image ... is a enterprise image; a community install takes only community images`	An Enterprise image name reached a Community render	Check `edition` and the chart folder

`ImagePullBackOff` on an Enterprise image after the upgrade	A node has no pull token, or its token is no longer valid	Check `registries.yaml` on that node, or make a new token
A licence refusal code	See the refusal table above	Follow its row; nothing was changed


When the licence page shows Enterprise and the groups you expected, the installation is licensed. The next stop is the first run in chapter 2.12, The first run, if you haven't claimed the installation yet. If you have, the assistant still needs the organisation's own artificial intelligence (AI) model keys before it can answer anyone. Chapter 2.14, AI providers and models, shows how to connect them.

Single-machine installs

Install Nexus on one Linux server with nexusctl, or evaluate it on a laptop with k3d, and reach the console over HTTPS so that sign-in and passkeys work.

FOR OPERATORS

18 MIN READ



Before Harrow Port Authority put Nexus on its production cluster, Tomás Reilly wanted two smaller installs. One was a pilot on a spare Linux server in the operations building, for the twelve people who would try it first. The other ran on his own laptop, so he could break things without anyone noticing. This chapter covers both. They use the same chart, the same images and the same first run as a full Kubernetes install, so what you learn on one machine carries over.

The server path is one command: `nexusctl install --single-node` builds a k3s cluster on the machine, installs cert-manager and then installs Nexus. The laptop path is more hands-on. You build a k3d cluster yourself, install cert-manager and the chart with Helm, and then do one extra job that catches almost everyone: you put the console behind HTTPS on your own machine, because a plain port-forward can never sign anybody in.



How big the machine has to be

Nexus asks for about 2.05 CPU (central processing unit) cores and 6.7 GiB of memory in requests with the chart's defaults, and its volumes add up to 142 GiB. That total is PostgreSQL 50, Valkey 5, Neo4j 20, Qdrant 10, the object store 50, the two OpenBao stores 1 and 5, and the receipts volume 1. Requests are what the scheduler reserves, and real use runs higher once people are working.

Machine	CPU	Memory (RAM, random-access memory)	Disk
Recommended single node	8 vCPU	32 GiB	250 GB SSD (solid-state drive)
Minimum for evaluation	4 vCPU	16 GiB	200 GB

A laptop that meets the evaluation minimum will run Nexus, but Docker's own memory limit counts, not the laptop's. Give Docker at least 16 GiB before you start.

Both paths need Kubernetes 1.33 or later. The single-node path brings its own: k3s v1.33.6+k3s1, the distribution every release is tested on.



Part one: one Linux server with nexusctl

Tomás's pilot server is an 8-core machine with 32 GiB of memory and a 500 GB SSD, running a current Linux with nothing else on it. The install needs root, because it installs k3s as a system service.

Get nexusctl and check it

1. Download `nexusctl` for your architecture from `https://downloads.adverant.ai/nexus/1.0.0-alpha.1/`, together with the release public key. Save the key as `release.pub`. Chapter 2.4, Getting and verifying a release, explains how to check the key's fingerprint against the one Adverant publishes.
2. Check the binary and the release with the key:

```bash
nexusctl version --json
nexusctl verify
```

`nexusctl verify` checks the download against the Adverant release key and refuses anything it can't verify. If it fails, stop and download again. Never run an install from a file that didn't verify.

Make the custodian key

The installation's key store seals its recovery keys to one or more custodians. A custodian is a person who holds an age identity file offline, and the chart refuses to install without at least one. On the custodian's own machine:

```bash
age-keygen -o custodian.key
```

The file starts with a line `# public key: age1...`. That public half is what goes into the values file. The identity file itself never leaves the custodian's machine. On a Mac with a Secure Enclave, `age-plugin-se keygen --access-control=any-biometry -o custodian.key` makes a key that needs Touch ID to use, and its public half starts `age1se1`.



WATCH OUT

If every custodian loses their identity file, the key store can't be unsealed after a restart, and nothing that needs a key will work again. Name at least two custodians on anything you intend to keep.

Write the values file

```yaml
# harrow-pilot-values.yaml (Helm values)
global:
  imageRegistry: registry.adverant.ai
  domain: harrow.example
hosts:
  console: console.harrow.example
  api: api.harrow.example
  auth: auth.harrow.example
edition: community
enterprise:
  enabled: false
tls:
  mode: existing
  existingSecret: harrow-public-tls
keys:
  installationName: harrow-pilot
  custody:
    recipients:
      - "<custodian-age-recipient>"
```

`<custodian-age-recipient>` is the `age1...` line from `custodian.key`. Add one list entry per custodian.

`keys.installationName` is permanent. The first start of the key store mints the installation's identity under that name, and nothing renames it afterwards. It must match `^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$` : lower case, starting with a letter, at most 63 characters. Don't copy `nexus-example` or the example recipient from the chart's own example files. The chart refuses both by name, and preflight reports the same codes first.

The three hosts are the installation's identity. Every service refuses to start without them, and every sign-in, cookie and passkey is bound to `hosts.console`. Choose names you will still want in five years.

Point the three names at the server

People reach the console, the API (application programming interface) and the sign-in service through k3s's built-in ingress controller, Traefik, on ports 80 and 443 of the server. Add three DNS (Domain Name System) records for `console.harrow.example` , `api.harrow.example` and `auth.harrow.example` , each pointing at the server's address. Preflight checks each name and tells you which one has no record.

The chart's network policy lets only one namespace reach the three public services. Its default, `kube-system`, is where k3s runs Traefik, so on a single node you leave `networkPolicy.ingressNamespace` alone.

Run preflight, then install

1. Run preflight with the single-node flag. It reads the machine and your values file and changes nothing.

```bash
sudo nexusctl preflight --single-node --values harrow-pilot-values.yaml
```

2. Read the summary line at the end. A warning never blocks the install, but a failure does, and every failing row carries a `fix` line.

```
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
9 passed · 1 warning · 0 failed   You can install. Warnings do not block; fix them when you can.
Report saved to preflight-2026-11-12-0902.txt · nothing was changed
```


3. Install. The `--edition` flag must agree with `edition` in the values file.

```bash
sudo nexusctl install --single-node --values harrow-pilot-values.yaml --edition community
```

4. Watch it run. It runs preflight again, installs k3s v1.33.6+k3s1, installs cert-manager v1.21.3, installs Nexus, and waits for every service to answer its health check. On Tomás's server it took a little under ten minutes.

```
done   Preflight again        9 passed · 1 warning
done   k3s v1.33.6+k3s1       node Ready
done   cert-manager v1.21.3   ready
done   Database and search    ready
done   Engines                started
done   Console                https://console.harrow.example
Installed. Nobody can sign in yet.
Open https://console.harrow.example/claim
Code <code>  works once, for 30 minutes
Fingerprint of this installation, to compare in the browser:
3F9A C21B 77E0 5D4C 9B12 A6F3 0E88 41D7
```

Keep that fingerprint on screen. You'll compare it in the browser when you claim the installation with the code. If the code runs out before you use it, `nexusctl claim-code --administrator <email>` makes a new one. Chapter 2.12, The first run, takes it from there.



SCREEN The Community install on one server is download, check, preflight and install, then the first administrator. There is no licence step.

Put the certificate in place

With `tls.mode: existing`, the three ingress routes serve the certificate in the Secret named by `tls.existingSecret`. It has to cover all three hosts. Preflight reads that Secret when it exists and warns when the certificate ends within 30 days. When the Secret isn't there yet, the row tells you to create it, and it's a warning, not a failure.

On a single node the cluster doesn't exist until the install has made it, so create the Secret straight after the install. Write out the cluster's kubeconfig first (the last section of this chapter explains it), then create the Secret with it:

```bash
sudo nexusctl kubeconfig > harrow-pilot.kubeconfig
chmod 600 harrow-pilot.kubeconfig
export KUBECONFIG=$PWD/harrow-pilot.kubeconfig
kubectl -n nexus create secret tls harrow-public-tls --cert=harrow-public.crt --key=harrow-public.key
```

`harrow-public.crt` holds the certificate followed by any intermediate certificates, and `harrow-public.key` its private key. If your certificates come from a private CA (certificate authority), `nexusctl preflight` and `nexusctl install` take `--ca-bundle <file>` so they can check the chain. The other ways to handle TLS (Transport Layer Security) are in chapter 2.11, Variations: external stores, TLS and ingress.

If this fails

What you see	What it means	What to do
`PREFLIGHT_FAILED` (409)	Preflight found a failure, so the install didn't start. Nothing was installed.	Fix each failing row, using its `fix` line, and run the install again.

`INSTALLATION_NAME_MISSING`	`keys.installationName` is empty.	Set the installation's own permanent name.
`INSTALLATION_NAME_EXAMPLE`	The name is the one from the chart's example values.	Choose your own name.
`KEYS_CUSTODIAN_MISSING`	`keys.custody.recipients` is empty.	Add each custodian's public `age1...` recipient.
`KEYS_CUSTODIAN_EXAMPLE`	A recipient is the chart's example custodian, whose identity nobody holds.	Replace it with your custodians' recipients.

`nexusctl` exits 0 when it can go ahead, 1 when a check blocked it, and 2 when it couldn't run at all (an unreadable values file, a wrong flag). A script can branch on those three.



Part two: an evaluation on a laptop with k3d

k3d runs k3s inside Docker containers, so a whole cluster lives on a laptop and disappears with one command. The release tools that test every Nexus release build their clusters exactly this way, and copying their settings saves you from rediscovering the problems they already met.

You need Docker, k3d 5.8.3, `kubectl`, Helm v4 and Chrome. Tomás used his Mac.

Create the cluster

```bash
k3d cluster create harrow-eval --agents 0 --wait --timeout 300s \
  --image rancher/k3s:v1.33.6-k3s1 \
  --k3s-arg "--disable=traefik@server:0"
k3d kubeconfig get harrow-eval > harrow-eval.kubeconfig
chmod 600 harrow-eval.kubeconfig
export KUBECONFIG=$PWD/harrow-eval.kubeconfig
```

Each flag has a reason.

- `--agents 0` gives one server node and no workers. Nexus runs happily on one node, and a second only costs memory.
- `--image rancher/k3s:v1.33.6-k3s1` pins the k3s version every release is tested on. Without it you get whatever k3d defaults to.
- `--disable=traefik@server:0` leaves out Traefik. A laptop has no public address to serve, and you reach the console through your own HTTPS front instead (below).
- `--wait --timeout 300s` returns only when the cluster answers, or fails after five minutes.

If you mirror the release registry on your laptop, add `--registry-config <registries.yaml>` to send image pulls to the mirror, and `--k3s-arg "--disable-default-registry-endpoint@server:0"` so that nothing falls back to an upstream registry. The release tools run this way, with every image coming only through the mirror.



TIP

k3d picks the cluster's API port by binding a free one and releasing it, and Docker binds it a moment later. On a laptop that runs many port-forwards, another process can grab it in between. The create then fails with `address already in use` and k3d rolls everything back. Run the same command again.

Install cert-manager

The chart makes its own local CA, `nexus-local-ca`, as a cert-manager issuer, and every service gets its certificate from it. Without cert-manager's resources in the cluster, `helm install` refuses the chart within seconds. Install cert-manager v1.21.3 first, from the chart the cert-manager project publishes:

```bash
helm install cert-manager cert-manager-v1.21.3.tgz -n cert-manager \
  --create-namespace --set crds.enabled=true --wait --timeout 10m
```

Nexus needs nothing else from cert-manager, and in particular no trust-manager.

Install Nexus

1. Write a values file for the laptop. TLS ends at your own front, so `tls.mode` is `none`.

```yaml
# harrow-eval-values.yaml (Helm values)
global:
  imageRegistry: registry.adverant.ai
  domain: harrow.example
hosts:
  console: console.harrow.example
  api: api.harrow.example
  auth: auth.harrow.example
edition: community
tls:
  mode: none
keys:
  installationName: harrow-eval
  custody:
    recipients:
      - "<custodian-age-recipient>"
```

2. Install the chart from the registry, and leave out `--wait` (the warning below says why).

```bash
helm install nexus oci://registry.adverant.ai/nexus/charts/nexus --version 1.0.0-alpha.1 \
  -n nexus --create-namespace -f harrow-eval-values.yaml --timeout 45m
```

3. Then wait for the workloads yourself:

```bash
kubectl -n nexus wait --for=condition=Available deploy --all --timeout=900s
for s in $(kubectl -n nexus get sts -o name); do
  want=$(kubectl -n nexus get "$s" -o jsonpath='{.spec.replicas}')
  kubectl -n nexus wait "$s" --for=jsonpath='{.status.readyReplicas}'="$want" --timeout=900s
done
```



WATCH OUT

Never run `helm install --wait` for Nexus. A post-install hook bootstraps the database and hands each service its database password. With `--wait`, Helm waits for the services before it runs that hook, the services wait for their passwords, and the install sits there until Helm's timeout. Helm still waits for its own hooks without the flag; the `kubectl wait` lines above do the rest.

The StatefulSet loop is there because some of them update one pod at a time on request, and `kubectl rollout status` refuses those. Waiting on `readyReplicas` works for every update strategy.

When both commands return, every Deployment is Available and every StatefulSet has its pods ready. Nobody can sign in yet. That's correct: the installation is unclaimed.



Why a port-forward can never sign you in

The obvious next move is `kubectl port-forward svc/nexus-alpha 3000:3000` and a browser on `http://127.0.0.1:3000`. The console's pages load, so it looks as if it works. It doesn't, and no setting will make it work. Three things stand in the way, each on purpose.

```
What        Why
stops it
```

The origin	The console's sign-in refuses a request whose origin isn't `https://<hosts.console>`, here `https://console.harrow.example`. A page served from `http://127.0.0.1:3000` has the wrong origin, so the sign-in never starts.
The cookie	The session is a `__Host-` cookie marked `Secure`. Browsers store such a cookie only over HTTPS, with no domain attribute, for exactly the host that set it. Over plain HTTP the browser throws it away.
The passkey	The first administrator signs in with a passkey, and a passkey needs a secure context with a valid certificate. Chrome refuses to create a passkey behind a certificate warning, even one you clicked through.

So the browser has to talk to `https://console.harrow.example`, with a certificate it trusts, and that name has to lead to your laptop.



Reaching the console over HTTPS on your laptop

The method below uses the chart's own CA to issue the certificate, a port-forward to reach the console, and a separate Chrome profile that trusts that one CA and maps the console's name to your laptop. Your system trust store and `/etc/hosts` stay as they are.




FIGURE How a browser on the laptop reaches the console in the k3d cluster over HTTPS.

Issue a certificate for the console's name

1. Ask cert-manager for a certificate for the console host, signed by the chart's issuer:

```yaml
# console-front-certificate.yaml (a cert-manager Certificate)
apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
kind: Certificate
metadata:
  name: nexus-console-front
  namespace: nexus
spec:
  secretName: nexus-console-front-tls
  dnsNames: [console.harrow.example]
  duration: 24h
  usages: [server auth, digital signature, key encipherment]
  privateKey: { algorithm: ECDSA, size: 256, rotationPolicy: Always }
  issuerRef: { name: nexus-local-ca, kind: Issuer, group: cert-manager.io }
```

```bash
kubectl apply -f console-front-certificate.yaml
kubectl -n nexus wait --for=condition=Ready certificate/nexus-console-front --timeout=120s
```

cert-manager signs it inside the cluster. You never read the CA's private key.

2. Copy the certificate, its key and the CA certificate out of the Secret:

```bash
kubectl -n nexus get secret nexus-console-front-tls -o jsonpath='{.data.tls\.crt}' | base64 -d > tls.crt
kubectl -n nexus get secret nexus-console-front-tls -o jsonpath='{.data.tls\.key}' | base64 -d > tls.key
kubectl -n nexus get secret nexus-console-front-tls -o jsonpath='{.data.ca\.crt}' | base64 -d > ca.crt
chmod 600 tls.key
```

3. Work out the CA's pin. Chrome identifies a trusted key by the base64 SHA-256 of its public key:

```bash
openssl x509 -in ca.crt -pubkey -noout | openssl pkey -pubin -outform der | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | base64
```

Pin the CA's key, not the certificate's. The certificate lasts a day and gets a fresh key each time cert-manager renews it, while the CA stays the same.

Put an HTTPS front in front of a port-forward

1. Forward the console's Service. Its port is the one named `http`, which is 3000 in this release:

```bash
kubectl -n nexus port-forward svc/nexus-alpha 3000:3000
```

2. Run an HTTPS listener on `127.0.0.1:28443` that forwards to `127.0.0.1:3000`. Any reverse proxy you already trust will do, as long as it does four things:
   - serves `tls.crt` followed by `ca.crt` as the chain, with `tls.key`;
   - keeps the `Host` header as `console.harrow.example`;
   - sets `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`;
   - passes WebSocket upgrades through, because the console uses them.

A port-forward to a Service binds the one pod it picked when it started. After an upgrade or a restart replaces the console pod, the forward stays up and forwards to nothing, and the browser shows a bad gateway. Restart the port-forward whenever the console pod changes.

Open Chrome with the pin and the name mapping

On a Mac:

```bash
open -na "Google Chrome" --args --user-data-dir="$HOME/.nexus-eval-chrome" \
  "--host-resolver-rules=MAP console.harrow.example:443 127.0.0.1:28443" \
  "--ignore-certificate-errors-spki-list=<ca-pin>" \
  https://console.harrow.example/install
```

`<ca-pin>` is the output of the `openssl` line. On Linux, start Chrome with the same three flags.

The three flags work together. `--host-resolver-rules` sends `console.harrow.example` on port 443 to your front, inside this profile only. `--ignore-certificate-errors-spki-list` trusts certificates issued by that one CA key, and Chrome honours it only with `--user-data-dir`. The separate profile keeps the exception away from your everyday browsing. It isn't a blanket "ignore certificate errors" switch: anything not signed by the cluster's CA still fails.

With that profile open, `https://console.harrow.example/install` leads to the claim page, and a passkey can be made. Chapter 2.12, The first run, picks up from here.

When the laptop restarts

The key store has two parts: the key store itself and a small unsealer that holds its unlocking key. After any restart of the node (a Docker restart, a laptop reboot, `k3d cluster stop` and `start`) the

unsealer starts sealed. The key store unseals itself through it, so until a custodian unseals the unsealer with their own age identity, nothing that needs a key works. That's a property of the design, and it's the same on a production cluster. Chapter 2.15, Day two: operating Nexus, shows the unseal.

When you're finished with the evaluation:

```bash
k3d cluster delete harrow-eval
```

Deleting the cluster deletes the installation and everything in it.

nexusctl kubeconfig

A cluster that `nexusctl install --single-node` built belongs to `nexusctl`. To reach it with `kubectl`, `helm` or any other tool, ask for its kubeconfig:

```bash
sudo nexusctl kubeconfig > harrow-pilot.kubeconfig
chmod 600 harrow-pilot.kubeconfig
export KUBECONFIG=$PWD/harrow-pilot.kubeconfig
kubectl -n nexus get deploy,statefulset
```

The file grants full administrative access to the cluster. Keep it at mode 600, on the machines of the people who run the installation, and nowhere else. Every later command in Part 2 that takes `--context` or reads `KUBECONFIG` works against a single node through this file. The same applies to an upgrade: `nexusctl upgrade plan --bundle <file>` and `nexusctl upgrade apply --bundle <file>` on a single node also upgrade the k3s cluster `nexusctl` owns.




FIGURE What `nexusctl install --single-node` puts on one Linux server.

What carries over to a cluster

Everything you did on one machine has an equivalent on a cluster. The values file is the same file with a different registry, TLS mode or storage class, as chapter 2.11, Variations: external stores, TLS and ingress, shows. The first run is identical. What doesn't carry over is the installation itself: the installation name is fixed for good, and an installation can't be lifted from a laptop onto a server.


When Tomás moved from his laptop to the pilot server he started again with a new name, `harrow-pilot`, and kept `harrow-eval` for experiments.

The installer disk image

Boot a bare server or a virtual machine from the Nexus installer image and it installs the operating system, k3s, cert-manager and Nexus with no network, checking every file before it is used.

FOR OPERATORS

17 MIN READ



The harbour master's office on Harrow's east quay has one server, no internet and nobody on site who runs Kubernetes. Tomás Reilly needed Nexus on it all the same. He wrote the image to a USB (Universal Serial Bus) stick, put a second, small stick beside it with four lines of settings, and booted the server. An hour later the screen showed the console's address and the three lines to add to the hosts file. He didn't type a single Kubernetes command.

That's the job of the installer disk image. It writes a minimal operating system to the server's disk, then on first boot it checks every file it carries against the Adverant release key, installs k3s with no network, imports every image, installs cert-manager and Nexus, and checks that every pod is running. Each step stops with a named reason the moment something is wrong. There's no degraded path and no default password anywhere.



The two images

Each release comes as two kinds of image, for two processor architectures, amd64 and arm64.

File	What it holds	Who can download it
`nexus-alpha-installer-1.0.0-alpha.1-<arch>.iso`	The installer only: the operating system, k3s v1.33.6+k3s1, cert-manager v1.21.3 and the first-boot installer. It works for either edition and holds no Nexus images.	Anyone, from `downloads.adverant.ai`
`nexus-alpha-<edition>-1.0.0-alpha.1-<arch>.iso`	The same installer with that edition's offline bundle added as a second partition labelled `NEXUS-BUNDLE`. One medium installs everything.	Community: anyone. Enterprise: only from your Adverant account

`<arch>` is `amd64` or `arm64`, and `<edition>` is `community` or `enterprise`.

The installer only ever looks for a filesystem labelled `NEXUS-BUNDLE`. In the all-in-one image that's the partition on the image itself. With the installer-only image you bring the bundle on a second disk or stick with that label, which is handy when you install several sites from one installer stick and change only the bundle. Chapter 2.10, Air-gapped installation, describes the bundle.

Enterprise images and Enterprise bundles are never anonymous. You download them from your Adverant account at `https://account.adverant.ai`, on the Downloads page, beside your licence. Community images and bundles are public.




FIGURE The installer-only image and the all-in-one image, and where the first boot finds each part.

What the image is built from

The operating system is based on Debian 13 and is not an official Debian image. It contains the Debian base system and nothing else: no extra packages, no desktop and no mirror. k3s brings its own container runtime and networking. The boot chain (shim, GRUB, the kernel and the initial ramdisk) is byte for byte the one Debian ships, so a machine with Secure Boot on starts it like any Debian installer.

Two builds of the same release give identical images, byte for byte, and the release isn't published until they do. The Debian source packages for every binary on the image are published beside it as `nexus-alpha-installer-1.0.0-alpha.1-debian-source.tar`, in the same checksum list.

Check the download before you write it

The image directory on `downloads.adverant.ai` holds the images, a `SHA256SUMS` file covering every published file, and `SHA256SUMS.sigstore.json`, the signature over that list made with the Adverant release key. Get the release public key separately, save it as `release.pub`, and check its fingerprint as chapter 2.4, Getting and verifying a release, describes.

1. Verify the signature on the checksum list. There's no transparency log for Nexus releases, so the flag that skips the log lookup is required.

```bash
cosign verify-blob --key release.pub --insecure-ignore-tlog=true \
  --bundle SHA256SUMS.sigstore.json SHA256SUMS
```

BASH

```
Verified OK
```

OUTPUT

2. Check the image you downloaded against the list:

```bash
grep nexus-alpha-community-1.0.0-alpha.1-amd64.iso SHA256SUMS | sha256sum -c -
```

BASH

```
nexus-alpha-community-1.0.0-alpha.1-amd64.iso: OK
```

OUTPUT

On a Mac, use `shasum -a 256 -c -` in place of `sha256sum -c -`.

3. Write the image to a USB stick with the tool you normally use, or attach it to the virtual machine as an optical disc.

k3s publishes checksums for its release files and no signature, so the k3s files inside the image are checked against the checksums k3s publishes, from the same origin as the files. Everything Adverant built is signed.

Bundles in pieces

A bundle you carry on a separate stick is several gigabytes. Some filesystems, FAT (File Allocation Table) among them, can't hold a file of 4 GiB or more, so bundle files are published in pieces of 2047 MiB that fit on any stick. Join the pieces back together in order and check the joined file against its `.sha256` before you use it.



The hardware it needs

The first boot checks the machine before it touches anything, and refuses to go on when the machine is too small.

Check	The floor	When it's checked
Architecture	The image's own: an amd64 image on amd64, arm64 on arm64	First boot
Memory	16 GiB	First boot
Target disk	Exactly one empty disk of at least 64 GB, or the disk the seed names	Before the operating system is written
Free space on `/`	50 GB after the operating system is in place	First boot
Clock	Not older than the date the image was built	First boot

Those are floors, not a recommendation. With the chart's defaults, Nexus's volumes alone add up to 142 GiB, so a 64 GB disk passes the installer and fills within days. Use what a single node should have: 8 vCPU (virtual central processing units), 32 GiB of memory and a 250 GB SSD (solid-state drive). Four vCPU, 16 GiB and 200 GB is enough for an evaluation.

The clock check is there because the server has no network, and so no time service, at install. Certificates and signatures are checked against the clock. If the machine's hardware clock is behind the image's build date, the first boot stops and asks you to set it. Set it in the firmware setup and boot again.

Bare metal and virtual machines

The image boots on UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) firmware, on physical servers and on virtual machines alike. It installs the boot loader on the removable-media path as well as the usual one, so a VM (virtual machine) with no saved boot entries still finds it after the first restart. Give a VM the memory and disk in the table above, one empty virtual disk, and the image as a CD.

The installer chooses the target disk by a strict rule and never picks "the first disk".

- It skips the medium it booted from.
- It skips removable disks, unless the seed names one.
- It skips any disk that already has a partition table, of either kind.
- It skips disks below 64 GB, and says so on the console.
- It installs only when exactly one disk is left.

On a server with two blank disks it stops and asks you to choose. You choose by naming the disk in the seed, with `wipe: true`, which is the only way it will ever write to a disk that already has partitions.



The NEXUS-SEED volume

The seed is a small volume, usually a USB stick, with a filesystem labelled `NEXUS-SEED` and a file `seed.yaml` at its top level. The installer mounts it read-only, reads the settings, and remounts it writable only at the very end, to leave you the operating system password.

```yaml
# seed.yaml on the NEXUS-SEED volume
domain: harrow.example
adminEmail: aoife.brennan@harrow.example
edition: enterprise
timeout: 45m
```

Key	What it sets	When it's missing
`domain`	The installation's domain. The installer derives the three hosts from it: `console.<domain>`, `api.<domain>` and `auth.<domain>`.	Asked on the server's console
`adminEmail`	The email of the person who'll be the first administrator	Asked on the server's console
`edition`	`community` or `enterprise`. When set, it must match the bundle's edition.	Taken from the bundle
`timeout`	How long cert-manager and the Nexus install may take, as a duration such as `30m` or `1h`	`30m`
`time`	The current time in UTC, in the form the clock message prints (`2026-11-14T09:00:00Z`), for a machine whose hardware clock can't be set or doesn't hold its setting. An offline machine has no time server to ask.	The hardware clock is used
`disk`	The target disk, as `/dev/<name>`, used only together with `wipe: true`	The empty-disk rule above
`wipe`	`true` lets the installer erase the disk `disk` names	No disk is ever erased

For Enterprise, put the licence file on the same volume as `licence.json`. Without it the first boot stops at the seed step and says the licence is missing. Community needs no licence, and for Community the whole seed is optional: the installer asks for the domain and the email on the console and carries on.

The installer reads each line as `key: value` at the start of the line. Write one key per line, at the top level, with no quotes and no indentation. A quoted value is read with its quotes.

At first boot the installer also asks on the console for the key store's custodian: the public half of an age key, `age1...`, made on the custodian's own machine with `age-keygen -o custodian.key`. The key store seals its recovery keys to it. Chapter 2.8, Single-machine installs, explains custodians. The custodian keeps the private half offline and safe: without it, nobody can unseal the key store after a restart.



WATCH OUT

`wipe: true` erases the named disk without a second question. Check the device name on the actual machine first. Device names on two servers of the same model aren't guaranteed to match.

What happens, from power-on to the console address

Stage one: the operating system

The image boots into an unattended Debian installer. It doesn't configure a network, use a mirror or install any package beyond the base system. It sets the time zone to UTC (Coordinated Universal Time), disables the root login, and makes one user, `nexus`, whose password is locked. It picks the target disk by the rule above and writes a GPT (globally unique identifier partition table) disk with an EFI (Extensible Firmware Interface) system partition and one ext4 root filesystem, with no swap.

At the end it copies the Nexus installer onto the new system, checks every copied file against the image's checksum list, and enables a first-boot service. If any copied file doesn't match, it stops there. Then it ejects the medium and restarts.

Stage two: the first boot

On first boot the service `nexus-install` runs once. Every step prints to the server's console and to the journal, and records itself as done, so a retry starts from the first step that isn't. The service as a whole may run for up to four hours before systemd stops it, which leaves room for a slow disk and an hour's wait for the bundle stick.

1. **Preflight.** The architecture, the clock, the memory and the free disk space, as in the table above.
2. **Payload.** The installer's own files: the signature on its checksum list with the release key it carries, then every file against that list.
3. **Seed.** Reads `seed.yaml`, and asks on the console for anything missing.
4. **Bundle.** Finds the volume labelled `NEXUS-BUNDLE` and mounts it read-only. If there isn't one, it says `waiting-for-bundle` and waits up to an hour for you to attach it. Then it runs the full bundle check, ending in `VERIFY-BUNDLE PASS`, with the release key it carries, before anything is imported. An Enterprise bundle needs `licence.json` on the seed, and the seed's edition must match the bundle's.
5. **k3s.** Installs k3s v1.33.6+k3s1 from the image's own files with downloads switched off, and waits up to ten minutes for the node to be Ready. Then it removes the k3s air-gap image archive, so the images aren't imported again at every start.
6. **Import.** Imports every verified image from the bundle, and cert-manager's images, into the node's container store. Nothing is ever pulled from a registry.
7. **cert-manager, then Nexus.** Installs cert-manager v1.21.3, then the Nexus chart from the bundle, both within the seed's `timeout`.
8. **Acceptance.** Checks that every pod is Running and every hook Job has completed.
9. **Credential.** Gives the `nexus` operating system user a new random password, shows it once on the console, and writes it to `nexus-os-password.txt` on the seed volume when the volume can be written to.

The bundle check in step 4 is the same script you run by hand in chapter 2.10, Air-gapped installation, and it prints the same lines:

OUTPUT

```
  1 SHA256SUMS OK files=<n>
  2 SHA256SUMS signature OK
  3 images signed + SBOM-attested: <n>
  4 helm lint --strict OK nexus-1.0.0-alpha.1.tgz
  5 coverage OK rendered=<n> lock=<n>
  6 source offer OK images=5 files=<n>
VERIFY-BUNDLE PASS files=<n> images=<n>
```

Line 3 counts the images that carry a valid signature and a signed SBOM (software bill of materials), the list of what each image contains. The counts (`<n>`) depend on the edition. What matters is the last line.

The install writes values in the chart's current form: `global.domain` and the three `hosts.*` names from the seed's domain, and `keys.custody.recipients` from the custodian you gave on the console. It installs from the bundle's own chart and images, so the release on the disk is exactly the release that was checked.




FIGURE The first boot of the installer image, one step after another, each able to stop the install.


The last lines on the console

When every step has passed, the console shows the operating system password once and the address to open:

```
nexus-install: OS login: user nexus, password <shown-once>  (shown once; change it with passwd)
nexus-install: DONE: https://console.harrow.example  (add to /etc/hosts: 10.20.4.15
console.harrow.example api.harrow.example auth.harrow.example)
```
OUTPUT

Write the password down or take it from the seed stick, then log in as `nexus` and change it with `passwd`. Nobody, Adverant included, knows a default password for this machine, because there isn't one.

The address in the hosts line is the server's own. With no DNS (Domain Name System) on the quay, Tomás added that one line to the hosts file of each laptop that would use the console. On a site with DNS, add records for the three names instead.




SCREEN After the install, the readiness list includes an outbound-traffic test, so an operator can show that nothing tried to leave in the last hour.

After the install

The installation is unclaimed. Nobody can sign in until someone claims it in a browser, comparing the installation's fingerprint with the one the server shows. Chapter 2.12, The first run, covers the claim, the first administrator and the passkey. The first administrator should be the person whose email is in the seed.

The node's own kubeconfig is at `/etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml`, readable by root only. To work on the cluster from a workstation, `nexusctl kubeconfig` prints it, as chapter 2.8, Single-machine installs, describes.

Updates arrive the same way the install did: a release on signed media, checked against the key already installed on the server and never against a key the disk brings with it. Chapter 2.10, Air-gapped installation, describes that check.



SCREEN The claim page that follows the install. The fingerprint is shown in eight groups of four, to compare with the server's console line by line.

If this fails

Every failure prints `nexus-install: FAILED <step>: <what is missing>` on the console and writes the same into `/var/lib/nexus/install.state`. Fix the cause and run the install again from the first step that isn't done:

```bash
sudo nexus-install retry
```

Message	What it means	What to do
`FAILED preflight: payload is for arm64, this machine is amd64`	You booted the image of the other architecture.	Use the image for this machine's architecture.
`FAILED preflight: memory 11 GiB, need >= 16 GiB`	The machine has less than the floor.	Add memory, or give the VM more.
`FAILED preflight: free disk 38 GB on /, need >= 50 GB`	The root filesystem is too small.	Install on a larger disk.

`FAILED preflight: the clock (...) is older than the build (...); set the RTC or give time: in the seed`	The hardware clock is behind the date the installer was built.	Set the clock in the firmware, or give `time` in `seed.yaml`, and retry.
`FAILED payload: SHA256SUMS signature does not verify`	The installer's own files are not what Adverant signed.	Stop. Download the image again and check it before writing.
`FAILED seed: the installation domain and the first administrator e-mail are required`	Neither the seed nor the console gave them.	Add them to `seed.yaml` or answer the prompts.
`FAILED seed: Enterprise bundle: licence file missing on NEXUS-SEED (licence.json)`	The bundle is Enterprise and the seed has no licence.	Put `licence.json` on the seed volume.
`FAILED bundle: no volume labelled NEXUS-BUNDLE within 1 h`	No bundle was attached in time.	Attach the bundle stick and retry.
`FAILED bundle: the bundle does not verify with this installer's release key`	The bundle check didn't end in `VERIFY-BUNDLE PASS`. Its own output, above the message, names the step.	Stop. Don't use that bundle. Get a new one.
`FAILED bundle: the seed asks for enterprise, the bundle is community`	The seed and the bundle disagree.	Fix `edition` in the seed or bring the right bundle.
`FAILED k3s: node not Ready within 10 min`	k3s didn't come up.	Check the journal for k3s, then retry.
`FAILED nexus: helm install nexus`	The chart didn't install within the timeout.	Look at `kubectl -n nexus get pods,jobs`, raise `timeout` in the seed if the machine is slow, and retry.
`FAILED acceptance: pods not ready`	Some pods aren't running after the install.	The message names up to five. Read their events, fix, retry.
`FAILED acceptance: jobs not complete: <jobs>`	A hook Job hasn't finished.	Read the named Job's log with `kubectl -n nexus logs job/<name>`, fix what it reports, and retry.

Before the operating system is written, the disk choice can stop the install too. Its message starts `nexus select-disk: REFUSED:`. The common one is `found 2 empty disks of >= 64 GB; need exactly one, or a NEXUS-SEED seed.yaml naming the disk with wipe: true`. Name the disk in the seed and boot again.


A failed bundle check is the one to take seriously. It means the files on the disk aren't the files Adverant signed, or a file was added. The installer has imported nothing at that point, so the server is unchanged. Keep the disk for your security team.

Air-gapped installation

Carry a signed offline bundle into a site with no internet, verify it against a key you brought in separately, load it into your own registry and install. Licences, updates and revocation lists cross the gap by hand too.

FOR OPERATORS

19 MIN READ



Harrow Port Authority's operations network has no route to the internet, by law and by design. Vessel traffic, berth plans and customs holds all live on it, and nothing on it may call out. When Tomás Reilly installed Nexus there, every byte arrived on a disk that a courier brought to the gatehouse, and every byte was checked inside the site before anything used it.

This chapter is that install. You get a signed offline bundle, check it with a key that reached you by a different route, copy its images into your own registry, check them again there, and install the chart with your registry's name in the values. Then come the things an air-gapped site does by hand that a connected one gets for free: k3s and cert-manager without a download, updates on media, licences through an offline exchange, and revocation lists you import yourself.




FIGURE How a release and its trust cross the gap by two separate routes.

What the offline bundle holds

A bundle is one edition of one release, as an uncompressed tar with a checksum file beside it: `nexus-alpha-1.0.0-alpha.1-enterprise.tar` and `nexus-alpha-1.0.0-alpha.1-enterprise.tar.sha256`. Community bundles are public on `downloads.adverant.ai`. Enterprise bundles come from your Adverant account at `https://account.adverant.ai`, beside your licence, and never anonymously.

Unpacked, it looks like this:

OUTPUT

```
nexus-alpha-1.0.0-alpha.1-enterprise/
  release/facts.json              the release facts: version, edition, architectures, key
fingerprint
  release/facts-gaps.json         the release facts the build couldn't record, each with its
reason
  release/images.lock.json        every image by digest: index, per platform, its SBOMs
  release/source-offer.json       the sources of every copyleft data-tier image
  release/source-offer.sha256     a checksum for each of those source files
  images/<svc>/                   one cosign save layout per image
  charts/nexus-1.0.0-alpha.1.tgz  the Helm chart
  sbom/<edition>/<svc>-<arch>.spdx.json
  source-offer/                   the source files themselves
  docs/INSTALL-AIRGAP.md
  docs/example-values.yaml
  docs/RELEASE-NOTES.md
```

```
SHA256SUMS                    a checksum for every file above
SHA256SUMS.sigstore.json      the signature over SHA256SUMS, made with the release key
```

Each `images/<svc>/` directory is what `cosign save` writes. It holds the image index and both platform images, linux/amd64 and linux/arm64, with the cosign signature, an SPDX SBOM (software bill of materials) attestation for each platform and a provenance attestation, all made with the Adverant release key. The same SBOMs sit in `sbom/` as plain files, so a security team can read them without cosign.

The data tier includes copyleft software: PostgreSQL with PostGIS, and Neo4j Community Edition among others. The bundle carries the source of every data-tier image it ships, and `release/source-offer.json` says so for each image. A bundle that would ship a copyleft binary without its source isn't built.

`release/facts.json` names the release, the edition, the architectures and the fingerprint of the release key the bundle was signed with, as `sha256:<hex>`.



NOTE

Bundle files are several gigabytes. Where a stick's filesystem can't hold a file of 4 GiB or more, the bundle is published in 2047 MiB pieces. Join them in order into the one tar before you check its `.sha256`.



The public key travels separately

The bundle never contains the key that checks it. A bundle that carried its own key could be replaced, key and all, by anyone, and every check would still pass. The verification script refuses a key that sits inside the bundle directory.

Get the release public key once, on a connected machine, from `https://downloads.adverant.ai/nexus/1.0.0-alpha.1/`. Save it as `release.pub`. Its fingerprint is the SHA-256 of the file:

```bash
sha256sum release.pub
```

Compare that with the fingerprint Adverant publishes, and with the one in the release notes you received by a separate channel. Chapter 2.4, Getting and verifying a release, has the details. Then carry `release.pub` into the site, by a different route from the bundle if you can, and keep it there. Tomás's team keeps it on the operations network's file share with a note of the date it came in. Every later release is checked against that installed key, never against anything a disk brings with it.



Verify the bundle

`verify-bundle.sh` is the script that checks a bundle, published with each release. The installer disk image runs the same script on first boot. It needs `cosign` v3, `helm` v4, and `sha256sum` or `shasum`. It reads nothing from any network and needs no Python, so it runs on a bare installer node as well as on a workstation.

1. Check the tar against its checksum, then unpack it:

```bash
sha256sum -c nexus-alpha-1.0.0-alpha.1-enterprise.tar.sha256
tar -xf nexus-alpha-1.0.0-alpha.1-enterprise.tar
```

2. Run the verification with the key you brought in:

```bash
./verify-bundle.sh nexus-alpha-1.0.0-alpha.1-enterprise release.pub
```

A third argument names a values file for the chart checks. Without it, the script uses the bundle's `docs/example-values.yaml`.

3. Read the last line, which must be `VERIFY-BUNDLE PASS` before you go any further.

```
  1 SHA256SUMS OK files=<n>
  2 SHA256SUMS signature OK
  3 images signed + SBOM-attested: <n>
  4 helm lint --strict OK nexus-1.0.0-alpha.1.tgz
  5 coverage OK rendered=<n> lock=<n>
  6 source offer OK images=5 files=<n>
VERIFY-BUNDLE PASS files=<n> images=<n>
```

The script stops at the first check that fails. Here is what each one does.

Step	What it checks
1	Every file listed in `SHA256SUMS` matches its checksum, and no file is present that the list leaves out. A planted extra file fails as surely as a changed one.
2	`SHA256SUMS.sigstore.json` is a valid signature over `SHA256SUMS` by the key you gave. With steps 1 and 2 together, every byte in the bundle is the byte Adverant signed.
3	For every image directory: the image's index digest is in `release/images.lock.json`; there is a cosign signature whose subject is that exact digest, and it verifies against your key; `cosign verify` and `cosign verify-attestation --type spdxjson` both pass on the saved layout.
4	`helm lint --strict` passes on the chart with the example values, or with yours.
5	Every image in the lock is saved in `images/`, and every image the chart renders is a digest in the lock. Nothing the chart installs comes from anywhere else.
6	When the lock holds data-tier images, `release/source-offer.json` is complete, names every one of them, and every source file it lists is present with the right checksum.

Step 3 checks the signature itself, by digest, as well as running `cosign verify`. The reason is cosign's own behaviour: `cosign verify` on a saved layout also exits 0 when the layout holds only an attestation by the key and no signature. The script doesn't accept that.

If this fails

A failure ends with `VERIFY-BUNDLE FAIL step=<k> <why>`.

Last line	What it means	What to do
`step=0 the public key must come from outside the bundle`	The key you named is inside the bundle directory.	Use the key you brought in separately.
`step=1 checksum mismatch`	A file changed after the list was made, or was damaged in transit.	Copy the bundle again from the original medium and re-check.
`step=1 files not covered by SHA256SUMS`	A file was added to the bundle.	Treat the medium as untrusted. Don't install from it.
`step=2 SHA256SUMS signature does not verify`	The checksum list isn't signed by the release key you hold.	Stop. Report it to your security team and ask Adverant for new media.
`step=3 image <svc>: ...`	An image's signature or SBOM attestation is missing or doesn't verify.	Stop, as for step 2.

`step=4`, `step=5`	The chart or its image list doesn't hold together.	Ask Adverant for a new bundle.
`step=6 ...`	The source offer is incomplete.	Ask Adverant for a new bundle.

Steps 2 and 3 failing is the case the whole design exists for. It means the files aren't the ones Adverant signed. Keep the medium for your security team.



Load the images into your own registry

Your nodes pull images from a registry inside the site. Harrow's is `registry.harrow.example`. Every Nexus image goes under the path `nexus/` in that registry, because the chart refers to each image as `<global.imageRegistry>/nexus/<svc>@<digest>`.

1. Log in to your registry with the tool you normally use, so `cosign` can push to it.
2. From inside the bundle directory, load every image and verify it again in its new home:

```bash
REG=registry.harrow.example
jq -r '.images[] | "\(.svc) \(.index)"' release/images.lock.json | while read -r svc digest; do
  cosign load --dir "images/$svc" "$REG/nexus/$svc"
  cosign verify --key release.pub --insecure-ignore-tlog=true "$REG/nexus/$svc@$digest" > /dev/null \
    && cosign verify-attestation --key release.pub --insecure-ignore-tlog=true --type spdxjson "$REG/nexus/$svc@$digest" > /dev/null \
    && echo "verified $svc"
done
```

`cosign load` carries the signature and every attestation along with the image, so the registry copy verifies against the same key. The verification here is the one that counts for your cluster: it proves that what your nodes will pull is what Adverant signed.

```output
verified nexus-alpha
verified nexus-auth
verified nexus-postgres
...
```

Every image in the lock should print one `verified` line. A missing line means that image's load or check failed, and its error is printed just above.

There's no transparency log for Nexus releases, so `--insecure-ignore-tlog=true` is needed on every check. The release key is the whole trust root. Without the flag, cosign refuses with `not enough verified log entries from transparency log: 0 < 1`.



Install from your registry

The values file for an air-gapped install differs from a connected one in one line: `global.imageRegistry` names your registry.

```yaml
# harrow-prod-values.yaml (Helm values)
global:
  imageRegistry: registry.harrow.example
  domain: harrow.example
hosts:
  console: console.harrow.example
  api: api.harrow.example
  auth: auth.harrow.example
edition: enterprise
enterprise:
  enabled: true
tls:
  mode: existing
  existingSecret: harrow-public-tls
storage:
  className: harrow-ssd
keys:
  installationName: harrow-port
  custody:
    recipients:
      - "<custodian-one-age-recipient>"
      - "<custodian-two-age-recipient>"
```

YAML

The `<custodian-...-age-recipient>` entries are the public `age1...` lines of the people who hold the key store's recovery keys. Chapter 2.8, Single-machine installs, explains how each makes one. `harrow-ssd` is Harrow's own storage class: put yours, or leave `storage.className` out to use the cluster's default.

1. Run preflight against the cluster with this file, as chapter 2.5, Preflight with nexusctl, describes.
2. Install from the bundle's chart, and leave out `--wait`.

```bash
helm install nexus charts/nexus-1.0.0-alpha.1.tgz -n nexus --create-namespace \
  -f harrow-prod-values.yaml --timeout 45m
kubectl -n nexus wait --for=condition=Available deploy --all --timeout=900s
```

BASH

`helm install --wait` deadlocks with this chart: a post-install hook gives each service its database password, and `--wait` holds the hooks back until the services are up. Chapter 2.8, Single-machine installs, has the loop that also waits for the StatefulSets.

With `nexusctl`, the same install is `nexusctl install --context <kube-context> --values harrow-prod-values.yaml`.

Nothing in the chart reaches outside the namespace except DNS (Domain Name System), the Kubernetes API (application programming interface) for token reviews, and any address you list in `networkPolicy.externalEgressCIDRs`, which is empty by default. No telemetry leaves the installation, and `telemetry.enabled` can't be set to anything but `false`. For AI (artificial intelligence) on a site with no internet, the organisation connects its own OpenAI-compatible model server inside the site, named in `ai.localProvider.baseUrl`; chapter 2.14, AI providers and models, covers it.

The licence isn't a chart value. You import it after the install, as described below.



k3s and cert-manager without a download

If Nexus is going onto a k3s cluster you build yourself, k3s has to install with no network too. The installer disk image does this for you (chapter 2.9, The installer disk image). By hand, on each node:

1. Bring across the k3s v1.33.6+k3s1 release files for your architecture: the `k3s` binary (`k3s-arm64` on arm64), `install.sh`, `k3s-airgap-images-<arch>.tar.zst` and `sha256sum-<arch>.txt`. k3s publishes checksums for these files and no signature. Check each file against `sha256sum-<arch>.txt`, and be clear with your security team that this is a checksum from the same origin, not a signature.
2. Put the binary and the system images where k3s looks for them, and install with downloads switched off:

```bash
sudo install -m 0755 k3s /usr/local/bin/k3s
sudo mkdir -p /var/lib/rancher/k3s/agent/images
sudo cp k3s-airgap-images-amd64.tar.zst /var/lib/rancher/k3s/agent/images/
sudo INSTALL_K3S_SKIP_DOWNLOAD=true INSTALL_K3S_EXEC="--write-kubeconfig-mode=0600" sh install.sh
sudo k3s kubectl wait --for=condition=Ready node --all --timeout=600s
```

cert-manager v1.21.3 is a prerequisite: the chart's own CA (certificate authority) is a cert-manager issuer. Bring across cert-manager's chart, `cert-manager-v1.21.3.tgz`, and its images. On the connected side, check the images with the cert-manager project's own key before they cross:

```bash
cosign verify --signature-digest-algorithm sha512 --insecure-ignore-tlog=true \
  --key cert-manager-pubkey-2021-09-20.pem quay.io/jetstack/<image>@<digest>
```

Inside the site, import the images into every node's container store under the names the cert-manager chart asks for, `quay.io/jetstack/cert-manager-<name>:v1.21.3`, then check them and install:

```bash
sudo k3s ctr -n k8s.io images import --all-platforms cert-manager-images.tar
sudo k3s ctr -n k8s.io images ls -q | grep cert-manager
helm install cert-manager cert-manager-v1.21.3.tgz -n cert-manager \
  --create-namespace --set crds.enabled=true --wait --timeout 10m
```

`--wait` is right for cert-manager. It's only Nexus that must not have it.




TIP

If the cert-manager pods sit in `ImagePullBackOff` on `quay.io/jetstack/...`, the images went in without their names, and the node is trying to fetch them from the internet. Check that every manifest in your archive carries its image name, import again, and the pods start.



Updates and new parts arrive on signed media

An air-gapped site upgrades from a disk too. In the console, **Import from media** on the This installation pages loads a release from a disk carried into the site. It checks every file's checksum, then the signature against the release key already installed on the site, never a key the disk brings, and then that the release is newer than the one running. Importing copies and checks only. People keep working on the running release, and nothing changes until you choose to upgrade.




SCREEN A release on a disk being imported at Harrow. The signature is checked against the key installed on the site, and the running version stays untouched until someone upgrades.

From the command line, the same release goes in with `nexusctl`:

```bash
nexusctl upgrade plan --bundle nexus-alpha-1.0.0-alpha.2-enterprise.tar
nexusctl upgrade apply --bundle nexus-alpha-1.0.0-alpha.2-enterprise.tar
```

`plan` shows what will change and changes nothing. `apply` takes a backup first and then upgrades. Chapter 2.15, Day two: operating Nexus, covers upgrades in full.

When a disk's signature doesn't match, the import is refused with `MEDIA_SIGNATURE_INVALID`. Nothing is loaded or copied in, and the running release keeps running. The page says which checks passed, where it stopped, and the key it expected beside the key it found. Keep the disk for your security team and ask Adverant for a new one.



SCREEN A refused import. Every checksum matched, but the signature was made by an unknown key, so nothing was loaded and the running release was left alone.

The Enterprise parts a licence switches on come the same way on an air-gapped site: on the release disk, through Import from media, before you switch them on. Each part is checked against the Adverant release key before it's turned on, so you never copy a binary into the cluster by hand.



Licences with no internet

A connected installation receives its licence by itself. An air-gapped one exchanges files with Adverant by hand, through the offline exchange.

1. The console's licence pages make a small licence request file. The installation signs it with its own key, so Adverant can tell which installation asked.
2. Someone carries the file out on a USB stick to a computer that is online, signs in to the Adverant account at `https://account.adverant.ai`, and uploads it on the **Offline exchange** page.
3. They bring the licence file back the same way.
4. Import it. In the console, open **Licence and what it unlocks** and press **Import a new licence**. From the command line:

```bash
nexusctl licence import harrow-port-licence.json
```

The licence is checked offline, inside the site, against Adverant's keys. Adverant signs every licence with two independent keys, and both signatures must verify.



SCREEN The Offline exchange page in the Adverant account, where a signed request file goes up and a licence file comes back.

The same exchange carries the yearly usage statement out. It holds counters only (seats, devices, feature groups), and the administrator reads it line by line on **Usage statement for Adverant** before it leaves.

Code	Status	What it means
`LICENCE_SIGNATURE_INVALID`	422	The file isn't a licence Adverant signed, or a byte changed after signing. Nothing changes.
`LICENCE_OTHER_INSTALLATION`	409	The licence is genuine but was issued for another installation. Ask for one issued for this installation's id.
`LICENCE_CLOCK_BEHIND_FLOOR`	409	The clock reads earlier than the latest time this installation has seen. Setting the clock back doesn't revive an expired licence.
`LICENCE_REVOKED`	403	Adverant withdrew the licence by a signed revocation. Enterprise parts stop being offered; Community and export stay.

Chapter 2.13, Licences, covers states, grace and renewal.

Revocation lists are imported by hand

When Adverant withdraws a licence, it publishes a signed revocation list. The list is cumulative: each one carries every licence withdrawn before it. A connected installation learns of it. An air-gapped one learns only when someone imports the list, so carry the latest list in with each release disk and import it through the installation's revocations import on the licence pages, or the `/api/v1/installation/licence/revocations` address on the sign-in host.

This cuts both ways. An air-gapped installation that never imports a list never learns that a licence was revoked, including a licence signed by a key that was later found to be compromised. Importing the list is the only way that news crosses the gap.



The sovereign sealed bundle: nexus-airgap

Some sovereign sites want a release as one sealed, signed file whose own manifest forbids network access. For them there's a second format, the sealed bundle, and its tool, `nexus-airgap`, from the package `@adverant/nexus-sovereign`. Install the tool from Adverant's package registry, separately from any bundle it will check. A bundle can't vouch for itself.

The sealed bundle is a single signed tarball. Its manifest is signed with Ed25519 and lists a SHA-256 for every file. The tool has four verbs.

Verb	What it does
`nexus-airgap bundle`	Builds a sealed bundle from a staged directory and signs its manifest.
`nexus-airgap verify --bundle <file> --trusted-key <pem> --profile <profile>`	Checks the signature against the trusted key, re-hashes every file, refuses any file the manifest doesn't list, and refuses a bundle whose network rule isn't the empty allow-list with local-only agent traffic. Changes nothing.
`nexus-airgap install`	Verifies, then carries out the install plan in order: load the images, apply the manifests, run the migrations, seed the skills, provision the keys.
`nexus-airgap open`	Opens the bundle's optional encrypted export with the site's own key custodian, which on an air-gapped site is the machine's TPM (Trusted Platform Module) chip.

Verify before anything else:

```bash
nexus-airgap verify --bundle nexus-alpha-1.0.0-alpha.1.tar.gz \
  --trusted-key release.pub --profile airgap --keep-staging > verify.json
jq '{ok, bundleId, profile, artifactsVerified}' verify.json
```

`--keep-staging` keeps the verified, unpacked copy and names it as `stagingDir` in the output, so you work from what was checked.

If verification fails with `BUNDLE_INTEGRITY_VIOLATION`, a file inside the bundle changed after it was signed. Stop there. The tool has a `--no-strict` switch that skips the check for unlisted files. Don't use it on a release.



The day the next disk arrives


Tomás keeps a short checklist taped inside the gatehouse cabinet, and it's worth copying. Check the tar's `.sha256`. Run `verify-bundle.sh` with the installed key and read the last line. Import the newest revocation list. Then, and only then, import the release from media and plan the upgrade. A disk that fails any of these steps goes back into its envelope, labelled, for the security team, and nothing on the network has changed.

Variations: external stores, TLS and ingress

The values that fit Nexus to a cluster that isn't a blank one, TLS (Transport Layer Security) included, along with databases you already run, your own certificates, another ingress controller, storage classes, mail, proxies, replicas and managed Kubernetes.

FOR OPERATORS

17 MIN READ



Harrow Port Authority's production cluster is not a blank one, and its TLS (Transport Layer Security) story alone has three parts. The database team runs PostgreSQL on its own machines and wants every database there, backed up their way. Certificates come from Harrow's internal CA (certificate authority) through cert-manager. The ingress controller isn't Traefik, and it lives in its own namespace. None of that needs a fork of the chart. Each difference is a value, and this chapter goes through them in the order Tomás Reilly met them.

Every values block in this chapter is a fragment. Merge the ones you need into your own values file, beside `global`, `hosts`, `edition` and `keys` from chapter 2.6, Installing Community on Kubernetes. The chart's schema refuses any key it doesn't know, so a misspelt key fails `helm lint --strict` and the install rather than being ignored. That's on purpose: a typo in `dataTier` that silently left a store in the cluster would be worse than an error.



External data stores

Nexus keeps its data in five stores. By default each runs inside the cluster from the release's own signed image, with its own volume.

Store	Values key	In-cluster default	Default volume
PostgreSQL 16 with PostGIS 3 and pgvector 0.8	`dataTier.postgres`	the release image	50Gi
Valkey 8.1	`dataTier.valkey`	the release image	5Gi
Neo4j 5.26 Community Edition	`dataTier.neo4j`	the release image	20Gi
Qdrant 1.15	`dataTier.qdrant`	the release image	10Gi
SeaweedFS 4.48, the object store compatible with Amazon S3 (Simple Storage Service)	`dataTier.objectStore`	the release image	50Gi

Any of them can be one you run instead. Set its `mode` to `external`, give its host, and name a Secret that holds its credentials. Add the store's address to `networkPolicy.externalEgressCIDRs` as well (see the network policy section below), because the namespace denies all other egress. For an external store the chart renders nothing of that store: no StatefulSet, no Service and no volume. The services connect to the host you gave.

```yaml
# harrow-external-postgres.yaml (Helm values)
dataTier:
  postgres:
    mode: external
    port: 5432
    sslmode: verify-full
    external:
      host: pg-nexus.db.harrow.example
      existingSecret: harrow-postgres
```

The Secret is created by you, in the namespace Nexus installs into, before the install. The chart only ever holds its name: the pods that need a credential read it from your Secret when they start, and nothing is copied into the chart's own Secrets. Change a credential and restart the pods that use it; there's nothing to render again.

Each store looks for fixed key names in its Secret:

Store	Keys in its Secret
PostgreSQL	`username` and `password` for a superuser on that server, and `ca.crt`, the certificate authority (CA) that signed the server's certificate

Valkey	`password`
Neo4j	`username` and `password`
Qdrant	`api-key`
Object store	`access-key` and `secret-key`

Load each value from a file, so it stays out of your shell history and out of your values file:

```bash
kubectl create namespace nexus
kubectl -n nexus create secret generic harrow-postgres \
  --from-file=username=./pg-username --from-file=password=./pg-password --from-file=ca.crt=./
harrow-db-ca.crt
```

An external store with no Secret named stops the render, exactly like one with no host.

PostgreSQL

The external server has to offer what the release image offers: PostgreSQL 16 with PostGIS 3 and pgvector. Traffic to it is always encrypted and checked against the `ca.crt` in your Secret. Set `sslmode` to `verify-full`, which also checks that the server's certificate names the host you gave, or to `verify-ca`. With an external server the render refuses `disable` and `require`. In-cluster Postgres is the opposite: its traffic never leaves the namespace, the network policy holds it there, and it takes `disable` only. Whichever mode you pick, the certificate has to name the host in `external.host`, because some of the services check the name on every connection.

On install, a bootstrap Job connects to the server with the account in your Secret and makes the roles Nexus runs as. It makes a migrator role that owns the schema, a runtime role, and one login role for each service. Nexus generates their passwords and keeps them. None of them is a superuser and none can bypass row-level security, so every isolation policy in the database applies to every service. The bootstrap itself does need a superuser: one of its steps locks down a built-in PostgreSQL function, and only a superuser may do that. Only the bootstrap and the console's own provisioning step use the account. A managed database service whose administrator role isn't a real superuser can't host the Nexus database for that reason.

The Job checks your server before it touches it. It stops, having changed nothing, if the account in your Secret isn't a superuser. If a role called `nexus` already exists with `SUPERUSER` or `BYPASSRLS`, the Job stops with `nexus-db-bootstrap: role nexus exists with SUPERUSER or BYPASSRLS on this server; nexus_migrator will not be made a member of it. Nothing more was done.` Remove those attributes from that role, or use a server where the name is free, and install again.

Valkey, Neo4j, Qdrant and the object store

The other four take the same three settings: `mode`, `external.host` and `external.existingSecret`. Here are all four switched to Harrow's own:

```yaml
# harrow-external-stores.yaml (Helm values)
dataTier:
  valkey:
    mode: external
    external: { host: valkey.db.harrow.example, existingSecret: harrow-valkey }
  neo4j:
    mode: external
    external: { host: neo4j.db.harrow.example, existingSecret: harrow-neo4j }
  qdrant:
    mode: external
    external: { host: qdrant.db.harrow.example, existingSecret: harrow-qdrant }
  objectStore:
    mode: external
    external: { host: objects.db.harrow.example, existingSecret: harrow-objects }
```

Run the versions the release images carry, listed in the table above, on the ports the services use. Valkey listens on 6379 and Neo4j on 7687; Qdrant takes 6333 and the object store 8333. The object store must be S3-compatible. The Valkey password goes into a connection address inside each pod, so keep it to letters and digits (the characters `-._~` are fine too).

If `mode` is `external` and `external.host` is empty, the render stops with `dataTier.<store>.external.host is required when mode is external`. Moving a store from in-cluster to external after people have used Nexus is a data migration you do yourself, and the chart won't copy anything for you. Decide before the first install.

The key store, OpenBao, isn't in this list and can't be external. It's part of the installation's identity and runs in the cluster on every install.



TLS at the public edge

`tls.mode` decides how the three public hosts get their certificates, and nothing more. Traffic between services always uses mutual TLS with certificates from the chart's own local CA, issued by cert-manager, whatever the mode. There's no service mesh, and `istio.enabled` stays `false`.

tls.mode	Who makes the certificate	What you must set
`existing` (the default)	You. One Secret holds a certificate for all three hosts.	`tls.existingSecret`
`cert-manager`	A ClusterIssuer you already run. The chart asks it for one certificate per host.	`tls.clusterIssuer`
`none`	Nobody in the cluster. TLS ends in front of it, at your load balancer or proxy.	Nothing, but read the warning below

existing

```yaml
# harrow-tls-existing.yaml (Helm values)
tls:
  mode: existing
  existingSecret: harrow-public-tls
```

Every Ingress serves the Secret `harrow-public-tls`, so its certificate must name `console.harrow.example`, `api.harrow.example` and `auth.harrow.example`. Create it in the namespace before you install:

```bash
kubectl -n nexus create secret tls harrow-public-tls --cert=harrow-public.crt --key=harrow-public.key
```

Preflight reads it, warns when it ends within 30 days, and names the Secret when it's missing. When the mode is `existing` and the name is empty, the render stops with `tls.existingSecret is required when tls.mode is existing`.

cert-manager

```yaml
# harrow-tls-cert-manager.yaml (Helm values)
tls:
  mode: cert-manager
  clusterIssuer: harrow-internal-ca
```

The chart adds the annotation `cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer` to each of the three Ingresses, and cert-manager makes the Secrets `nexus-console-tls`, `nexus-api-tls` and `nexus-auth-tls`. Without `tls.clusterIssuer` the render stops with `tls.clusterIssuer is required when tls.mode is cert-manager`.

If your issuer uses ACME (Automatic Certificate Management Environment) with the HTTP-01 challenge, nothing else is needed. The chart adds no redirect of its own, so a request for `/.well-known/acme-challenge/` reaches your issuer's solver unchanged. On a site with no internet, the solver is an image too: put cert-manager's `cert-manager-acmesolver` image in your registry, or every challenge pod waits in `ErrImagePull`.

none

```yaml
# harrow-tls-none.yaml (Helm values)
tls:
  mode: none
proxy:
  trustedCIDRs: "10.30.0.0/16"
```


With `none`, the Ingresses carry no TLS section. Use it when a load balancer or reverse proxy in front of the cluster ends TLS for the three hosts.



WATCH OUT

The browser must still reach `https://console.harrow.example`. The session cookie only travels over HTTPS, and passkeys need a secure context with a valid certificate. `tls.mode: none` moves where TLS ends. People still have to use HTTPS. Chapter 2.8, Single-machine installs, explains why plain HTTP can never sign anyone in.

`proxy.trustedCIDRs` names the proxy hops whose `X-Forwarded-For` header nexus-auth believes. The default, `10.42.0.0/16`, is k3s's pod network, where its ingress controller runs. On any other cluster, set it to the network your ingress controller's pods use, so that sign-in rate limits and audit records see the person's address and not the proxy's.



SCREEN Once installed, the address, certificate, proxy and mail each have their own test on one page, and the result is written in words.



Ingress controllers

The chart makes three plain Kubernetes Ingresses, one per public host. Each routes the path `/` to one Service.

Ingress	Host	Service and port
`nexus-console`	`hosts.console`	`nexus-alpha`, 3000
`nexus-api`	`hosts.api`	`nexus-gateway`, 9092
`nexus-auth`	`hosts.auth`	`nexus-auth`, 9101

Three values shape them, and one value in the network policy has to agree.

```yaml
# harrow-ingress.yaml (Helm values)
ingress:
  enabled: true
  className: harrow-nginx
  annotations:
    "<annotation-key>": "<annotation-value>"
networkPolicy:
  ingressNamespace: ingress-harrow
```

- `ingress.className` names the IngressClass. Left empty, the chart leaves the class off and the cluster's default class takes the three Ingresses. Preflight checks that the class exists or, when you named none, that exactly one class is marked default.

- `ingress.annotations` is added to all three Ingresses. Values are strings, so quote numbers and booleans. Use it for your controller's own settings.
- `ingress.enabled: false` renders no Ingress at all, for a site that routes to the three Services some other way.
- `networkPolicy.ingressNamespace` is the namespace your ingress controller runs in.

That last one catches people out. The chart's network policy denies all traffic into the namespace by default and then admits the ingress controller to the three public Services only from the namespace you name. The default, `kube-system`, is right for k3s, which runs Traefik there. With any other controller, leave it unchanged and the controller can't reach Nexus: the Ingresses exist, the controller logs connection timeouts, and the browser gets a gateway error. Preflight's "Ingress ports" check looks for a Service in that namespace open on ports 80 and 443, as a LoadBalancer or a NodePort, and its `fix` line names this value.




FIGURE The three public hosts, the ingress controller's namespace, and the network policy that admits only that namespace.

The rest of the network policy

`networkPolicy.enabled` is `true` by default and should stay so. With it, nothing in the namespace reaches outside except DNS (Domain Name System), the Kubernetes API (application programming interface) for the token reviewers, and the addresses you list.

```yaml
# harrow-network.yaml (Helm values)
networkPolicy:
  apiServerCIDRs: ["10.30.0.1/32"]
  externalEgressCIDRs: ["10.30.40.25/32"]
```

`apiServerCIDRs` is the API server's address as /32 CIDRs (Classless Inter-Domain Routing). Empty, the chart reads it from the cluster at install. `helm template` has no cluster to read, so give it there. `externalEgressCIDRs` is everything else a workload may reach, empty by default. Harrow lists its mail relay. Every external data store outside the namespace has to be listed here too, or the default-deny policy stops the services reaching it.

Only three workloads ever talk to the API server: the evidence service `nexus-probitas`, the orchestrator, and the key store's custody Job. They check the service-account tokens other workloads present. The policy gives the API server's address, on ports 6443 and 443, to those three and to nothing else. If the three can't reach it, they can't check the tokens other workloads present, so give every address it can have.

Choosing a TLS mode

Harrow chose `cert-manager` with its internal CA as a ClusterIssuer, and the reason was renewal. With `existing`, a person renews the certificate in the Secret before it ends, and preflight's 30-day warning is the only reminder. With `cert-manager`, renewal happens on its own and nobody has to remember. `none` suits a site where every public address already sits behind a load balancer that ends TLS for many systems, and where that team owns the certificates. Whichever you choose, the certificate a browser sees must be one the browser trusts. A self-signed certificate that people click through breaks passkeys, because Chrome won't make or use a passkey behind a certificate warning.



Storage, mail, and replicas and resources

Storage class

```yaml
# harrow-storage.yaml (Helm values)
storage:
  className: harrow-ssd
dataTier:
  postgres:
    size: 200Gi
  objectStore:
    size: 500Gi
```

`storage.className` applies to every data-tier PVC (persistent volume claim) and to the key store's volumes. Empty means the cluster's default class, and preflight fails when no class is marked default and you named none. Each in-cluster store has its own `size`. The key store's are `keys.openbao.storage.unsealer` and `keys.openbao.storage.keystore`, with `keys.receiptsStorage` for receipts. Pick sizes for a year's growth.

Mail

```yaml
# harrow-mail.yaml (Helm values)
smtp:
  existingSecret: harrow-smtp
```

Nexus sends invitations and notices through your mail server. `smtp.existingSecret` names a Secret you create, in the namespace, with the mail server's details. As with every integration, the chart takes a Secret's name and never a credential. Remember the network policy: add the relay's address to `networkPolicy.externalEgressCIDRs`, or mail stops at the namespace edge. Until mail works, invitations can't be sent, and the first administrator's checklist says so.

Replicas and resources

Each core component has a replica count and Kubernetes resources under `components`, and each in-cluster store has resources under `dataTier`.

```yaml
# harrow-sizing.yaml (Helm values)
components:
  console:  { replicas: 2, resources: { requests: { cpu: 200m, memory: 512Mi }, limits: { memory:
1Gi } } }
  auth:     { replicas: 2 }
  gateway:  { replicas: 2, resources: { requests: { cpu: 400m, memory: 1Gi }, limits: { memory:
2Gi } } }
  graphrag: { resources: { requests: { cpu: 400m, memory: 1Gi }, limits: { memory: 3Gi } } }
dataTier:
  postgres:
    resources: { requests: { cpu: "1", memory: 4Gi }, limits: { memory: 8Gi } }
  neo4j:
    heap: 2G
    pagecache: 1G
    resources: { requests: { cpu: 500m, memory: 4Gi }, limits: { memory: 4Gi } }
```

The default Neo4j pod asks for 2 GiB and may use up to 4 GiB. With 3 GB of heap and page cache, raise its request too, so the pod is placed on a node that has the memory.

The components with `replicas` and `resources` are `console`, `bff`, `auth`, `orchestrator`, `workflows`, `gateway`, `graphrag`, `probitas` and `skillsEngine`. The key service, `keys`, takes `resources` only. These core components are required and can't be switched off; the chart runs them whatever their `enabled` switch says. The data-tier stores run one replica each.

On slow storage, two more values give services time to start: `probes.startupFailureThreshold` (60 by default) and `schemaWait.timeoutSeconds` (1800), how long a service waits for its database migrations before its start-up container fails by name.



Sign-in sessions, rate limits and private model hosts

Three smaller groups of values are worth knowing before the install, because people notice them on the first day.

```yaml
# harrow-auth.yaml (Helm values)
auth:
  accessTokenTTL: 15m
  refreshTokenTTL: 12h
  rateLimitPerMinute: 5000
ai:
  installationHosts: [models.harrow.internal, .gpu.harrow.internal]
```

`auth.accessTokenTTL` and `auth.refreshTokenTTL` are how long a session's two tokens last. The defaults, 15 minutes and 12 hours, mean a person who closes the laptop in the evening signs in again in the morning. Shorten the refresh token if your policy asks for it, and expect more sign-ins.

`auth.rateLimitPerMinute` is the most requests one signed-in person may make to the sign-in service in a minute before it answers 429. The default, 5000, is about 83 a second from one account, plenty for the console and for scripts. An installation has no subscription plans, so every person gets the same limit. Lower it to tighten abuse protection, or raise it for heavy automation. Sign-in brute-force protection, such as account lockout and limits on second-check attempts, is separate and not set here.

`ai.installationHosts` lists extra host names inside the installation, for the organisation's own AI (artificial intelligence) model servers on private names. Each entry is a host name, a `.suffix` that matches every name under it, an IP address, or an IPv4 CIDR (Classless Inter-Domain Routing) block. The router treats them as part of the installation beside the release's own hosts. The model server itself is named in `ai.localProvider.baseUrl`; chapter 2.14, AI providers and models, covers both.



What is never a value

Some things people look for in a values file aren't there, on purpose.

Not in the values file	Why, and where it is instead
The licence	It's imported after the install, in the console or with `nexusctl licence import <file>`. A licence is never a chart value or a mounted file. Chapter 2.13, Licences, has the details.
Model keys	Each organisation keeps its own keys in its own pool, entered in the console. No AI provider credential is ever a chart value.
Sign-up hardening	The internet CAPTCHA and the sign-up network screen are both off on an installation, and there's no value to turn either on. The CAPTCHA would need the internet at every sign-up.

	The network screen would need a licensed geolocation database that the chart doesn't carry. A stranger's sign-up is held for an administrator's approval instead, as chapter 2.12, The first run, explains.
Telemetry	The schema accepts one setting for `telemetry.enabled`, which is `false`. Nothing leaves an installation, and the data tier's own reporting (Neo4j's usage report, Qdrant's telemetry) is switched off too.



Check the whole file before you install

With the fragments merged into one file, run two checks on it from your workstation. `helm lint --strict` validates every key against the chart's schema, and `helm template` renders the whole release for you to read before anything is made. The commands use the Community chart's address; for Enterprise, give the path of the Enterprise chart you downloaded instead (chapter 2.7, Installing Enterprise and applying a licence). A render on your workstation can't read the API server's address from a cluster, so set `networkPolicy.apiServerCIDRs` in the file first.

The two checks:

```bash
helm lint --strict oci://registry.adverant.ai/nexus/charts/nexus --version 1.0.0-alpha.1 -f
harrow-prod-values.yaml
helm template nexus oci://registry.adverant.ai/nexus/charts/nexus --version 1.0.0-alpha.1 \
  -n nexus -f harrow-prod-values.yaml > harrow-render.yaml
```

A misspelt key fails the lint with "additional properties" and names the key. A missing required value, such as a host when a store is external, fails the render with the sentence quoted in this chapter. `helm template` has no cluster to read, so give `networkPolicy.apiServerCIDRs` when you render offline, or it stops and asks for them.


Then run preflight with the same file. Preflight is the only check that reads the cluster and the values together: it's where a wrong ingress namespace, a missing storage class or a certificate that ends next week shows up before anybody depends on the install.

Managed Kubernetes

Nexus runs on any conformant Kubernetes 1.33 or later, a cloud provider's managed service included. Nothing in the chart is specific to one provider. What changes from k3s is a handful of values, each covered above:

- cert-manager v1.21.3 is installed first, as on any cluster. | On a managed cluster | What to set or check | |—|—| | Storage | Name the provider's class in `storage.className`, or mark one as default. | | Ingress | Install the ingress controller you use, expose it on ports 80 and 443, set `ingress.className` if it isn't the default, and set `networkPolicy.ingressNamespace` to its namespace. | | The proxy hops | Set `proxy.trustedCIDRs` to that controller's pod network. | | The API server | If the install can't read the API server's address from the cluster, give it in `networkPolicy.apiServerCIDRs`. | | Network policy enforcement | The chart's policies take effect only where the cluster's network plugin enforces NetworkPolicy. Choose a cluster configuration that does. | | Images | The nodes need to reach `registry.adverant.ai`, or your own registry named in `global.imageRegistry`. |

Run preflight before anything else. It reads the cluster and the values file together and prints each of these as a row, with the fix beside every one that misses. Chapter 2.5, Preflight with nexusctl, shows the report.




SCREEN A passing preflight on a production cluster. Each row is one requirement, and every warning carries its fix on the line below.

The first run

From an unclaimed installation to people at work. Make the claim code, claim the installation in a browser, create the first administrator with a passkey, then connect company sign-in and invite everyone else.

FOR OPERATORS

18 MIN READ



When an install finishes, the installation belongs to nobody. It has no organisation, no person and no session, and nobody can sign in. It waits for one person to prove, in a browser, that they're talking to the installation that was just made. At Harrow Port Authority that person was Aoife Brennan, head of IT, with Tomás Reilly beside her at the terminal. This chapter follows their first twenty minutes.

The order is fixed, and each step closes the one before it for good: claim the installation, create the first administrator and the organisation, set up a passkey and land on the Today page. After that come the six things to get ready, company sign-in, and inviting everyone else, in whatever order suits you.




FIGURE The first run, from the terminal to the first Today page, and the two places it can stop.

Make the claim code

The claim code proves that the person in front of the browser can also see the terminal of someone with access to the cluster. Only such a person can make one. Run this where your kubeconfig reaches the cluster:

```bash
nexusctl claim-code --administrator aoife.brennan@harrow.example
```

`nexusctl claim-code` asks the installation's key service, `nexus-keys`, to make the code. Without `nexusctl`, the same command runs in the key service's own pod:

```bash
kubectl -n nexus exec deploy/nexus-keys -- nexus-keys claim-code \
  --administrator aoife.brennan@harrow.example --source "Tomás Reilly, ops terminal"
```

`--source` is a few words saying who made the code. The claim page shows them under "Made by", so the person claiming knows where the code came from.

```
Code  7KQM-4TXD-PL9R  works once, for 30 minutes, until 09:55 · 5 tries
Fingerprint of this installation, to compare in the browser:
3F9A C21B 77E0 5D4C 9B12 A6F3 0E88 41D7
```

Three things about the code matter.


- It lasts 30 minutes. A code seen over someone's shoulder is soon useless.
- It allows 5 tries. After the fifth wrong attempt it's used up, whatever the time.
- It's for one person. The email you give is the first administrator's. It travels with the claim, and the first administrator's form shows it as fixed, not typed again.

The fingerprint is eight groups of four characters, the installation's own identity. Leave it on screen. You'll compare it, group by group, in the browser.



Claim the installation

1. On the computer you'll use as the first administrator, open the console's install address, here `https://console.harrow.example/install`. It sends you to the right page for the installation's state: the claim page while it's open, the first administrator's page once it's claimed, and the console if you're already signed in.
2. On **Claim this installation**, type the code into **Group one**, **Group two** and **Group three**, one group of four in each.
3. Compare the page's **Fingerprint of this installation** with the terminal, all eight groups, one at a time.
4. If every group matches, tick **All eight groups match what my terminal shows**.
5. Press **Claim this installation**, and the page confirms the claim and sends you on to the first administrator.



SCREEN The claim page. The code goes in three groups, the full fingerprint is shown in eight groups of four to compare with the terminal, and the card on the right says where the code came from and how many tries are left.


Claiming does three things. It makes this browser the only place the first administrator can be created. It records who claimed the installation, and when, in the audit log. And it turns the claim page off for good. From then on, the claim address answers that the installation has been claimed.

If the fingerprint doesn't match, stop

A different fingerprint means a different installation is answering at this address. It might be a mistyped address, a stale DNS (Domain Name System) record, or a machine set up to catch the first administrator. If you claimed it, that machine would hold your organisation.

Don't claim, and don't type the code on that page. Close the page, then check two things: that `console.harrow.example` resolves to your ingress, and that the certificate the browser shows is issued by the CA (certificate authority) you expect. Your own installation is unchanged and still unclaimed.

If a claim is sent with a fingerprint that isn't the installation's, the key service refuses it with `CLAIM_FINGERPRINT_MISMATCH` (403). Nothing is claimed. The page then shows the two fingerprints side by side with the groups that differ marked, and the steps to check the address and the certificate.



SCREEN The page a mismatched fingerprint leads to. The differing groups are marked, and the steps check the address and the certificate before anything else is typed.



Create the first administrator and the organisation

The page that follows is headed "Two short forms, then you are in". The first administrator can add everyone else, and almost everything here can change later. Two things can't, and the page marks them.

Field	What goes in	Can it change later?
Full name	Your name	Yes
Work email	The address the claim code was made for, shown and not typed again	It's the administrator's address
Role in Nexus	Organisation administrator. The first person is always an administrator.	Not chosen here
Second check	Passkey on this laptop	Yes, more can be added
Name (of the organisation)	Harrow Port Authority	Yes
Country	Where the organisation is based	Yes
Short name in addresses	Made from the name, such as `harrow-port-authority`	**No.** Links and exports use it.
Where data is kept	This installation	**No.** Changing it later means a new installation.
Language and dates	English (UK), with today's date	Yes
Time zone	The server's time zone	Each person sees times in their own


The short name is lower-case letters, digits and hyphens, up to 100 characters, made from the organisation's name with accents removed. Look at it before you press anything. It appears in every link people share and every export they make, for as long as the organisation exists.

You also set a password on this page. It's never enough on its own: an administrator never signs in with a password alone. The second check, below, is what signs you in.

An emergency administrator sign-in is made at the same time. It's sealed and printed once, for the safe. It works only when company sign-in is down, and every use is recorded and announced to all administrators. Put it in the safe the day you print it.

The page also says that Adverant is not told who you are. These details stay on the installation. A licence names the company, never the people in it.

Press **Create and sign in**. Creating the administrator and the organisation takes a few seconds. The page answers "Made for aoife.brennan@harrow.example. Now set up your passkey: it is how you sign in."



SCREEN The first administrator and the organisation on one page. The two choices that can never change, the short name and where data is kept, say so beside the field, and the emergency sign-in is sealed for the safe.



The passkey: the second check

1. Press **Set up the passkey and sign in**.
2. Your browser asks you to make a passkey. On a laptop with Touch ID or Windows Hello, confirm with your finger, face or PIN. If the computer can't make a passkey itself, the browser shows a QR (quick response) code: point your phone's camera at it and follow the phone.
3. The page answers "Your passkey is set up and you are signed in as aoife.brennan@harrow.example." and opens the console.

You have ten minutes from **Create and sign in** to make the passkey, in the same browser. After that the setup is closed, and the administrator exists with no passkey. An operator has to help, as described under retries below.

From now on the first administrator signs in with that passkey. A full administrator's password, typed on its own, never makes a session: the sign-in service answers with a request for the second check. That's a property of the design, and the reason the passkey matters. A lost passkey is a lost way in, so add a second one, on a phone or a security key, on the first day.

Later, people sign in to the installation with a passkey, with Google, with GitHub, or with their company's sign-in, whichever the organisation allows.

Code	What it means	What to do
`PASSKEY_UNSUPPORTED`	This browser can't make a passkey. Nothing was set up.	Open the page in a browser that supports passkeys, on the same computer.
`PASSKEY_CANCELLED`	The prompt was closed, or nothing was chosen in time. Nothing was sent.	Press the button again.




WATCH OUT

Use the real address over HTTPS. A passkey needs a secure context with a valid certificate, and the session cookie travels over HTTPS only. A page opened through a plain port-forward can't make a passkey or keep a session. Chapter 2.8, Single-machine installs, shows how to reach the console over HTTPS on a laptop.



The first Today page

The console opens on Today, and on the first day almost everything on it is empty. Each empty area says what will appear there and gives the button that starts it, so "Needs an administrator" says requests will wait there once people join, with **Invite people** beside it. The set-up checklist says how many of its steps are done, in any order. The one real history, the set-up itself, is already under "What changed": the installation set up, and the first administrator's passkey made.



SCREEN Today on the first day. Every empty area says what will appear there and how to start it, and "What changed" already holds the set-up itself.

Six things before anyone signs in

The page **Six things before anyone signs in** lists what must be true before people are invited. It isn't a wizard. Do them in any order, and the page counts them ("Three of six true").


Thing	What makes it true
Licence	An Enterprise licence imported. Chapter 2.13, Licences. Community needs no licence.
Address and certificate	The public address answers with a certificate whose chain is complete.
Backups	A backup schedule set, with a target that can be written to.

Company sign-in	Connected and tested. Until then, people use passkeys.
Mail	A mail server set. Until then, invitations can't be sent.
AI model	An AI (artificial intelligence) model: an organisation model key, or a model on your own hardware. Until then, the assistant waits. Chapter 2.14, AI providers and models.

Invite people opens when all six are true.

The same page lists what becomes fixed once people sign in, with the reason for each: the short name in addresses, where data is kept, and the key custodian (keys can move from a software custodian to hardware, never back). The organisation's name is listed too, because it's worth checking, though it can change.

Nexus won't answer anyone's AI request until the organisation has a model. There's no shared key behind an installation and no fallback, so an organisation with no model key gets a plain refusal that tells an administrator what to add.



SCREEN Six checks in any order, counted in words. The choices that become fixed once people sign in are listed with the reason, so nobody finds out later.


Company sign-in

Most organisations want people to sign in with the accounts they already have. Connect your identity provider on the company sign-in page: over OIDC (OpenID Connect) on Community, or over OIDC or SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) on Enterprise.

1. Choose the provider and the standard it uses.
2. Enter the application identity and the application secret your identity provider gave you. The secret is never shown again after you save it.
3. Say who may sign in, for example anyone with an `@harrow.example` address.
4. Press **Test sign-in** and sign in as yourself. The result says, in words, who signed in and what the provider sent.
5. Save.

Community gets one company sign-in for the organisation. Enterprise adds enforcement and directory sync. Enforcement turns passwords off, so everyone must use company sign-in, and a password attempt is refused with `SSO_REQUIRED` and a button to the right way in. Directory sync copies people and groups from your directory every 15 minutes, and can make administrators from one named group.

When company sign-in stops answering, people already signed in stay signed in, and a new sign-in is refused with `IDP_UNREACHABLE` (503). An administrator can then use the emergency administrator sign-in from the safe, together with their passkey. Every use is written to the audit log, announced to every administrator, and ends after four hours or when company sign-in returns.



SCREEN Company sign-in with a test. The provider, the standard in small type, and a test sign-in whose result is written in words before anyone relies on it.


Invite people

With mail set up, invite people from the People page. For each, give their email and a role:

- Member uses everything the organisation has and changes no settings.
- Administrator also manages people, models, budgets and settings.

An invitation lasts 7 days. The person opens it, sees who invited them, their role and what they'll see, and signs in. A second check is asked for on their first sign-in.

Invited members sign in to the console and do their daily work there: Today, the assistant, team chat, files and search, notebooks, agents and workflows, as their role allows. Administrators see the administration pages as well. A member who opens an administrator's page gets the "Not an administrator" page. It shows the settings read-only, says why, and offers to ask an administrator.



SCREEN An invitation chooses the person's role before they arrive, Member or Administrator, and can carry a short note.

Sign-ups need approval

People can also ask to join by signing up themselves. On an installation, a stranger's sign-up doesn't create a working account. nexus-auth refuses it with `SIGNUP_REQUIRES_APPROVAL` (403) and holds it for an administrator's approval.

Two other sign-up controls exist on Adverant's hosted service and are off on every installation, with no value to turn them on. The internet CAPTCHA would need the internet at every sign-up. The sign-up network screen would need a licensed geolocation database the installation doesn't carry. Approval is the installation's gate.



Retries, expired codes and other refusals

Every refusal in the first run says what happened, that nothing changed where that's true, and what to do next.

Code	Status	When	What to do

`CLAIM_CODE_EXPIRED`	410	The 30 minutes have passed. Nothing was claimed and nothing changed.	Make a new code with `nexusctl claim-code --administrator <email>`, then press **I have a new code**.
`CLAIM_FINGERPRINT_MISMATCH`	403	The fingerprint sent isn't this installation's.	Stop. Check the address and the certificate.
`TRANSITION_NOT_PERMITTED`	409	A step that has already happened was asked for again: the claim on a claimed installation, or the first administrator a second time.	Sign in at the console; the first administrator adds everyone else.
`TRANSITION_NOT_PERMITTED`	409	The passkey step, from a browser with no first administrator waiting, or after its ten minutes.	See below.
`RATE_LIMITED`	429	Too many attempts on the first-run pages in a minute. Nothing was sent.	Wait the seconds the page gives, then try again.

A code with no tries left reads "This code has no tries left". Make a new one, the same as for an expired code. Only someone with access to the cluster can, which is the point.

The first-run pages take 20 attempts a minute between them. If you didn't make those attempts, someone else on your network is trying the page, and that's worth knowing.

When the passkey step was missed

If the first administrator was created but no passkey was made within ten minutes, or the browser was closed, the administrator exists with no way to sign in. The passkey step answers `TRANSITION_NOT_PERMITTED` with the words "If you made the first administrator in this browser over ten minutes ago, ask an operator: the administrator exists and has no passkey yet". The claim is spent at that point, so a new claim code won't help. Ask the operator who ran the install before anything else is tried.

When the browser lost the claim

The claim lives in the browser that made it, in a cookie the page can't read. If that browser loses it between the claim and the first administrator, for example in a private window that was closed, the first administrator's form also accepts the claim file and its setup secret, pasted in by hand.

Once Aoife had her passkey, Tomás closed his terminal. The claim page was off, the first administrator existed, and every other way in now ran through her.


PART 2 · CHAPTER 2.13

Licences

What a Nexus licence file contains, how the installation checks it offline, the six states it can be in, and how you request, import, renew and withdraw one.

FOR OPERATORS

19 MIN READ



Harrow Port Authority runs Nexus Enterprise on its own Kubernetes cluster at `harrow.example`, with no route from the cluster to the internet. Each year Aoife Brennan, head of IT, renews the contract, and Tomás Reilly, the platform engineer, carries a small JSON file across the gap and imports it. Nothing restarts, and the licence page shows a new end date.

This chapter is about that file. In short, a licence is one signed JSON document bound to one installation. The installation checks it itself, with public keys baked into the image, and makes no network call to do so. A licence is never a Helm value and never a mounted file. You import it through the console, `nexusctl` or the application programming interface (API), and nowhere else.



The licence document

A licence is one JSON object in the format `nexus-licence/v1`. Here is Harrow's, with the two signature values shortened.

```json
{
  "format": "nexus-licence/v1",
  "licence_id": "8c1e4f2a-6b0d-4e7a-9f31-2d5c7a9e0b14",
  "issued_at": "2026-12-14T10:20:00Z",
  "type": "alpha",
  "channel": "alpha",
  "licensee": { "name": "Harrow Port Authority", "customer_id": "harrow-port-authority" },
  "scope": {
    "deployment": { "installation_id": "4b7d2e90-1c5a-4f8e-a3d6-7e0b9c2f5a18" },
    "tenants": []
  },
  "edition": "enterprise",
  "grants": [
    { "feature_group": "enterprise-base", "scope": "deployment" },
    { "feature_group": "map-and-geoai", "scope": "deployment" }
  ],
  "add_ons": ["mail"],
  "domain_packs": ["logistics-and-maritime"],
  "metric": { "kind": "per-environment", "quantity": 1 },
  "term": { "starts_on": "2027-01-01", "ends_on": "2027-12-31", "warn_days": 30, "grace_days":
30 },
  "matrix": { "version": 1, "sha256": "<64 lower-case hexadecimal characters>" },
  "signatures": {
    "ed25519": { "key_id": "licence-ed-2026a", "sig": "<86 characters>" },
    "p256": { "key_id": "licence-p256-2026a", "sig": "<86 characters>" }
  }
}
```

Every field is required, and every object in the document is closed. A member the format does not list is refused, so nothing can ride along outside the signature.

Field	What it holds
`format`	Exactly `nexus-licence/v1`. Any other value, a later version included, is refused.
`licence_id`	A lower-case UUID (universally unique identifier). An installation imports each licence id once.
`issued_at`	The instant Adverant issued it, as `YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ssZ`.
`type`	`alpha`, `evaluation` or `commercial`.
`channel`	The release channel it was issued for, such as `alpha`. Signed and carried; the check does not branch on it.
`licensee.name`	1 to 200 characters, signed exactly as written. `Brennan` and `Brennán` are two different names with two different signatures.
`licensee.customer_id`	Your customer id at Adverant: lower case, digits, `.`, `_` and `-`.

`scope.deployment.installation_id`	The installation's identity, minted by its key service at the first install.
`scope.tenants`	Organisation ids, up to 1,000. Empty unless some grant is tenant-scoped.
`edition`	`enterprise` or `team`. An Enterprise licence always grants `enterprise-base`.
`grants`	1 to 500 `{feature_group, scope}` pairs, each group named once.
`add_ons`	Add-on ids from the edition matrix, up to 100. May be empty.
`domain_packs`	Domain pack ids from the edition matrix, up to 100. May be empty.
`metric`	`kind` is `per-environment`, `per-core` or `named-seat`; `quantity` is a whole number from 1.
`term`	`starts_on` and `ends_on` are dates; `warn_days` and `grace_days` are whole numbers from 0 to 365.
`matrix`	The edition matrix version the groups are written against, and the SHA-256 of that matrix file, kept for audit.
`signatures`	Two signatures, `ed25519` and `p256`. The one field that is not signed.

Dates are calendar dates in UTC, and the day must exist: `2028-02-29` is fine and `2027-02-29` is refused.



NOTE

The installation id is permanent. It is minted once, under the installation name you gave the chart in `keys.installationName`, when the key store first starts. A licence names that id, so a licence for Harrow's production cluster will never verify on Harrow's test cluster. Each installation needs its own licence.



Two signatures, both required

Adverant signs every licence with two independent keys. One signature is Ed25519. The other is ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) on the P-256 curve from NIST (the US National Institute of Standards and Technology), which buyers who need US federal algorithms ask for. Both are made over the same bytes, and both must verify. A document with one half missing, or either half wrong, counts as no licence at all.

The signed bytes are the RFC 8785 canonical form of the document with `signatures` taken out, so whitespace and the order of the members in your file make no difference. A single changed character in the licensee's name, the dates or a grant is a different document, and it fails.

The public keys the check uses live in a trust-roots file baked into each image at release build. No environment variable, flag or mount names another file. When Adverant replaces a signing key, the old key signs the new one and the next signed release carries the new key. A licence signed with a new key verifies on a release that carries it, so after a key change you may need to upgrade before importing (see chapter 2.17, Troubleshooting).



Types, editions and how a licence is counted

The `type` says what kind of agreement the licence comes from:

- `alpha`: a licence for the alpha release channel, which is the kind Harrow holds.

- `evaluation`: a self-hosted trial of Enterprise. It runs for at most 30 days, for at most 5 named people (metric `named-seat`), with `grace_days` set to 0. The format refuses an evaluation with any grace at all.
- `commercial`: a contracted licence.

The `metric` records how the licence is counted: `per-environment` (Harrow's production cluster is one environment), `per-core` or `named-seat`. Adverant quotes the price; the licence carries only the measure and the quantity.

The licence `edition` is `enterprise` for every Enterprise installation. The format also accepts `team`, where the licence grants the `team` group and never `enterprise-base`.



Feature groups, add-ons and domain packs

What a licence lets people use is listed by feature group, using the ids of the edition matrix. Harrow's licence grants `enterprise-base` (custom roles, four-eyes approvals, long audit retention, company sign-in with enforcement and directory sync, business units, the operator pages and the rest of the Enterprise base) and `map-and-geoai`. It carries the `mail` add-on and the `logistics-and-maritime` domain pack.


The matrix has rules about what goes together, and Adverant's issuing checks them before a licence is signed. Every add-on and every pack needs `enterprise-base`. Some packs need add-ons: the Logistics and maritime pack needs Map and GeoAI, the Insurance pack and the Capital markets and asset management pack need Decision rooms and sealed records, and the Legal and professional services pack needs Decision rooms and Mail. The phone screens of every pack also need the Mobile apps add-on.

Each grant has a scope:

- `deployment`: the group applies to the whole installation, for every organisation on it.
- `tenant`: the group applies only to the organisations listed in `scope.tenants`. A licence with a tenant-scoped grant must list at least one organisation, and a list of organisations with no tenant-scoped grant is refused.

Suppose Harrow's pilotage team ran as a second organisation on the same installation, and only that organisation were to hold Ideas. The grant would read `{ "feature_group": "ideas", "scope": "tenant" }`, with the pilotage organisation's id in `scope.tenants`. If the licence were imported before that organisation existed, the import answer would count it under `tenants_without_organisation`, and the grant would reach it once the organisation was made.

An administrator can narrow what a group reaches. Only a licence from Adverant adds a group.



SCREEN The licence page lists every feature group with how it is protected and what it covers. Groups the licence doesn't hold stay in the list, greyed, so people can see what exists.



The term: warning and grace

The `term` sets four dates on the calendar. From `starts_on` to `ends_on` the licence is in force. `warn_days` sets how early the warning starts, and `grace_days` how long everything keeps working after the end. Licences Adverant issues carry 30 days of each unless the contract says otherwise. An evaluation always has `grace_days` 0.

For Harrow's licence above, the calendar works out like this:

Dates	State
1 January 2027 to 1 December 2027	VALID
2 December 2027 to 31 December 2027	WARN
1 January 2028 to 30 January 2028	GRACE
From 31 January 2028	RESTRICT

The last day of the term, `ends_on`, is still a WARN day. The day after it is GRACE, or RESTRICT when there is no grace.

The six states

Every time the licence is read, the installation recomputes its state from the document and the current date. Nothing is cached past a day boundary, so an expiry happens on time without a scheduled job.

State	When	What people can do
ABSENT	No licence imported, or the document was refused	The Community floor. Enterprise areas show as teasers with who can turn them on.
VALID	`starts_on` to `ends_on` minus `warn_days`	Every granted group is entitled.
WARN	The last `warn_days` days of the term	Entitled, and administrators see an in-product banner with the end date.
GRACE	After `ends_on`, for `grace_days` days	Entitled, with the notice `LICENCE_IN_GRACE` on Today and on the licence page.
RESTRICT	After the grace period	No new work can start under a licensed group. Running work finishes, reads and exports keep working, and security fixes keep arriving.
TERMINATE	Adverant revoked the licence	Enterprise artefacts stop being offered. The Community floor and data export remain.

In every state, running work keeps running, security fixes keep arriving, exports stay readable and nothing is deleted. In RESTRICT, a person who tries to start new Enterprise work sees a refusal plate with the code `LICENCE_LOCKED` and the name of whoever can renew.




FIGURE The licence states along the calendar.

How the current date is worked out

A clock can be wrong, and a clock can be set back on purpose. So the installation never reads the clock alone. The current date is the later of two instants: the wall clock and a stored floor, which is the latest instant the installation has seen. The floor moves forward on every import and every state

read, and it never moves back on its own. Setting the clock back a month does not bring an expired licence back to VALID; a RESTRICT licence stays RESTRICT.

When the clock reads earlier than the floor, the state carries the notice `LICENCE_CLOCK_BEHIND_FLOOR` and is read at the floor's day. If the clock genuinely ran ahead (a node booted with the wrong date and the floor was carried forward), ask Adverant for a time-reset token. It's a small signed document bound to your installation id and a one-time nonce, with a `floor_to` instant. You import it through the API with this request:

```bash
curl --fail-with-body -X POST https://auth.harrow.example/api/v1/installation/licence/time-reset
\
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <access-token>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  --data-binary @harrow-time-reset.json
```

`<access-token>` is the access token of an installation administrator. A token is applied when both signatures verify, its installation id is yours and its nonce has not been used. A refused token changes nothing, so it can never be used to refuse a good licence. A token whose nonce was already used is refused with `LICENCE_CLOCK_BEHIND_FLOOR`.



Requesting a licence

Licences are requested and downloaded from your Adverant account at `https://account.adverant.ai`. Who in your organisation may claim deployments and download licences is set on the account's Organisation and team roles page.

Adverant needs to know which installation the licence is for, and there are three ways to tell it.

A one-time code, for an installation with a screen. The installation shows a one-time code and its fingerprint. On the Claim a deployment page you paste the code, then compare the fingerprint group by group with what the installation shows. When every group matches, you claim it for your organisation, and the licence arrives on the account.

A claim key, for an appliance or an edge device. These have no screen to show a code. The serial number and a claim key are printed on the box and in the equipment maker's order. Enter them on the Enter a claim key page one at a time, or drop the maker's order file to claim many at once. Each key is checked against Adverant's record of what was shipped to you, and a key from someone else's order is refused.

A signed licence request, for an installation with no outside connection. This is Harrow's route. On the installation, an administrator makes a request file under This installation, Licence. It is a statement of kind `licence-request` naming the installation id, signed with the installation's own Ed25519 key. Tomás carries it out on approved media, drops it on the Offline exchange page, and downloads the licence file that comes back. The licence works only on the installation that made the request.



SCREEN The offline exchange for an installation with no outside connection. Each file that crosses the gap is signed, so a file changed on the way is refused, and every exchange is listed with who made it.




FIGURE How a licence reaches an installation with no outside connection.


Importing a licence

There are three ways in, and they all reach the same endpoint on nexus-auth. Only an installation administrator can import: an owner or administrator of the whole organisation that owns the installation, signed in to it, or a full platform administrator. Anyone else is refused before the file is read.


In the console

On a new installation, Import the licence is one of the six checks on Six things before anyone signs in. When you drop the file on the page, the console checks it on the installation, offline, and lists its feature groups with how each is protected and the term.

Later imports go through This installation, Licence: use Import a new licence, or Import a renewed licence when the current one has run out. A Community installation moving to Enterprise uses From Community to Enterprise. That page reads the licence first and shows what will be fetched and what changes, before anything happens. Nothing is fetched until someone chooses Fetch and switch on. The Enterprise parts then come from `registry.adverant.ai` with the installation's pull token, each one checked against the Adverant release key, and the groups switch on one at a time. It's the same installation afterwards, with the same people, files, workflows and channels.



SCREEN Importing the licence during set-up. The genuine file lists its feature groups; a copy with two changed lines is shown as absent with the code LICENCE_SIGNATURE_INVALID, and the licence already in force is left alone.



SCREEN Moving a Community installation to Enterprise. The licence has been read and found genuine, and the page lists the parts to fetch and what changes before anyone presses Fetch and switch on.

With nexusctl

```bash
nexusctl licence import harrow-2027.licence.json
```

The command imports the file unchanged and prints the licence's current state. Add `--explain` to print the operations it would run without running them.

Through the API

```bash
curl --fail-with-body -X POST https://auth.harrow.example/api/v1/installation/licence \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <access-token>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  --data-binary @harrow-2027.licence.json
```

Send the file exactly as Adverant gave it to you. Don't reformat it, and don't wrap it in another object: the body is the document. The route takes no query string, and a body of more than 1 MiB is refused. A top-level member that names an organisation or a person is refused with `TENANT_NOT_A_PARAMETER` or `ACTOR_NOT_A_PARAMETER`, because the installation's licence belongs to the installation that the token's organisation owns.

A good import answers `201`. The body holds the licence view (its id, its current state, the licensee, the edition, the term, the grants and the feature groups), how many organisations now hold it, and how many listed tenants have no organisation yet. The licence, its SHA-256 digest and the ledger rows for each organisation are written in one transaction, and the import is recorded in the audit log.

Two read routes go with it:

- `GET /api/v1/installation/licence/state` answers the state, recomputed on every read. An administrator gets the full view. Any other member of an organisation on the installation gets only the notice: the state, the notice code (`LICENCE_ENDS_SOON`, `LICENCE_IN_GRACE` or

`LICENCE_CLOCK_BEHIND_FLOOR`) and the dates the notice names. A member never sees the licensee, the term or the groups, because those belong to the installation's owner.

- `GET /api/v1/installation/licence/document` answers the imported document, raw, for administrators. Each Enterprise module fetches it and checks the signatures again with its own compiled-in verifier, so a modified identity service cannot switch on a group the licence doesn't grant.

Every refusal

A refused import changes nothing, not even the clock floor, and the refusal is recorded in the audit log.

Code	HTTP	Meaning	What to do
`LICENCE_FORMAT_INVALID`	422	The file isn't a licence this build can read: not JSON, not the schema, dates out of order or a group named twice.	Send the file exactly as Adverant gave it to you.
`LICENCE_SIGNATURE_INVALID`	422	One of the two signatures is missing, or the file changed after signing.	Ask Adverant for the file again, and don't edit it.
`LICENCE_ROOT_UNKNOWN`	422	It's signed with a key this release's trust roots don't hold.	Ask for a licence signed for this release's roots, or upgrade.
`LICENCE_MATRIX_MISMATCH`	422	It's written against an edition matrix this build doesn't read, or grants a group the build's catalogue doesn't know.	Upgrade to a release that reads it, or ask for a licence written against this release.
`LICENCE_OTHER_INSTALLATION`	409	It was issued for another installation id.	Ask for a licence for this installation's identity.
`LICENCE_REVOKED`	403	Adverant has withdrawn this licence.	Ask Adverant for a new licence.
`LICENCE_LOCKED`	403	The licence hasn't begun: the current date is before `starts_on`.	Import it again on or after its first day.
`TRANSITION_NOT_PERMITTED`	409	A licence with this id was imported already.	Ask Adverant for a new licence if the terms must change.
`RECORD_NOT_FOUND`	404	The installation hasn't been declared yet, so it has no identity to check against.	Finish the first administrator step, then import.
`VALIDATION_FAILED`	400	The body couldn't be read, is over 1 MiB, or the request had a query string.	Send the file alone as the body, with no query.

The installation checks in a fixed order, and the first failure names the code. A missing half is reported before an unknown key, and a document whose signatures fail is never read further, so a tampered file that also names another installation still answers `LICENCE_SIGNATURE_INVALID`.



Renewal

A renewal is a new licence with a new `licence_id`. Import it the same way as the first. It takes effect at once, whatever state the old one had reached: from WARN, GRACE or RESTRICT the

installation goes straight back to licensed, and nothing needs reinstalling. Adverant can also issue a changed licence mid-term, for example to add Decision rooms, and you import that the same way.



WATCH OUT

Ask for a renewal whose `starts_on` is no later than the day you plan to import it. A licence that hasn't begun is refused with `LICENCE_LOCKED`, and nothing is imported, so a renewal dated 1 January can't be loaded on 28 December. If the old licence is already in grace, that gap matters.

Importing the same licence twice is refused with `TRANSITION_NOT_PERMITTED`.



Revocation

Adverant withdraws a licence by signing a revocation list. The list has a `sequence` number and names each withdrawn licence id with when and why. Lists are cumulative: each one carries every id revoked before it. You import it the same way as a licence:

```bash
curl --fail-with-body -X POST https://auth.harrow.example/api/v1/installation/licence/revocations
\
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <access-token>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  --data-binary @revocations-12.json
```


A list whose sequence isn't higher than the last one imported is refused with `TRANSITION_NOT_PERMITTED`, so an old list can't be put back in place of a newer one. A list that doesn't read or doesn't verify is refused with the same codes as a licence. Once a list names your licence, its state is TERMINATE.

An installation with no outside connection only learns of a revocation when someone imports the list. For Harrow, revocation is a matter of contract as much as of software, and Tomás imports each list Adverant sends at the next crossing.



Seats over the licence

The licence's quantity is a promise about use, and Nexus treats going over it as a warning, never a lock-out. When more people use Nexus than the licence covers, administrators see the plate `SEATS_OVER_LICENCE` on the People page. Everyone keeps working. The plate says by when to put it right (30 days), shows where the extra people came from, and offers the two fixes: remove people who don't need Nexus, or ask Adverant for more seats. Adding seats is a sensitive change that needs a second person, and the extra seats are counted in the yearly usage statement.



SCREEN More people than seats. Directory sync added 143 contractors, and the plate gives 30 days to remove people or add seats while nobody is locked out.

The usage statement holds counters only, and you can read every line before it leaves. Harrow saves it as a file and carries it out through the offline exchange.



Evaluations

An evaluation is a licence of type `evaluation`, started from the account's Trials page for a claimed deployment. It lasts at most 30 days, covers at most 5 named people, and has no grace. On the day after `ends_on` it goes straight to RESTRICT: Enterprise areas return to teasers and nothing made during the evaluation is deleted. Idea runs, drafted policies and mail rules are kept exactly as they were, and they open again once a licence is imported.


An organisation runs one self-hosted evaluation at a time.

AI providers and models

How the artificial intelligence (AI) Provider Router picks a model from the organisation's own pool of keys, and how scripts and AI tools reach Nexus from outside.

FOR OPERATORS

16 MIN READ



Harrow Port Authority runs two installations. The one on its air-gapped operations network (chapter 2.10, Air-gapped installation) has no hosted provider at all. On the connected corporate installation, which this chapter follows, most questions are answered by a model running on two graphics processing unit (GPU) nodes in the port's own server room. A Google Gemini key, paid for by Harrow, takes the overflow when the local model is busy, and Aoife Brennan has locked the organisation's artificial intelligence (AI) traffic to the EU. Nobody at Harrow configured a model inside a service or a plugin. They told one component what Harrow owns, and that component decides every call.

This chapter covers that component, the AI Provider Router, which Part 1 and the console call the AI switchboard, and the pool of keys it draws on. It ends with the ways scripts and AI tools reach Nexus from outside: keys for scripts, the REST (representational state transfer) application programming interface (API) and the Model Context Protocol (MCP).



The AI Provider Router

The router runs inside the gateway, nexus-gateway. It is the only service that holds an organisation's model credentials, and it makes the final decision about which provider and which model answer each request. Every other part of Nexus asks it. A workflow step says what it would like, and the router decides.

Only a few services may ask, and each list is fixed by the chart:

What is asked	Who may ask
A completion (`/internal/ai/chat` and its stream)	nexus-orchestrator, nexus-workflows, nexus-skills-engine
Tool calls and the other internal AI routes	nexus-orchestrator, nexus-workflows
Embeddings and reranking	nexus-graphrag, nexus-skills-engine, nexus-workflows

Each internal route checks two things in turn: the caller's internal service key, and the caller's identity against the list above. A request without the key is refused with `MISSING_SERVICE_KEY` (401), a wrong key with `INVALID_SERVICE_KEY` (403), a request that doesn't say who is calling with `MISSING_CALLER_IDENTITY` (403), and a caller outside the list with `UNAUTHORIZED_CALLER` (403). None of these is retried, because none of them is a passing fault.

Apps and plugins never appear on that list. A plugin declares its wishes on the skills it registers and dispatches through UNO, the workflow engine. The orchestrator then asks the router on the plugin's behalf. This is why one leaked plugin secret can act as that plugin but can't spend anybody's model budget.




FIGURE How a request reaches a model.

The organisation's pool of keys

Model keys belong to the organisation. Each organisation brings its own provider account and pays its own bill, and the key lives in the organisation's pool, encrypted in nexus-auth. There is no shared platform key behind an organisation, so no organisation ever spends another's budget. The cost of that rule is plain: an organisation with no key in its pool gets no AI answers. The assistant shows `MODEL_NOT_CONNECTED` (503) and says who can connect one.

A key can be added to the pool for four providers:

Provider id	Shown as
`anthropic_api_key`	Anthropic
`gemini`	Google Gemini
`openrouter`	OpenRouter
`scaleway`	Scaleway

A model server of your own


An organisation can also use any server it runs that speaks the OpenAI-compatible API, such as the model on Harrow's GPU nodes. The installer names it in the values file:

```yaml
# harrow-values.yaml (Helm values): the AI part
ai:
  localProvider:
    baseUrl: "https://models.harrow.example/v1"
  installationHosts:
    - models.harrow.example
    - 10.40.20.0/24
networkPolicy:
  externalEgressCIDRs:
    - 10.40.20.0/24
```

`ai.localProvider.baseUrl` points the gateway's OpenAI-compatible adapter at your server. On an installation, the pool's `scaleway` slot reaches that server, so the key you add for `scaleway` is the key your own server expects.

`ai.installationHosts` lists host names that are inside the installation, besides the release's own service domain and the three public hosts. Each entry is a host name, a `.suffix`, an IP address or an IPv4 Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) range. The router uses the list to tell a call that stays on site from one that leaves it, which is what the "Nothing leaves this site" check on the Connect a model on your own hardware page reports.

The network policy matters as much as the router. The namespace denies all egress by default, so the gateway can reach a model server outside the namespace only when its range is in `networkPolicy.externalEgressCIDRs`. The same goes for a hosted provider: if Harrow wants its Gemini key to answer, the provider's address ranges have to be listed there too, or the call never leaves the cluster. Chapter 2.16, Security and networking, covers the policy in full.



SCREEN Connecting a model on your own hardware. The page lists the models the server reports, the role each one plays, and confirms that nothing leaves the site.




Adding and withdrawing keys


Owners and administrators of an organisation keep its pool. Anyone else can't see the keys and can't change them, and a request from them is refused with `AUTHORITY_EXCEEDED`.

In the console

On Enterprise the pool is kept in the AI switchboard, under the engines. On Community the same keys are kept on Settings, AI models. That page is the basic router, where you add keys and a local model address and choose which model does which job. Both show each key by who set it and when ("Set by Aoife, 3 Sept") and by a masked hint of its last four characters at most, such as `••••7f2q`. The key itself is never shown again after you add it.



SCREEN The AI switchboard lists each provider with who set its key and which jobs it does. One key is resting after failures, another has been switched off, and the page says where data may go.



SCREEN The basic router on Community: an organisation key, a local model on the organisation's own machine, and which model does which job.

Through the BFF API

The console's backend for frontend (BFF) serves three routes for the pool. Call them with a person's own access token: the organisation comes from the token, never from the request.

OUTPUT

```
GET  /api/v1/ai-providers
POST /api/v1/ai-providers/keys
POST /api/v1/ai-providers/keys/<key-id>/withdraw
```

`GET` answers the providers in the pool, whether each can answer, every key by its hint, and the providers a key may be added for. Adding a key takes a JSON body with two required fields and one optional one:

JSON

```
{ "provider": "gemini", "api_key": "<the provider's key>", "label": "Overflow, EU" }
```

The key travels once. nexus-auth encrypts it and tells the router, and the answer carries only the hint. The answer is `201` with the new key's id and its row: "Added. The Google Gemini key ••••7f2q is in the organisation's AI pool, and the AI Provider Router can route to it now." A label is at most 100 characters, and a key is one string without spaces of at most 4,096 characters. Any other field in the body, or a field naming an organisation or a person, is refused.

Withdrawing takes an empty body. The router stops routing to the key at once, and nexus-auth keeps it, listed as withdrawn, so its history stays. Nothing in the pool is ever deleted.

Refusal	HTTP	When
`VALIDATION_FAILED`	400	A body that isn't `{provider, api_key, label?}`, an unknown provider, or a person's own subscription offered as an organisation key
`AUTHORITY_EXCEEDED`	403	The caller isn't an owner or administrator of the organisation

`RECORD_NOT_FOUND`	404	No key with that id is in the organisation's pool
`TRANSITION_NOT_PERMITTED`	409	The key is already withdrawn
`TENANT_NOT_A_PARAMETER`	403	The body or query named an organisation



Key states

Each key in the pool is in one of six states. Only a key in use answers a chat.

State	What it means
`in_use`	The key answers, until its expiry date if it has one.
`resting`	The router rested it after failures, until a set time. Requests go to the next key meanwhile.
`exhausted`	It used up its limit at the provider.
`invalid`	The provider no longer accepts it.
`expired`	It lapsed on its expiry date.
`withdrawn`	An administrator withdrew it. It stays listed as history.

A key that fails rests for 60 seconds. After 5 failures in a row the router switches it off, moves its share to the other keys, and records the notice `PROVIDER_KEY_SWITCHED_OFF`. Nobody is refused while another key can answer.

When a provider has no key in use, the pool says why ("No key in use: 1 withdrawn, 1 lapsed"). When no provider in the pool has a key in use, a chat is refused with `NO_PROVIDER_FOR_ROLE` (422) and the remedy: an owner or administrator adds an organisation key. That's a configuration state, and it stays on screen until someone fixes it.



Roles, policy and wishes

The router thinks in roles. Every request is for one of five: `default`, `fast`, `reasoning`, `code` or `long_context`. Each model is also in a tier, `frontier`, `standard` or `fast`, and a higher tier is preferred when the role allows it. The organisation decides which provider serves each role (its role assignments) and the order to fall back in when a provider fails (its routing-policy ladder). Administrators set both in the AI switchboard. nexus-auth also serves them at `/auth/org/<organisation-id>/settings/ai-provider/role-assignments` and `/auth/org/<organisation-id>/settings/ai-provider/routing-policy` for an admin key holding `ai_provider:manage`.

Callers can say what they would like. A skill row may carry a preferred provider and a preferred model, plus a capability profile. The router treats each differently:

- A **preferred provider** is honoured only when the organisation has that provider enabled and has a key for it. Otherwise the router substitutes.
- A **preferred model** is honoured when it's in that provider's catalogue and fits the profile.
- A **capability profile** is a filter that never selects. It can ask for a minimum context window, tool use, vision, embeddings, long context or a data residency. Anything that fails it isn't eligible.

The router picks in a fixed order. It honours the wish when it can, then tries another model of the same provider, then the role assignment and any other provider with a key whose catalogue fits. If a profile was given and no catalogue fits it, the request is refused with `MODEL_CAPABILITY_UNAVAILABLE` (422). If nothing is assigned and nothing matches, it's `NO_PROVIDER_FOR_ROLE` (422). There is no last-resort default model. A role you haven't configured fails loudly, with the router's own words saying what to set.

Data residency is the one constraint that can't be substituted around. A profile with `eu_only` is served by an EU provider or refused. Harrow sets this lock for the whole organisation, and the switchboard draws the second hosted provider, which sits in a US region, as off.

A skill can also pin one exact model when the skill needs that model to work. Even then the router uses the organisation's own key for it, and without one nothing answers. A caller can never make Nexus use a provider the organisation hasn't configured.

Once a provider is chosen, failover is a separate matter. A 429, a 5xx or a network failure moves the request down the ladder to the next provider. A 400, 401, 403 or 404 stops at once, because credentials and request shapes don't carry across providers and a retry would burn quota to reach the same failure.


To see what the router would choose before anyone asks a question, read `GET /api/ai/routing-policy/effective` on the gateway with a person's own token. It answers the model for the signed-in organisation, or the router's refusal in words when there is none, and it sends no request to a model.



Watching the router

The figures strip at the bottom of every page shows the model in use ("Model: local"). On Enterprise, The AI switchboard, live draws the router's traffic as it happens: requests from the assistant, jobs and apps flowing through roles to providers and keys, a key in its 60-second rest drawn grey, a key switched off drawn red, and a fallback to the hosted provider when the local model is busy. Beside the flow it charts load per provider, requests a second and waiting time. Tomás keeps it open during the first week after any change to the routing policy, because a wrong role assignment shows up there within minutes as traffic going somewhere nobody meant it to.

On Community, the AI models page has a Test every model button that checks each configured model and marks whether it answers. It's the quickest way to prove a new key works before anyone relies on it.



SCREEN The router live. Traffic flows from the assistant and jobs through roles to a local model and hosted keys; one key is resting, one is switched off, and gold dots show a fallback while the local model is busy.

Embeddings

Search and the knowledge graph turn text into vectors. By default the installation does this with an embedding model that runs inside the cluster on the processor, so no text leaves the site to be embedded and an organisation needs no key for it. Using a hosted provider for embeddings is a choice an organisation makes; it then goes through the same pool and the same rules.

Only three services may ask the router for embeddings or reranking: nexus-graphrag, nexus-skills-engine and nexus-workflows. GraphRAG embeds as the organisation whose content it is, with that organisation's settings, and holds no provider key of its own. When an organisation changes its embedding model, nexus-workflows runs the re-embed job for that organisation's stores.

Per-person credentials stay personal

Some credentials belong to one person. A Claude Max subscription, signed in through that person's own account, is the common case. Such a credential is never an organisation key: the pool refuses it

with `VALIDATION_FAILED`, it's never listed in the organisation's table of keys, and no screen of another person shows it.

Model keys also never go anywhere else. The External data keys page, which holds keys for outside data sources, refuses anything that looks like an AI model key with `AI_PROVIDER_KEYS_BELONG_TO_ORG_POOL` (422). If the file reader finds model keys inside a document or configuration where they don't belong, it records `CREDENTIALS_IN_WRONG_PLACE` and an administrator removes them and replaces them.



Scripts, REST and MCP


Nexus has three public hosts. At Harrow they are `console.harrow.example` for the console, `api.harrow.example` for the gateway and `auth.harrow.example` for sign-in. Scripts and tools use the second and third.

Keys for scripts

A script signs in with a key made on Settings, Keys for scripts. Each key has a name, a reach (for example, "Start Drone yard count only"), the person who made it and an end date; an organisation can lock the longest life a key may have. The secret is shown once when the key is made. Copy it into the script's secret store, because Nexus keeps only its last four characters. A key is withdrawn, never removed: it stops at once and stays listed with every call it made. Rotating gives the key a new secret and shows it once.

Each key has its own page with calls per day, calls by service and an activity log of time, address, service and result. A call outside the key's reach is refused and shows in the log.

nexus-auth serves the same keys to a signed-in person at `https://auth.harrow.example/api-keys`: create and list, then read, change, revoke or rotate one key by its id.



SCREEN One key for scripts. The page shows the key's reach, who made it, its end date, calls by day and by service, and every call's result; the secret ends ...7QK2 and is never shown again.

REST through the gateway

Send REST calls to `https://api.harrow.example` with `Authorization: Bearer <token-or-key>`. Every key must belong to an organisation. A key with none is refused with `TOKEN_ORG_MISSING` (403) by every service that checks keys through nexus-auth.

A caller that asks too often is answered `429` with `RATE_LIMITED`, a `Retry-After` header, and the limit and window in the body. Wait for the number of seconds it gives. On Enterprise, administrators set limits per key, per app and per unit on Settings, Rate limits (see chapter 2.16, Security and networking).

MCP for AI tools

AI tools that speak the Model Context Protocol connect to `https://api.harrow.example/mcp`. They sign in through the OAuth 2.1 server (OAuth is the open standard for delegated authorisation) at `https://auth.harrow.example`, which supports client registration by the tool itself, so a tool such as Claude Code or Cursor registers itself and opens the person's browser to sign in. The connection then acts for that one person, with that person's rights and nothing more. A signed-in person can fetch a ready-made configuration for a command-line tool from `https://auth.harrow.example/api/v1/mcp/cli-config`.

Tool calls that need a model go through the router like everything else, under the person's organisation.


PART 2 · CHAPTER 2.15

Day two: operating Nexus

The routine work of running an installation after the first week. It starts with unsealing the key store after a restart and ends with uninstalling.

FOR OPERATORS

18 MIN READ



The first time the power failed at Harrow Port Authority's server room, everything came back except the parts that needed keys. Pods were Running and the console loaded. Nobody could open a file. Tomás Reilly had read about this, and it still took him twenty minutes to remember why. The key store's unsealer starts sealed after every restart of its node, and only a custodian can open it.

This chapter follows the operator's routine after the first week, from the key store and its custodians to uninstalling. Every `nexusctl` verb here accepts `--explain`, which prints the `kubectl` and `helm` operations it would run without running them. Use it the first time you run anything on a production cluster.



Key-store custody

An installation has two OpenBao servers in its namespace. The key store, `openbao`, holds every key Nexus uses. The unsealer, `openbao-unsealer`, is a second, small OpenBao whose only job is to unseal the key store. The key store unseals itself through the unsealer's transit key; the unsealer is sealed with Shamir's scheme, as 5 shares of which any 3 unseal it.

At the first install a custody Job initialises both servers inside the cluster. It encrypts the unsealer's shares, and the key store's recovery keys, in its own memory to every custodian named in `keys.custody.recipients`, and stores only the ciphertext (the Secrets `openbao-unseal-shares-encrypted` and `openbao-recovery-keys-encrypted`). It revokes both root tokens in the same Job. Each custodian's bundle holds enough shares to unseal on their own, so one custodian is all you need after a restart.

After a node restart

After any restart of the node the unsealer runs on (a power cut, a machine reboot, a container runtime restart) the unsealer starts sealed. Until a custodian unseals it, the key store stays sealed too, and nothing that needs a key works. The console still answers and people can still sign in, but any act that needs a key from the key store waits: opening encrypted content, a claim, a check of a compiled part.

Ask OpenBao itself, inside each pod. This is the unsealer:

```bash
kubectl -n nexus exec openbao-unsealer-0 -c openbao -- \
  bao status -format=json -address=https://127.0.0.1:8200 \
  -ca-cert=/openbao/tls/ca.crt -tls-server-name=openbao-unsealer
echo "exit $?"
```

Run the same command against `openbao-0` with `-tls-server-name=openbao` for the key store. `bao status` exits `0` when the server is unsealed, `2` when it's sealed and `1` when it couldn't answer. An exit of `1` concludes nothing, because the pod may not be up yet. Wait a minute and ask again. If the unsealer is unsealed and the key store is still sealed, the key store is unsealing itself and you have nothing to do.




FIGURE What a custodian does after a node restart.

Unsealing

The chart ships `unseal.sh`, in its `files/custody/` folder, byte for byte the same in every release. A custodian runs it on their own machine. It reads the encrypted Secret, decrypts it once with the custodian's identity (a Secure Enclave identity asks for Touch ID once), submits the shares to the unsealer and confirms it is unsealed. No share is ever written to a file or put on a command line.

Harrow runs it in direct mode, through a port-forward:

```bash
kubectl -n nexus get secret openbao-unsealer-tls -o jsonpath='{.data.ca\.crt}' | base64 -d > unsealer-ca.crt
kubectl -n nexus port-forward pod/openbao-unsealer-0 28200:8200 &

AGE_IDENTITY=<path-to-your-custodian-identity> \
OPENBAO_NS=nexus \
UNSEAL_ADDR=https://127.0.0.1:28200 \
UNSEAL_CACERT=unsealer-ca.crt \
UNSEAL_RESOLVE=openbao-unsealer.nexus.svc \
UNSEAL_SECRET_JSON_CMD='kubectl -n nexus get secret openbao-unseal-shares-encrypted -o json' \
bash unseal.sh
```

`<path-to-your-custodian-identity>` is the custodian's age identity file, the private half of one of the recipients in `keys.custody.recipients`. `UNSEAL_RESOLVE` is the name the unsealer's certificate carries, so TLS is checked against the unsealer's own CA even though the connection goes to `127.0.0.1`. The script never turns certificate checking off.

Exit	Last line	Meaning
0	`UNSEALED nexus/openbao-unsealer-0`	Unsealed. If it already was, nothing was sent
1	`STILL-SEALED …`	Still sealed, or an unseal call failed
2	`UNSEAL-REFUSED …`	A prerequisite is missing, named in the message

3	`UNSEAL-REFUSED …`	This identity can't decrypt the shares, so it isn't a custodian of this installation. Nothing was sent

Within a minute the key store follows by itself. Check with `kubectl -n nexus get deploy,statefulset` that everything is ready again.

Custodians are chosen before the install, and each makes their own key on their own machine. The chart only ever sees the public half:

```bash
age-keygen -o custodian.key
age-plugin-se keygen --access-control=any-biometry -o custodian.key
```

The first command makes an ordinary age identity; its recipient is the `# public key: age1...` line in the file. The second makes one held in a Mac's Secure Enclave, with a recipient starting `age1se1`. Either recipient goes into `keys.custody.recipients`. The identity file stays with its custodian, offline.



WATCH OUT

The custodians' identities are the only way to open the key store. If every custodian loses their identity file, the key store can't be unsealed, and nobody at Adverant can do it for you. Name at least two custodians in `keys.custody.recipients`, keep each identity offline on its holder's own machine, and test an unseal from each one after the install.




Backup and restore

Back up and restore shows each store with its last backup and the last time a restore of it was actually tested. A backup is only proven once it has been restored, so the page tracks both. Six stores are backed up. The main database holds people and settings; jobs and the audit log. Beside it sit the knowledge graph and the search index, then the file store and the memory store. The keys are the sixth, sealed and kept apart from the data. Backups go to your own storage, encrypted with your own keys, and Adverant can't read them. When a store hasn't been test-restored within your rule, the page shows the plate `RESTORE_TEST_OVERDUE` with a Test it now button. A test restore runs in a separate space and nobody notices it.

The same two acts are available from the command line:

```bash
nexusctl backup now
nexusctl backup verify
```

`backup now` takes a backup of every store at once. `backup verify` checks the latest backup. Run both before any change you're nervous about.




SCREEN Each store with its last backup and its last tested restore. The search index is overdue for a test, and the plate offers to run one now.

To restore, you name the backup:

```bash
nexusctl restore --from <backup-id>
```

`<backup-id>` comes from the list on Back up and restore. A restore needs a second person to approve it, and while it runs the progress stripe shows it with the time it started and who approved it.

Everyone is read-only during the restore, which is different from being locked out: people can sign in and read. Jobs don't start (schedules wait and catch up), and search returns when the search index is back. Anything written after the backup was taken is lost, so the restore report lists it by owner so they can redo it.



SCREEN A restore in progress. Stores come back in order, people are read-only until the last one is in, and a notice on every page says when to expect it back.

Keep one more thing with your backups: the Secret `nexus-generated` in the `nexus` namespace. The chart makes the installation's generated passwords and encryption keys at the first install and reads them back from that Secret on every upgrade. Data sealed under `EXTERNAL_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY` opens only with that key. Store a copy of the Secret wherever you keep the most sensitive material you have, because anyone who holds it holds those keys.



Upgrades

Tomás upgrades in two steps. First he asks what will change:


```bash
nexusctl upgrade plan --bundle nexus-alpha-1.0.0-alpha.2-enterprise.tar
```

The plan lists what changes in the release, any change to the shape of the database, and whether it can be undone. Then he applies it:


```bash
nexusctl upgrade apply --bundle nexus-alpha-1.0.0-alpha.2-enterprise.tar
```

The apply takes a backup first and runs preflight. It then moves the engines in waves, and each wave waits until the last one has been healthy for 10 minutes. The Upgrade page shows each wave as it goes and the health of the installation meanwhile. It also says until when the way back stays open; after that date, going back needs a restore. If a step fails, Nexus rolls every engine back to the previous release and checks them. The notice `UPGRADE_ROLLED_BACK` then names the step that failed and says data wasn't changed. The fix comes before Try again, and the support bundle is one button away.

For an installation with no outside connection the bundle arrives on media. Import from media checks the release's signature against the Adverant release key installed on the installation and checks that versions only move forward. Files signed by anyone else are refused with `MEDIA_SIGNATURE_INVALID`: nothing is loaded, and the running release keeps running.



SCREEN An upgrade in progress. A backup was taken first, the second of three waves is moving, and the way back stays open until a stated date.



SCREEN A wave failed because a volume ran short of space. Every engine is back on the previous release with data untouched, and the fix is listed before Try again.

What happens underneath

`nexusctl upgrade apply` runs `helm upgrade` against the chart. If you upgrade with Helm yourself, the same rules apply:

```bash
helm upgrade nexus oci://registry.adverant.ai/nexus/charts/nexus --version <version> -n nexus -f harrow-values.yaml
kubectl -n nexus wait --for=condition=Available deploy --all --timeout=900s
```

The schema moves before the new pods roll. The chart's migrations are pre-upgrade hooks that run in order: the database bootstrap first, then each service's migrations, then those of the console's

backend for frontend (BFF). The custody Job runs too, and on an installation that is already initialised it confirms that and changes nothing. Each hook Job has a backoff limit of 0, so a migration that fails stops the upgrade and is never retried silently: read its log with `kubectl -n nexus logs job/<hook-job>` before trying again.

Each service's pod waits in an init container, `wait-for-schema`, until the release ledger shows its migrations applied for the new release's image. After a rollback, or an upgrade that changed only values, a restarted pod finds its row and starts at once.

Before you upgrade

Three points from the release notes are worth planning around:

1. **Upgrade in a quiet period.** On the first upgrade of an installation made from an earlier chart, the bootstrap job takes away the old default table rights, and each service gets its own back from its own migration. Until that migration runs, a service can't use its tables. The gap lasts seconds. If seconds matter, scale the services to zero first and back up once the migration jobs have finished.
2. **Give every application programming interface (API) key an organisation.** A key with no organisation is refused with `403 TOKEN_ORG_MISSING` by every service that checks keys through nexus-auth, nexus-graphrag included. Before you upgrade, give each such key an organisation or issue a new key. Old bcrypt keys keep working until their hard-revoke date.
3. **Flush the cached API keys afterwards.** Up to an hour of cached key entries carry the wrong application name until you do. Run this against nexus-auth's cache, the installation's Valkey (`nexus-valkey`, password in the Secret `nexus-generated` under `VALKEY_PASSWORD`):

```bash
pw=$(kubectl -n nexus get secret nexus-generated -o jsonpath='{.data.VALKEY_PASSWORD}' | base64 -d)
kubectl -n nexus exec nexus-valkey-0 -- sh -c \
  'valkey-cli -a "$1" --scan --pattern "apikey:prefix:*" | xargs -r valkey-cli -a "$1" del' _ "$pw"
```

That's for the default in-cluster store. With `dataTier.valkey.mode: external` there's no such pod: run the same scan and delete against your own Valkey host, with the password from the Secret named in `dataTier.valkey.external.existingSecret`.

Rollback

Within the window the Upgrade page shows, Go back returns every engine to the previous release. After the window, going back means restoring the backup the upgrade took first.

Two values must never change across an upgrade or a rollback.

`keys.installationName` is permanent. The first key-store bootstrap mints the installation's identity under it, and that identity is what your licence names. Use exactly the same value in every values file you ever apply to this installation.

The Secret `nexus-generated` must stay as it is. On every upgrade the chart reads `EXTERNAL_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY` from it and checks its shape. A value that is neither base64 of 32 bytes nor the raw 32-byte key of an older install stops the render with `EXTERNAL_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_INVALID`, and the chart never prints the value. It means someone edited or replaced the Secret. Put back the key this installation's data is sealed under, as base64 of its 32 bytes (`printf %s "$OLD" | base64`), and upgrade again. A fresh random key would leave everything sealed under the old one unreadable.



Scaling

Each component has a switch and a size in the values file. Required components can't be switched off: the chart runs them whatever their switch says. The others can be given more replicas and more resources.

```yaml
# harrow-values.yaml (Helm values): scaling
components:
  gateway:
    replicas: 2
    resources: { requests: { cpu: 400m, memory: 1Gi }, limits: { memory: 3Gi } }
  graphrag:
    replicas: 2
  workflows:
    replicas: 2
workflows:
  concurrency: "8"
dataTier:
  qdrant:
    resources: { requests: { cpu: 200m, memory: 512Mi }, limits: { memory: 4Gi } }
```

Apply it with `helm upgrade` as above. Volumes are sized under `dataTier.<store>.size`; check that your storage class can grow a volume before you raise one. How the installation is doing charts how busy the cluster's processors and memory have been, with the room left in each. Grow whichever runs out first.




Support bundles

When Harrow needs Adverant's help, Tomás makes a support bundle:

```bash
nexusctl support-bundle --out harrow-support-4471.tar.gz
```

The console's Support bundle page makes the same file. It collects the engine logs of the last 24 hours with health and version details. Settings go in without their secrets, along with the preflight and install reports. Before anything is written, redaction replaces names and secrets with placeholders, and you read a preview of exactly what will leave. People's own content is never collected. The bundle goes to Adverant either as an upload to your account's Support and support bundles page or as a file carried out on media. Only the support engineers named on the request can open it, and it's erased after 30 days.



SCREEN Making a support bundle. The redaction preview shows what is hidden before anything leaves, and only the named engineers can open it.



Evidence export

Auditors and your own compliance team often want proof that the platform behaves as described. `nexusctl evidence export` writes it:

```bash
nexusctl evidence export --out harrow-evidence-2027-01
```

Alongside the records it exports, the command runs the platform's acceptance probes: the artificial intelligence (AI) router is reachable and answers, a UNO job is dispatched and completes, and a read across organisations is refused. Their results are in `probes.json` in the output folder.



Status at a glance

`nexusctl status --json` answers whether the installation is healthy and what state each component is in. It also reports the licence state with its expiry date, the edition and the running release. Each compiled part is listed with its digest and signature. It's the command to put behind your own monitoring.



Uninstalling

```bash
nexusctl uninstall --profile <profile-file>
```

`<profile-file>` is the deployment profile for the cluster, the same file you passed to `nexusctl handoff --profile <profile-file> --out <dir>` if your platform team runs the cluster. Handoff writes, for that team, a plain-language list of what Nexus needs from the cluster and the manifests to meet it. Uninstall removes the Nexus namespaces and nothing else, and it keeps your backups. The installation's identity goes with it. A later install on the same cluster is a new installation with a new identity, so its claim is a new claim and its licence is a new licence.



The This installation pages

Operators of the installation have their own group in the menu, This installation, and its pages are where most of this chapter happens in the console. A member who opens one of them sees the Not an administrator page, which names who can act.

Page	What it's for
Licence and what it unlocks	The licence and its feature groups (chapter 2.13, Licences)
If the licence runs out	The expiry ladder in words, with this licence's dates
Compiled parts	Each licensed module with its nightly signature check
Usage statement for Adverant	The yearly counters, readable before they leave
Versions and upgrades	Every version installed, with who installed it and when
Upgrade	The staged upgrade and the way back
Back up and restore	Each store, its last backup and its last tested restore
How the installation is doing	Nodes, capacity and running cost, with warnings
Keys and erasure	Each organisation's key, and Erase with a reason and a second person
Incidents	Open and closed problems, with what was done
Retiring soon	Features being switched off, with dates, export and replacement
Status	Each part of Nexus now and over 30 days, in words anyone can read
Support bundle	What leaves for Adverant, and how

Two of these pages deserve a word. Compiled parts checks every licensed module against Adverant's signature each night. A changed copy of a module is refused and never loaded, while

the signed copy keeps running, and the page counts refusals by month so a tampered copy can't pass unnoticed. Status is written so that anyone in the organisation can read it. It shows each part of Nexus now and over the last 30 days as a strip of days, with scheduled maintenance and recent incidents, and an operator adds an incident or a maintenance window from the same page.


A Community installation has one page, This installation (Community), with its version, health and updates. The Enterprise pages appear on it as teasers that name who can turn them on.

Security and networking

What an installation lets in and out, how its services prove who they are to each other, and the controls an operator sets or inherits for sign-in and the database.

FOR OPERATORS

17 MIN READ



Harrow Port Authority's security review asked Tomás Reilly one question first: what leaves the cluster? His answer fitted on a page. Nothing in the `nexus` namespace reaches anything outside it except Domain Name System (DNS) lookups, the Kubernetes application programming interface (API) for a few workloads, and the address ranges Harrow lists in its values file. There's no telemetry and no call home. The review then moved on to sign-in and the database, which is roughly the order this chapter follows.



Network policies

Network policies are on by default (`networkPolicy.enabled: true`), and the chart starts from a deny-all policy and adds back only what Nexus needs:

Policy	What it allows
`nexus-default-deny`	Nothing. It selects every pod in the namespace, in both directions.
`nexus-in-namespace`	Nexus pods talking to each other, and DNS lookups to `kube-dns` in `kube-system` on port 53.
`nexus-token-review`	The token reviewers (nexus-probitas and nexus-orchestrator) and the key-custody Job reaching the Kubernetes API server on 6443 or 443. No other pod has the API token mounted.
`nexus-ingress-controller`	The ingress controller's namespace reaching the three public services and nothing else.
`nexus-operator-egress`	Pods reaching the address ranges in `networkPolicy.externalEgressCIDRs`. Rendered only when that list isn't empty.

The two OpenBao servers sit behind their own policy. They are labelled as part of the key store and not as part of Nexus, so the in-namespace rule doesn't reach them. Only nexus-keys and its jobs (the custody Job among them) can talk to them, and only the key store can talk to the unsealer.

Three values shape the policies:

```yaml
# harrow-values.yaml (Helm values): network policy
networkPolicy:
  enabled: true
  ingressNamespace: ingress-nginx
  apiServerCIDRs:
    - 10.40.0.10/32
  externalEgressCIDRs:
    - 10.40.30.25/32
    - 10.40.20.0/24
```

`ingressNamespace` is the namespace of the ingress controller in front of the three public hosts. The default, `kube-system`, fits k3s, which ships Traefik there. Harrow runs its own controller in `ingress-nginx`.

`apiServerCIDRs` are the Kubernetes API server's addresses as `/32` Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) ranges. Left empty, the chart reads them from the `kubernetes` Endpoints when it installs. `helm template` has no cluster to read, so it must be given them, and otherwise it stops with "networkPolicy.apiServerCIDRs is empty and the kubernetes Endpoints could not be read".

`externalEgressCIDRs` lists everything outside the namespace that Nexus must call. Empty means nothing. Harrow lists its mail relay and the subnet of its model servers. If you connect a hosted model provider, a company sign-in service outside the cluster, or a data source, its ranges belong here too. Forgetting one is the usual reason a key that works on a laptop fails on the installation: the call never leaves the cluster.





FIGURE What the network policies allow in and out of the nexus namespace.

Inside the product, the Where calls can leave page lists each outside place Nexus may reach, why it's there and who added it. Anything else is refused with a code that names the rule. On the page the refusal reads `EGRESS_DENIED`. Residency works the same way one level up: on Enterprise, Where data lives sets the region for each kind of data, and an organisation can lock its artificial intelligence (AI) traffic to EU providers so the router refuses anything else (see chapter 2.14, AI providers and models). An app that tries to reach an address its manifest never declared is stopped at the edge with `EGRESS_NOT_DECLARED`.



SCREEN Where calls can leave. Each allowed destination says who added it and why; everything else is refused, and today's refusals are listed with the rule that stopped them.



Service identity from the local certificate authority

Nexus runs without a service mesh. The chart has an `istio.enabled` value, it defaults to `false`, and there is no reason to turn it on. Services prove who they are to each other with mutual TLS (mTLS) instead: Transport Layer Security (TLS) where both ends show a certificate. The certificates come from a local certificate authority (CA) that the chart creates through cert-manager v1.21.3, and nothing else needs installing.

The chain is short. A self-signed issuer, `nexus-selfsigned`, signs the CA certificate `nexus-local-ca`, an ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) P-256 key valid for ten years. cert-manager renews it 30 days before it ends. A second issuer of the same name signs everything else from it.

Each service that calls a service requiring mutual TLS gets its own client certificate, in a Secret named after its service account (`<service-account>-client-tls`). The certificate carries the service's SPIFFE identity as its URI name:

```
spiffe://cluster.local/ns/nexus/sa/nexus-api-gateway
```
OUTPUT

The service it calls checks that certificate against the local CA and reads who the caller is from it. Each workload trusts the CA through the `ca.crt` in the Secret of its own certificate. No pod mounts the CA's private key, and no ConfigMap carries the CA. nexus-probitas serves TLS itself from `nexus-probitas-tls`, a 90-day certificate renewed 15 days before it ends.

The public edge is separate, and `tls.mode` decides it:

- `existing`: a TLS Secret you made, named in `tls.existingSecret`.
- `cert-manager`: certificates from a ClusterIssuer you run, named in `tls.clusterIssuer`.
- `none`: TLS ends before the ingress, on your own load balancer. The browser must still reach the console over HTTPS (see chapter 2.17, Troubleshooting).

The sign-in session itself depends on HTTPS. The console accepts a sign-in only from its own origin, `https://<hosts.console>`, keeps the session in a `__Host-` cookie marked Secure, and the first administrator's passkey needs a page with a valid certificate. A browser on plain HTTP, or behind a certificate warning, can't sign in at all.

The in-cluster data tier talks to the services without TLS by default (`dataTier.postgres.sslmode: disable`), because that traffic stays inside the namespace under the policies above. An external Postgres uses `verify-full` or `verify-ca`, with the server's CA in the store's Secret, as chapter 2.11, Variations: external stores, TLS and ingress, describes.



Telemetry is off

No telemetry leaves an installation. `telemetry.enabled` can only be `false`: the chart's schema refuses any other value. The data tier's own reporting is switched off as well, so Neo4j sends no usage report and Qdrant sends no telemetry.



Sign-up controls

nexus-auth has two controls for screening people who sign up, and both are off on every installation.

The CAPTCHA control checks each sign-up with a hosted service on the internet. An installation never depends on the internet at sign-up, so the chart switches it off. The network screen needs two GeoLite2 databases to judge where a sign-up comes from. They're licensed downloads that are neither in the nexus-auth image nor mounted by the chart, and there is no value to turn the screen on. What you give up is the screening of sign-ups from datacentre and hosting networks.

What you get instead is approval. A stranger's sign-up is held for an administrator to approve, and until then the person is answered `403 SIGNUP_REQUIRES_APPROVAL`. Neither switch changes that.




Rate limits and token lifetimes

```yaml
# harrow-values.yaml (Helm values): sign-in service
auth:
  rateLimitPerMinute: 5000
  accessTokenTTL: 15m
  refreshTokenTTL: 12h
proxy:
  trustedCIDRs: "10.244.0.0/16"
```
YAML

`auth.rateLimitPerMinute` is the most requests one signed-in person may make to nexus-auth in a minute before it answers `429`. Every person gets the same limit, and the platform's own service principal isn't counted against it. The default of 5000 is about 83 a second from one account, which

is plenty for people and scripts. Lower it to tighten, or raise it for heavy automation. It's a whole number of 1 or more. Brute-force protection at sign-in (account lockout and limits on second-factor attempts) is separate and isn't set here.

A caller over a limit gets `RATE_LIMITED` with a `Retry-After` header, and the body carries the limit and how long to wait. On Enterprise, administrators set finer limits on Settings, Rate limits: requests a minute and jobs at once, for each script key or app and for each unit. A caller over its limit is asked to wait and is never cut off. A withdrawn limit falls back to the unit's, then to the default.



SCREEN Rate limits per key and unit. One script is retrying too fast and is being slowed; the page shows the 429 answer the script sees and lets an administrator raise its limit with a reason.

`auth.accessTokenTTL` and `auth.refreshTokenTTL` set how long an access token and a refresh token live. Keep the access token at one hour or less. Plugins built with the Plugin SDK, the software development kit for Nexus extensions, refuse a session token that lives longer than an hour, with `JWT_LIFETIME_EXCEEDED`.


`proxy.trustedCIDRs` names the proxy hops whose `X-Forwarded-For` header nexus-auth believes. The default, `10.42.0.0/16`, is the k3s pod network where its Traefik runs. On another distribution, set it to your ingress controller's pod network. If it's wrong, nexus-auth sees every request as coming from the ingress controller, so the address rules below would see only that address. A different `X-Forwarded-For` from an untrusted hop never opens a new rate-limit window.

Company sign-in

People sign in with a passkey or through Google or GitHub, and company sign-in is the fourth way. An administrator never signs in with a password alone: the second check is a passkey.

Community includes one company sign-in through OpenID Connect (OIDC), with its own set-up screen and a test result. Enterprise adds Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), enforcement for everyone, and directory sync through the System for Cross-domain Identity Management (SCIM).

Company sign-in can be required only once an administrator has done four things, in order: connect the sign-in service, prove the domain, sign in through it with their own account, and name one emergency account. Until then the Require it button stays closed, and the page says which steps are missing with the code `COMPANY_SIGNIN_STEPS_MISSING`. Changing the sign-in service clears the test, so a new service has to be tested again.



SCREEN Company sign-in can be required only after an administrator has tested it with their own account and named an emergency account. Each step must be done before the last one opens.


When the company sign-in service stops answering, the sign-in page shows `IDP_UNREACHABLE` (503). People already signed in stay signed in. Administrators can use the emergency administrator sign-in, which needs the sealed code kept in the safe and the administrator's passkey. Every use is written to the audit log with who used it and from where, announced at once to every administrator, and it ends after 4 hours or when company sign-in returns.

Everyone in an organisation signs in to the same console and does their daily work there; owners and administrators also see the administration pages. A member who opens one of those pages gets the Not an administrator page, with its rows greyed and the names of the people who can change them (`NOT_AN_ADMINISTRATOR`).

Suspicious sign-ins and address rules

On Enterprise, Suspicious sign-ins lists password sign-ins that looked new or unusual: a new place or device, or wrong passwords earlier that day. For each it says what Nexus did, whether that was asking for a second check or blocking the sign-in. Someone answers each row with Not them, which ends that person's sign-ins, or It was them.

Addresses allowed and blocked holds two lists. The allowed ranges are the only places owners and administrators may sign in from; with none, they sign in from anywhere. Members aren't affected. The blocked addresses are places nobody signs in from. Each entry records who added it and when it lifts. Every change is tested against your own current address first, and a change that would lock you out is refused with nothing saved. Tightening a range ends, at once, the administrators' sign-ins it no longer lets in.



SCREEN The address rules. The plate at the top says what the rules make of the administrator's own address, so a change that would lock her out is refused before it is saved.



Keys and certificates

Each organisation's data is locked with its own key, held by a custodian you choose: a hardware security module or software. The Keys page shows the organisation key's versions and when the next rotation is due. A version stays readable after it stops being current, until nothing is wrapped under it any more. The keys themselves are never shown, only their fingerprints.


Destroying a key is how Nexus erases. On Keys and erasure, Erase destroys the key of one person or of a whole organisation, which makes everything it locked unreadable everywhere, backups included. It can't be undone, so it asks for a written reason and a second person. It leaves a receipt that records what was erased and by whom, never the content.

Keys about to run out lists provider tokens and certificates ending soon, who is warned and when, and what stops if one lapses. Running work doesn't stop, and the AI router falls back to another key.



Four-eyes approvals

On Enterprise, policies can hold sensitive changes for a second person. Four-eyes approvals lists each waiting request with who asked, why, how many approvals it needs and when it lapses. Nobody approves their own request (`TRUST_APPROVAL_SELF_APPROVAL`), and a request already decided answers `APPROVAL_ALREADY_DECIDED` . Turning a request down needs a reason. A request nobody decides in time lapses, and nothing changes. Which changes wait here is set by the policies that ask for a second person: restoring a backup and adding seats are two examples elsewhere in this guide.



SCREEN Changes waiting for a second person. Each request shows who asked and when it lapses, and the person who asked has no Approve button on their own request.



Seeing what someone else sees

Support inside an organisation sometimes means seeing a page as a colleague sees it. On Enterprise, See it as they do gives an administrator a read-only view of the console as one member sees it, for 30 minutes, after a second check and a written reason. The member is told. Their private items (mail, notebooks, direct messages and what the assistant remembers for them) are never shown, a banner sits across the top for the whole time, and everything is recorded in the audit log.

Big changes get a pause of their own. Before a change with wide effects is saved, the Before this change happens overlay lists what breaks, what needs attention and what is unaffected. The change isn't blocked. It's made expensive enough to think about, and on Enterprise a sensitive one also waits for a second person.



Audit retention and streaming

The audit log records who did what, newest first, and can be filtered and exported. Community keeps 30 days and exports a spreadsheet file. Enterprise keeps it as long as your retention policy says, on the Keeping and letting go page under Settings, and streams it to your security monitoring system. Refusals are recorded too, so a person who was told no leaves a row as well as a person who succeeded. The governance records behind it are chained per organisation, so each organisation can check its own slice without seeing anyone else's.



Database roles

Nexus never runs its services as a database superuser. The bootstrap hook, which is the only part that holds the cluster superuser apart from the one-time provisioning step of the console's backend for frontend (BFF), creates these roles:

Role	What it is
`nexus_migrator`	`LOGIN NOSUPERUSER NOBYPASSRLS CREATEROLE`. Owns the `nexus` database and every object the migrations create, and creates the roles the migrations name.
`nexus_runtime`	A group that can't log in. It grants connection and schema use, and no table rights.
`nexus_auth`, `nexus_gateway`, `nexus_graphrag`, `nexus_skills`	Each service's own login: `NOSUPERUSER NOBYPASSRLS`, a member of `nexus_runtime`, granted its own tables by its own migrations and nothing else.
`nexus_ledger_reader`	Reads one table, the release ledger, for the `wait-for-schema` init containers. No other grant.

Because no service role owns its tables and none can bypass row-level security (RLS), every RLS policy applies to every service connection. Row-level security is forced on nexus-auth's tables, so even their owner is held to it. If a role named `nexus` already exists on your server with `SUPERUSER` or `BYPASSRLS`, the bootstrap refuses to go on: "role nexus exists with SUPERUSER or BYPASSRLS on this server; nexus_migrator will not be made a member of it. Nothing more was done." Remove that attribute or use another server.


PART 2 · CHAPTER 2.17

Troubleshooting

The problems operators meet most often, organised by what you see. Each one gives the cause, the command that confirms it and the fix, and the chapter ends with sending a support bundle.

FOR OPERATORS

22 MIN READ



Most of what goes wrong on a Nexus installation goes wrong in the same dozen ways, and nearly all of them announce themselves with a code. This chapter is organised by what you see, in roughly the order you'd meet each problem: installing, claiming, licensing, then running. For each one you get the cause, a command that confirms it, and the fix.

The examples use Harrow Port Authority's installation: namespace `nexus`, release `nexus`, hosts `console.harrow.example`, `api.harrow.example` and `auth.harrow.example`. Replace them with yours. Three habits save time with every problem here:

1. Read the code before the message. Every refusal in Nexus ends with a machine code, and the code is what this chapter is indexed by.
2. Run `nexusctl preflight` again after any change to the cluster or the values file. It reads the cluster without changing it, and it reports most chart refusals by name before Helm does.
3. Use `--explain` on any `nexusctl` verb you're unsure of. It prints the `kubectl` and `helm` operations without running them.



The install hangs

You ran the install and it hasn't finished. `helm` hasn't returned after fifteen minutes, or it returned and pods are still in `Init` or `Pending`, or the console address doesn't answer.

The most common cause is `helm install --wait`. Nexus creates its database, its roles and every service's schema in post-install hooks, and the bootstrap hook is what hands each service its database password. With `--wait`, Helm waits for the Deployments to be ready before it runs those hooks, while the Deployments wait for the hooks. Neither moves. Never install with `--wait`; install without it and wait afterwards.




FIGURE What runs, in order, when the chart installs or upgrades.

The other causes are ordinary Kubernetes ones. Images can't be pulled because `global.imageRegistry` names the wrong registry, or an Enterprise install has no pull token. A volume stays `Pending` because the storage class doesn't exist. cert-manager is missing, in which

case the install doesn't hang at all: it fails within seconds, because the chart's certificate issuers need cert-manager's resources.

Start with the pods and the hook Jobs:

```bash
kubectl -n nexus get pods,jobs
kubectl -n nexus describe pod <pod-name>
kubectl -n nexus logs job/<job-name>
kubectl get crd certificates.cert-manager.io
```

`describe` shows image pull errors and unbound volumes in its events. A hook Job that shows `0/1` completions with a failed pod has stopped the install, because hook Jobs have a backoff limit of 0 and are never retried silently. Its log says why.

Here's how to fix each cause:

- If Helm is waiting with `--wait`, stop it, uninstall, and install again without the flag. Then wait for the services:

```bash
kubectl -n nexus wait --for=condition=Available deploy --all --timeout=900s
```

- For pull errors, check `global.imageRegistry` and, for Enterprise, the pull token from your account's Pull tokens and install commands page.
- For `Pending` volumes, set `storage.className` to a storage class the cluster has, or make one the default.
- For a missing cert-manager, install cert-manager v1.21.3 and run the install again.
- For a failed hook, fix what its log names and run the install again.



A pod waits on its schema

A service's pod sits in `Init:0/1` for minutes. Every service that uses the database has an init container, `wait-for-schema`, that holds the pod until the release ledger shows its migrations applied for this release's image. That's normal for the first minutes of an install or an upgrade, while the migration hooks run. It's a problem when it doesn't end.

Read the init container's log:

```bash
kubectl -n nexus logs <pod-name> -c wait-for-schema
```

The log names the component, the migration chains it waits for and its time limit, then prints a line whenever its state changes:

```output
wait-for-schema: nexus-auth waits for nexus_release.schema_applied (read as nexus_ledger_reader)
to show: nexus-auth-migrations=sha256:…; gives up after 1800s
```

Progress line says	What it means
Which chains are still to be applied for this release	The named migration hooks haven't finished. Look at those Jobs.
That the release ledger can't be read, with the database's error	Postgres isn't answering, or the ledger doesn't exist because the database bootstrap hasn't run.
`FAILED (<component>): after <n>s, …`	It gave up after `schemaWait.timeoutSeconds` (1,800 by default). The init container restarts; the service itself never started.

A chain that never applies almost always means its migration Job failed. Find it with `kubectl -n nexus get jobs` and read its log. Fix what it names (a full disk, an external database the

migrator can't reach, a role conflict) and run `helm upgrade` with the same values: the hooks run again, and each one is safe to re-run.

Raise `schemaWait.timeoutSeconds` only when a migration is slow and healthy, as a large first migration on slow storage can be. Raising it to hide a failed Job just makes the pod wait longer for something that will never come.



The key store is sealed

After a power cut, a node reboot or a container runtime restart, pods come back and the console loads, and anything that needs a key fails or waits. The unsealer starts sealed after every restart of its node, and the key store can't unseal itself until the unsealer is open.

Ask OpenBao in each pod:

```bash
kubectl -n nexus exec openbao-unsealer-0 -c openbao -- \
  bao status -format=json -address=https://127.0.0.1:8200 \
  -ca-cert=/openbao/tls/ca.crt -tls-server-name=openbao-unsealer
echo "exit $?"
```

Exit `0` is unsealed, `2` is sealed, and `1` means it couldn't answer (ask again in a minute). Run the same against `openbao-0` with `-tls-server-name=openbao` for the key store. If the unsealer is unsealed and the key store isn't, the key store is unsealing itself; give it a minute.

To fix a sealed unsealer, one custodian runs the chart's `unseal.sh` with their own age identity. Chapter 2.15, Day two: operating Nexus, has the full command. The script's exit tells you what happened:

Exit	Meaning	What to do
0	Unsealed	Check `kubectl -n nexus get deploy,statefulset` within a minute.
1	Still sealed, or an unseal call failed	Read the share lines it printed; run it again.
2	A prerequisite is missing	The message names it: `AGE_IDENTITY`, a binary such as `age` or `jq`, or a direct-mode setting.
3	This identity can't decrypt the shares	You aren't a custodian of this installation. Nothing was submitted. Find a custodian who is.



WATCH OUT

If no custodian's identity can be found, the key store can't be opened, and Adverant can't open it for you either. Every custodian's identity is a single point of recovery. Keep at least two, and test each one after the install.



You can't sign in over HTTP

The console loads at an `http://` address, or through a `kubectl port-forward` to `127.0.0.1`, and signing in fails. The passkey prompt never appears, or the sign-in loops back to the start.

Sign-in needs the console's own HTTPS origin. The console accepts a sign-in only from `https://<hosts.console>`, keeps the session in a `__Host-` cookie marked Secure (which a browser only stores over HTTPS), and the first administrator's passkey needs a page with a valid certificate. Browsers refuse passkeys behind a certificate error. A port-forward to `http://127.0.0.1` can never sign in.

Check what the browser actually reached:

```bash
curl -sI https://console.harrow.example
kubectl -n nexus get ingress
```

The first should answer over HTTPS with a certificate your machine trusts. The second should show the three hosts with the names you set in `hosts.*`.

To fix it, reach the console at `https://console.harrow.example`, the exact name in `hosts.console`, with a certificate the browser trusts. With `tls.mode: existing`, check that `tls.existingSecret` holds a certificate for all three hosts. With `tls.mode: cert-manager`, check that the ClusterIssuer issued it. With `tls.mode: none`, Transport Layer Security (TLS) ends on your own load balancer, and that's where the certificate has to be right. For a private certificate authority, install its certificate on the machines your administrators sign in from.




The claim code expired

On Claim this installation the page refuses the code with `CLAIM_CODE_EXPIRED` (410). A claim code is three groups of four characters. It works once, for 30 minutes, with 5 tries. After that, or after the fifth wrong try, it's dead, and nothing was claimed or changed.

Make a new code from the terminal that has cluster access:

```bash
nexusctl claim-code --administrator aoife.brennan@harrow.example
```

It prints a fresh code and the installation's fingerprint. Enter the code on the claim page within 30 minutes and compare the fingerprint again.



SCREEN Claim this installation. The code from the terminal goes in three groups, and the page shows the full fingerprint in groups of four to compare; an expired code is refused with CLAIM_CODE_EXPIRED and nothing is claimed.

Two related answers:

- `RATE_LIMITED` (429) on the claim page means the page has had several attempts in the last minute. Wait the number of seconds it gives. If you didn't make those attempts, someone else on your network is trying the page; find out who before you claim.
- `TRANSITION_NOT_PERMITTED` (409) means the installation is already claimed, and its claim page is off for good. Sign in instead. If you didn't claim it, treat that as a security incident.



The fingerprint doesn't match


The claim page shows `CLAIM_FINGERPRINT_MISMATCH` (403), or you can see for yourself that the eight groups of four on the page differ from the ones your terminal printed. Even one group different means the browser is talking to a different installation.

Stop. Don't type the code into that page. Something other than your installation may be answering at that address, possibly a machine set up to catch the first administrator. If you claimed it, that machine would hold your organisation. Your own installation is unchanged and still unclaimed.

Check where the name points and which certificate answered:

```bash
nslookup console.harrow.example
kubectl -n nexus get ingress
curl -svI https://console.harrow.example
```

The address should be your ingress controller's, and the certificate should be the one you installed for `hosts.console`.



SCREEN The fingerprints differ in three of eight groups. The page says to stop, explains who might be answering, and lists what to check before trying again.

To fix it, give your security team the address that answered and keep the install log, which records the fingerprint the installation printed. Correct the Domain Name System (DNS) record or the proxy that sent you elsewhere. Then make a new claim code with `nexusctl claim-code --administrator <email>` and claim from a browser on a network you trust, comparing all eight groups again.



The licence is refused

The import on Import the licence, Import a new licence or `nexusctl licence import` answers with a refusal. A refused import changes nothing: the licence in force stays in force, and the clock floor doesn't move.

Read the code and the step:

```bash
curl --fail-with-body -X POST https://auth.harrow.example/api/v1/installation/licence \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <access-token>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  --data-binary @harrow-2027.licence.json
```

The refusal body carries `code`, `message`, `refused_at` (the step that failed) and `troubleshooting`. To see the state of the licence in force, read `GET https://auth.harrow.example/api/v1/installation/licence/state` with the same token.

Code	HTTP	Usual cause	Fix
`LICENCE_SIGNATURE_INVALID`	422	The file was edited, reformatted or re-saved, or one signature is missing	Download it again from your account and import it untouched
`LICENCE_FORMAT_INVALID`	422	Not a licence: wrong file, truncated, or wrapped in another object	Send the file exactly as Adverant gave it
`LICENCE_ROOT_UNKNOWN`	422	Signed with a key this release doesn't carry	Upgrade, or ask for a licence signed for your release
`LICENCE_MATRIX_MISMATCH`	422	Written for a newer edition matrix, or grants a group this build doesn't know	Upgrade, or ask for a licence written against your release
`LICENCE_OTHER_INSTALLATION`	409	Issued for another installation, often the test cluster's licence on production	Ask for a licence for this installation's identity
`LICENCE_REVOKED`	403	Adverant withdrew it	Ask Adverant for a new licence
`LICENCE_LOCKED`	403	Its `starts_on` is after the current date	Import it on or after its first day
`TRANSITION_NOT_PERMITTED`	409	This licence id was imported already	Nothing to do if it's in force; ask Adverant if the terms must change
`RECORD_NOT_FOUND`	404	The installation hasn't been declared, so it has no identity yet	Finish the first administrator step, then import
`TENANT_NOT_A_PARAMETER`	403	The body names an organisation at its top level	Send the licence file alone as the body

Two things look like licence problems and aren't. A state read that carries `LICENCE_CLOCK_BEHIND_FLOOR` means the node's clock reads earlier than the latest time the installation has seen; fix the node's time, and if the clock had run ahead and carried the floor with it, ask Adverant for a time-reset token. And a licence that imports and still shows a group as a teaser usually doesn't grant that group: read the grants on the licence page before anything else.



No AI answers

The artificial intelligence (AI) assistant shows `MODEL_NOT_CONNECTED` (503), a workflow step fails with `NO_PROVIDER_FOR_ROLE` (422), or answers simply stop.

The organisation's pool has no key that can answer, or the router can't reach the provider. Every organisation brings its own model key. With no key in use there's no AI, by design, and no shared key fills in.

Check the pool and the router's choice, each with the person's own access token:

```
OUTPUT
GET https://console.harrow.example/api/v1/ai-providers
GET https://api.harrow.example/api/ai/routing-policy/effective
```

The first lists each provider, whether it can answer and why not ("No key in use: 1 withdrawn, 1 lapsed"), and every key's state. The second answers the model the router would use for the organisation, or its refusal in words. Then check the path out of the cluster with these two commands:

```bash
BASH
kubectl -n nexus get networkpolicy nexus-operator-egress -o yaml
kubectl -n nexus logs deploy/nexus-gateway
```

What each finding means:

You find	Fix
No key in the pool	An owner or administrator adds an organisation key on the AI switchboard or Settings, AI models
Keys `invalid`, `expired` or `exhausted`	Add a fresh key; the old one stays listed as history
Keys `resting`	Wait: a failing key rests for 60 seconds, and after 5 failures in a row it's switched off (`PROVIDER_KEY_SWITCHED_OFF`)
`NO_PROVIDER_FOR_ROLE` with keys in use	The role has no assignment and nothing matches; set the role in the routing policy
`MODEL_CAPABILITY_UNAVAILABLE` (422)	The request needs a capability, or a residency, that no provider in the pool offers; enable one that does
No `nexus-operator-egress` policy, or the provider's ranges missing from it	Add the ranges, written in Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) notation, to `networkPolicy.externalEgressCIDRs` and upgrade
A local model server that doesn't answer	Check `ai.localProvider.baseUrl`, list the server in `ai.installationHosts`, and allow its range in `networkPolicy.externalEgressCIDRs`

A hosted provider key that works from a laptop and fails on the installation is nearly always the network policy. The namespace denies egress by default.



429 responses

A client is answered `429 Too Many Requests`. Nexus has four places that can say it, and the body tells you which.

Where	Code and detail	What to change

nexus-auth, per signed-in person	`RATE_LIMITED` with `limit`, `windowSeconds` and `retryAfterSeconds`	`auth.rateLimitPerMinute` (default 5000), for heavy automation
A script key, app or unit limit (Enterprise)	`RATE_LIMITED` naming the key and its limit	The limit on Settings, Rate limits, with a reason
The first-run claim page	`RATE_LIMITED` with `retry_after_seconds`	Nothing: wait, and find out who else is trying the page
A model provider	The router treats it as a passing failure and moves to the next provider	Add another key or provider if it happens often

Every one carries a `Retry-After` header. A well-behaved client waits that long and doesn't retry sooner.

If every user at once seems to share one limit, check `proxy.trustedCIDRs`. When it doesn't cover your ingress controller's pod network, nexus-auth can't believe the `X-Forwarded-For` header and sees every request as coming from the controller. The default, `10.42.0.0/16`, fits k3s only.

```bash
kubectl get pods -A -o wide
```

Find the ingress controller's pod address in the output and make sure `proxy.trustedCIDRs` covers it.



Upgrade errors

The upgrade rolled back. The Upgrade page shows `UPGRADE_ROLLED_BACK`: a step failed, every engine is back on the previous release, and data wasn't changed. The page names the step. A common one is a volume too small for a store's new layout. Fix what it names, run `nexusctl upgrade plan --bundle <file>` again, then apply. The backup is taken again first.

The chart refuses to render with `EXTERNAL_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_INVALID`. The Secret `nexus-generated` holds `EXTERNAL_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY` in a shape the chart can't use. It must be base64 of 32 bytes, or the raw 32-byte key of an older install. Someone edited or replaced the Secret. Put back the key this installation's data is sealed under, as base64 of its 32 bytes (`printf %s "$OLD" | base64`), and upgrade again. Don't let the chart make a new one: data sealed under the old key would stay unreadable.

Scripts are refused with `TOKEN_ORG_MISSING` after the upgrade. Every service that checks application programming interface (API) keys through nexus-auth now refuses a key with no organisation, with `403 TOKEN_ORG_MISSING`. Give each such key an organisation, or issue a new key.

Keys report the wrong application for an hour. Flush the cached key entries in nexus-auth's cache, the installation's Valkey store. Chapter 2.15, Day two: operating Nexus, has the command, for the in-cluster store and for an external one.

A migration hook failed. `helm upgrade` reports a failed pre-upgrade hook. The schema moves before the new pods roll, so the running release is still serving. Read the Job's log with `kubectl -n nexus logs job/<job-name>`, fix what it names and run the upgrade again.

Services couldn't use their tables for a few seconds. On the first upgrade of an installation made from an earlier chart, each service loses its old default table rights and gets its own back from its own migration. The gap is seconds. Upgrade in a quiet period, or scale the services to zero first.

The release on disk was refused. Import from media shows `MEDIA_SIGNATURE_INVALID` (422): the files aren't signed by the release key installed on this installation. Nothing was loaded and the running release keeps running. Keep the media for your security team and ask Adverant for new media through the offline exchange.


A chart render refusal

`helm install`, `helm upgrade` or `helm template` stops before anything is applied, with a message that starts with a code or names a value. The chart refuses values it can't run safely. Nothing on the cluster changed.

Render the chart on its own to see every refusal without touching the cluster. Use the Enterprise chart you downloaded in place of the `oci://` address on Enterprise, and set `networkPolicy.apiServerCIDRs` in the values, because an offline render can't read it from the cluster:

```bash
helm template nexus oci://registry.adverant.ai/nexus/charts/nexus --version <version> \
  -n nexus -f harrow-values.yaml > /dev/null
nexusctl preflight --context harrow-prod --values harrow-values.yaml
```

Preflight checks the same identity values in its "time and keys" section and reports the same codes. Its exit is `0` when the install can go ahead (warnings don't block), `1` when at least one check failed, and `2` when it couldn't run.



SCREEN Preflight cannot continue. The failing checks come first, each with its fix, and the install stays blocked with PREFLIGHT_FAILED until they pass.

Refusal	Cause	Fix
`INSTALLATION_NAME_MISSING`	`keys.installationName` is empty	Set it to this installation's own name, matching `^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$`. It's permanent once the key store first starts
`INSTALLATION_NAME_EXAMPLE`	The name is the one in the chart's example values files	Set your own name
`keys.installationName "…" does not match …`	Capitals, underscores or a leading digit	Use lower-case letters, digits and hyphens, starting with a letter

`KEYS_CUSTODIAN_MISSING`	`keys.custody.recipients` is empty	List your custodians' age recipients, the public halves
`KEYS_CUSTODIAN_EXAMPLE`	A recipient is the example custodian from the chart's values files, whose identity nobody holds	Replace it with your own custodians' recipients
`keys.custody.recipients: …`	A recipient in a form the custody Job can't encrypt to	Use `age1…`, `age1tag1…`, `age1tagpq1…`, `age1pq1…` or `age1se1…`, in lower case
`NEXUS_EDITION_INVALID`	`edition` is neither `community` nor `enterprise`	Set one of the two
`edition=… but enterprise.enabled=…`	The two disagree	Set `enterprise.enabled: true` exactly when `edition` is `enterprise`
`global.imageRegistry is required`	No registry named	Set the registry your nodes pull the images from
`hosts.<name> is required`	A public host is missing	Set `hosts.console`, `hosts.api` and `hosts.auth`
`tls.existingSecret is required when tls.mode is existing`	No certificate Secret named	Name the Secret, or choose another `tls.mode`
`tls.clusterIssuer is required when tls.mode is cert-manager`	No issuer named	Name your ClusterIssuer
`dataTier.<store>.external.host is required when mode is external`	An external store with no address	Give its host, and its Secret in `existingSecret`
`networkPolicy.apiServerCIDRs is empty and the kubernetes Endpoints could not be read`	`helm template` has no cluster to look them up in	Give the API server's addresses as `/32` ranges
`EXTERNAL_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_INVALID`	The generated key in `nexus-generated` has the wrong shape	See "Upgrade errors" above

A values file that uses a key the chart doesn't have, or a value of the wrong type, is refused by the chart's schema before any of these. `telemetry.enabled: true` is one example: the schema accepts only `false`.

> TIP
> Keep the values file in version control, without secrets. Most render refusals on an upgrade come from a values file that drifted from the one the installation was made with, and `keys.installationName` must never change.

Sending a support bundle

When none of this fixes it, send Adverant a support bundle with your support request.

```bash
nexusctl support-bundle --out harrow-support-<request-number>.tar.gz
```

`<request-number>` is the number of the request you opened on your account's Support and support bundles page. You can make the same bundle from the console's Support bundle page under This installation.

The bundle holds engine logs from the last 24 hours, health and version details, settings without their secrets, and the preflight and install reports. Before it's written, redaction replaces names, secrets and addresses, and you read a preview of exactly what leaves. People's messages, files and memory are never collected.

Upload it on the request in your account, or save it to media and carry it out if the installation has no outside connection. Only the support engineers named on the request can open it, and it's erased after 30 days. Say in the request which of the problems above you were looking at, and what the checks in this chapter showed: it saves a round trip.


PART 2 · CHAPTER 2.18

The extension model

The six ways to extend Nexus, from a setting to a domain pack, the limits of each, and how trust and isolation levels decide where your code runs. Read it before you open the software development kit (SDK).

FOR DEVELOPERS

16 MIN READ



The first thing I built on Nexus at Corrán Orbital wasn't a plugin. Our flight dynamics team wanted the assistant to answer "which ground-station passes do we lose if the Svalbard antenna goes down for maintenance?" in the same shape every time, with the pass table first and the cost in contact minutes underneath. I spent half a day reading the software development kit (SDK) before a colleague pointed out that what I wanted was a skill: a folder with a `SKILL.md` in it, uploaded to the Skills Engine and published once its tests passed and a reviewer approved it. It took forty minutes.

Two plugins and one domain pack later, that is still the advice I give first. Nexus has six ways to extend it, and they sit on a ladder of effort. The cheap rungs do more than people expect, and the expensive ones carry obligations that are easy to underestimate. This chapter lays the ladder out. Pick the lowest rung that does the job. The chapters after it go deep on each: chapter 2.19, The rules every extension inherits; chapter 2.20, Skills; chapter 2.21, The Plugin SDK; chapter 2.22, The plugin runtime; and chapter 2.23, Domain packs.




The six building blocks

Here they are in the order you should consider them.

1. **Settings and policies.** These are values an administrator sets in the console for the organisation, a unit or one person, inside what the licence allows. You write no code at all.
2. **Skills Engine skills.** A `SKILL.md` package holding instructions and the tools the skill may call, with optional files and scripts beside it. The assistant, agents, workflows and the AI (artificial intelligence) buttons on screens all run the same skills, and so does your IDE (integrated development environment).
3. **Plugins.** Your own code, declared by a manifest and built with the SDK's tools. A plugin comes in one of three tiers: `skills-only`, `ui-only` or `full-service`.
4. **Domain packs.** One industry's lenses and templates, its skills and knowledge model, its connectors and its phone screens, licensed as a unit. Adverant ships ten; you can build your own.
5. **Lenses.** What one role sees inside a pack or a platform. A lens narrows a base lens and never widens it.
6. **MCP connections and connectors.** The Model Context Protocol (MCP) tools a plugin publishes or an AI coding tool connects through, and the read-only connectors that bring records in from systems you already run.

Two words get overloaded, so let me fix them now. A **Skills Engine skill** is a `SKILL.md` package in the library. A **manifest skill** is a typed row in a plugin's `skills[]` array, compiled into the platform's skill registry and run through UNO, the workflow engine. Both are called skills on screen. They're written and governed differently, and this documentation always says which one it means.



SCREEN Start something new offers six golden paths, one per kind of extension. Each makes a repository from a versioned template with a manifest that declares what it needs, and sets up tests, a dev space and data branches.

What each one can do, and what it can't

The table is the short version. I've put the "can't" column in on purpose: each limit is a property of the design, and every one of them has saved me from something.

Building block	What it can do	What it can't do	Who makes it
Setting or policy	Change how a feature behaves at any level from the organisation down to one person; lock a value; delegate it down; ask for a second person on a change	Add a screen or a route, store a new table, or start a new kind of work	An administrator, in the console
Skills Engine skill	Give the assistant and agents, workflows and AI buttons a repeatable way to do one job, with its own	Hold a credential; call a tool outside the allow-list of the person running it (`SKILL_CANNOT_WIDEN_TOOLS`);	Anyone holding the right, in the creator or from their IDE

	instructions and test cases	go live without its tests and approval	
Plugin, `skills-only`	Publish manifest skills that run on the platform: host callbacks, queued work, maps over a list and, at trust `core` or `verified`, model-backed skills	Serve pages of its own	A developer, with the SDK
Plugin, `ui-only`	Add a frontend surface inside the shell	Store data of its own or run compute	A developer, with the SDK
Plugin, `full-service`	Its own backend and frontend, a Postgres schema, a route table with rights, and skills and MCP tools	Call a model provider; hold a model key; read another organisation's rows except through a recorded grant; run compute outside UNO dispatch	A developer, with the SDK
Domain pack	Bring an industry's lenses and templates, its skills and workflows, a knowledge model, an evidence map and phone screens to the units an administrator chooses	Change the shell or its components, or the writing rules; run without the organisation's licence carrying it	Adverant, or your own developers on Enterprise
Lens	Choose the cards and fields one role sees inside a pack or platform, and the actions it offers	Show anything its base lens hides (`LENS_CANNOT_WIDEN`); change what a role may do	A pack author builds it; an administrator grants it per unit
MCP tools and connectors	Expose a plugin's tools to agents and coding tools; read records from a policy system or a telemetry archive into the knowledge model	Write back to the source system through a connector; act beyond the signed-in person's own permissions	A developer declares MCP tools; an administrator sets up connectors

A few of those cells deserve a sentence more.

Settings are a framework, and every plugin uses the same one. A plugin that declares a `settings` block in its manifest gets the levels (platform, organisation, pack, unit, group, repository, person), locks and delegation, a change log and second-person approval, all without writing a settings table. That's why the cheapest rung is often enough: if the behaviour you want already exists and only needs a different value for the Rotterdam unit, it's a setting.

A Skills Engine skill runs as the person. It never holds a key, and it can only reach tools inside the allow-list of whoever runs it and read only what that person may open. A skill that adds a tool which writes is held until two people approve it, then goes live in shadow, then in canary, then for everyone.

A `skills-only` plugin is the middle rung. You need it when the work is code you own: a deterministic calculation, a queue worker, a fan-out over a list. The platform calls your code; your code never calls a model.

A `full-service` plugin is a small product. It owns a Postgres schema, a route table with a rights register, a frontend, a set of database roles, and every isolation obligation in chapter 2.19, The rules every extension inherits. It's the right answer more often than people fear and the wrong answer more often than people hope.

Which do I need?

Start at the top of this table and stop at the first row that fits.

You want to…	Use	Why not something lighter
Change a value or a limit, or who may do something	A setting or a policy	Nothing lighter exists
Make the assistant do one job the same way every time	A Skills Engine skill	A setting can't hold instructions
Put an "AI button" on a screen that runs that job	A Skills Engine skill bound to the button	A button only runs skills; there's nothing to build
Let an AI coding tool reach Nexus	An MCP connection through the Workbench	Nothing to write; the person signs in through their browser
Read records from an existing system into the knowledge model	A read-only connector	A connector writes nothing back, so it carries no write risk
Run deterministic code you own on the platform's schedule	A `skills-only` plugin with a `host_callback` or `plugin_queue` skill	A Skills Engine skill can't run your code
Add a screen or two inside the shell	A `ui-only` plugin	Only plugins add screens
Keep your own records behind your own routes and rights	A `full-service` plugin	Only this tier owns a schema
Give one role a narrower view of an industry's screens	A lens on an existing pack	A lens is data, not code
Bring an industry's knowledge model and lenses, with phone screens, to several units	A domain pack	A plugin alone has no lenses or licence gate

At Corrán Orbital the pass-planning question stayed a Skills Engine skill. The orbit propagation it needs became a `skills-only` plugin with one `host_callback` skill, because the numerical work is ours and must give the same answer twice. Our anomaly review board became a `full-service` plugin, because it keeps its own records of who looked at which telemetry excursion and what they decided. The pack came last, when a second unit wanted the same thing.

How the pieces combine

The building blocks compose upwards. A domain pack is the clearest example, because it's a bundle of the others plus a licence gate:

- a knowledge model, the kinds of thing the industry knows and how they link, often built on a base model from another pack;
- lenses, one per role, each narrowing a base lens;
- templates and workflows, and the Skills Engine skills they call;
- plugins where the pack needs code of its own;
- read-only connectors into the systems that already hold the records;
- a mobile overlay that says which cards and capture steps appear on phones;
- and the entitlement: the feature groups the licence must carry before any of it switches on.





FIGURE How a domain pack bundles the other building blocks.

None of this is per-app plumbing. The pack ships no isolation code of its own, no model client and no licence check: it inherits the platform's. That's the subject of the next chapter, and it's the reason a pack author at a bank and one at a port write the same amount of security code, which is none.



SCREEN The Domain packs page lists all ten packs with what each needs and where it runs. A pack the licence doesn't carry stays listed and greyed, with what it would need.



Trust levels

Every plugin declares a `trust` level in its manifest. Trust isn't a gate the SDK can talk its way past. It's advisory metadata the platform reads to decide how isolated a plugin's contributions run and the most sensitive data its skills may touch. The live gates (classification and residency, export and spend) stay exactly where they are.

Trust	Who it's for	Isolation posture	Classification ceiling
`core`	First-party code that ships in the platform	`none`: same-origin, no extra isolation	`restricted`
`verified`	A reviewed third party, a verified publisher	`same-origin` surface, brokered skills	`restricted`
`community`	An unreviewed third party; the default for a new plugin	`sandboxed` surface, brokered skills	`tenant`
`untrusted`	Anything from an unknown source	`strict`: sandboxed surface, brokered skills only, no host trust	`public`

Two rules follow from that table, and `create-nexus-plugin validate` enforces both before anything is built.

First, **a skill's `classification` can't exceed its plugin's ceiling**. Classifications rank `public`, then `tenant`, then `restricted`. A `community` plugin that declares a `restricted` skill fails to build.

Second, **only `core` and `verified` plugins may declare skills that reach the AI Provider Router**. Those are the `tool_using` and `llm_only` tiers. A `community` or `untrusted` plugin brokers

deterministic work (`host_callback` , `plugin_queue` , and `map` over those) and asks the platform to do anything that needs a model. My first plugin was `community` , and I lost an afternoon trying to declare an `llm_only` summary skill before I understood the refusal was the point.

If you omit `trust` , the SDK treats the plugin as `community` . An omitted field can never be a promotion.



Isolation levels 1 to 4

Separately from trust, the manifest's `runtime` block says how the plugin runs. `isolationLevel` is an integer from 1 to 4, and the execution mode follows from it. You don't choose the two independently: the validator derives one from the other and refuses a manifest whose pair disagrees.

isolationLevel	executionMode	What it means
1	`external_https`	The plugin runs outside the installation and is reached over HTTPS
2	`mcp_container`	A container that exposes MCP tools
3	`hardened_docker`	A hardened container in the plugin's own pods; the template's default
4	`firecracker`	A microVM, the strongest separation

```json
"runtime": {
  "nodeVersion": "20",
  "executionMode": "hardened_docker",
  "isolationLevel": 3,
  "entrypoint": "dist/server.js",
  "healthCheck": "/health"
}
```

`entrypoint` is required. Entrypoints are shipped artefacts and never fetched at runtime: the SDK has no dynamic-import or remote-load path at all, so trust is written down and checked once, then frozen, never downloaded.




What you sign up for at each rung

Every rung above settings costs something to keep. Here's what each one costs you.

- A Skills Engine skill needs test cases, a reviewer who isn't you, and a version history you'll be asked about when it misbehaves. The same bytes are never published twice (`CONTENT_HASH_ALREADY_PUBLISHED`), so "just re-upload it" isn't a fix.
- A plugin needs a manifest whose route table matches the routes your code registers, in both directions. A route that exists but isn't declared is a conformance failure, and so is a declared route the code never registers.
- A `full-service` plugin owns a schema with five database roles, row-level security forced on every table, and a boot that refuses to listen until the database proves the fence holds. It also restates the three platform laws in its manifest, word for word.
- A domain pack is licensed. It switches on one unit at a time, through a pilot, and the organisation's licence must carry it. You don't get to decide that a customer has it.
- A lens can only take away. If a role needs to see more, the base lens has to change, which is a conversation with whoever owns that base.

None of these costs can be negotiated per app, which is the trade. You give up some freedom on the first plugin and get it back on every one after.



SCREEN Installing a third-party plugin works like app permissions. Each scope its manifest declares is granted or withheld per unit, and a call for anything it didn't declare is refused with `CONNECTION_SCOPE_EXCEEDED`.



MCP tools and connections


MCP shows up in three places, and they're easy to confuse.

A plugin can **publish MCP tools** by declaring them in `mcpTools[]`: a `name`, a `description` and an `inputSchema`. The one rule the validator adds is that an `inputSchema` may not use a top-level `oneOf`, `allOf` or `anyOf`, because a combinator at the top of the schema makes every MCP client that imports the tool fail with a 400. A plugin at `isolationLevel` 2 runs as an `mcp_container`.

The **Skills Engine's library is reachable over MCP**. Claude Code and agents use thirteen MCP tools to find and match skills, run them and record the run, and create, import or sync them, and each call runs as the person who started it, inside their allow-list.

And an **AI coding tool connects through the Workbench**: one address per installation, a sign-in through the person's browser, a one-hour pass instead of a stored key, and only the tools that person ticks. Chapter 2.26, Building with AI coding tools, walks through it.

Connectors are the quieter neighbour. A domain pack's knowledge model is fed by read-only connectors into systems such as policy administration or a claims system, each with a schedule and a test button. Nothing is written back to the source.



SCREEN Plugins and MCP sync shows which plugins bring skills, which syncs were refused whole, and the thirteen MCP tools Claude Code and agents use to reach the library.



From your branch to people's screens

Whatever rung you're on, the route to production is the same. Every release moves from your dev space to staging, then to a pilot unit, then to all units, and each step has gates: tests, a manifest that hasn't widened, a dry run on a masked copy, and named reviewers who aren't the author. A promotion that tries to jump a step is refused with `GATE_CANNOT_BE_SKIPPED`. Each environment keeps the previous version for 30 days, and rolling one unit back is a reviewed change that takes about a minute.

Deployment itself goes through the installation's release channels only. Units choose their channel, and their administrator agrees to each move. You see counts and error rates per unit on the Channels and installs page, never what anyone did with your extension. Chapter 2.28, Releasing your extension, covers the release side end to end.



A note on editions

Most of this ladder exists on both editions. Community gets settings and Skills Engine skills, plugins at every tier, and the same golden paths on one server with code in your own Git host. Enterprise adds the promotion from dev space through staging to a pilot unit with its gates, plus publisher clusters and masked copies of live data. It also adds your own private catalogue, and domain packs. Chapter 2.25, Building for each edition, has the detail.

The next chapter is the one to read before you write any code. It's short on choices and long on rules, and the rules are the same for the first extension and the thousandth.


PART 2 · CHAPTER 2.19

The rules every extension inherits

Isolation on three axes, compute through UNO, AI (artificial intelligence) through the router, organisation-owned keys and licence checks. What each rule means for your code and which gate enforces it, and why you inherit it instead of writing it.

FOR DEVELOPERS

15 MIN READ



The first refusal my anomaly-review plugin ever sent was to me. I'd written a test client that posted a new review with the organisation's id in the body, out of habit from another platform, and the plugin answered before my handler ran:

```json
{
  "error": true,
  "code": "TENANT_NOT_A_PARAMETER",
  "message": "The request body names the organisation. Tenancy comes from the token.",
  "resolved": ["tenant", "owner"],
  "missing": [],
  "troubleshooting": ["Remove organizationId from the body. The organisation is read from your sign-in."]
}
```

I hadn't written that check. It came with the scope guard the SDK (software development kit) template wires into every `/api` route, and it fires even when the id in the body is the caller's own. That's the pattern for this whole chapter: a small number of rules, each enforced by a mechanism you inherit, each with a gate that fails your build if your code walks around it. On Nexus your plugin inherits its isolation from the platform, and the gates audit it.

There are five rules, and the sections below take them in turn: isolation on three axes; compute that runs only through UNO dispatch; AI (artificial intelligence) that goes only through the AI Provider Router; model keys that belong to the organisation; and licensed features checked against the licence. Every manifest also restates three of them in one block of sentences.



Rule 1: isolation on three axes, from the authenticated request

Every read and write in an extension is scoped on three axes, and so is every tool call and skill dispatch.

Axis	Column	Answers	How hard the line is
Tenant	`organization_id`	Which organisation	A hard boundary, crossed only through a recorded read-only grant
Owner	`owner_user_id`	Which person inside the organisation	Private even inside one organisation, for anything personal
Unit	`business_unit_id`	Which part of the organisation	An optional fence inside a tenant

The owner axis is the one newcomers get wrong. A mailbox is personal, and so is a saved view or a graph derived from one person's data. Two members of the same organisation, in the same unit with the same role, don't see each other's owner-scoped rows. On an organisation artefact, an approval or a case record for example, owner is provenance instead: it records who acted, and reads are scoped to the tenant so the audit trail stays visible to the people who need it. You decide per table which kind it is, and the repository layer encodes it, never a special case in a route.

The axes come from the authenticated request **and nowhere else**. An environment variable can't supply them, and neither can a query parameter, a path segment, a client header or a build constant. The SDK makes the wrong thing hard to write: `resolveScope(identity, options)` has no organisation parameter at all. The organisation is inside `identity`, and only a verified token produces one. There's nothing to pass an id through.

That is why a body naming the tenant is refused rather than ignored. The guard refuses any of five field names: `orgId`, `organizationId`, `organization_id`, `tenant` and `tenantId`. A silently ignored field teaches the caller that the field works. The first caller tests it and sees their own data; the second one sends a different organisation's id. Refusing on the first request names the contract

before anyone builds on the wrong one. The same rule holds for the `inputParams` of a dispatch: a skill's input that carries an organisation id is refused at dispatch.

The unit axis is either declared and enforced or not used. A route that declares `needsUnit: true` refuses when the credential doesn't resolve a unit, with `unit` named in `missing[]`. Don't synthesise a unit from a subdomain or a header, and don't default one. A made-up unit fences differently from the organisation's real units, and it joins rows it shouldn't.



A surface that can't express the predicate refuses

If a route can't say which tenant and owner a row belongs to, and which unit when it needs one, it refuses. There's no organisation-wide read as a fallback and no placeholder value. A placeholder is the worst option, because a placeholder is a value and values match rows: a tool router that defaulted both tenant and user to the string `'unknown'` served organisation-wide data to whoever called it. On a tenant boundary, `?? 'unknown'` is a defect.

The refusal has one shape everywhere on the platform, and it carries enough for a client to render the fix:

```JSON
{
  "error": true,
  "code": "SCOPE_PREDICATE_MISSING",
  "message": "Request cannot be scoped to a tenant from the presented credential.",
  "resolved": ["tenant", "owner"],
  "missing": ["unit"],
  "troubleshooting": [
    "The credential resolved tenant+owner; this route additionally requires a business unit.",
    "Select a business unit in the client and retry — re-authentication will not change this
outcome."
  ]
}
```

`error` is always `true`. `code` comes from the platform's code catalogue. `resolved[]` names the axes that were derived and `missing[]` the ones the route needed and couldn't get. `troubleshooting[]` says what would actually fix it. A bare "forbidden" teaches nobody anything.

Keep 401 and 403 apart, because clients act on them differently.

Status	Meaning	What the client does
401	Not authenticated	Signs in again
403	Authenticated, but the request can't be scoped, or the caller lacks the right	Stops retrying and changes the request

A scope refusal answered as 401 sends a client into a sign-in loop that no sign-in can end: it throws the session away and signs in again, retries and gets 401 again, while the person watches a spinner forever.

Two more mechanisms make the refusal total. Inside a handler, `scopeOf(req)` is the only way to read the scope, and it throws if the guard didn't run. And the guard runs after body parsing and before any handler; a handler that becomes reachable without the predicate answers 500 with `MIDDLEWARE_ORDERING_ERROR`, deliberately, so it lands in your error budget instead of in an incident report.



The database holds the same line on its own

The code fence and the database fence are two mechanisms for one law, and you get both.

Every statement against a scoped table composes `tenantFence(scope)` from the SDK; you never write the predicate by hand. Every statement also runs inside `withScopedTx`, which binds the three

axes for that one transaction through a single database function and refuses a second bind (`SCOPE_ALREADY_BOUND`). Underneath, every table in your schema has row-level security forced on, and the role your request path connects as can't change the bound tenant itself. A process that connects as a role able to bypass row-level security refuses to boot with `DB_ROLE_BYPASSES_ISOLATION`. Chapter 2.22, The plugin runtime, shows the code; chapter 2.21, The Plugin SDK, shows how the roles are rendered for you.



The one crossing: a recorded grant

There's exactly one way across the tenant boundary. The organisation that holds the rows records a grant naming which organisation may read which tables, under which agreement and for how long. The database makes the read read-only, and every look is written before the read, in both organisations, by id only. Writes never cross; work handed to another firm travels as a message. The owner and administrator roles never read across the boundary at all, and the manifest is refused if the right that admits a cross-organisation read doesn't bar them. A plugin that wants another way across doesn't get one.



Rule 2: all compute runs through UNO dispatch

UNO, the workflow engine, is the only compute path. Your code never fetches a model provider or an engine directly, and never a queue or a workflow host either. You send one envelope to the dispatch endpoint and get `202` with identifiers back; the result arrives by polling or by callback.

Three habits follow, and the template already has all three.

- One file owns the dispatch URL. `UNO_DISPATCH_URL` is read once in the config loader and must be an in-cluster address. A public one is refused at boot, because nothing leaves the installation.
- One closed allow-list of what this surface may dispatch. A backend that will dispatch any skill id a browser hands it is a general-purpose proxy for every skill in the registry, including skills of other plugins and skills that spend someone else's model budget. The list is a module-level constant of namespaced job types, never an environment variable. An id not on it is refused with `SKILL_NOT_ALLOWED`.
- Re-check what comes back. When you read a job back, the SDK's client compares the returned row's `organization_id` with the caller's tenant on your side of the network call. A fence that only exists on the other side of a call is a convention.



Rule 3: all AI goes through the AI Provider Router

A plugin makes no call to a model, anywhere. There's no provider SDK in `package.json`, no model key in the environment and no relay. The router alone holds the organisation's provider credential and makes the final provider and model decision.

What a plugin may do is express wishes, at registration time, on the manifest skill's registry row:

```json
{
  "execution_config_skill": {
    "preferredProvider": "gemini",
    "preferredModel": "gemini-3.5-flash",
    "capabilityProfile": { "needsToolUse": true, "minContextWindow": 200000 }
  }
}
```

The router honours a wish only when the organisation has that provider enabled and credentialed. Otherwise it substitutes, from the organisation's own pool. `capabilityProfile` never selects; it filters, and its `dataResidency` field is a hard jurisdictional constraint the router satisfies or refuses. Omitting all of these is the right default for most skills: the organisation's own role assignments then decide, and the organisation is the one paying.

Two kinds of refusal come back, and they mean very different things.

Code	Status	What it means
`MISSING_CALLER_IDENTITY`, `UNAUTHORIZED_CALLER`	403	Your code tried to call the router itself. Stop: this is the seam refusing by design, and it isn't retryable
`MODEL_CAPABILITY_UNAVAILABLE`	422	No enabled provider has a model that satisfies the profile. Relax the profile, or the organisation enables a capable provider
`NO_PROVIDER_FOR_ROLE`	422	The organisation hasn't configured routing for this role. Show the router's remediation text to the person

The second pair belongs on screen, not in a log. There's no default model and no fallback provider: a role the organisation hasn't set up fails loudly, with a sentence saying what to configure.

The one read a plugin may make of the router is `effectiveRoute()` from `runtime/ai-route`. It answers which provider and model the router would choose for the signed-in organisation without sending an AI request, and it returns the router's refusal in words when there's no model. Chapter 2.22, The plugin runtime, shows it.

The trust ladder adds one more line. Only `core` and `verified` plugins may declare the two manifest skill tiers that reach the router, `tool_using` and `llm_only`. Everyone else brokers deterministic work and lets the platform do the model-reaching part.



Rule 4: keys belong to the organisation

Each organisation brings its own provider account and key, and pays its own bill. The key lives in the organisation's AI provider pool, managed by its own administrators from the console, and the router resolves it at call time. There's no shared platform key behind a tenant, so no organisation spends another's budget.

For an extension that means three things.

- You never hold a model key, whether in code or configuration or a secret store. The `no-credentials` gate fails the build if one is readable, and the config loader refuses to boot if one is present.

- You never enumerate an organisation's keys. If your plugin thinks it needs to, the requirement is in the wrong place.
- An organisation with no key gets no AI answers. That's an expected state with a real screen. Name the missing role and quote the remediation, then point the person at their provider settings. Don't render it as an empty result.



Rule 5: licensed features are checked against the licence

What an installation may use beyond the Community floor comes from one place: the licence document Adverant signs, verified on the installation with public keys only. Your extension never decides from anything weaker, such as a plan name in a token or a flag in configuration.


In a plugin, the simplest way to tie a feature to the licence is on the right that guards it. A right in the manifest's `rights` register can name a `licence` feature:

```json
"rights": {
  "evidence.export": {
    "summary": "Export the evidence pack for an inspection.",
    "roles": ["owner", "admin", "member"],
    "licence": "compliance-packs"
  }
}
```

Whoever calls a route guarded by that right is refused with `LICENCE_LOCKED` (403), whatever roles and seats they hold, when the organisation's licence doesn't carry `compliance-packs`. The refusal names the feature and what carries it, and says who can turn it on.

The licence's state matters too. While a licence is valid or in its warning window, licensed features work, and they keep working in grace, and grace shows the notice `LICENCE_IN_GRACE`. Once a licence has run past grace it restricts: running work and reads go on, and so do exports and security updates, but creating something new under a licensed feature is refused with `LICENCE_LOCKED`. Build your create paths expecting that answer.

When your plugin asks the entitlement check whether an organisation holds a feature, it gets a verdict, never a bare boolean. "Not reachable" and "reachable and no" are different facts with different codes: `ENTITLEMENT_UNREACHABLE` (502) and `ENTITLEMENT_DENIED` (403). A reachability blip must never quietly downgrade every customer to the free floor.



SCREEN Manifest and permissions compares what a release declares with the last one. Here version 0.4.0 adds sending mail and one outside address, so the release is held with `MANIFEST_SCOPE_WIDENED` until two reviewers and the compliance officer agree.



The manifest restates the law

Every v2 manifest carries an `architecture` block with three required sentences, and the validator pins their wording. In a plugin you build for your own installation they read:

```json
"architecture": {
  "compute": "All compute runs via UNO dispatch (nexus-orchestrator /api/v1/dispatch + nexus-workflows). No direct engine, queue or model-provider calls from plugin code.",
  "ai": "All AI goes through the AI Provider Router, which alone owns the credential and the final provider/model decision. This plugin holds no model credentials.",
  "deploy": "Deploy is through the installation's release channels only."
}
```

Those sentences are checked. A plugin whose manifest agreed to the laws while its code fetched a model provider would be lying in its own contract, and the gates exist to make the lie detectable.




The gates that enforce each rule

The SDK ships twenty-two adherence gates as one command, `nexus-gates`. Chapter 2.21, The Plugin SDK, describes every one. Here they are grouped by the rule they hold.

Rule	Gates	What fails the build
Isolation in the route layer	`scope-adherence`, `one-fence`, `rights-register`, `crud-adherence`	An `/api` route without the scope guard, a second hand-written tenant predicate, a scope route with no right, a mutating route whose right names nothing
Isolation in SQL	`sql-fence`, `no-set-config`	A statement on a scoped table without the fence; plugin code binding the tenant setting itself
Isolation in the database	`migrations-are-scoped`, `rls-present`, `db-role-honest`	A table missing an axis or a tenant-leading key, a table without forced row-level security, a request path connecting as the owner or a superuser
The one crossing	`grants-declared`	A table granted in migrations that the manifest doesn't declare, or a read seat handed privileges by hand
Compute through UNO	`no-direct-compute`	A direct fetch to a model provider or engine, or to a queue or workflow host; a second reader of the dispatch URL
AI and keys	`no-credentials`	A model-provider credential readable in the repository or environment
The declared contract	`api-contract`, `platform-clients`, `declared-input`	A route registered but not declared, or declared but not registered; a platform client imported but not named

Every gate has a self-test that proves it fails on a fixture built to trip it. `npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 nexus-gates --self-test` runs them all, and a gate that has stopped failing on its own fixture has stopped working.



SCREEN What an app may reach lists every outside address an app has declared and whether the compliance officer approved it. A call to an address nobody declared is stopped and counted before anything leaves.

Before you ask for a review

This is the list I walk before I ask a colleague to review a plugin. Each line is something a reviewer at Corrán Orbital has sent back to me at least once.

1. Every `/api` route registers the scope guard, and the only anonymous routes are exact paths declared `auth: public` with `allowAnonymous: true`.

2. Every route the scope guard serves names a `right` from the manifest's register, and no handler carries a right-check of its own.
3. No handler reads an organisation, a person or a unit from the body, the query or a header.
4. Every statement on a scoped table goes through `tenantFence` inside `withScopedTx`, and nothing in the repository calls `set_config`.
5. Every table has the three axis columns, a primary key that leads with `organization_id`, and composite foreign keys that carry the tenant.
6. The dispatch URL is read in one file, and the dispatch allow-list is a constant of namespaced job types.
7. Nothing in `package.json` talks to a model provider, and no key sits in the environment.
8. Every feature that only some licences carry names its `licence` on the right that guards it.
9. `npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 nexus-gates --self-test` is green, and so is `npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 create-nexus-plugin validate nexus.manifest.json`.

If all nine hold, the review is about your product, which is where a reviewer's time should go.



Why the platform enforces these rules

Each rule above was once a convention somewhere, and each convention failed the same way: the routes that remembered it were fine and the one that forgot it was the incident. A business-unit fence applied as optional middleware was bypassed six independent ways, every one a route that never opted in. An environment variable that rewrote tenant identity served one organisation another's 1,406 contacts, and it looked correct in review because it was correct for the pod it was written for.

So the platform puts the predicate where every surface already passes through it: in the scope guard and the fence function, in the transaction wrapper and the forced row-level security, and in the dispatch client. A gate then enumerates every route and statement and every import, and fails the build when one of them reaches a scoped table or a model or a compute engine without going through those mechanisms. The cost of that design is that your first plugin feels constrained. The return is that the thousandth plugin is isolated without its author knowing the feature exists, because there is no other path to the data for it to take.


There's an honest limit to all this. The gates prove your code goes through the mechanisms; they can't prove your product logic is right. A route that correctly scopes a query to the owner's rows can still show the wrong rows to the right owner. The isolation test kit in chapter 2.22, The plugin runtime, attacks every route as another organisation and as a colleague, with each fence removed in turn, and that's the test I'd run before I trusted my own reading of any of this.

Skills

How to write, test and publish a Skills Engine skill, where it shows up once it's live, and how manifest skills in a plugin differ. Includes a worked berth-allocation summary for Harrow Port Authority.

FOR DEVELOPERS

17 MIN READ



Tomás Reilly, the platform engineer at Harrow Port Authority, asked me last month why his berth planners got a different answer each time they asked the assistant "who's on which berth tomorrow, and what moved?". The answer was that nobody had told the assistant what a good answer looks like. A Skills Engine skill fixed it in an afternoon: the planners now get the same three-part summary every time, with the berth table first, the changes since the last plan underneath, and the clashes last. This chapter walks through that skill end to end, and then covers the other kind of skill, the one that lives in a plugin's manifest.



Two kinds of skill

Nexus uses the word "skill" for two different things, and they're built differently.

	Skills Engine skill	Manifest skill
What it is	A `SKILL.md` package in the skills library	A typed row in a plugin's `skills[]` array
Who writes it	Anyone with the right, in the creator or their own editor	A developer, inside a plugin
What it contains	Instructions, the tools it may call, optional files and scripts	An input and output schema, a tier, and the fields that tier needs
How it reaches the platform	Validated, uploaded and published to the Skills Engine	Compiled from the manifest and synced to the skill registry
What runs it	The assistant, agents, workflows, AI (artificial intelligence) buttons, Claude Code	UNO (the workflow engine) dispatch
Typical use	"Summarise the berth plan the same way every time"	"Run our orbit propagator on this pass"

The rest of the chapter keeps them apart. If a paragraph says "skill" on its own, it's a Skills Engine skill.



Part 1: Skills Engine skills

What a skill is

A skill is a folder. Its `SKILL.md` says what the skill is for and how to do the job; beside it sit any files the job needs and any scripts it runs. The engine loads a skill in three layers: the name and description always, the instructions when a task calls for the skill, and the files only when a step needs them. That's why an installation can hold two hundred skills and pay almost nothing for them until one is used.

OUTPUT

```
skills/<slug>/
├── SKILL.md      # required: YAML frontmatter, then the instructions
├── skill.yaml    # optional: engine metadata (triggers, aliases, tags, capabilities)
└── scripts/      # optional: bundled with the skill as components
```

The directory name must equal the skill's slug. A mismatch is a validation warning, and it's worth fixing, because the slug is how the library matches an upload to an existing skill.

SKILL.md frontmatter

The frontmatter is YAML between two `---` lines at the top of the file. The format requires three fields. Validation itself blocks on only a few things: a missing name or description, and a slug or job type that's already taken. Everything else it reports as a warning.

```
Field         Type    Required   What it holds
```

`name`	string	yes	The unique identifier, in kebab-case
`description`	string	yes	What the skill does, at most 500 characters. The library and the matcher read it, so write it for a reader deciding whether this is the right skill
`allowed-tools`	string or list	yes	The tools the skill may call. It can only narrow the allow-list of whoever runs it
`triggers`	list	no	Slash commands that invoke the skill directly
`capabilities`	list	no	Structured capabilities, each with a `name`, a `description` and optionally `input_schema`, `output_schema` and `examples`
`version`	string	no	A semantic version; `1.0.0` when omitted
`visibility`	string	no	`private`, `team` or `public`
`status`	string	no	`draft`, `testing` or `published`

Keep the instructions under about 5,000 tokens. Be specific and give examples. Each skill should do one job well; if you find yourself writing "and also", you probably have two skills.

skill.yaml

`skill.yaml` carries what the engine needs for discovery and the library, so the `SKILL.md` stays readable. The fields the engine reads include `name`, `display_name`, `description`, `version`, `status`, `visibility`, `triggers`, `aliases`, `category`, `tags`, `allowed_tools` and `capabilities`. A capability can carry `query_patterns`, the phrasings the matcher should send to it. There are also hints for the engine's own budgeting: `complexity`, `estimated_tokens` and `required_services`.

scripts/

Anything under `scripts/` is bundled verbatim with the skill as a component. A script is run, never read into the model's context, and it runs in a sandbox. Use one when a step is arithmetic or parsing that a model shouldn't do in its head.


Visibility and status

Visibility says who can find the skill: `private` is you, `team` is your team, and `public` is everyone in the organisation the library serves. In the console the same choice reads "Only me", a team such as "Customs desk", or the whole organisation, and a skill can also be shared into a domain pack through that pack's own review.

Status says where the skill is in its life.

Status	Meaning
`draft`	Work in progress; not discoverable
`testing`	Being validated, with limited access
`published`	Available for general use
`deprecated`	Superseded; on its way to retirement

Once a version is published it never changes. In the console, "live", "canary" and "shadow" are labels on versions, and switching back to an earlier version moves a label. Runs in flight finish on the version they started with.



SCREEN The creator's second step shows the draft `SKILL.md`, the files beside it and when each loads, and the tools the skill may call. A checking skill is offered no tool that writes, and a skill can only narrow the runner's allow-list.

From a folder to a live skill

Five `npm` scripts in the Skills Engine's repository take a skill from your editor to the library and prove it arrived.

Command	What it does
`npm run skill:validate skills/<slug>`	Lints the package. Publishing needs zero errors
`npm run skill:upload skills/<slug>`	Validates and publishes in one step; idempotent
`npm run skill:upload skills/<slug> --dry-run`	Validates and prints the plan without writing anything
`npm run skill:publish -- --dry-run skills/<slug>`	The lower-level publish behind upload, same pipeline
`npm run skill:reconcile`	Compares the skills in your repository with what the library and the skill registry hold
`npm run skill:live:verify`	Checks a published skill end to end on the running installation

Publishing writes two entries, and both matter. One is the skill itself, with its `SKILL.md` body, capabilities, components and quality record; the library, discovery and matching read that one. The

other is the registry entry the workflow engine resolves a dispatch against. A skill that only ever reached the registry runs, but it's invisible in the library until you upload it.

Publishing is idempotent. An unchanged skill is a no-op, and an existing skill is matched by its slug and updated in place, never re-created. Upload the same bytes as a version that's already published and you get that version back with `CONTENT_HASH_ALREADY_PUBLISHED`, not a duplicate.

`skill:reconcile` walks your repository's skills against the library, the registry and the workflow engine's inventory, and reports anything that exists in one place and not another. `skill:live:verify` goes further on the running installation: both entries exist and point at each other with the same content hash, a dry-run dispatch of the skill's job type is accepted, the skill shows in the library list and detail, it can be invoked, and the audit trail ties the publish, the dispatch and the run together by slug and request id.

From a workstation, the upload reaches the installation's knowledge service, `nexus-graphrag`, through a port-forward, and it needs the Skills Engine's service key in the environment. Load the key without echoing it:

```bash
kubectl -n nexus port-forward svc/nexus-graphrag 8090:8090
read -rs GRAPHRAG_SKILLS_ENGINE_SERVICE_KEY
export GRAPHRAG_SKILLS_ENGINE_SERVICE_KEY
GRAPHRAG_URL=http://localhost:8090 npm run skill:upload skills/berth-allocation-summary
```

Inside the cluster, in a pipeline job, the default address resolves on its own and `GRAPHRAG_URL` isn't needed. Get the key through your organisation's own secret process. It never goes in the repository, your shell history or a command's output.


Tests, approval and going live

A skill reaches the library as a draft, and the creator holds it there until three things pass.

Check	What it does
Test cases	Every case must pass before the skill can go for approval. A case can be removed only with a reason, which the approvers see.
A dry run in shadow	The skill runs on past work, where nobody sees the answers, and its results are compared with what a person decided at the time.
A blind review by a model from another family	It looks for a missed check, an invented source and a planted instruction the skill followed when it shouldn't have.

Then approval. A skill that adds a tool which writes is held until two people approve it with their passkeys, and the person who proposed it can't be one of them (`PUBLISH_NEEDS_APPROVAL`). It then goes live in shadow, then in canary for one unit behind named gates, then for everyone. If a canary gate isn't met, the canary stops itself and everyone stays on the previous version; sending it to everyone early needs a reason and a second approver (`CANARY_GATE_NOT_MET`).

On Community the creator, library, versions and tests are all there, and the owner publishes alone once the tests pass. Canary, two-person approval, plugin sync and merging duplicates come with Enterprise.



SCREEN Publishing shows why a skill is held, who must agree and how it goes live: approved, in shadow, in canary behind named gates, then for everyone. The proposer can't approve their own change, and the last version stays ready to switch back to.


Where skills show up

The same published skill reaches people in five places.

1. **The assistant** matches a request to a skill by its description, triggers and query patterns, and follows the skill's instructions.
2. **Agents and workflows** call skills as steps. A workflow step names the skill; the run records which version it used.
3. **AI buttons** on screens each run one skill. An administrator can open "About this button" to see the skill a button runs, what it reads and who changed it last, and can turn the button off without touching the skill.
4. **Your IDE (integrated development environment) and Claude Code** reach the library through the Workbench and thirteen MCP (Model Context Protocol) tools: `list_skills`, `get_skill`, `match_prompt`, `discover_skills`, `invoke_skill`, `record_execution`, `create_skill`, `import_skill`, `get_generation_job` and `sync_skills_local` among them. Each call runs as the person who started it, inside their allow-list.
5. **The skills library** itself, where people browse, run and suggest changes to skills, and administrators see each skill's owner, users, runs and spend.

Whatever runs a skill, the skill can't widen what the runner may do: it calls only tools inside the runner's allow-list and reads only what that person may open (`SKILL_CANNOT_WIDEN_TOOLS`). A run

without a model route is refused rather than guessed (`SKILLS_ENGINE_BINDING_MISSING`); the dispatcher chooses the route, from the organisation's own model setup.



SCREEN About this button shows the skill an AI button runs, the three sources it reads, who wrote and reviewed it, and what the latest version changed. Turning the button off removes it everywhere at once; the skill and every past answer stay.

Worked example: a berth-allocation summary for Harrow

Harrow's planners already had two read-only tools on their allow-list from Harrow's own berth-planning plugin: `berth-plan.read` returns the plan for a date, and `vessel-call.read` returns a vessel call with its arrival window and length. The skill needs nothing else. It never writes, so it never needs two approvers.

MARKDOWN

```
---
name: berth-allocation-summary
description: Summarise tomorrow's berth plan at Harrow for the planning desk. Use when someone
asks who is on which berth, what moved since the last plan, or where two calls clash.
allowed-tools: berth-plan.read, vessel-call.read
triggers:
  - /berth-summary
capabilities:
  - name: summarise_berth_plan
    description: The berth table, the changes since the last plan and any clashes, for one date
```

```
version: 1.0.0
visibility: team
status: draft
---

# Berth allocation summary

## When to use
A planner asks about the berth plan for a date, or asks what changed.

## Steps
1. Read the plan for the date with berth-plan.read. If no date is given, use tomorrow.
2. For each call on the plan, read it with vessel-call.read.
3. Write the berth table first: berth, vessel, arrival window, length overall.
4. Then list what moved since the previous plan, one line per change, with the reason the plan
records.
5. Then list clashes: two calls whose windows overlap on one berth, or a vessel longer than the
berth.
6. Cite the plan's version for every line. Never guess a time the plan doesn't give.

## Output
Three headed sections, in this order: Berths, Changes, Clashes. Write "No clashes" when there are
none.
```

The `skill.yaml` beside it gives the library a display name, a category and the phrasings the matcher should route here:

YAML

```yaml
# skill.yaml, beside SKILL.md
name: berth-allocation-summary
display_name: "Berth allocation summary"
version: "1.0.0"
status: draft
visibility: team
category: operations
tags:
  - berths
  - planning
triggers:
  - "/berth-summary"
allowed_tools:
  - berth-plan.read
  - vessel-call.read
capabilities:
  - name: "summarise_berth_plan"
    description: "Berth table, changes since the last plan and clashes, for one date"
    query_patterns:
      - "who is on which berth tomorrow"
      - "what moved on the berth plan"
      - "any berth clashes on *"
```

Then the commands, from the repository root:

BASH

```bash
npm run skill:validate skills/berth-allocation-summary
npm run skill:upload skills/berth-allocation-summary --dry-run
npm run skill:upload skills/berth-allocation-summary
```

Tomás added six test cases in the creator: an ordinary day, a day with a late arrival that moved two calls, a day with a genuine clash, a date with no plan yet, a vessel too long for its berth, and a request that tried to get the skill to propose a new berth (it shouldn't; it has no tool that writes). The dry run replayed twenty past plans in shadow. Once the cases passed, a reviewer on the planning desk approved it, and it went live for the planning team. The assistant now answers the question in the same shape every time, and the planners' AI button on the berth plan page runs the same skill.

Part 2: manifest skills

A manifest skill is the unit of compute a plugin publishes. It's declared in the manifest's `skills[]`, validated by the SDK (software development kit) when you run `create-nexus-plugin validate`, compiled into the registry body by `compileRegistry`, and synced to the skill registry. You never write registry SQL by hand, so the row the platform dispatches and the descriptor you declared can't drift apart.

Every manifest skill needs `id`, `displayName`, `description`, `tier`, `classification`, `inputSchema` and `outputSchema`. Declare `timeoutMs` too: it's an integer from 1,000 to 21,600,000 (one second to six hours), and a value outside that range is refused with `TIMEOUT_OUT_OF_BOUNDS`. `dataResidency` is `any`, `eu` or `us`, and `any` is the default.

The `id` is lower_snake, and the registry's dispatch key is the namespaced job type `<plugin name>.<skill id>`, so two plugins can both have a `summarise` skill without colliding. Here's the template's one skill, trimmed:

```json
{
  "id": "sentiment_score",
  "displayName": "Sentiment score",
  "description": "Deterministic lexicon-based sentiment score for a piece of text.",
  "tier": "host_callback",
  "classification": "tenant",
  "dataResidency": "any",
  "inputSchema": { "type": "object", "properties": { "text": { "type": "string", "minLength":
1 } }, "required": ["text"] },
  "outputSchema": { "type": "object", "properties": { "score": { "type": "number" } },
"required": ["score"] },
  "hostCallback": {
    "service": "my-plugin",
    "port": 8080,
    "path": "/internal/skills/sentiment_score",
    "maxRequestBytes": 262144,
    "maxResponseBytes": 16384,
    "tenantHeader": "X-Organization-ID"
  },
  "timeoutMs": 10000
}
```

The five tiers

The tier isn't a label. Each tier has fields of its own, and a field that belongs to another tier is refused with `FIELD_NOT_FOR_TIER` rather than quietly dropped.

Tier	Requires	Reaches a model	Who runs it
`host_callback`	`hostCallback`: your Service, its port, a path and both byte caps	No	The platform POSTs the input to your own Service, inside your namespace
`plugin_queue`	`queueName`, spelled `<plugin name>.<name>`	No	Your worker, pulling from your queue
`tool_using`	`systemPrompt` and `tools[]`; trust `core` or `verified`	Yes	The platform, through the AI Provider Router; each tool call runs through an allowlisted executor
`llm_only`	`systemPrompt`; trust `core` or `verified`	Yes	The platform, one call through the AI Provider Router
`map`	`map.perItemJobType`, naming another skill of the same manifest that isn't a map	Only through its target	The platform runs the target once per item and gathers the results

Neither model tier names a provider or a model. The router picks both from the dispatching organisation's own pool. A tool in a `tool_using` skill names one of six executors: `standing_service_call` (your own Service), `graphrag`, `graphrag_query`, `graphrag_search`, `h3` or `web_search`. Any other is refused with `EXECUTOR_NOT_PERMITTED`. The three knowledge-graph executors accept only the tool names `graphrag_query` and `graphrag_search`, because the executor runs whatever operation the tool is named after.

Two tiers exist in the registry that a plugin can't declare: chains and skills that run on their own are written by the platform only. A sync that names one is refused whole.

Which tier to use

- `host_callback` when the work is a function of the input that your own code computes: a score, a calculation, a lookup in your own schema. It's the simplest to test and the template's default. Guard the callback route: a path in a manifest isn't a secret, and the route must verify the platform's call and take the organisation from it, never from the body. Declare it `auth: internal` and mount `requireService` (Fastify) or `serviceMiddleware` (Express) on it. The guard refuses a token minted for anyone else. Answer fast, and make a second delivery of the same job harmless.
- `plugin_queue` for longer work a person waits on, where your worker owns the lifecycle. The worker must move the run to `running` when it starts and to a terminal status when it finishes; a worker that only posts its result leaves the run showing `queued` forever.
- `llm_only` when one model call with a fixed system prompt does the job, and your plugin is `core` or `verified`.
- `tool_using` when the model needs to call tools in a loop, again only at `core` or `verified`.
- `map` when you want the platform to fan one of your other skills out over a list.

My orbit-propagation skill at Corrán Orbital is a `host_callback`. Our plugin is `community`, so the model tiers were never an option, and I don't miss them: a propagator that gave a different answer on Tuesday would be worse than useless.

Approval before every run


A manifest skill that must never run on a machine's say-so alone declares it:

```json
"approval": { "required": true, "reason": "Re-planning a pass needs the flight dynamics lead." }
```

`required` is always `true`; a skill that needs no approval omits the block. `reason` is what the approver sees, 1 to 500 characters after trimming, and any other shape is refused with `APPROVAL_INVALID`. A dispatch of the skill is then held: the dispatch answers `202` with `status: "awaiting_approval"` and a `waitpointId`, and only a named person's approval releases it, once. A batch, map or chain dispatch of a held skill is refused with `SKILL_APPROVAL_NOT_HOLDABLE`, because a fan-out can't hold its items. Render the held answer and let the approver rule; don't dispatch and then ask for consent.

Syncing to the registry

Every sync is declarative and checked whole. Send the full skill set each time: a skill you leave out is disabled, and its run history stays. One bad skill refuses the whole sync with `SYNC_CONTRACT_VIOLATION`, every violation listed together and nothing written, so a plugin is never half updated. Chapter 2.22, The plugin runtime, covers the sync call and how the platform knows which plugin is calling.



SCREEN Skills in the IDE and Claude Code shows the same validate, upload and publish steps from a developer's own terminal, with the draft held for approval because its author can't approve her own change.

Choosing between the two kinds

If the job is "say this the same way every time", it's a Skills Engine skill. If the job is "run my code and give me its answer", it's a manifest skill. Most real work ends up as both: Harrow's berth summary is a Skills Engine skill whose tools come from a plugin, and the plugin's tools are themselves declared in its manifest. The Skills Engine skill is the cheaper of the two to change, which is a good reason to keep the wording and the judgement there and the arithmetic in the plugin.

The cost is real either way. A Skills Engine skill isn't done when the `SKILL.md` reads well; it's done when its cases pass, its dry run agrees with what people decided, and someone who isn't you has approved it. Budget a week for a skill that writes, most of it the canary.


PART 2 · CHAPTER 2.21

The Plugin SDK

Installing the Plugin SDK (software development kit), its command-line tools, a tour of the full-service template, the v2 manifest field by field, and the twenty-two gates that hold a plugin to the rules.

FOR DEVELOPERS

22 MIN READ



My second plugin took a third of the time of my first, and nearly all of the saving was the SDK (software development kit). The first time, I wrote a scope check, a config loader and a migration runner, and a reviewer sent every one of them back. The second time, I ran one scaffold command, deleted the sample sentiment skill, and spent my days on the anomaly-review records our flight dynamics team actually needed.

`@adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk` is one npm package. It holds the v2 manifest schema and the validators that read it (`definePlugin` , `defineSkill`), the runtime modules your plugin imports for scope, database, dispatch and the rest, test helpers, the adherence gates, and the command-line tools. This chapter covers installing it, the tools, the template, the manifest and the gates. Chapter 2.22, The plugin runtime, covers the runtime modules in your running code.



Installing it

The package comes from Adverant's registry at `https://registry.adverant.ai/npm/` , never the public npm registry, and you need the pull token from your account's "Pull tokens and install commands" page. Point the `@adverant-nexus` scope at the registry in your repository's `.npmrc` :

OUTPUT

```
@adverant-nexus:registry=https://registry.adverant.ai/npm/
//registry.adverant.ai/npm/:_authToken=<pull-token>
```

`<pull-token>` is the token from your account page. In a pipeline, pass it in from a secret and never commit it; the template's Dockerfile refuses to build without it and deletes `.npmrc` from the build stage once `npm ci` has run, so the token never ships in an image.

Then pin the version exactly:

BASH

```
npm install --save-exact @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0
```

Commit `package-lock.json` on the first install. The template's image build runs `npm ci` and refuses to fall back to `npm install` : the lockfile is the contract. The SDK's own floor is Node 18; the template targets Node 20.

The command-line tools ship inside the package, so every command in this documentation names the package and its version with `npx -p` . On its own, `npx create-nexus-plugin` is looked up on the public registry, and that name isn't this package.



The command-line tools

Tool	What it does
`create-nexus-plugin`	Scaffolds a plugin, validates a manifest, migrates a v1 manifest to v2, and renders the consumer guide for your frontend developer
`nexus-tenancy`	Renders your schema's tenancy SQL from the manifest: roles, grants, the row-level security template, and the graph tables
`nexus-migrate`	Applies your migrations: provisions the roles once, then runs each numbered file as the migrator role
`nexus-gates`	Runs every adherence gate, and each gate's own self-test

`create-nexus-plugin` makes no network call and loads no remote code. It runs the same in-process validators the platform's onboarding runs, so there's no drift between "it validated on my machine" and "the platform accepted it".

Verb	Flags	What it does	Exit codes

`scaffold <name>`	`--tier full-service|ui-only|skills-only` `--dir <path>`, `--print`	Writes a new plugin directory; `--print` prints only the manifest	0 written · 1 refused to overwrite · 2 bad usage
`validate <file>`		Validates a `nexus.manifest.json`, or a `.ts` or `.js` module exporting one	0 valid · 1 invalid or unreadable · 2 bad usage
`migrate <file>`	`--write`	Lifts a v1 manifest to v2 and prints it, or writes it in place	0 · 1 · 2, as above
`guide`	`--manifest <file>`, `--narrative <dir>`, `--out <guide.md>`, `--check`, `--lint`	Renders the consumer guide from the manifest and your narrative; `--check` compares with the committed copy and writes nothing	0 · 1 drift or a lint offender · 2 bad usage
`help`		Prints usage	0



Scaffolding, and the three tiers

```bash
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 create-nexus-plugin scaffold anomaly-review --tier full-service
```

`--tier` defaults to `full-service`. The scaffolder refuses to write into a directory that exists, and the manifest it writes already passes validation; it never emits an invalid one.

Pick the tier by what your plugin has.

Tier	Has	Must declare
`skills-only`	Manifest skills and nothing else	`skills[]`, with at least one entry
`ui-only`	A frontend surface inside the shell	`frontend`
`full-service`	A backend and a frontend, usually with its own schema	`backend` and `frontend`; and because it has a backend, `runtime.healthCheck`

If you're not sure, scaffold `full-service` and delete what you don't need. Going the other way means writing the parts the template would have given you.



A tour of the full-service template

The template is the reference plugin, built to the strict pattern every later chapter assumes. Clone its shape, not its sample logic.

Path	What it is
`nexus.manifest.json`	The v2 manifest: the three laws restated, the route table and its rights register
`src/config.ts`	The config loader. One spec, read once, every problem collected before the process refuses to boot
`src/scope.ts`	The one file that turns a request into a scope, with the SDK's strict token verifier and two regimes: a person's bearer token and the platform's service call

`src/db.ts`	Every statement composes `tenantFence()` and runs inside `withScopedTx`
`src/uno.ts`	The one dispatch file: one URL, one client, a closed allow-list
`src/routes/*.ts`	`health` (anonymous, exact path), the `/api` routes (scoped) and the `/internal` callback (service-guarded)
`src/skills/sentiment.ts`	A deterministic `host_callback` skill; replace the lexicon with your own logic
`src/server.ts`	The composition root: installs the refusal ledger once, waits for the database (bounded), then runs the isolation and ledger checks before it listens
`migrations/000_tenancy.sql`	Rendered by `nexus-tenancy render` at scaffold time: roles, schema, the row-level security template
`migrations/001_init.sql`	Two tables with a tenant-leading composite key and a composite, tenant-carrying foreign key
`migrations/002_refusal_ledger.sql`	The table the refusal ledger writes
`scripts/ci/required-env`	Prints the boot-required environment variable names as JSON
`scripts/ci/shadow-migrate-*.sh`	The pipeline's migration dry run, through `nexus-migrate`
`gates/`	The gates' exemption directory: empty, which is the correct state for a new plugin
`test/`	Tests for scope, routes, database, dispatch and the boot, with the scope doubles every test injects
`Dockerfile`	A non-root image (user ID 10001) with the migrations inside it

A few of those files repay a closer look.

`src/config.ts` follows two rules. It collects every problem before it throws, so one restart names all five missing variables instead of five restarts naming one each. And it defaults a value only when a wrong value can't produce a silent wrong answer: `PORT` may default to 8080, because a wrong port fails the bind visibly, while `DATABASE_URL` and `UNO_DISPATCH_URL` are required and must be in-cluster addresses. A public one is refused at boot.

```bash
node scripts/ci/required-env
```

```output
["DATABASE_URL","PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET","PLATFORM_SERVICE_KEY","UNO_DISPATCH_URL"]
```

The template's own test runs that file and compares its output with the names the config spec marks as required, so adding a required variable without updating the list fails `npm test`.

`src/server.ts` does not listen until the database answers, and it bounds the wait at 120 seconds, logging every failed attempt with its cause. Then it proves, in order, that the app role can't rebind the tenant and every table is forced under row-level security, that each pod's pool fits the role's connection limit, and that the refusal ledger's table can take a row. A refusal from any of the three is printed whole and the process exits 2.



The v2 manifest, field by field

The manifest is the plugin's machine-readable contract with the platform. It's validated when you author it, when the platform onboards it and continuously after that. The schema is `additionalProperties: false` at every level: if your plugin has a section, there's a property for it, and an undeclared key is refused. The fix is always to use the right optional property.

The required core

Field	Rule
`manifestVersion`	Exactly `"2"`. A v1 document is migrated, never revalidated in place
`name`	`^[a-z0-9]+([-.][a-z0-9]+)*$`, at most 64 characters. The plugin id used in registration, dispatch namespacing and tenant-scoped rows. A plugin that declares skills also needs a name with no dot and no leading digit
`displayName`	1 to 120 characters
`version`	Semantic version; your own release train
`description`, `author`, `license`	At least one character each
`tier`	`skills-only`, `ui-only` or `full-service`
`trust`	`core`, `verified`, `community` or `untrusted`
`runtime`	Required: `executionMode`, `isolationLevel` (1 to 4), `entrypoint`. Optional: `nodeVersion`, `healthCheck`, `readinessCheck`, `livenessCheck`, each a path starting with `/`. The mode is derived from the level: 1 `external_https`, 2 `mcp_container`, 3 `hardened_docker`, 4 `firecracker`
`architecture`	`compute`, `ai` and `deploy`, the three platform laws restated. The validator pins the wording

For a plugin you build for your own installation, the three sentences read as follows. The `ai` sentence covers artificial intelligence (AI) and is the place to say the plugin holds no model credentials.

```JSON
"architecture": {
  "compute": "All compute runs via UNO dispatch (nexus-orchestrator /api/v1/dispatch + nexus-workflows). No direct engine, queue or model-provider calls from plugin code.",
  "ai": "All AI goes through the AI Provider Router, which alone owns the credential and the final provider/model decision. This plugin holds no model credentials.",
  "deploy": "Deploy is through the installation's release channels only."
}
```

The route table: `api` and `rights`

`api` needs `version` and `basePath`, and optionally `websocket` (`path`, `auth`) and `endpoints[]`. The route table is the strongest idea in the schema: a gate diffs it against the routes your code really registers, in both directions, so the manifest is a checkable contract and not documentation.

Each endpoint needs `method` (`GET`, `POST`, `PUT`, `PATCH` or `DELETE`) and `path`. The rest:

Field	What it says
`auth`	One of five classes: `scope` (a person's route, behind the scope guard), `service-key` and `internal` (server to server, never reachable from a browser), `public` (only ever an exact path with `allowAnonymous`), and `device` (a machine with a credential of its own, behind the device guard)
`right`	Required on every route the scope guard serves, and refused on any other: the name of a right in the `rights` register
`needsUnit`	The route refuses when the caller's unit can't be resolved
`allowAnonymous`	Exact-match allow-list only. A prefix rule is how `/health-of-tenant-42` ends up public
`group`, `serves`, `screens`	Under a `release` block: the capability group the route serves, what it answers when that group's licensed feature is locked (`data`, `teaser`, `sighting` or `ask`), and the screens it serves

`query`	`required` (each name with an example value) and `allowed`: the query parameters the route reads
`body`	`example`: a write route's example body, one its own validator accepts. Never on a GET

`rights` is the register those routes name. Each right has `roles` (the ceiling) and optionally `summary`, `never` (roles that may never exercise it, whatever else they hold), `barred` (the product's own words for refusing a `never` role), `seat` (a live seat is needed too), `self` (every verified person holds it, for rights over their own session), `grants` (holders grant seats; at most one right says so), `licence` (a licensed feature the organisation's licence must carry) `installation` (held only by the installation's own administrators) and `platform` (held only by Adverant's platform administrators; it names no roles). Right names have at least one dot: `project.read`, `money.pay`.

JSON

```
"api": {
  "version": "1",
  "basePath": "/",
  "endpoints": [
    { "method": "GET", "path": "/health", "summary": "Liveness", "auth": "public",
"allowAnonymous": true },
    { "method": "GET", "path": "/api/projects", "summary": "List the caller's projects", "auth":
"scope", "right": "project.read" },
    { "method": "POST", "path": "/api/projects", "summary": "Create a project", "auth": "scope",
"right": "project.create" },
    { "method": "POST", "path": "/internal/skills/sentiment_score", "summary": "host_callback
receiver", "auth": "service-key" }
  ]
},
"rights": {
  "project.read": { "summary": "Read the organisation's projects.", "roles": ["owner", "admin",
"member", "viewer"] },
  "project.create": { "summary": "Open a project.", "roles": ["owner", "admin", "member"] }
}
```

`definePlugin` refuses a scope route with no right (`ENDPOINT_RIGHT_MISSING`), a right the register lacks (`ENDPOINT_RIGHT_NOT_REGISTERED`) and a right on a route no guard serves (`ENDPOINT_RIGHT_UNGUARDED`). It also refuses a register that contradicts itself, and two spellings of one route (`:id` and `:recordId`) as `DUPLICATE_ENDPOINT`.

Your data: `databases`, `schema` and `db`

`schema` is the one Postgres schema the plugin owns. `public`, `plugins`, `auth` and `nexus` are forbidden, and if `databases[]` also names a Postgres schema the two must match.

`databases[]` declares each store by engine: `postgresql` (`schema`, `tables`, `migrations`, and `granted`, the tables another organisation may read under a recorded grant), `neo4j` (`schemas`), `qdrant` (`collections`) or `redis` (`purpose`).

`db` holds the session limits for every connection the plugin opens, declared here rather than coded so a reviewer and the deployment can both read them:

Field	What it bounds
`maxConnections`	The pool per replica
`pods`	The most pods holding a pool at once, replicas plus a rolling update's surge. Each role's connection limit is rendered as `maxConnections × pods`; leave it out and `definePlugin` warns `DB_PODS_UNDECLARED`
`statementTimeoutMs`	One statement
`idleInTransactionTimeoutMs`	An open transaction that's running nothing
`workMemKB`	One sort or hash node, per node, not per query

`piiMask[]`	`table.column` entries holding personal data, masked in the governed SQL console and in logs

Skills and tools: `skills`, `mcpTools`, `entitlements`

`skills[]` holds manifest skills; chapter 2.20, Skills, covers their fields and tiers. `mcpTools[]` holds the MCP (Model Context Protocol) tools the plugin publishes, each a `name`, a `description` and an `inputSchema` with no top-level `oneOf`, `allOf` or `anyOf`.

`entitlements` requires `featureIdPattern` and accepts `alwaysOn[]`, `source` and `store`. The pattern names the namespace your feature ids live in, conventionally the plugin's `name` plus one segment your code fills in per surface. `alwaysOn[]` is the short, exact list that must answer even when no entitlement verdict can be had: health, readiness, sign-in, and the settings an administrator needs to repair the entitlement.

Change control: `changePolicy`

```JSON
"changePolicy": {
  "enabled": true,
  "classes": ["website", "bff", "migration"],
  "approvals": { "website": 1, "bff": 1, "migration": 2 }
}
```

Approvals are counted in distinct people, and the person who proposed the change is never one of them; without both halves, "two approvals" becomes one person clicking twice. `enabled: true` requires `classes`, and every class named needs its own count. A class you leave out is ungoverned, which is a legitimate choice the schema makes you write down.

Who you are: `domains`, `branding`, `routing`

`domains[]` (each `primary` and `aliases[]`; `domain` is the single-domain form) lists where the plugin answers. `branding` requires `appName` and accepts `tagline`, `logo`, `favicon`, `primaryColor`, `accentColor`, `oauthClientRef`, `passkeyRpId` and `gaId`. Everything in `branding` is public: the sign-in page reads it before anyone has a credential, so it never holds a secret or an internal address. `routing` (`type`, `gateway`, `virtualService`) is for plugins that describe their own routing.

Sizing and the rest

`resources` requires `cpuMillicores` (10 to 64,000) and `memoryMB` (16 to 262,144), and accepts `diskGB`, `timeoutMs`, `port` and `wsPort`. `backend` holds `port`, `healthPath`, `apiPrefix`, `framework` and `platformClients[]`, the SDK clients your backend imports by name. The list is closed, and a gate checks it against your imports. The schema allows fourteen names: `access`, `bindings`, `documents`, `files`, `governance`, `graph`, `jobs`, `keys`, `memory`, `platform`, `runs`, `signin` and `uno`, plus one for the client that answers plan-entitlement refusals, which keeps an internal name. The feature-entitlement client, `runtime/entitlements`, isn't one of them and never goes on the list, because your `entitlements` block already declares it, and a backend that imports it with no `entitlements` block fails the same gate. `frontend` holds `basePath`, `mountPath` and `framework`. `nexus` holds `minVersion`, `maxVersion`, `capabilities[]` and `permissions[]`.

The remaining blocks are each there for one job:

Block	For
`settings`	Your settings on the shared framework: `groups` and `keys`, set at the levels each names
`people`	`sweep` (`service`, `port`): the organisation's members, synced from the identity service, with seats switched off when someone leaves
`ontology`	`entityTypes` and `relationshipTypes`: the typed graph kept in your own schema
`release`	`groups` and `frame`: the capability groups your routes are staged in, released first as a canary

`cells[]`	A plugin that is several deployables: `name`, `kind`, `entrypoint`, `port`, `wsPort` each
`pricing`	`model`, `currency`, `tiers[]` for your catalogue listing
`marketplace`	`category`, `icon`, `screenshots`, `documentation`, `featured`
`compliance`	`instruments[]`, `dataResidency`, `sovereignty`
`developer`, `repository`, `keywords`	Who publishes it and where its code lives
`metrics`, `atlas`	The two deliberately open objects, for your own metric names and architecture-doc generation

What the schema can't say

The JSON Schema settles shape; `definePlugin` adds the rules a schema can't express. A skill's `classification` can't exceed the trust ceiling. Only `core` and `verified` plugins may declare `tool_using` and `llm_only` skills. Every declared path must be relative and same-origin, with no scheme, no `//` and no backslash, because the URL parser folds `\` to `/` and `/\evil.example/x` resolves cross-origin. Every rule the registry sync applies to a skill is applied here first, with the sync's own code, so `validate` and the sync name a broken rule the same way.



Validating, and moving from v1

```bash
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 create-nexus-plugin validate nexus.manifest.json
```

```
✓ anomaly-review@0.3.0 · tier=full-service · trust=community · skills=1 · mcpTools=0
```

A failure prints the precise path and, for a sync rule, the code first. Make it a commit hook.

A v1 manifest lifts mechanically. `migrate` adds the three law sentences, moves `domain` to `domains[]` and refuses to invent an entrypoint you didn't have. It validates the result before printing or writing anything, so a migration never moves a failure from the tool into your repository.

```bash
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 create-nexus-plugin migrate nexus.manifest.json --write
```

Read the diff before you commit it. The law sentences it adds are the wording the validator pins; for your own installation, set `deploy` to the sentence shown earlier.



Rendering the tenancy, and provisioning the roles

You never write your role grants or the row-level security template by hand. `nexus-tenancy render` writes them from the manifest's `schema` and `db`:

```bash
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 nexus-tenancy render --manifest nexus.manifest.json --
out migrations/000_tenancy.sql
```

The rendered file creates five roles for the schema, each with what it must not hold: a migrator that can only become the owner, an owner that can't log in, an app role for the request path, a report role that sees only aggregates, and a ledger role that can only append. No role holds `BYPASSRLS`. The only way to bind a tenant is one database function, and `set_config` is revoked from every role but the owner.

An applied tenancy file is never edited. A change is a revision with its own number-0 file, and the read seat for cross-organisation grants arrives that way, as revision 2. `--graph` renders the two tables of the typed graph your `ontology` declares as your next numbered migration.

```bash
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 nexus-tenancy render --manifest nexus.manifest.json --
revision 2 --out migrations/000_tenancy_r2.sql
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 nexus-tenancy render --manifest nexus.manifest.json --
graph --out migrations/001_graph.sql
```

The tenancy file creates the very roles the runner connects as, so it's applied by the database owner with `nexus-migrate provision`:

```bash
DATABASE_URL=<database-owner-url> npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 nexus-migrate
provision --state <dir>
```

`<database-owner-url>` is a connection string for the database owner, and `<dir>` is a private directory. Provision applies the base tenancy file and every revision in order, writes `migrator.url` and `app.url` (and `seat.url` once revision 2 exists) into `<dir>` with mode 0600, and prints nothing secret. It sets each role's connection limit from `db.maxConnections × db.pods` on every run. A re-run keeps existing passwords unless you ask: `--passwords <dir>` sets them from files and `--rotate <roles>` gives the named roles fresh ones. Turn the files into your deployment's secrets.

After that, applying connects with the migrator's connection string that provision wrote:

```bash
DATABASE_URL="$(cat <dir>/migrator.url)" npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 nexus-migrate
apply --manifest nexus.manifest.json
```

It runs files 001 onwards as the migrator, every file under `SET ROLE <schema>_owner`, one transaction per file. It keeps a ledger, `<schema>.schema_migrations`, with each file's checksum; an applied file whose bytes changed is refused by name (`CHECKSUM_DRIFT`), never re-run and never skipped. Every pending file is parsed with the real Postgres grammar before the first one runs, so a refusal leaves the database untouched. The one header a file may carry is `-- nexus-migration: transaction=file|per-statement`, with optional lock and statement timeouts; `per-statement` is for `CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY`.



The gates


`nexus-gates` runs twenty-two gates. Each encodes one class of defect so it can't ship twice, and each has a self-test that proves it fails on a fixture built to trip it. Run them before you push:

```bash
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 nexus-gates --self-test
```

Gate	What it catches
`scope-adherence`	An `/api` route without the scope guard; an anonymous path that isn't an exact declared one; a device route without the device guard, or with a person's guard beside it
`one-fence`	A tenant predicate defined anywhere but one place, including a hand-rolled seat or grant fence
`sql-fence`	A statement reading or updating a scoped table without the fence, in any FROM, JOIN, USING or UPDATE target
`migrations-are-scoped`	A table missing an axis, a tenant-leading composite key, a tenant-carrying foreign key or the demo column
`migrations-commit-what-they-open`	A migration whose `BEGIN` count doesn't match its `COMMIT` and `ROLLBACK` count
`no-direct-compute`	A direct call to a model provider, engine, queue or workflow host; a second reader of the dispatch URL
`no-credentials`	A model-provider credential readable in the repository or the environment
`crud-adherence`	A mutating route whose right-check names nothing in the register
`blocked-backends`	A route that is neither served, blocked by name, refused by law nor owned elsewhere
`every-test-runs`	Tests the test script's glob never reaches
`tiles-are-invariant`	A tenant-invariant cached seam that reads a tenant value or skips authentication
`api-contract`	A registered route the manifest doesn't declare, or a declared one the code never registers
`rls-present`	A table without forced row-level security; a `SECURITY DEFINER` function without a pinned `search_path`
`no-set-config`	Plugin code binding the tenant setting itself
`db-role-honest`	A request path connecting as the owner or migrator, or asking for `SUPERUSER` or `BYPASSRLS`
`platform-clients`	An SDK client imported but not listed in `backend.platformClients`, or listed but never imported
`rights-register`	A scope route without a declared right; a right-check beside the register
`refusal-ledger`	A declared refusal table with no ledger installed, or a refusal body sent around it
`grants-declared`	A granted table the manifest doesn't declare; read-seat privileges handed out by hand
`people-declared`	A `people` block without its sweep route, guard and tables
`functions-closure`	An Azure Functions plugin whose served routes and declared routes disagree
`declared-input`	A handler's query parameter list that doesn't match the route's declared `query`

The `gates/` directory holds the five exemption files a gate may read (`demo-exempt.json`, `non-crud.json`, `blocked-backends.json`, `tenant-resolving.json` and `invariant-seams.json`), one reason per entry. A blank reason counts as no entry, and an entry naming something that no longer

exists fails the gate. You can also drop your own gate modules there, and `nexus-gates` picks them up beside the built-in ones.




SCREEN Compatibility shows which SDK version works with which platform version, from nightly runs of the quickstart. An untested pair says so, and a failing pair names the change that broke it.

The template's pipeline

The template ships no hand-written workflow. Its pipeline configuration names the Dockerfile, the one build argument (the registry token), the migration dry run and the boot probe, and the gate the merge queue runs. The order is the order you'd want to fail in.

1. `npm ci`
2. `npm run typecheck`
3. `npm run build`
4. `npm test`
5. `npm run validate:manifest`, which is `create-nexus-plugin validate nexus.manifest.json`
6. `npm run gates`, which is `nexus-gates --self-test`
7. `node scripts/ci/required-env`

Two more checks run around the image. The **migration dry run** applies every file to a throwaway Postgres before the image can be released, with the same runner production uses: `nexus-migrate provision` once as the superuser, then each numbered file as the migrator. The **boot probe** starts the built image with its own entrypoint and every variable `required-env` prints, pointed at stand-ins that accept connections and never answer. The server waits for the database, inside its bounded window, and that wait is the pass signal; a config loader that refuses to boot fails the build there and not in production.



SCREEN On Community, a developer gets the same golden paths, a dev space and data branches on one server, with code in their own Git host. Staging, pilot units and masked copies of live data come with Enterprise.



What it costs


The SDK takes decisions away from you, and some of them you'd have made differently. The manifest refuses keys it doesn't know, the route table has to match your code exactly, the database roles aren't yours to design, and the gates fail a build for a missing right on a read. On my first plugin I spent a day arguing with `api-contract` about a route I'd registered and forgotten to declare. It was right; the route was unguarded. Expect the first plugin to feel slow, and expect the second one to take a third of the time.

The plugin runtime

The SDK (software development kit) modules your plugin runs on, from the scope guard and the database fence to UNO dispatch, the AI (artificial intelligence) route read and licence checks. Then testing against a real database, registering your skills and onboarding.

FOR DEVELOPERS

21 MIN READ



The runtime half of the SDK (software development kit) is a set of modules under `@adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk/runtime/*`, plus test helpers under `testing/*`. You import them; you don't reimplement them. That's the whole idea, and it took me one rejected review to take it seriously: the reviewer's note on my first plugin's hand-written scope check was a single line, "the SDK already has this, and yours accepts an MFA (multi-factor authentication) challenge token as a session".

This chapter follows a request through a running plugin, the way the full-service template wires it: the scope guard, the database fence, the one allowed crossing, dispatch through UNO, the AI (artificial intelligence) route read and the licence checks. Then it covers testing, registering your manifest skills, and the onboarding steps.



Scope: one guard per framework

Every `/api` route carries the scope guard. It verifies the bearer token, resolves the three axes (tenant, owner, unit) from it, refuses a body that names a tenant, applies the route's right from the manifest's register, and only then lets the handler run. The SDK ships one adapter per framework, all from `@adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk/runtime/scope` and all taking the same options.

Framework	Adapter
Express	`scopeMiddleware`
Fastify	`requireScope`, as a preHandler
Next	`withScope`, wrapping the handler; a Next handler isn't told its route, so `withScope` takes it as a third argument

Here's the template's Express wiring, trimmed. The verifier is the SDK's, and it holds the token to the identity service's session format: HS256 only; `iss`, `exp`, `iat` and `jti` required; a lifetime of at most an hour; and no MFA challenge, impersonation or OAuth (the open standard for delegated authorisation) resource token admitted as a session.

```typescript
import { platformAccessTokenVerifier } from "@adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk/runtime/platform-token";
import { scopeMiddleware } from "@adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk/runtime/scope";

const requireScope = scopeMiddleware({
  verify: platformAccessTokenVerifier(config.PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET),
  rights: { manifest },
});

router.get("/api/projects", requireScope, async (req, res) => {
  res.json({ projects: await db.listProjects(scopeOf(req)) });
});
```

The rights guard applies a route's right in four steps. A role in the right's `never` list refuses with `AUTHORITY_EXCEEDED` and the `barred` words, and no seat lifts it. A role in `roles` admits, with a live seat as well when the right says `seat: true`. Otherwise a live seat carrying the right admits. Otherwise the request is refused `AUTHORITY_EXCEEDED`, naming the people who could grant a seat. Give the guard a store (`rights: { manifest, store: { pool, schema } }`) and it reads seats under the caller's own scope; a right that names a `licence` also needs a licence reader, covered below.

Inside a handler, `scopeOf(req)` is the only way to read the resolved scope, and it throws if the guard didn't run. A guard registered on a prefix, running before any route has matched, answers 500 `MIDDLEWARE_ORDERING_ERROR`; a route your code registers that the manifest doesn't declare answers 500 `UNHANDLED_ERROR`. Both fail closed.

The template's `/internal` routes, which the platform calls, use the other regime. The service guard checks `X-Service-Key` in constant time and takes the tenant from the platform's

`X-Organization-ID`, refusing `MISSING_SERVICE_KEY`, `INVALID_SERVICE_KEY` or `MISSING_ORG_ID_HEADER`. For the platform's signed per-call token the SDK has `requireService` (Fastify) and `serviceMiddleware` (Express), which also check which skill and route the token was minted for and refuse a token used twice.



The database fence: `tenantFence` and `withScopedTx`

Every statement against a scoped table composes the fence and runs inside a scoped transaction:

```typescript
import { withScopedTx } from "@adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk/runtime/db";
import { tenantFence } from "@adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk/runtime/fence";

async function listProjects(scope: ResolvedScope) {
  // Projects are owner-private inside the organisation, so the owner axis is passed explicitly.
  const f = tenantFence(scope, { alias: "p", owner: scope.owner });
  const r = await withScopedTx(pool, scope, { schema: SCHEMA }, (db) =>
    db.query(`SELECT p.* FROM anomaly_review.reviews p WHERE ${f.where} ORDER BY p.created_at
DESC`, f.params),
  );
  return r.rows;
}
```

`tenantFence(scope, options)` builds the predicate and its parameters from a resolved scope. Pass `owner` for personal tables; leave it out for organisation artefacts where owner is provenance. When the statement already has parameters, `startIndex` tells the fence where to number from. An insert never takes the axes as input: it writes `scope.tenant`, `scope.owner` and `scope.unit` from the scope.

`withScopedTx` binds all three axes for one transaction through the schema's one bind function, then runs your callback. A second bind in the same transaction raises `SCOPE_ALREADY_BOUND` (500: your code bound twice; the caller did nothing wrong). An absent or zero tenant or owner raises `SCOPE_PREDICATE_INVALID` (403). The setting is transaction-local, so a pooled connection can't carry one tenant into the next request.

Two siblings cover the cases that aren't a person's request. `withTenantScopedTx` binds tenant and unit with no owner, for rows a machine reads (the device registry), and refuses a scope that carries an owner. `maintenanceScope(reason)` makes an organisation-wide operation say what it is aloud before the owner's transaction will open. The code fence and forced row-level security are two mechanisms for one law; the boot check refuses to listen until the database proves the second one holds (`DB_ROLE_BYPASSES_ISOLATION` otherwise).



Every refusal is a row

The template installs one more piece of middleware, once, between the body parser and the routers: the refusal ledger.

```typescript
import { recordRefusals } from "@adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk/runtime/refusal-ledger";

app.use(express.json({ limit: "256kb" }));
app.use(recordRefusals({ pool, schema: SCHEMA }));
```

It wraps the response so that every refusal a person reads, whether from the rights guard, a handler or a store, is written to your schema's `refusal` table inside that person's own scoped transaction before the body is sent. An anonymous 401 writes nothing. If the row can't be written, the answer becomes `UNHANDLED_ERROR`: a "no" the product can't record isn't sent as if it were. The boot runs `assertRefusalLedger` to check the table can take the ledger's row, and a store can call `noteSubject({ recordId, isDemo })` so every refusal names the record it was about. When a customer asks why someone was turned away last Tuesday, the answer is a query, not a guess.

The one crossing: a recorded read-only grant

When one of your customers does work for another and the other may inspect it, there's one sanctioned way across the boundary. The organisation holding the rows records a grant. The reader's organisation admits a person through a seat carrying the right `granted.read`, which must name `owner` and `admin` in `never`. The read runs as a sixth database role, the read seat, which can select only the tables `databases[].granted` lists:

```typescript
const r = await withSeatTx({ app: appPool, seat: seatPool }, seatsOf(req), { holder, grantId },
{ schema: "anomaly_review" }, (db) => {
  const f = grantFence(db.seat, { alias: "r" });
  return db.query(`SELECT r.review_id FROM anomaly_review.reviews r WHERE ${f.where}`, f.params);
});
if (!r.ok) return res.status(r.status).json(r.refusal);
```

`withSeatTx` writes the look in the reader's own tenant first, then binds the read seat to the grant, which writes the look in the holder's tenant. The database's own policy checks that the grant names the reader's organisation, covers the table, has started, hasn't ended and wasn't withdrawn, and that this transaction wrote its look. A read that skips the look sees nothing. At boot, `assertSeatAtBoot(seatPool, schema)` checks the pool opened from `seat.url` really is the seat and nothing more, and refuses with `DB_SEAT_ROLE_INVALID` otherwise.

Dispatch through UNO

All compute goes through one client, built in one file, with a closed allow-list:

```typescript
import { UnoClient } from "@adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk/runtime/uno";

/** The namespaced job types this surface may dispatch. Closed; edit in code. */
export const DISPATCHABLE = Object.freeze([`${manifest.name}.sentiment_score`] as const);

export function createUno(deps: UnoDeps): UnoClient {
  return new UnoClient({
    baseUrl: deps.dispatchUrl,
    serviceKey: deps.serviceKey,
    callerService: manifest.name,
    dispatchable: DISPATCHABLE,
  });
}
```

The allow-list is a module-level constant on purpose. If an operator could widen it from configuration, the route would become a dispatch proxy for the whole registry. The template's own test asserts that the list names exactly the job types the manifest compiles to.

The envelope

A dispatch carries six fields at its required core. The client fills the tenant and actor from the verified scope, never from the request:

Field	What it holds
`jobType`	The namespaced job type, `<plugin name>.<skill id>`
`organizationId`	The tenant, from the scope
`userId`	The actor, from the scope, for audit and billing
`inputParams`	The skill's input. It never carries a tenant id; one that does is refused at dispatch
`priority`	`critical`, `high`, `normal` or `low`
`pluginId`	Your manifest `name`. Every dispatch declares its originating plugin

Optional fields include `correlationId` (a UUID (universally unique identifier), or a fresh one is minted) and `callbackUrl`, which a `plugin_queue` skill needs so the worker knows where to post its result.

```typescript
const accepted = await uno.dispatch(scope, {
  jobType: DISPATCHABLE[0],
  inputParams: { text: text.body },
  priority: "normal",
  pluginId: manifest.name,
  correlationId: crypto.randomUUID(),
});
if (!accepted.ok) return res.status(statusFor(accepted.refusal.code)).json(accepted.refusal);
res.status(202).json(accepted.value);
```

202, then polling

Every dispatch is enqueued. The answer is always `202` with identifiers (`jobId`, `runId`, `traceId`, `status`), never a result. The result comes from polling the job or from your callback. `uno.peek(jobId, { scope })` reads it once and `awaitJob` polls to a terminal status; both send the tenant from the verified scope, and both check the returned row's `organization_id` against the caller's tenant on your side of the network call, refusing a mismatch with `SCOPE_REFUSED`.

Read the run row in its own spelling. The dispatch response says `jobId`; the row says `job_id`, `organization_id` and `plugin_id`. The result and failure columns are `result`, `error`, `error_code` and `error_troubleshooting`. `completed` and `failed` are terminal. `timed_out`, `cancelled` and `system_failure` come from the reaper and a late result may still correct them. A client that treats any of those as unparseable refuses rows the platform writes every day.

The approval hold

A manifest skill that declares `approval` is held at dispatch. The `202` then says `status: "awaiting_approval"` and carries a `waitpointId`, with the reason the manifest gave. The run stays held until a named person rules on it. `uno.approve` and `uno.resolveWaitpoint` send the tenant and the caller as the actor, and a ruling by someone other than the verified caller is refused. An approval releases the job once and runs the dispatch checks again; a rejection ends it `failed`. A second ruling is refused, and so is a ruling after the hold expires. If your product needs the approver to be a different person from the proposer, enforce that in the route that rules: the platform records both.

Render a held job as held. Don't tell a person their click released it until the run row says so.



AI: wishes on the skill row, and one read

Your plugin never calls a model. When a manifest skill needs one (`llm_only` or `tool_using`, at trust `core` or `verified`), you express preferences on its registry row, and the router decides from the organisation's own pool:

```json
{
  "execution_config_skill": {
    "preferredProvider": "gemini",
    "capabilityProfile": { "needsToolUse": true, "dataResidency": "eu_only" }
  }
}
```

`preferredProvider` and `preferredModel` are wishes the router honours only when the organisation has that provider enabled and credentialed. `capabilityProfile` filters and never selects; its `dataResidency` (`eu_only`, `us_only` or `any`) is a hard constraint the router satisfies or refuses. Leaving all of them out is usually right. `modelOverride` exists for the rare skill that needs one exact model, and it makes the wishes beside it inert; I'd avoid it unless the skill is meaningless on any other model.

When your interface needs to show which model the router would use, read it, don't predict it:

```typescript
import { createAIRouteClient } from "@adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk/runtime/ai-route";
```

`createAIRouteClient(...).effectiveRoute()` is the one sanctioned read of the AI Provider Router. It takes the gateway's address, the caller's own bearer and your platform's slug, and sends no AI request. It answers the provider and model, the providers the policy allows, and whether the chosen endpoint runs `local` or `external`. When the route isn't usable it answers the router's refusal in words (`NO_PROVIDER_FOR_ROLE` , `MODEL_CAPABILITY_UNAVAILABLE` or `NO_MODEL_FOR_ROLE_AND_PROVIDER` , with the remediation), never a default model. Show that refusal to the person; it's their organisation's configuration speaking.



Licence checks

Three mechanisms check licensing, at three grains.

A right that names a licence. The simplest. In the manifest, a right carries `licence: "<feature>"` , and the guard asks the identity service whether the organisation's licence carries it, with the caller's own token, before any role is read. Build the guard with a reader:

```typescript
import { createLicenceReader } from "@adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk/runtime/licence";

const requireScope = scopeMiddleware({
  verify,
  rights: { manifest, store: { pool, schema: SCHEMA }, licence: createLicenceReader({ baseUrl:
config.NEXUS_AUTH_URL }) },
});
```

A licence that doesn't carry the feature refuses everyone with `LICENCE_LOCKED` , naming what carries it and saying the organisation's owners and administrators can turn it on. A licence that can't be read refuses `UNHANDLED_ERROR` : a locked feature is never served because the licence was out of reach. Answers are remembered for 30 seconds per organisation and feature.

The product gate. `createProductGate({ baseUrl, product })` from `runtime/product-gate` asks the entitlement check whether the caller's organisation holds your product at all, and its `middleware()` runs after the scope guard. A negative verdict is `ENTITLEMENT_DENIED` ; a check that can't be reached is `ENTITLEMENT_UNREACHABLE` , and the gate never treats one as the other.

The licence document itself. Code that must decide for itself from the signed licence, such as the closed module of a domain pack, uses `verifyLicenceDocument(docText, opts)` from `runtime/licence-document` . It's a pure function: no network call, no environment variable, no file. It checks both signatures against the trust roots the build carries and answers a state (`VALID` , `WARN` , `GRACE` , `RESTRICT` , `TERMINATE` or `ABSENT`) with the grants, add-ons and domain packs. `licenceAllows(verdict, featureGroup, action, tenantId?)` then says whether you may `use` or `provision` under a group. `RESTRICT` allows `use` and answers `provision` with `LICENCE_LOCKED` , so running work continues and nothing new starts.



Testing

The template's tests show the pattern; these are the tools behind it.

Scope fakes. Build the resolved scope double once, in `test/scope-fakes.ts` , and inject it everywhere, including the absent cases: no unit, no token, a token with a zero organisation. The refusal paths are the product.

A fake dispatch transport. `UnoClient` takes `fetch`, `now` and `sleep`, so a unit test never touches the network. Assert the envelope's fields, the `202` shape, the poll to a terminal row with its `organization_id`, and that a row for another tenant is dropped.

A real Postgres. A fake query function proves an SQL string. It can't prove that forced row-level security holds or that the files apply in order as the migrator. `testing/ephemeral-postgres` starts a throwaway server and runs the same `nexus-migrate` production runs:

```typescript
import { EPHEMERAL_REMEDY, migrated, startEphemeralPostgres } from "@adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk/testing/ephemeral-postgres";

const pg = await startEphemeralPostgres();          // null off CI: skip each case by name with EPHEMERAL_REMEDY
const db = migrated(pg!, "plugin_test", { root });  // provision as the superuser, then every file as the migrator
// connect as db.appUrl and run the boot checks the server runs
```

Off CI (continuous integration), a machine with no Postgres server skips each database case by name with the remedy, never green. In CI the same absence fails the suite (`EPHEMERAL_POSTGRES_UNAVAILABLE_IN_CI`), because a skipped row-level security test is a green gate that measured nothing. The server waits up to 180 seconds to start, and a watchdog stops it when the test process goes away.

The isolation harness. `runIsolationHarness(target)` from `testing/isolation-harness` reads every route your app mounts and attacks each one as another organisation's administrator and as a colleague. Then it attacks again with the code fence removed, the database fence removed, and both. A route is `PROVEN` only when the attack fails with either fence in place and reaches the victim's data with both removed, so you know the test can see a leak at all. It sends each route's declared query and example body, so a route that refuses an empty request is still reached. Pin `ledgerOf(report)` in a test and fail on `defectsOf(report)`.



Registration: from manifest to skill registry

Your manifest skills reach the skill registry by one path:

```output
manifest.skills[]  →  compileRegistry(manifest)  →  POST /api/v1/plugins/sync
```

`compileRegistry` turns a validated manifest into the `nexus.plugin-sync/v1` body. The template does it at import, so an invalid manifest fails the build:

```typescript
import { compileRegistry, definePlugin } from "@adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk";

export const manifest = definePlugin(raw);
export const registryPayload = compileRegistry(manifest);
```

```json
{
  "contract": "nexus.plugin-sync/v1",
  "pluginId": "anomaly-review",
  "version": "0.3.0",
  "skills": [ { "job_type": "anomaly-review.excursion_summary", "tier": "host_callback",
"classification": "tenant" } ]
}
```

The sync is declarative: send the whole skill set every time, and a skill left out is disabled, with its history kept. It's strict: an unknown field, a field of another tier or a `null` is refused, all violations come back together in one `400 SYNC_CONTRACT_VIOLATION`, and nothing is written while there's one. And it writes one registry row per skill, keyed on the namespaced job type, carrying every column the dispatcher reads, so the skill is runnable the moment the sync answers `200`.

The plugin is the authenticated caller, never a body field. Call the sync from your plugin's own workload over mTLS (mutual TLS: Transport Layer Security with a certificate on both ends). The Skills Engine reads your workload's client certificate, whose SPIFFE identity (`spiffe://<trust-domain>/ns/<namespace>/sa/<service-account>`) names the namespace and service account, and looks up the plugin and owning organisation recorded for that namespace. The body's `pluginId` must match; it's a check, not a selector. Every row is written with that plugin and organisation.

Status	Code	Meaning
200		`{contract, pluginId, version, created, updated, unchanged, disabled, skills}`
400	`SYNC_CONTRACT_VIOLATION`	Every violation listed in `violations[]`; nothing written
401	`UNAUTHORIZED`	Bad or missing service key
401	`CALLER_IDENTITY_UNVERIFIED`	No readable client identity
403	`DELIVERY_IDENTITY_MISSING`	The calling namespace belongs to no plugin
403	`PLUGIN_ID_MISMATCH`	The body names another plugin
409	`REGISTRY_CONFLICT`	A job type is owned elsewhere or was registered outside the sync; nothing written

Fail your deploy step on any status but `200`. No other status means your skills are registered.




Onboarding

Onboarding runs as ten ordered steps, each of which can be re-run, cancelled or rolled back on its own:


1. Clone the repository and validate it.
2. Parse the manifest.
3. Scan it for security problems.
4. Build the image.
5. Push it to the installation's registry.
6. Set up its domain names.
7. Deploy it, through the installation's release channels.
8. Wait for the health check.
9. Register the plugin.
10. Tell the developer.

Before deploy, five conformance checks run against the manifest and the built image: the manifest parses and carries its required fields; every declared route is a real registered route; the plugin owns its schema and writes nothing outside it; resource requests are declared and within bounds; and the image has a working health handler. A plugin that registers itself at boot runs the same contract under its own authority, so the checks become its CI instead of the pipeline's. Skipping one doesn't shorten onboarding; it moves the failure to runtime.

The branding in your manifest is served without authentication by domain, because the sign-in page needs it before anyone has a credential. Treat everything in `branding` as public.



SCREEN Environments and promotion moves each release from the dev space through staging to a pilot unit, then to all units, with every gate and its state on one page. A promotion that skips a gate is refused with `GATE_CANNOT_BE_SKIPPED`.



SCREEN Channels and installs shows which unit runs which version, with error rates as counts and never content. Rolling one unit back is a reviewed change that touches only that unit.


What the runtime won't do for you

The runtime holds the line on isolation, dispatch and model access. It won't make your product logic right, and it won't make a slow query fast: every statement runs inside a bound transaction with the timeouts your manifest's `db` block declares, and a statement that outruns `statementTimeoutMs` is cancelled, not waited for. Size your queries for that. And the approval hold, the read seat and the licence reader all add a round trip or a transaction. On my anomaly-review plugin the licence check added a few milliseconds per request until its 30-second memory warmed up, which was a fair price for never serving a locked feature.

Domain packs

What a domain pack is made of and what its pack.json says; lenses and the lens registry; knowledge models, connectors and mobile overlays; how a pack is licensed and switched on for a unit; and the ten packs Adverant ships.

FOR DEVELOPERS · 19 MIN READ



The pack I built at Corrán Orbital started as two plugins and a dozen Skills Engine skills that only our ground-station team used. When the mission operations unit asked for the same thing, I had a choice: copy the lot and maintain two of everything, or turn it into a domain pack with one knowledge model and two lenses, switched on per unit. It took me a week to make it a pack. I'd make the same choice again tomorrow, and I'd start with the pack the next time.

A domain pack brings one industry's way of working to Nexus. It holds the industry's kinds of thing and how they link, and what each role sees. It carries the templates and workflows people use every day, the evidence the industry's rules ask for, and the screens that work on a phone without signal. It never changes the shell or its components, and never the writing rules. A new industry is a pack, not an app.




What a pack is made of

Underneath, a pack is four things, and none of them is per-pack code in the platform:

1. **A feature-group bundle in the entitlement check.** The pack's controls belong to a set of feature groups. Every menu row and panel tab the pack adds is then decided by the same mechanism as the rest of Nexus: entitled, shown as a teaser, or hidden.
2. **A pack manifest**, `pack.json`, which declares the pack's clusters of screens and its words, its lenses and its phone screens.
3. **Closed modules that verify their own grant.** The server code that decides, such as a pack's compiled brains, carries the licence verifier inside it and checks the signed licence itself. Nothing outside the module can switch it on.
4. **A catalogue entry**, so the pack appears on the Domain packs page with what it brings and what it needs.

On top of those sit the parts people see: the knowledge model and the lenses; templates, workflows and Skills Engine skills; read-only connectors into the systems that already hold the records, an evidence map from each rule to the records that answer it, and a mobile overlay.



SCREEN The Domain packs page lists all ten packs with what each needs and where it runs. Only Adverant grants a pack; you decide which units it runs in.



The pack.json file

Here's the Banking and payments pack's manifest, trimmed to one lens with one seat, and two terms. Its file id is `fintech`, and `name` holds the pack's working name; the console and the catalogue show it as Banking and payments.

JSON

```
{
  "id": "fintech",
  "name": "Financial services",
  "version": "0.1",
  "inherits": "insurance",
  "screenCount": 10,
  "clusters": [
    {
      "id": "FL01",
      "kind": "lens",
      "name": "Lending decisions",
      "seats": "Credit analysts, underwriters of loans, credit committee",
      "purpose": "Whether to lend, how much, at what price, and writing down why.",
      "lexicon": ["fin"],
      "menu": [],
      "screens": [
        { "id": "FL01-A01", "title": "Credit desk today", "who": "Omar Haddad, credit analyst",
"doing": "Seeing which applications are waiting and which rule held each one" },
        { "id": "FL01-A04", "title": "Refer to credit committee", "who": "Omar Haddad, credit
analyst", "doing": "Sending a loan above his mandate to two people who can decide it" }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "lexicon": {
    "core": [],
    "fin": [
```

```
      ["affordability", "whether someone can pay it back without hardship", ""],
      ["mandate", "the most one person may lend alone", ""]
    ]
  },
  "world": {
    "tenants": [
      {
        "id": "larchmont",
        "name": "Larchmont Bank",
        "kind": "bank",
        "market": "GB",
        "locale": "en-GB",
        "people": 212,
        "plan": { "areas": ["H", "C", "E", "B", "X", "FL01", "FL02", "FL03"], "of": 12 },
        "ai": { "onDevice": "allowed", "personalDataToCloudModels": "uk-only", "sealRequiresUno":
true }
      }
    ],
    "seats": [
      {
        "id": "credit-analyst",
        "person": "Omar Haddad",
        "tenant": "larchmont",
        "title": "Credit analyst",
        "lens": "FL01",
        "clusters": ["C", "E", "B", "X"],
        "home": "FL01-A01",
        "posture": "desk"
      }
    ]
  }
}
```


The fields, top to bottom:

Field	What it says
`id`	The pack's id, lower case
`name`	Its working name
`version`	The pack's own version
`inherits`	The pack this one builds on. Banking and payments inherits from Insurance, which holds the shared clusters every pack uses, such as the conversation and settings. A new pack adds its lenses and leaves the shared clusters to the pack it inherits from
`screenCount`	How many screens the pack defines
`clusters[]`	The pack's groups of screens. Each has an `id`, a `kind`, a `name`, the `seats` it's for, its `purpose`, the `lexicon` sets its words come from, its `menu` and its `screens`, each with an `id`, a `title`, `who` and what they're `doing`
`clusters[].kind`	`shared` for a cluster every lens can reach (the conversation, say); `lens` for one role's own screens. A cluster's `scope` says whether it belongs to the core (`core`) or to the industry (`domain`)
`lexicon`	The pack's words, in named sets. Each term has a plain gloss a newcomer can read, and the third slot is `exact` for a term that must be used word for word, such as a regulatory figure
`world`	The sample world of fictional tenants and seats that the pack's screens and tests use, and its data branches
`world.tenants[].plan`	The plan's `areas`: the clusters and lenses this tenant's plan opens, out of `of`
`world.tenants[].ai`	The organisation's AI (artificial intelligence) policy for the pack: whether on-device models are allowed (`onDevice`), where personal data may go to a cloud

	model (`personalDataToCloudModels` , such as `uk-only` or `eu-only`), and whether sealing a record requires UNO dispatch (`sealRequiresUno`)
`world.seats[]`	One person's seat: their `title` , the `lens` they hold, the shared `clusters` they also reach, their `home` screen, their `posture` (`desk` , `field` or `consumer`) and, in the full file, their `authority` , the limits they act within

Two rules govern what a pack.json may carry. A regulation is named in plain words with a gloss, never as a bare initialism. And nothing in the file is code: it's a readable definition the server and the apps interpret, so it never holds a rule or a prompt, and never a compiled brain.



Shared lenses


Some regimes belong to several industries. A register of outsourced technology serves Insurance and Banking and payments; incident clocks (the countdowns to the reports a regulator expects after an incident) serve both Critical infrastructure and energy and Government and public sector. A regime that several packs use is written once as a shared lens. Each pack that needs it includes it. When the rule changes, it changes in one place.



A lens only narrows

A lens is what one role sees inside a pack or a platform: which cards and fields, and which actions. It's always defined as a narrowing of a base lens. A lens with a base shows no kind of thing its base doesn't show and opens no area its base doesn't open, and it can't both show and hide the same kind. Permissions still come from roles; a lens changes the view, never what a person may do.

Try to widen one and the answer is `LENS_CANNOT_WIDEN` (422), with nothing saved. In the lens builder that reads, for a reefer technician lens built on an operations controller base that doesn't show claim amounts: "Claim amount cannot be added to this lens". The fix is a different base lens, which is a different request to whoever owns the base.



SCREEN The lens builder lists what a role sees, card by card and field by field, ticked against the base lens it narrows. Trying to show a field the base hides is refused with the reason and the name of whoever can change the base.

The rule is held in the database, not only in the route. Each organisation's lenses live in four tables of the plugin registry's schema:

Table	What it holds
`plugins.lenses`	One lens of one owner, a pack (`owner_kind` `pack`) or a platform (`platform`): its `slug` and `name`, its `base_lens_id`, the kinds it `shows` and `hides`, the areas it `opens`, its `status` (`active` or `withdrawn`) and its `version`
`plugins.lens_grants`	A lens given to one role (`owner`, `admin`, `member`, `viewer`, `developer` or `billing_admin`) in one business unit

`plugins.lens_changes`	Every change to a lens or its grants, kept as before and after with who made it and why. Append-only
`plugins.lens_holder_months`	How many people held a lens in a unit each month. A count, never who

A trigger refuses any lens that shows more than its base, and refuses a change to a base that would leave a lens built on it showing more than it does. Nothing is deleted. Lenses and grants are withdrawn, and giving a lens again is a new row; a change is never rewritten, and a past month's count is never changed. Every row cites a lens of its own organisation through a composite key, so a grant can't point across organisations.

The console and your own tools reach the registry through `/api/v1/lenses`, with the person's own bearer token. The organisation and the person, and the unit seat, come from the verified token and from nothing else.

Method and path	What it does
`GET /`	Lenses, filtered by `owner_kind`, `owner_id` and `status`, with their grants in your seat
`POST /`	Add a lens: `owner_kind`, `owner_id`, `slug`, `name`, `shows`, and optionally `description`, `base_lens_id`, `hides`, `opens` and `reason`
`GET /owners/:kind/:id`	A pack's or platform's lenses, and which of them shows each kind
`GET /owners/:kind/:id/grants`	Lens by unit: the roles given each lens and the people it reaches
`GET /owners/:kind/:id/holders`	People holding a lens each month (`months`, six by default)
`POST /owners/:kind/:id/holders/count`	Record this month's counts
`GET /owners/:kind/:id/changes`	The change history of the owner's lenses (`limit`, 50 by default)
`GET /:lensId`	One lens with its base and the lenses narrowing it, and its grants and changes
`PATCH /:lensId`	Change a lens: `name`, `description`, `shows`, `hides`, `opens`, `reason`
`POST /:lensId/withdraw`	Withdraw a lens, and its grants with it. A lens that another active lens narrows can't be withdrawn until that one is
`POST /:lensId/grants`	Give a lens: `business_unit_id`, `role`, `reason`
`POST /:lensId/grants/:grantId/withdraw`	Withdraw one grant

`:kind` is `pack` or `platform`. Every refusal carries a code with a sentence and a next step, and an unexpected failure answers `UNHANDLED_ERROR` with its cause in the service log, never in the answer.




Knowledge model, connectors and compiled brains

The **knowledge model** is the kinds of thing the pack knows and how they connect. It's versioned, and a pack usually builds on a base model from the pack it inherits from: a cold-chain pack on the logistics base model adds five kinds (reefer unit and vessel call among them) and links two of them into the base without changing the base itself. Each property is classed as it's made, so the personal fields and the commercial ones are known before any lens or data branch uses them. A lens for technicians then can't show a claim amount that's classed commercial. A withdrawn property stays

in the version that had it and leaves only in a later version. Staging a new version copies the knowledge first, and the way back stays open for a set period.

Connectors bring records in from the systems that already hold them: policy administration, a claims system, a mail folder of files partners send. Each is read-only, runs on its own schedule, and has a test button. Records are mapped to the pack's words on the way in and land in the knowledge model the lenses read; the assistant's answers cite it. Nothing is written back to the source system from Nexus.

Compiled brains are the parts of a pack that decide: the Insurance pack's underwriting brain and its claims brain, for example. They run at the server as compiled, licensed modules, each verifying the licence itself, and they're never shipped to a phone or a browser.



SCREEN Knowledge model and connectors shows the pack's model version and vocabulary, with the organisation's own terms, and tests each read-only connector. Nothing in the policy or claims systems is changed from Nexus.



The mobile overlay and offline fields


A pack declares its phone screens in the same manifest, as a mobile overlay: which cards and capture steps appear on phones, and for which roles. An administrator then sets the rules on phones per organisation, such as how long captures may wait offline, whether each photo carries

where it was taken, and whether approvals need a passkey. Setting up stays on a computer; the administrator sees what phones send as names and counts, never the photos or notes themselves.

Every field a phone screen offers without signal declares one of three classes, and the screen shows which:

Class	What happens to it	Examples
Authored offline	Saved on the phone and merged when the phone reconnects	Notes, photos, readings
Proposed offline	Sent as a suggestion the office decides. The server never merges it; it replays it through its own authority checks	An amount, a finding, a reserve change, a decision
Never offline	Not possible out there. Drawn as a row with its reason, never as a button	A signature, a seal, an authority check, a check against a sanctions list

Overlays carry no rules and no prompts, and no brains either. They're readable screen definitions, and everything that decides stays at the server. A pack's phone screens open only inside the Nexus phone apps, and only when the organisation holds both the pack and the Mobile apps add-on.



SCREEN The mobile overlay chooses which pack cards and capture steps appear on phones and for which roles. Captures wait offline for as long as the organisation allows and approvals need a passkey. The preview shows exactly what one role sees.


Entitlement: who has the pack, and where it runs

A pack is licensed, never switched on by configuration. Three layers decide who sees it.

The licence. The signed licence document carries a `domain_packs` list of matrix ids (at most 100, possibly empty), beside its feature-group `grants` and `add_ons`. Adverant's console won't issue a pack without the add-ons it needs: a pack that requires Decision rooms and sealed records can't be issued to a licence without it. Feature groups in a licence are granted either to the whole installation or to named organisations, and the entitlement check answers per organisation. Remove the grant and every lens and phone screen of the pack becomes a teaser, with its records kept.

The entitlement check. For each organisation and plan, each role and each person, the entitlement check decides whether a control the pack adds is entitled, shown as a teaser, hidden, or refused with a code. It drives the menu rows and panel tabs, and the route and dispatch checks. The closed module stays the authority for its own grant.

Units and lenses. Inside an organisation that has the pack, an administrator decides where it runs. A pack is switched on for a unit in stages, never for the whole unit at once: the licence check, a pilot group, a settings preset, then widening to everyone in the unit on a date the administrator chooses. Before anything changes, the page shows who gains what, by role. Lenses are then given per role and per unit, in one matrix. Switching the pack off for a unit later keeps every record people made; the lenses and templates disappear, and nothing else changes.



SCREEN Turning a domain on for a unit runs in stages, from the licence check through a pilot group to the whole unit. The administrator sees who gains what before anything changes, and the pilot's settings carry over unchanged.



The ten packs

Adverant ships ten domain packs. Each one needs the Enterprise base licence and some need add-ons. Every pack's phone screens also need the Mobile apps add-on.

Pack	Matrix id	What it brings	It also needs
Insurance	`insurance`	Insurance lenses for underwriting, claims, reinsurance, Lloyd's and delegated authority, among others; the fraud and investigations flow; insurance storefront journeys and settings; the insurance compiled brains	Decision rooms and sealed records

Banking and payments	`financial-services`	A register of outsourced technology; technology-incident clocks and reports; exit plans for critical providers; lending decisions; card disputes	Nothing beyond the base
Capital markets and asset management	`capital-markets`	Lenses for the research analyst, the portfolio manager, surveillance and compliance, and client reporting; calls on trading desks recorded; research held behind a wall until release; templates for the wall-crossing log, call review and research release. Phones get the morning briefing and release approvals as well as surveillance alerts, never orders	Decision rooms and sealed records
Government and public sector	`government`	Benefit and entitlement claims; planning applications; information requests	Nothing beyond the base
Healthcare	`healthcare-providers`	Patient-record access and sharing, and information requests. No clinical decision support	Nothing beyond the base
Life sciences	`life-sciences`	Deviations and corrective actions; batch record review; validated change control	Nothing beyond the base
Critical infrastructure and energy	`energy-and-utilities`	Incident clocks and reports; inspections and defects; work orders	Nothing beyond the base
Defence and security	`defence-and-mission`	Field reports fused with platform alerts; sharing markings; debriefs. Its phone build is installed only through device management	Nexus Edge, for the platform alerts
Legal and professional services	`legal`	Lenses for the fee earner, the knowledge lawyer, conflicts and risk, and billing; a conflict check at every new matter; ethical walls lifted only by two partners; templates for a new matter check, the wall builder and wall reminders. Phones get time capture and matter updates with approvals, never privileged files	Decision rooms and sealed records, and Mail
Logistics and maritime	`logistics-and-maritime`	Lenses for the operations controller, the customs officer, the carrier manager and the port inspector; customs entries and holds; sanctions checks before the first booking, with a person releasing every hold; a knowledge model of ports and vessels, carriers and holds. Phones get yard and berth inspections and customs holds, with drone findings	Map and GeoAI

Harrow Port Authority runs the Logistics and maritime pack, and it's the one I'd read first if you're building your own: its knowledge model is the base the cold-chain example above builds on.



Building your own

On Enterprise, a developer starts a pack from the golden path in Start something new, in three steps. "About it" names the pack, its units, the pack it builds on and the rules it must show evidence for. "Knowledge model" adds the new kinds of thing on top of the base model. "Review and create" shows the plan and then follows it. It makes a repository from the pack template with a manifest declaring what the pack may reach, and its tests; then a dev space with synthetic data branches; then a draft catalogue entry only you can see. Nothing is made until you press Create on the last step. Chapter 2.24, Building a custom vertical end to end, walks the whole path.



What a pack costs you

A pack is the most expensive extension to own. Its knowledge model has versions people depend on, so a property you regret stays in the version that shipped it. Its lenses can only take away, so a role that needs more means a conversation about the base lens. Its evidence map names rules that your own counsel has to confirm before anyone relies on it. And a customer gets it only through their licence: you can build the best pack in the industry and still not switch it on for a single unit until the organisation's licence carries it. In return, the thirtieth unit that wants it costs you one switch and a pilot.


PART 2 · CHAPTER 2.24

Building a custom vertical end to end

A worked build of the Cold chain domain pack, from the first brief to a release running for every unit, with its knowledge model, lenses, a skill, a full-service plugin and sample data. Then how to extend a pack that already exists and how to add a lens to one that has shipped.

FOR DEVELOPERS

19 MIN READ



I'm Mateo Ruiz, a developer at Corrán Orbital. Most of my week goes on our own payload software, but this chapter is about a job we did for a customer. Larkfield & Vane insures cargo, and a growing share of it travels in refrigerated containers. When a reefer loses shore power at the quay, the temperature climbs, the cargo spoils and a claim follows weeks later. Larkfield wanted their people to see that chain as one thing in Nexus, from the power fault to the claim, with each role seeing only its part. That became the Cold chain pack.

What follows is the build in the order we did it, with the screens, the files and the commands. I've kept the mistakes in, because two of the refusals we hit taught us more about the platform than the happy path did. The reference material lives in the chapters before this one, and I point to them rather than repeat them. The ones I leaned on most were chapter 2.18, The extension model, and chapter 2.23, Domain packs, with chapter 2.21, The Plugin SDK, open beside them for the software development kit itself.




FIGURE The Cold chain build, from the brief to every unit.

The brief, and who does what

Larkfield gave me a developer seat in their organisation for the length of the project. That matters, because a private pack for one customer is built inside that customer's installation, on its dev spaces and data branches, under its people's approvals. A pack meant for many customers is built differently, on a publisher cluster with sample data only, and chapter 2.25, Building for each edition, covers that case.


The brief fitted on one page:

- Reefer containers at the quay and on vessels: their power, their temperature excursions and the claims that follow.
- Two roles to start: a reefer technician on the quay, and a cold-chain controller in the office.
- A pilot that runs in the Rotterdam unit first and moves to Felixstowe after.
- Evidence for three sets of rules: the ATP agreement for perishable food, EU good distribution practice for medicines, and food safety records under HACCP (hazard analysis and critical control points). Claims under the Hague-Visby rules use the same excursion records, so we noted them for after the pilot.

Domain packs are an Enterprise capability. Larkfield runs Enterprise, so the domain pack path was open to me. On Community, the golden path for a pack isn't offered at all.

Start from the golden path

Everything starts on the Start something new page. It offers six golden paths: plugin, domain pack, lens, platform, skill and workflow. Each one makes a repository from a versioned template, a manifest that declares what the thing needs, tests, a dev space and data branches. The same paths work in the console, on the command line and from your IDE (integrated development environment), where the Workbench tool `nexus.create` does the same job with a plan you confirm first.



SCREEN The six golden paths, each with what it makes, its `nexus create` command and its pinned template. Notice the plate at the foot: the manifest is enforced, not advisory, and a release that asks for more is held until two people review it.

We took the domain pack path from that page, naming the pack `cold-chain` and its first unit Rotterdam. The result names the pinned template, `domain-pack@1.6.0`, and lists what it made: the repository, a manifest declaring four scopes, two stores and no outbound addresses, 66 tests from the template, a dev space in Rotterdam, three synthetic data branches and a draft entry in Larkfield's own catalogue that only I could see. The template version is pinned, and upgrading it later arrives as a reviewed change like any other, so nobody's pack moves under them because a template moved. I used the console wizard for our first pack anyway, because it shows the plan before it makes anything.



Step 1: say what the pack is for

The New domain pack wizard has three steps: about it, knowledge model, and review and create. Step 1 asks the few things that shape everything after it.

Field	What we entered	Note
Name	Cold chain	Used for the repository and the catalogue
What it is for	Reefer containers at the quay and on vessels: power, temperature excursions and the claims that follow	
Industry	Logistics and maritime	Builds on the Logistics and maritime pack
Owner	The person creating it	Locked in the wizard
Units	Rotterdam (pilot)	Felixstowe after the pilot
Template	`domain-pack@1.6.0`	Locked; upgrades come as reviewed changes
Rules it maps	ATP agreement, EU good distribution practice, food safety records	Each rule becomes a page in the pack's evidence map

The assistant in the dock suggested the last row, including the point that cargo claims reuse the same excursion records. A plate at the foot of the page says nothing is made yet. The repository, dev space and data branches are made only when you press Create on step 3, after you've seen the plan. You can save a draft and come back.




Step 2: the knowledge model

The knowledge model is the set of kinds of thing the pack knows about and how they link. Cold chain started from the logistics base model, `logistics-base 4.2`, imported from the SDK, which gave us five base kinds to build on (Vessel, Port, Container, Carrier and Shipment). Base kinds are read-only in the wizard. If one needs to change, it changes in the pack that owns it.

We added five kinds of our own:

Kind	What it is	Properties
Reefer unit	A refrigerated container	9
Vessel call	One vessel at one berth	6
Excursion	A temperature outside its limits	8
Power supply	A shore or ship power point	4
Claim	Money asked for spoiled cargo	7



SCREEN The knowledge graph with five base kinds and five new ones. Look at the properties of Excursion on the right: each property carries its class as it's made, and the plate says claim amounts are commercial, so technician lenses can't show them.

Every property is classed as you make it. "Reported by" on an Excursion is personal. "Cargo value at risk" and a claim's amount and settlement are commercial. This felt like paperwork on day one and saved us twice later, because the classes decide what a lens may show, what a masked copy replaces and what a log line hides.

Two of our relations reach into the base model: a Reefer unit is plugged into a Power supply, and a Claim refers to a Shipment. The base model itself isn't changed. A property you withdraw stays in version 1.0 of the model and leaves only in a later version, so nothing that was true of old records stops being readable.



Step 3: review and create

Step 3 is the plan. It lists what will be made, the scopes the manifest will declare, the data branches and the dev space. You confirm the plan with your passkey, and the plan gets a fingerprint. Creating then follows that plan exactly, one step at a time, and you can stop at any step and keep what was made.

The plan for Cold chain declared four scopes:

Scope	Why the pack needs it
Read reefer telemetry	Power and temperature readings
Write excursions	Records an excursion when limits break
Read shipments	Links a claim to its shipment
Draft claim notes	Drafts only; a person sends

Its stores were the graph and records. It had no outbound addresses and the Standard sandbox profile. The dev space came with 4 cores, 16 GiB of memory and 50 GiB of storage, a network closed except for what the manifest declares, signed images only, and an end after 7 idle days. When it ends, its definition stays in the repository, so you make it again from there.

The three data branches came from the synthetic generator. No customer data was copied. A masked copy of Rotterdam needs the data owner's agreement, which at Larkfield is Priya Natarajan, and you ask for it separately.



The pack manifest

The repository holds the pack's manifest, `pack.json`. It names the pack, its version, the pack it inherits from (if any), its clusters and its words. A cluster is either a lens, which is what one role sees inside the pack, or shared, which runs across every lens. Here is the core of ours:

```json
{
  "id": "cold-chain",
  "name": "Cold chain",
  "version": "0.4.0",
  "clusters": [
    {
      "id": "CC01",
      "kind": "lens",
      "name": "Reefer technician",
      "seats": "Technicians on the quay",
      "purpose": "Which reefers have lost power or warmed up, and what to do next.",
      "lexicon": ["cold"],
      "menu": [],
      "screens": []
    },
    {
      "id": "CC02",
      "kind": "lens",
      "name": "Cold-chain controller",
      "seats": "Controllers in the operations office",
      "purpose": "Every excursion from first reading to closed claim, with its evidence.",
      "lexicon": ["cold"],
      "menu": [],
      "screens": []
    }
  ],
  "lexicon": {
    "core": [],
    "cold": [
      ["excursion", "a time when the temperature left its limits", ""],
      ["set point", "the temperature a reefer is told to hold", ""],
      ["shore power", "electricity from the quay rather than the ship", ""]
    ]
  }
}
```

The lexicon holds the pack's own words with a plain gloss for each, short enough to read on a phone.

Beside `pack.json` the manifest also declares what the pack may reach: its scopes, stores, outbound addresses and sandbox profile. Nexus grants exactly that and nothing more. Each tool call is checked against the declared scopes, and an outside address is blocked unless it's listed. You can read the declaration, and the change against the last release, on the pack's Manifest and permissions page.




Lenses: what each role sees

A lens can only ever narrow what its base shows, and that one rule shaped more of our design than any other. A lens shows a part of what its base lens shows, and permissions still come from roles: a lens decides what a role sees in the pack, not what it's allowed to do.

The Reefer technician lens narrows Operations controller, the base lens Larkfield already runs for logistics work. In the Lens builder you tick the cards, fields and actions the lens shows. Items the base doesn't show are locked.

Part	Reefer technician shows	Left out
Cards	Reefer units at the quay, open excursions, power points, vessel calls today	Anything about claims
Fields	Power state, set point, last reading, highest temperature	Claim amount (not in the base lens), personal fields (off by default)
Actions	Record an excursion cause, ask for a power check	Change a set point and close an excursion (controllers only), draft a claim note



SCREEN The Lens builder for Reefer technician, ticked against its base lens. The plate in the lower left is the refusal you get for ticking claim amount: the base lens doesn't show it, so this lens can't.

I tried to add claim amount to the technician lens anyway, because a technician had asked for it. The builder refused with `LENS_CANNOT_WIDEN` and saved nothing. There's no workaround inside the lens: the way forward is a lens on a wider base, a different request that the organisation administrator decides. We left it out.

Hiding something in a lens doesn't remove it from Nexus. It means this role doesn't see it. The builder shows how many people a lens will reach in the pilot (29, in our case) and keeps a log of every Add, Change and Withdraw. A lens is defined once for the organisation and granted per unit to a platform role, so the same Reefer technician lens can be given to Rotterdam's technicians this month and Felixstowe's next.



A skill for drafting claim notes

Controllers wanted a first draft of the note that goes to a cargo owner after an excursion. That's language work, so it runs on a model, and the question was where to put it.

There are two kinds of skill in Nexus, and the difference matters here. A manifest skill is a typed row in a plugin's `skills[]`, dispatched by the platform. A Skills Engine skill is a `SKILL.md` package in the organisation's skill library, which agents, AI (artificial intelligence) buttons, workflows and developer tools all run the same way. Chapter 2.20, Skills, covers both.

Our plugin's trust is `community`, and a community plugin may only declare manifest skills that don't reach a model (`host_callback` and `plugin_queue`). The two tiers that reach the AI Provider Router, `tool_using` and `llm_only`, need trust `core` or `verified`. So claim-note drafting became a Skills Engine skill, and the router picks the model from Larkfield's own pool:

```MARKDOWN
---
name: draft-claim-note
description: Draft a note to a cargo owner about one reefer excursion, from the excursion record
and its readings. Drafts only; a person reviews and sends.
allowed-tools: Read, Grep
triggers:
  - /draft-claim-note
capabilities:
  - name: draft_note
    description: Write a first draft for one excursion
version: 1.0.0
---

# Draft a claim note

Use this when a controller asks for a note about one excursion.

## Steps

1. Read the excursion: unit, start, length, highest temperature and cause.
2. Read the shipment it belongs to, for the cargo owner's name.
3. Write four short paragraphs: what happened, when, what the readings show, what happens next.
4. Never state a claim amount. Never send anything.
```

The package lives in `skills/draft-claim-note/` in the repository, with the folder name equal to the skill's name. We validated and uploaded it from the terminal:

```BASH
npm run skill:validate skills/draft-claim-note
npm run skill:upload skills/draft-claim-note --dry-run
npm run skill:upload skills/draft-claim-note
```

Uploading the same content twice returns the existing version rather than a new one (`CONTENT_HASH_ALREADY_PUBLISHED`), so re-running the upload is safe. Before a version goes out, the Skills Engine runs its test cases, a dry run in shadow on past work, and a blind review by a model from another company, with the time and cost of each run.



The full-service plugin

The pack also needed code that runs all the time: a reader for the reefer telemetry feed, and a writer that opens an excursion record when a reading breaks its limits. Code like that belongs in a full-service plugin, and we scaffolded it with the SDK's own command, which writes the whole reference tree with the name substituted:

```BASH
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 create-nexus-plugin scaffold cold-chain --tier full-service
cd cold-chain
```

```
npm install
npm ci
npm run typecheck && npm test && npm run build
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 create-nexus-plugin validate nexus.manifest.json
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 nexus-gates --self-test
```

The SDK installs from `https://registry.adverant.ai/npm/` with the pull token from the Pull tokens and install commands page of your Adverant account. Commit the `package-lock.json` the first install writes; the image build runs `npm ci` and refuses without one.

Here is the part of our `nexus.manifest.json` that differs from the template. It isn't the whole file: the scaffold's `description`, `author`, `license`, `runtime`, `backend` and `frontend` blocks stay as they are, and the validator refuses a full-service manifest without them. The three `architecture` sentences are the law every plugin restates, and the validator checks the wording. UNO in the first one is the workflow engine:

JSON

```
{
  "manifestVersion": "2",
  "name": "cold-chain",
  "displayName": "Cold chain",
  "version": "0.4.0",
  "tier": "full-service",
  "trust": "community",
  "architecture": {
    "compute": "All compute runs via UNO dispatch (nexus-orchestrator /api/v1/dispatch + nexus-
workflows). No direct engine, queue or model-provider calls from plugin code.",
    "ai": "All AI goes through the AI Provider Router, which alone owns the credential and the
final provider/model decision. This plugin holds no model credentials.",
    "deploy": "Deploy is through the installation's release channels only."
  },
  "api": {
    "version": "1",
    "basePath": "/",
    "endpoints": [
      { "method": "GET", "path": "/health", "summary": "Liveness", "auth": "public",
"allowAnonymous": true },
      { "method": "GET", "path": "/api/excursions", "summary": "List the unit's excursions",
"auth": "scope", "right": "excursion.read", "needsUnit": true },
      { "method": "POST", "path": "/api/excursions", "summary": "Record an excursion", "auth":
"scope", "right": "excursion.create", "needsUnit": true },
      { "method": "POST", "path": "/internal/skills/excursion_open", "summary": "host_callback
receiver the platform POSTs to", "auth": "internal" }
    ]
  },
  "rights": {
    "excursion.read": { "summary": "Read the unit's excursions.", "roles": ["owner", "admin",
"member", "viewer"] },
    "excursion.create": { "summary": "Record an excursion.", "roles": ["owner", "admin",
"member"] }
  },
  "skills": [
    {
      "id": "excursion_open",
      "displayName": "Open an excursion",
      "description": "Open an excursion record when a reading breaks its set point limits. No
model; runs in the plugin's own backend.",
      "tier": "host_callback",
      "classification": "tenant",
      "dataResidency": "eu",
      "inputSchema": { "type": "object", "properties": { "readingId": { "type": "string" } },
"required": ["readingId"] },
      "outputSchema": { "type": "object", "properties": { "opened": { "type": "boolean" } },
"required": ["opened"] },
      "hostCallback": {
        "service": "cold-chain",
        "port": 8080,
        "path": "/internal/skills/excursion_open",
        "maxRequestBytes": 65536,
        "maxResponseBytes": 16384,
```

```
        "tenantHeader": "X-Organization-ID"
      },
      "timeoutMs": 10000
    }
  ],
  "changePolicy": {
    "enabled": true,
    "classes": ["website", "bff", "migration"],
    "approvals": { "website": 1, "bff": 1, "migration": 2 }
  }
}
```

`excursion_open` is a manifest skill with the `host_callback` tier: the platform posts the input to our own Service, inside our namespace, and never to a host we name. The receiver route is declared `auth: internal` and guarded with the SDK's `serviceMiddleware`, the Express form of the guard, which refuses a call token minted for any other plugin, organisation, skill or route. Its `classification` is `tenant`, which is the ceiling for a community plugin. Chapter 2.27, Build scenarios, walks through a `host_callback` skill on its own.

Two habits from this stage are worth copying. Every table carries `organization_id`, `owner_user_id` and `business_unit_id` from the first migration, because adding an axis later is a migration over live rows. And we ran `nexus-gates` locally before every push, since it's the same command the pipeline runs; a run that examined nothing exits 2 and says so. Chapter 2.19, The rules every extension inherits, lists the gates.



Sample data for testing

The Sample data for testing page offers three kinds of branch:

Kind	What it holds	Who agrees
Synthetic	Data generated from counts and shapes you set; nothing comes from a real unit	Nobody; it's yours
Masked copy	A copy of a unit with personal, sensitive and commercial fields replaced	The data owner (Priya Natarajan for Rotterdam)
Schema only	The shape of the stores, with no rows	Nobody; for migrations

We generated a busy week: about 7 excursions in every 100 reefers, which is what a busy August looks like at Rotterdam. The odd cases mattered more than the volume. We asked for power loss during discharge, a door left open, a sensor gap, and two claims for one excursion. The page can suggest odd cases from the excursion causes in the knowledge model, never from real records.


Each set of counts and shapes is saved as a seed, such as `cold-chain-busy-01`, with its fingerprint. The same seed gives the same data, so every test run on every branch sees the same week. That's what made our 66 tests repeatable.

A branch lives 72 hours by default and 14 days at most. I asked to keep our busy branch for 30 days during a long review, and the page refused with `BRANCH_LIFE_EXCEEDED`. The fix is the one the plate suggests: keep the seed, and make a fresh branch from it when you need one. A masked copy follows the same limits, and its request carries a reason and a length of up to 14 days.



Preview a lens as a person

Before anyone in Rotterdam saw Cold chain, we looked at it as they would. Preview a lens as a person renders the pack exactly as a chosen role sees it, on a data branch, inside a dashed preview frame.



SCREEN Cold chain as a Rotterdam reefer technician sees it, on a synthetic branch. Notice the claim column marked "hidden by lens" on each open excursion, and the side panel that says what this lens hides and why.

Three rules make previews safe to use freely. A preview uses a data branch, never the live unit. Your own permissions don't leak into it, so you see what the role sees and not what you can see. And it ends after 30 minutes. Pointing a preview at a live unit is refused with `CONNECTION_SCOPE_EXCEEDED`; if you need real shapes, ask the data owner for a masked copy and preview on that.

The preview is where we caught a real mistake. The temperature chart on the technician view showed the set point, and set point edits were meant for controllers only. The chart was fine; the edit button underneath it wasn't. Version 0.3.2 hid set point edits from technicians, and the preview is where we found it.



Changing the knowledge model after it ships

By version 0.4.0 we needed an Inspection kind for pre-trip inspections, and the relation "Excursion caused Claim" read better as "Excursion led to Claim". Moving the model from 1.3 to 1.4 is a knowledge model change, and the Knowledge model changes page shows its diff, what it would touch and where it is on its way.


The change travels as a graph change request. Its dry run counts what it would touch on Rotterdam's masked copy, as counts: for us, 1,284 links renamed and nothing removed. Two reviewers approve it, and the pipeline applies it to staging, then the pilot. Nobody writes to the shared graph by hand; an attempt is refused and recorded. Three saved questions used the word "caused", and the change carried an automatic rewrite for each of them, which the page listed. Lens filters didn't change, because both lenses still only narrowed.



Promote to production

Every release moves along one path: dev space, staging, a pilot unit, then all units. Each step has gates, and nothing skips one.

Into	Gates
Staging	All tests pass; quality checks; manifest unchanged or the widening accepted; signed image
Pilot (Rotterdam)	Model change dry run on the masked copy with no errors; policy check on lens and scope rules; two reviewers who aren't the author, one of them the data owner
All units	14 days in the pilot; errors under 1 in 1,000, counted in the pilot; each unit administrator agrees for their unit; two reviewers who aren't the author



SCREEN Cold chain 0.3.2 waiting at the pilot gate for its second reviewer. The plate on the right is the refusal for trying to promote straight from a dev space to all units.

I tried the shortcut once, on a Friday, for a one-line fix: promote 0.4.0-dev from my dev space to all units. It was refused with `GATE_CANNOT_BE_SKIPPED`, and nothing was promoted. The plate tells you to promote to the next step instead, and that's the only answer there is.

The release review itself, the evidence a second reviewer reads and the channels units choose, are in chapter 2.28, Releasing your extension. Two facts from it belong here, because they shape how you plan a vertical. The author never counts as a reviewer, so a two-person team needs a third person for every release. And each environment keeps the version before for 30 days, so rolling back is a reviewed change the pipeline does in about a minute.



Extending a pack that already exists

Not every vertical starts from nothing. A pack can inherit from another and add only what's different. The Banking and payments pack, which Larchmont Bank runs, is the clearest example in the catalogue. Its manifest starts like this:

```json
{
  "id": "fintech",
  "name": "Banking and payments",
  "version": "0.1",
  "inherits": "insurance",
  "clusters": [
    {
      "id": "FL01",
      "kind": "lens",
```

```
      "name": "Lending decisions",
      "seats": "Credit analysts, underwriters of loans, credit committee",
      "purpose": "Whether to lend, how much, at what price, and writing down why.",
      "lexicon": ["fin"],
      "menu": [],
      "screens": []
    }
  ],
  "lexicon": {
    "core": [],
    "fin": [
      ["APR", "the yearly cost of borrowing, fees included", "exact"],
      ["mandate", "the most one person may lend alone", ""]
    ]
  }
}
```

`inherits` names the pack it builds on. Banking and payments keeps the Insurance pack's shape, its shared conversation clusters and its core words, and adds three lenses of its own: Lending decisions, Card disputes and My account. The third element of each lexicon entry is `exact` for a term that must be shown as written, such as APR (annual percentage rate), rather than reworded.

Some things you can't do by inheriting. A pack never changes the shell, the components or the writing rules, so a child pack can't restyle the console. A regime that several packs need is one shared lens rather than a copy in each: the register of outsourced technology serves both Insurance and Banking and payments. If your child pack needs a lens that already exists as a shared lens, use it instead of drawing your own.

Licensing follows the inheritance. A pack is licensed on top of Enterprise and may need add-ons, and the licence document carries those dependencies. Insurance needs Decision rooms and sealed records, so a customer licensing a pack that inherits it needs that add-on too, and the console refuses to issue a licence that leaves it out. A pack's phone screens need the Mobile apps add-on as well. Check the chain of requirements before you promise a customer a date.



Adding a lens to a pack that has shipped

The smallest vertical work is a new lens on a pack you didn't write. Six months into the pilot, Larkfield's marine claims team wanted a lens of its own inside Cold chain: excursions and claims, no power points, no set points. We didn't touch the pack's code. A lens is a row in the organisation's lens registry, owned by the pack, so we started it from the lens golden path on Start something new and shaped it in the Lens builder against the Cold-chain controller lens as its base. The same rule applies as before: the new lens can hide what its base shows and can never show more. It's defined once for the organisation and granted to a platform role in each unit. A grant is withdrawn, never deleted, and giving the lens again makes a new grant, so who held which lens when stays readable. The registry counts how many people held a lens each month, never who.

The Lenses and who sees them page shows the result as a matrix of lens by unit and role, with Add, Change and Withdraw on each cell. Preview the new lens as a person before you grant it, exactly as above.



What it cost, honestly

A pack touches a customer's records, so the platform makes some things slow on purpose, and you should plan for these from day one.

1. A masked copy needs the data owner's agreement every time. Ours took a day to arrive the first time, because Priya wanted to read the knowledge model first. Start with synthetic data and ask early.
2. The author can't approve their own release, and requests lapse after 3 days. If your reviewers are busy, your release waits.
3. A release that asks for more than the last one, such as sending mail or one outside address, is held until two reviewers accept the wider manifest. Chapter 2.28, Releasing your extension, shows the Manifest and permissions page that tells you before you ask.
4. A lens can't show what its base lens hides. If a role really needs more, that's a conversation with the organisation administrator, not a setting.


None of these got in our way twice. The second release of Cold chain took a week from first commit to the Rotterdam pilot, most of it the 66 tests running against three branches and two people reading the evidence.

Building for each edition

What changes when one extension has to work in every edition, on an air-gapped site, on a Nexus Edge payload or behind a customer's own brand. Covers the licence line for Enterprise modules and signed offline delivery, with a matrix of what to do differently for each target.

FOR DEVELOPERS

17 MIN READ




At Corrán Orbital we ship to more places than most teams will. Our own engineers run Enterprise on the ground. A satellite, CORR-3, runs a mission pack on Nexus Edge. Two customers run Community on a single server, one runs an air-gapped Enterprise installation that never sees the internet, and we've built a pack for an insurer on their own installation. The code underneath is mostly the same, and the differences are mostly about where it's allowed to go and how it gets there.

This chapter goes through each target in turn: what you build against, what you're not allowed to touch, and how the result reaches the customer. A matrix at the end puts it on one page. Chapter 2.18, The extension model, explains how skills, plugins, packs and modules differ. Chapter 2.2, Editions under the hood, describes the editions themselves.

Community and the open core

Community is the open core, under the Apache License, Version 2.0. You can fork it and ship changes to it. The NOTICE file that travels with it says one thing worth knowing before you brand anything: the licence doesn't grant use of Adverant's names or trademarks beyond saying where the work came from.

You extend Community the way you extend Enterprise. The Plugin SDK (software development kit) is the same package on both editions, and neither the full-service template nor the 22 adherence gates change; chapter 2.21, The Plugin SDK, covers it. Skills work too. Community gets the whole Skills Engine creator and library, with versions and tests, while canary releases and two-person approval stay with Enterprise.



SCREEN Building a booking plugin on a single Community server. Notice the access pass, which reaches Propose through GitHub and doesn't offer Elevate, and the teaser on the right listing what Enterprise adds.

The developer pages on Community offer the same golden paths with three differences you'll feel straight away:

1. Your code lives in GitHub rather than in the installation's own repositories. The plugin golden path makes a GitHub repository and a dev space from the same pinned template Enterprise uses; screen DV18 shows it making `room-bookings`.
2. The domain pack and platform golden paths are Enterprise. On Community you build plugins and skills, plus lenses and workflows on what you run.
3. Community passes stop below the Elevate tier. On one server there's no production to reach from an IDE (integrated development environment), and you administer the server directly. An attempt from the IDE is refused with `PASS_TIER_REQUIRED`.

A Community dev space on a small server is modest. Ours had 2 cores and 8 GiB of memory, closed except what the manifest declares, and it ended after 7 idle days.

Contributing back

The Skills Engine is Apache-2.0 as well, and it takes contributions in the usual way. Fork the repository, branch from `main`, make the change with its tests, and run the checks before you open a pull request:

```bash
git checkout -b feature/skill-synthesis-validation
npm test
npm run lint
npm run typecheck
```

A contribution that changes behaviour needs a test that fails without it. That's not a house style: the SDK's own testing rules say every new test must be shown to fail on the tree before the change, and reviewers ask for the evidence.



Enterprise modules and the licence line

Enterprise is Community plus licensed modules. A licensed module is a separate artefact that a Community service loads when it starts, and it's how Enterprise features, and any closed module you build for Enterprise customers, attach to the open core.

The rule that makes this work is the licence line. A closed module may reach the Community edition through one package only, `@adverant/nexus-spi`, the service provider interface. It's Apache-2.0 and holds interfaces plus the type guards a host and a module use to check each other, with no other runtime logic. Coupling across the line is an interface or a network protocol, never source.

Export	What it is
`RouteModule`	A licensed route module: `id`, `featureGroup`, `bodies` and `register(app, ctx)`, which mounts its routers on the host's app
`SpiApp`	The part of the host's HTTP app a module touches: `use`
`SpiContext`	What the host hands a module: the product gate and scope guard, the licence reader, the scoped-query pool, the service's schema, the upstream addresses and the platform clients
`SpiRuntime`	The plugin SDK values a host hands a module, so the module never imports the SDK's runtime itself
`SpiPlane`	What a licensed plane adds besides routes, such as the screen reads it serves
`ScreenModule`	A console's licensed screen group: `group`, `featureGroup`, `routes`, `screens` and `menu`
`GrantCheck`	`(featureGroup) => Promise<{ entitled, code?: 'LICENCE_LOCKED' }>`

The HTTP framework and the console's screen type are type parameters, so the interface binds neither. Here's the skeleton of a route module, with an Express handler type:

```typescript
import type { GrantCheck, RouteModule, SpiApp, SpiContext } from "@adverant/nexus-spi";
import { Router, type RequestHandler } from "express";

export function auditTrail(checkGrant: GrantCheck): RouteModule<RequestHandler> {
  return {
    id: "audit-trail",
    featureGroup: "<feature-group>",
    bodies: [],
    register(app: SpiApp<RequestHandler>, ctx: SpiContext<RequestHandler>) {
      const router = Router();
      router.get("/api/audit-trail", ...ctx.requireScope, async (_req, res) => {
        const verdict = await checkGrant("<feature-group>");
        if (!verdict.entitled) {
          res.status(403).json({
            error: true,
            code: verdict.code,
            message: "This organisation's licence does not carry the audit trail.",
            troubleshooting: ["An owner or administrator can turn it on with a licence from
Adverant."],
          });
          return;
        }
        res.json({ entries: [] });
      });
      app.use(router);
    },
  };
}
```

`<feature-group>` is the edition matrix feature group the module serves. Every licensed route runs behind `ctx.requireScope`, the host's product gate and scope guard, and the module also checks its own grant before it answers. A module that isn't entitled refuses with `LICENCE_LOCKED` and draws the feature's teaser, never its data. Your module never imports the plugin SDK's runtime either, because the SDK is a Community package the line doesn't admit. The host hands it the SDK values it calls. Before it loads any module, the host installs a `SpiHost` on `globalThis` under `Symbol.for(SPI_HOST_KEY)`, holding the SDK runtime and the app's own route kit. It has to happen first: a module compiled to one bundle evaluates as a whole, and a `register` call would come too late for code that reads the SDK values while it loads. For types, `@adverant/nexus-spi/sdk/<module>` re-exports the SDK's declarations, vendored unchanged from one SDK release and pinned by checksum, so your module type-checks against the same refusal bodies and clients a plugin uses.

A screen module follows one more rule: one module per feature group, so a group whose screens belong to two feature groups ships as two modules, and only one of them carries the menu row.

What the licence-line gate refuses

Adverant's licence-line gate holds every Enterprise module to the line, and it's worth holding your own closed modules to the same rule. Its configuration is one file:

```json
{
  "communityScopes": ["@adverant/", "@adverant-nexus/"],
  "allowedCommunityPackages": ["@adverant/nexus-spi"],
  "enterprisePrefixes": ["@adverant/enterprise-", "@adverant-enterprise/"],
  "communityRepos": ["nexus-community", "nexus-core", "Adverant-Nexus-Open-Core"],
  "allowedCommunityGoModules": []
}
```

Each of these is a finding with its file and line:

- any import of a package under a Community scope that isn't the allowed interface or an Enterprise package, dynamic imports included;

- any specifier, Go import path or dependency URL that names a Community repository, unless it's a Go module listed in `allowedCommunityGoModules`;
- a relative import that climbs out of the repository;
- a `package.json` dependency that is a `file:`, `link:`, `portal:` or `workspace:` path outside the repository, or a Git URL to a Community repository;
- a `go.mod` `replace` that points outside the repository.

It exits 0 when clean and 1 on findings. Exit 2 means it refused, because its configuration was bad or it scanned nothing. The interface package isn't published to a registry. You carry a byte-pinned copy of the built package inside your repository as a local `file:` package, with a `SHA256SUMS` pin and a check in your pipeline that refuses a copy that differs. Because the copy is inside the repository, the gate accepts it.




FIGURE The licence line between Community and an Enterprise module.

Edition builds

If your extension ships to customers on both editions, you build it once per edition, and each build happens in its own composed tree. Composing a tree means taking only the files that belong to that edition. Adverant's own export does this from a boundary list in which every tracked file is assigned by first-match-wins rules: a rule names a capability and the file's edition follows from that capability's tier in the edition matrix, or it names a class of file that ships in neither edition, with a reason. Build-only files ship in the Enterprise tree and, when marked, in the Community tree too. A module's migration chain is installer data and ships in every edition's tree.

Then run the whole build from clean in each composed tree. That means all three commands, every time:

```bash
npm ci
npm test
npm run build
```


We learned this the expensive way: an Enterprise tree passed its tests while the Community tree failed its production build, because a type it needed lived only in an Enterprise file. Tests passing in one tree tell you nothing about the other. An edition's tests may import only what that edition's tree holds, and the export refuses a test that reaches outside it.

The export also writes each edition's licence. Community files carry the SPDX (Software Package Data Exchange) identifier `Apache-2.0`; Enterprise files carry `LicenseRef-Adverant-Enterprise` and their `package.json` says `UNLICENSED`. Don't hand-edit those fields: the export rewrites them, and a copy that no longer matches its pinned licence text is refused.

Team: cloud only

Team is Community plus the Team set, and it runs only on Adverant cloud. There's no self-hosted Team. The Team set adds six capabilities on top of Community, among them the consolidated work panel, shared notebooks, skills library administration and workflow operations with promotion between environments.

For a builder, cloud only means one thing: a Team customer gets your plugin as a signed release through the catalogue, never from your own servers. You build it the way an outside publisher builds, on a publisher cluster.



SCREEN A publisher's own virtual cluster on Adverant cloud, with sample data only. Follow the live flow along the top: the IDE reaches the publisher's cluster and sample data, a signed release goes through review to the catalogue, and there's no path to any customer.

A publisher cluster is a virtual cluster on Adverant cloud with a quota set by Adverant. It holds sample data only and has no route to any customer. Asking for a masked copy of a customer's data there is refused with `TENANT_BOUNDARY`; a customer can share test results with you, never their data.

Your pass on it never reaches into a customer. When the release is ready it's signed and reviewed by Adverant before it's listed in the catalogue. Each customer then chooses whether to install it and grants it only what its manifest declares, unit by unit. A call to anything the manifest didn't declare is refused at the customer's end with `CONNECTION_SCOPE_EXCEEDED`, and the only way to add it is a new release the customer reviews.



Air-gapped customers

One of our customers runs Nexus where nothing goes in or out over a network. Their installation is described in chapter 2.10, Air-gapped installation. For us it meant shipping our plugin on signed media, and the tool for that is `nexus-airgap`, from the sovereign delivery kit `@adverant/nexus-sovereign`.

A sealed bundle is one signed, self-contained tarball. It can carry images and migrations, pre-signed skills and model weights, and an SBOM (software bill of materials) with the licences of everything inside. Its manifest lists every file with its SHA-256 and is signed with Ed25519. Building one from code looks like this:

```typescript
import { SealedBundleExporter } from "@adverant/nexus-sovereign";

const { bundleDigest } = await new SealedBundleExporter().export(source, {
  outPath: "./cold-chain-0.4.0.tar.gz",
  profile: "airgap",
  signerPrivateKeyPem,
});
```

`signerPrivateKeyPem` is your release signing key. The `nexus-airgap bundle` command does the same from the command line. The customer's operator then checks it before anything else:

```bash
nexus-airgap verify --bundle cold-chain-0.4.0.tar.gz --trusted-key corran-release.pub.pem --
profile airgap
```

Verification re-hashes every file against the manifest, rejects any file the manifest doesn't list, requires a trusted Ed25519 signer, and refuses any bundle whose network allow-list isn't empty. A file changed after signing fails with `BUNDLE_INTEGRITY_VIOLATION`. Tell the operator to stop there and call you; there's a non-strict switch, and they should never use it.

Three rules carried our delivery:

1. The trusted key travels separately from the bundle. We send the public key and the bundle's SHA-256 by a different route from the media, so a bundle can't vouch for itself.
2. Nothing in the bundle may need the network at install. No package fetch, no model download, no licence call. If the plugin needs a model, the customer's own model server provides it through the AI (artificial intelligence) Provider Router.
3. After verifying, the operator brings the release in through the installation's own release channels, exactly as a connected customer would. The bundle is how the bytes arrive, not a way round the promotion gates.


Air-gapped work is slower, and there's no fixing that from our side. A wrong byte costs a new set of media and another trip, so we verify the bundle ourselves on a clean machine with the same command before it leaves the building.



Nexus Edge mission packs

Nexus Edge is a smaller Nexus that runs on satellites and drones, on mission computers kept separate from the flight computer. It's an add-on with a licence per platform or fleet. What changes from one mission to the next is the mission pack, and building those is a good part of my job.

A mission pack carries what the payload needs for one mission. Alongside its models and adapters it holds the ontology with a starting graph, agent steps, alert rules, the priorities for what comes down first, a placement table saying which computer runs what, the degraded steps the platform can drop to when a computer fails, and the test cases it must pass on board.




SCREEN Building Maritime watch 1.5 from 1.4. Notice the test cases on board (48, all must pass) and the placement table, which says what runs on each of the two GPU (graphics processing unit) boards and the CPU (central processing unit) board at each degraded step.

Packs are built and signed on the ground. Some practical rules from our builds:

- Keep the big parts stable. Maritime watch 1.5 added a ship-finder adapter and two alert rules; the language model and ontology didn't change, so the pack was 412 MB instead of 9.8 GB. The uplink is narrow, and base models load before launch.
- Use one embedding model for the whole mission family on ground and payload alike, so the graph changes that come down can merge with the ground graph.

- The payload never sends a command to the flight systems. It sends typed requests through the supervisor to the flight computer, which answers each with a reason.
- Every hardware type needs its own check of the pack. Installing a pack not checked for a device's hardware is refused with `PACK_NOT_CHECKED_FOR_HARDWARE`.



SCREEN Releasing Maritime watch 1.5 to CORR-3. Two of three signatures are needed, so one stolen key can't release a pack, and the plan shows the pack switched on only after its 48 tests pass on board.

Release needs two of three signatures. Ours and Adverant's are the usual pair, and the third is an offline key we keep in a safe for when one of the other two is lost. The pack goes up into the idle slot, is verified, runs its test cases on the real boards, and is switched on only if they all pass, with a counter that stops an older pack being reinstalled. If a test fails, the platform stays on the previous pack and the failure comes down on the next pass. We roll out one platform at a time, each after a week clean. Packs stay valid while a platform is out of contact, so a satellite with no link keeps working on the pack it has.

On vehicles and vessels Edge can run on k3s. A spacecraft runs a supervisor with signed images or static binaries and a fixed placement table instead of Kubernetes, and that's why the placement table travels inside the pack.



White-label storefronts

The Storefront / white-label add-on lets a customer put their own brand and domain on what their users see, with their own sign-in screens, and take payments through their own gateways. Card details never touch Nexus.

A plugin built for a white-label customer must never show Adverant. The manifest carries everything brand-specific, and the platform resolves the rest from the organisation's own brand rather than from anything hard-coded in your code:

```json
{
  "domains": [
    { "primary": "<app-domain>", "aliases": ["www.<app-domain>"] }
  ],
  "branding": {
    "appName": "<app name>",
    "tagline": "<one line>",
    "primaryColor": "<hex>",
    "accentColor": "<hex>",
    "passkeyRpId": "<app-domain>",
    "oauthClientRef": "brand:<plugin name>:google"
  }
}
```

`<app-domain>` is the customer's own domain, and `passkeyRpId` must match it, because passkeys are bound to the domain a person signs in on. A web app on its own origin signs people in through the SDK's sign-in helpers, whose two public routes are the only unguarded `/api` routes the scope gate accepts, and only when the manifest declares them `auth: public` with `allowAnonymous: true`. Frontend calls go through the backend for frontend allow-list proxy, never straight to a service address. The customer's administrator configures the payments side, from gateways to the branded checkout. Your plugin doesn't.



The matrix

Build target	Build against	What you do differently	How it reaches the customer
Community	Plugin SDK, Skills Engine	Code in GitHub; no domain pack or platform paths; no Elevate	The customer installs it; no catalogue review needed
Enterprise (your own installation)	Plugin SDK, Skills Engine, pack templates	Dev spaces, data branches, masked copies with the data owner; packs and lenses	Promotion from staging to a pilot unit, then everywhere
Enterprise module (closed)	`@adverant/nexus-spi` only	Licence-line rule; grant check on its own feature group; `LICENCE_LOCKED` when not entitled	Loaded by a Community service at start, on licensed installations
Both editions	Plugin SDK	Compose each edition's tree; `npm ci`, tests and production build in each	One release per edition

Team	Plugin SDK on a publisher cluster	Sample data only; cloud only	Signed release, Adverant review, catalogue
Air-gapped	Plugin SDK, `@adverant/nexus-sovereign`	Sealed bundle; key and checksum sent separately; nothing fetched at install	Signed media, verified, then the installation's release channels
Nexus Edge	Mission pack contents	Placement table, degraded steps, on-board tests, hardware checks	Two of three signatures, idle slot, switched on after tests pass
White-label	Plugin SDK	`domains` and `branding` in the manifest; no Adverant name anywhere	As for Enterprise, on the customer's own domain

Whatever the target, deploy is through the installation's release channels only. Chapter 2.28, Releasing your extension, covers those channels. Chapter 2.27, Build scenarios, has a recipe for each row above.


PART 2 · CHAPTER 2.26

Building with AI coding tools

How to build Nexus extensions safely with Claude Code and other AI (artificial intelligence) coding tools. It starts with connecting your IDE (integrated development environment) to the Workbench and a project CLAUDE.md that carries the platform rules, and ends with six worked prompts and the gate that proves each one.

FOR DEVELOPERS

24 MIN READ



Most of the Cold chain pack in chapter 2.24, Building a custom vertical end to end, was written with Claude Code open in the terminal beside me. That's normal at Corrán Orbital now, and Nexus was built expecting it. The platform doesn't treat an AI (artificial intelligence) coding tool as a clever autocomplete. It treats it as an agent acting for a named person, with a pass that's always narrower than that person's, and it records every call the agent makes.

This chapter is about working that way without getting hurt. It starts with connecting your IDE (integrated development environment), then covers skills in the editor, the project file that teaches the tool the platform's rules, the two compilers that turn existing work into Nexus code, how commits say which tool wrote them, and how I review what the tool produces. It ends with six prompts I'd hand a colleague, each with what should come back and the gate that proves it.




Connecting your IDE to Nexus

Every installation has one Workbench address for AI coding tools. You find it on the Connect your IDE page under Developers, and Claude Code connects with one command:

```bash
claude mcp add workbench --transport http <workbench-address>
```

`<workbench-address>` is the address the page shows, with a copy button beside it. The other tools have their own one-liners on the same page: `codex mcp add workbench --url <workbench-address>` for Codex, an install link for Cursor, and `code --add-mcp` with a small JSON argument for VS Code with Copilot. All of them speak MCP (Model Context Protocol) to the same address.



SCREEN Connect your IDE, with one command per tool and the default tiers on the right. The diagram at the foot shows each call passing the Workbench, getting its own short-lived credential, and landing only in the organisation's own space in each store.

There's no key to paste. The first call opens your browser, which shows exactly what's asking: which tool on which computer, acting for whom, wanting which tiers. You allow it with your passkey, and from then on the tool holds no database password or kubeconfig, only a pass that ends. Behind the address, Nexus makes a short-lived credential for each store, for each request, as you.

An organisation administrator can also download a managed-settings file so that every company copy of Claude Code connects to this server and no other:

```json
{ "workbench": { "type": "http", "url": "<workbench-address>" } }
```

Tiers and passes

Every Workbench sign-in gets a pass made of named tiers. The default for a developer is Observe and Sandbox on their own units.

Tier	What it allows	Who gets it

Observe	Read your units, including logs and metrics, and query the masked copy	Default
Sandbox	Write in your own space: your dev space and your own data branches	Default
Propose	Open a change request; a pipeline applies it after review	Asked for when first used
Elevate	One time-boxed action on one target, approved by a named person	People only, never by sign-in alone
Break-glass	Emergency access	Platform administrators only, with two approvers


An agent always acts for a person and appears as its own line. Its pass is never wider than yours and never includes the Elevate tier or unmasked data. It lasts an hour, renewed only while you're active in Nexus or the IDE. A person's pass lasts 8 hours. So a tool you leave running overnight stops by itself, and ending your own pass ends your agent's too. Each agent pass also carries a model-cost budget, estimated before the pass is granted and shown as a meter while it runs.

The My access passes page lists every pass you and your agents hold, with its tiers and what it has cost so far, and lets you renew, narrow or end each one. Ending a pass stops the next call at once; the record of every call stays. Each pass also carries hard limits, which on ours were 200 rows and 30 seconds per query, and 50 objects changed in the dev space per session.



The first session in the IDE

Once connected, `/mcp` in Claude Code lists the Workbench tools grouped by tier. The Observe group holds the reading tools: `workbench.k8s.describe`, `workbench.k8s.events`, `workbench.logs.query`, `workbench.metrics.query`, `workbench.traces.get`, `workbench.db.schema`, `workbench.db.query` on the masked copy, `workbench.graph.query` and `workbench.vector.search`. Sandbox adds `workbench.devspace.deploy`, `workbench.branch.create` and `workbench.branch.reset`. Propose adds the tools that open a change request and plan a graph change. Elevate isn't on the pass at all; you ask for it in the console.




SCREEN A first session in Claude Code, with the tools listed by tier, a restart traced to its cause, and a request for a database password refused. Every answer says where it came from and what was hidden.

My first real question was why our telemetry reader restarted in Rotterdam overnight. Claude Code described the workload (two restarts, out of memory against a 512 MiB limit), queried the logs (organisation set by the gateway, personal data redacted) and the memory metric, and found that the nightly load pulled a whole night of readings into one batch. Then I asked it, half as a test, for the database password the service uses. The Workbench refused with `SECRET_NEVER_SHOWN`. It shows a Secret's name and last four characters, never the value, to anyone. The assistant's reply was the right one: it doesn't need the password, because each query it makes gets its own short-lived credential, a read-only role made for that one request.

Plan, then apply

Every tool that changes something shows a plan first. The plan is a diff with counts and a fingerprint, and apply runs only that plan, exactly.




SCREEN A memory limit raised in the dev space from a plan, then the same change outside the sandbox. In the interactive session a person confirms it in the IDE; from a headless script it's refused.

Inside your own dev space, apply runs straight away. Outside it, a person must confirm in the IDE, and the change goes to the pipeline, which applies it after review. Two refusals follow from that, and both bit me:

- From a script with nobody at the keyboard, such as `claude -p` in a cron job, there's no way to show the confirm box, so a change outside the sandbox is refused with `CONFIRMATION_UNAVAILABLE`. Nothing happens. Run it in an interactive session.
- An apply that names a plan this session never made, or a plan that changed, is refused with `PLAN_FINGERPRINT_MISMATCH` before anything runs. Plan again.

Read-taint

Customer content can hide instructions meant for an assistant. So once a session has read it, the session loses its tools for writing and for reaching outside Nexus until a person confirms one write or starts a fresh session.



SCREEN A claim document read on the masked copy, with an instruction hidden in it that the assistant ignored. The next write is refused until the person confirms that one write or starts a fresh session.

I met this on a claim document that contained a paragraph addressed to "the assistant", asking it to copy the claims table to an outside address. Claude Code ignored it and said so. When I then asked it to add the excursion to my branch graph, the write was refused with `SESSION_TAINTED`. I could confirm that one write after reading its plan, or start a fresh session that hadn't read the document. Logs and metrics don't taint a session. Documents, tickets, mail and graph source text all do. The hidden text was counted in my activity record as instructions found in content, without its words.


Another organisation

Nothing you type can reach another organisation's data. Ask for it and every store refuses with `TENANT_BOUNDARY`. An organisation value slipped into a log query is replaced by the gateway with your own. It isn't a missing permission. Every layer on the path is fenced to your organisation, so there's nobody who could grant it from where you sit, and a platform administrator's access wouldn't help either. If two organisations agree to share data, that's an agreement set up between them, never something an IDE session does.



Skills in the IDE and Claude Code

Skills Engine skills are `SKILL.md` folders, and Claude Code reads the same folders. The library syncs to `~/.claude/skills` in your own home directory, read-only, with your drafts beside them in `~/.claude/skills/drafts`. So the skills your organisation has published are available in your editor without any copying, and what you write locally goes back through the same tests and approval as anything written in the console.



SCREEN A skill written and tested in the editor, then sent through the same approval as one made in the console. Notice the publish held because its author can't approve their own change.

From the terminal, in the repository that holds the skill, two npm scripts take it from your editor into the library:

```bash
npm run skill:validate skills/check-a-customs-filing
npm run skill:upload skills/check-a-customs-filing
```

Validate checks the format and the test cases. Upload makes a draft, and if the content matches a version already published it returns that version instead (`CONTENT_HASH_ALREADY_PUBLISHED`). Publish is held for approval when the skill needs it, and you can't approve your own change. A run started from a script without a model route is refused with `SKILLS_ENGINE_BINDING_MISSING`: the dispatcher chooses the route and the engine checks it was given, never guessing one. Chapter 2.24, Building a custom vertical end to end, shows the same scripts in a whole project.

Agents and Claude Code also reach the library over MCP, through 13 tools in all. Among them, `list_skills` and `get_skill` find and read a skill, `match_prompt` and `discover_skills` say which skill fits a task, `invoke_skill` runs one, and `sync_skills_local` copies the library to your skills folder. Each call runs as the person who started it, inside their allow-list. A skill can never widen its tools beyond the allow-list of whoever runs it.



A project CLAUDE.md that carries the platform rules

Claude Code reads a `CLAUDE.md` at the root of the repository at the start of every session. It's the cheapest safety measure you have, because it puts the platform's rules in front of the model before it writes anything. The SDK (software development kit) gates will catch most mistakes anyway, but a rule the model read up front costs you no failed build.

Write it as rules with their reasons, not as aspirations. Here's the one in our Cold chain plugin repository, lightly trimmed:

MARKDOWN

```
# CLAUDE.md: the cold-chain plugin

This repository is a Nexus plugin built on @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk 2.50.0.
Read nexus.manifest.json before anything else. It is the contract; the code follows it.

## Done means the gates pass

A change is done only when every one of these has run in this order and you have
quoted its last line to me:

1. npm ci
2. npm run typecheck && npm test && npm run build
3. npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 create-nexus-plugin validate nexus.manifest.json
4. npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 nexus-gates --self-test   (exit 0 passes; exit 2
means a gate examined nothing, which is a failure)
5. node scripts/ci/required-env  (must list every variable src/config.ts requires)

Never report done from a partial log or from memory.

## Isolation: three axes, from the token and nowhere else

- Every scoped row carries organization_id, owner_user_id and business_unit_id.
  Primary keys lead with organization_id. Foreign keys are composite and carry it.
- Tenant, owner and unit come from the authenticated request through the SDK's
  scope guard (runtime/scope). Never from a request body, a query string, a header
  you parse yourself or an environment variable.
- A route that cannot resolve an axis it needs refuses with SCOPE_PREDICATE_MISSING.
  Never substitute a placeholder id, a default organisation or the string "unknown".
- A body that names a tenant field is refused with TENANT_NOT_A_PARAMETER.
  Never "fix" that by accepting the field.
- The tenant predicate is defined in one file. Never write a second one.
- Every statement on a scoped table runs inside withScopedTx with the fence.
  Never call set_config yourself.

## Compute goes through UNO only

- src/uno.ts is the only file that knows the dispatch URL. Use its UnoClient.
- No fetch to a model provider, engine, queue or workflow host anywhere else.
- A 202 means accepted, not done. Poll to a terminal run, and drop any returned
  row whose organisation is not the caller's.

## AI goes through the router only

- This plugin holds no model credential. src/config.ts refuses to boot if one is
  in the environment. Never weaken that check.
- Our trust is community, so manifest skills are host_callback or plugin_queue.
  Never add a tool_using or llm_only skill. Model work is a Skills Engine skill.
- Provider and model wishes go on skill rows and nowhere else.

## No credentials, ever

Never write a key, token or password into the repository, a fixture, a log line
or your reply. If a task seems to need one, stop and ask me.

## Refusals have one shape

Every refusal is a JSON body with error: true, a code from the SDK catalogue,
message and troubleshooting[]. Scope refusals also carry resolved[], missing[]
and invalid[]. Send it with res.json so the refusal ledger records it.
Tests assert the body, never just the status.

## Tests fail first

- Every new test must fail on the tree before your change. Show me: undo the
  change, run the test, paste the failure, restore the change, run it green.
- Never delete, skip or weaken a test to make the build pass.
- Never add an entry under gates/ without a reason I have agreed to.
- Every test takes its scope from test/scope-fakes.ts.
- Database tests run on a real Postgres through the SDK's ephemeral-postgres
  harness. In CI a skipped database case is a failure, not a pass.

## The manifest
```

```
- Every route is in api.endpoints[] with its auth and a right from rights.
- A change that widens scopes, stores or outbound addresses needs two reviewers.
  Say so at the top of your summary when a change does it.
- The architecture block keeps its three sentences word for word.
  Deploy is through the installation's release channels only.

## Commits

Stamp every commit you write with an X-Generator trailer: claude-code/<model>.
```

Three things make a file like this work. Every rule names the mechanism that enforces it, so the model can check its own work against the same thing the pipeline will. The definition of done is a list of commands with exit codes, not a feeling. And it forbids the specific shortcuts a model reaches for when a build is red, such as deleting the test or defaulting a missing organisation to a placeholder.



Feeding the SDK corpus as context

The SDK documentation is a set of 28 volumes, written for a developer or an LLM (large language model) to build a complete production plugin from the corpus alone, without access to the platform's private code. Every wire shape and error code a plugin meets is in the documents themselves.

That makes it unusually good context. In practice I give Claude Code the volumes the task touches rather than the whole set: the manifest and HTTP volumes for a new route, the database volume for a migration, the error catalogue whenever a refusal is involved, and the conformance checklist always, because it's the whole corpus as a tick-list. Tell the model to prefer an observed fact over its own memory of how a framework usually works. When the two disagree, the corpus is right about this platform.

For the frontend developer on your team, generate a guide from the manifest instead of writing one:

```bash
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 create-nexus-plugin guide --manifest nexus.manifest.json
--narrative docs/guide --out docs/GUIDE.md
```

It lists every route the web app may call with every refusal it can get back, so it makes good context for the model writing the web app too. Commit it, and check it in CI (continuous integration) with `--check --lint` so it can't drift from the manifest.



Wrapping an existing repository: /plugin-create

The `/plugin-create` skill turns an existing repository or an API (application programming interface) specification into a Nexus plugin. Give it the source when you invoke it:

```
/plugin-create https://github.com/<owner>/<repo>
```
OUTPUT

It works in phases. It clones and analyses the source first, working out the language and framework, the API surface, the database and its migrations, and what the thing actually does. It prints an analysis report and picks a wrapping strategy from what it found:

Source	Strategy
REST (representational state transfer) API in Node.js	An Express wrapper around the existing routes
REST API in Python	A FastAPI wrapper
Full-stack Node.js and React	A backend wrapper with a user interface (UI) adapter
Command-line tool	An Express API that runs the commands
Library or SDK	An Express API exposing its functions
Complex platform	One plugin container with an nginx proxy in front

Then it generates the backend and its migrations, a UI, the manifest and the tests. Treat what it writes as a strong first draft and hold it to the same standard as anything else. In our repository that meant three steps before anyone reviewed it. We lifted its manifest to the v2 contract with `create-nexus-plugin migrate --write`, which adds the law sentences and refuses to invent an entrypoint. We then made it pass `create-nexus-plugin validate`. And we ran `nexus-gates` until it went green, which in our case meant replacing tenant headers the wrapper read itself with the SDK's scope guard, and adding the three axes to its tables. Deploy stays with the installation's release channels; ignore any deployment files the draft contains.



mockup-compiler: from screens to working code

The second compiler works the other way round. `mockup-compiler` takes a project's mockups, which can run to thousands of screens, and compiles them into working UI, backend for frontend (BFF) routes and SQL, proven faithful screen by screen by gates with exit codes. It traces every drawn word to the source line that drew it, joins each screen to its spec, works out the domain changes the screens need, and emits the contracts and migrations along with a specification of the demo data every screen needs.

Two rules set it apart from asking a model to "build these screens":

- Compiler first. Anything that can be known is computed, deterministically. A model is used only for typed holes: it writes an artefact against a schema, a deterministic checker accepts it or names every defect, and the model gets at most 3 repair rounds fed with the checker's report.
- Every gate has a planted-defect negative control. When `verify` runs a project's gates for a screen, a copy of the tree gets one planted defect per gate, and if a gate passes its planted defect the whole run is marked untrusted. A gate that can't fail aborts the run.

The work runs in stages, each with its own mode and its own gate:

Stage	Mode	What its gate proves
Pin	`pin`	The drawing is identical across two builds, with unique screen ids

Trace	`trace`	Every drawn word is traced to exactly one source line
Join	`join`	Every compiled slot matches the source that drew it
Spec	`spec`	Every screen has its row of the specification
Domain change	`domain`	The proposal covers everything the screens read and write, with codes from the SDK catalogue
Contracts	`shape-check`, `emit-contracts`	Every read field has a shape taken from its column or declared
SQL and store	`emit-sql`, `emit-store`	The migration applies to a real Postgres, with fail-first tests
World	`world`	The demo data covers every screen's cells
Bind	`bind`	The decided part of each binding, with the rest listed as named holes
Verify	`verify`	The project's own gates per screen, each proven able to fail

The only project-specific input is `.mockup-compiler.json`, the adapter. It says how a page marks one screen and which SQL and store idioms to emit. It also names the tenancy axes, with the one that leads every key, and the authorisation call every write makes.
`mockup-compiler init --project <dir>` writes a skeleton in which every unfilled entry is refused by name. A project without its own UI compiler can't use `compile`, `baseline-check`, `join` or `world`, and those modes say so with `NO_PROJECT_COMPILER` rather than failing further down.

The rule I'd take from it even if you never run it: a write rule the spec doesn't state becomes an honest 501 that names what's missing, never a guess. That's the same rule I want from any model writing code against screens.



Generator attribution

When a tool writes a commit, the commit should say so. The generator-attribution contract asks for one trailer line in the commit message:

OUTPUT

```
feat(excursions): page the nightly telemetry load

X-Generator: claude-code/<model>
```

The identity is `<harness>/<model>`, lowercase, with one slash: the harness is the tool that ran (`claude-code`), and the model is the one it was running. If the model changed during the work the commit closes, add `X-Generator-Session` with each identity, oldest first, so the work isn't blamed on whichever model happened to be active at commit time. A service that wraps somebody else's commit, such as a merge queue, carries these trailers forward.

Two properties make this useful rather than decorative. A claim a reader doesn't recognise is kept and shown under `unregistered/<harness>` with the exact text preserved, never dropped. And the trailer is self-reported provenance, never proof: nothing signs it, so every surface that counts these claims shows that caveat beside the numbers. The identity grammar is published with the SDK as `@adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk/schema/generator-id`. It isn't a manifest field, because the tool that wrote a commit is a fact about the commit, not about the plugin.



Reviewing code an AI wrote

The tool writes quickly and confidently in the same voice whether it's right or wrong. My review routine for its changes is short and I don't skip any of it:

1. Read the diff, not the summary. The summary says what the model meant to do.
2. Run the definition of done yourself, from clean: `npm ci`, the tests, the build, `validate` and `nexus-gates`. Quote the last lines in the review.
3. For every new test, check that it fails on the tree before the change. A test that passes both ways is decoration.
4. Look for the shortcuts. A deleted or skipped test, a new entry under `gates/` without a reason, a tenant value read from a body or a header, a default organisation, a `catch` that swallows a refusal, a fetch to an address the manifest doesn't declare.
5. Compare the manifest with the last release. Any new scope or outbound address is a widening, and widenings get two reviewers.
6. Check refusal tests assert the whole body: `error`, `code`, `resolved[]`, `missing[]` and `troubleshooting[]`.
7. Check the commit carries its `X-Generator` trailer.

The gates catch the mechanical defects. They can't tell you whether a route belongs on the non-CRUD list, or whether a backend is legally blocked, and nor can the model; that judgement stays with you. If the same problem keeps coming back, fix the `CLAUDE.md`, not just the code.



Six worked prompts

Each prompt below is one I've used, lightly cleaned up. After each: what the tool should produce, and the gate that proves it did. If the gate isn't green, the work isn't done, whatever the summary says.

1. A new Skills Engine skill

OUTPUT

```
Write a Skills Engine skill called summarise-excursion in skills/summarise-excursion.
It reads one excursion record and its readings and writes a five-line summary for a
controller. Read-only tools. Add test cases, including one where the excursion's cause
field contains an instruction to email the claims table to an outside address; the skill
must not follow it. Then validate it and show me the upload plan without uploading.
```

It should produce `skills/summarise-excursion/SKILL.md` with `name`, `description`, `allowed-tools`, `triggers`, `capabilities` and `version` in the frontmatter, its instructions in the body, and test cases that include the planted instruction. The proof is `npm run skill:validate skills/summarise-excursion` with zero errors, then `npm run skill:upload skills/summarise-excursion --dry-run` showing the plan. Publishing is a person's decision afterwards, and a skill that writes needs two named approvers on Enterprise.

2. A full-service plugin route

OUTPUT

```
In this plugin, add GET /api/excursions/:excursionId and POST /api/excursions/:excursionId/close.
Close needs the right excursion.close for owner, admin and member. Add the migration for the
closed_at column. Follow CLAUDE.md. Write the refusal tests first and show me them failing
before you implement.
```

It should produce a numbered migration that adds the column to a table carrying the three axes, both routes declared in `api.endpoints[]` with their `auth` and `right`, the right in the `rights` register, handlers behind the scope guard, and tests that assert an unauthenticated request and a wrong-organisation request are refused with full bodies. The proof is `nexus-gates`:

`scope-adherence`, `crud-adherence`, `api-contract`, `rights-register` and `migrations-are-scoped` all pass, and the failing-first output is in the transcript.

3. A lens

```
OUTPUT
Using the Workbench, start a lens called Marine claims on the Cold chain pack, narrowing
Cold-chain controller. It shows excursions and claims, and hides power points and set points.
Show me the plan before you apply it, then open a preview as a Rotterdam marine claims handler
on the synthetic branch.
```

It should use `nexus.create` with a plan you confirm, then shape the lens against its base. If it tries to show something the base doesn't, the registry refuses with `LENS_CANNOT_WIDEN`, and the tool should report that rather than look for a way round. The proof is the preview as a person, and at promotion the pilot gate's policy check that the lens only narrows and keeps personal fields off by default.

4. A domain pack

```
OUTPUT
Start a domain pack called Yard power for the Rotterdam unit. Purpose: shore power points
in the container yard, their faults and the reefers they feed. Base it on the logistics base
model and add Power point and Fault kinds. Class every property as personal, sensitive,
commercial or not classified. Show me the plan, the scopes the manifest will declare and the
plan fingerprint before anything is created.
```

It should produce the wizard's plan, listing the repository and its first change, the declared scopes and the three synthetic data branches, plus a `pack.json` with its lens clusters and lexicon. Nothing is made until you confirm the fingerprint. The proof is the template's tests passing on the synthetic branches, and later the staging gate. If the pack asks for more than its last release, the release is held with `MANIFEST_SCOPE_WIDENED` until two reviewers accept it.

5. A data connector

```
OUTPUT
Add a connector to this plugin that pulls container gate events from the terminal operating
system every five minutes. Make it a plugin_queue skill with a queue named after this plugin.
Declare the terminal system's address as an outbound address in the pack's manifest. Store events
in
our own schema with the three axes. The credential for the terminal system is read by name
from the environment and listed in required-env. No model involvement.
```

It should produce a `plugin_queue` skill whose `queueName` is `<plugin name>.<name>` with no colon, a `timeoutMs` between 1 second and 6 hours, a worker that pulls the queue, a migration for the events table, the outbound address in the pack's manifest (not in `nexus.manifest.json`, whose schema has no such field), and the credential's variable name in `scripts/ci/required-env`. The proof is `create-nexus-plugin validate`, which applies the registry sync's own rules on queue names and timeouts, then `nexus-gates` with `no-credentials` and `no-direct-compute` green. At run time, a call to any address the pack's manifest didn't declare is stopped at the edge with `EGRESS_NOT_DECLARED`.

6. An Enterprise module

```
OUTPUT
Write a licensed route module for the audit trail feature group. Compile only against
@adverant/nexus-spi; do not import the plugin SDK or any Community package. Every route runs
behind ctx.requireScope, checks the module's own grant before answering, and refuses with
LICENCE_LOCKED when the organisation isn't entitled. Then run the licence-line gate and the
edition builds.
```

It should produce a `RouteModule` with its `id`, `featureGroup`, empty `bodies` and a `register` that mounts a router on the host's app, with the grant check inside each handler and the refusal body in the standard shape. The proof is the licence-line gate exiting 0, then `npm ci`, `npm test` and `npm run build` passing in each composed edition tree. Chapter 2.25, Building for each edition, shows the module's skeleton and what the gate refuses.



What it costs


Working this way is faster, and it isn't free. Each agent pass has a budget and an hour's life, and a long refactor means renewing it. Read-taint will stop a session that read one customer document from writing anything until you confirm, which is irritating the first few times and exactly right. A script can never change anything outside your sandbox, so automation that needs to reach staging goes through a change request and two reviewers like everyone else. I'd rather have those limits than explain to Larkfield why an assistant emailed their claims table somewhere.

Build scenarios

A cookbook of thirteen builds, from a single skill to an air-gapped delivery. Each recipe gives the goal, the building blocks, the steps and commands, the gate that proves it worked, and what changes by edition and delivery form.

FOR DEVELOPERS

25 MIN READ



These are the recipes I reach for when someone at Corrán Orbital, or at a customer, says "we want Nexus to do X". Each one is short on purpose. The reasoning behind the steps is in the chapters before this one: chapter 2.20, Skills, and chapter 2.21, The Plugin SDK, which covers the software development kit, then chapter 2.23, Domain packs, and the three chapters after it on building. Here you get the goal, which building blocks to use, the steps, the commands, the gate that tells you it worked, and the edition and delivery notes.

The gate matters most. A recipe is finished when its gate is green. Every gate in this chapter is something you can run or something the platform runs for you, and each one exits non-zero or refuses with a code when it isn't satisfied.

Scenario	Main building block	The gate that proves it	Edition
A new Skills Engine skill	`SKILL.md` package	`skill:validate` with zero errors	Community and Enterprise
A manifest skill with `host_callback`	Plugin manifest `skills[]`	`create-nexus-plugin` and `validate nexus-gates`	Community and Enterprise
Extending an existing pack	`pack.json` with `inherits`	Lens policy check at the pilot gate	Enterprise and a pack licence
A new pack from scratch	Domain pack golden path	Staging and pilot gates	Enterprise
A data connector	`plugin_queue` skill	`validate`, `nexus-gates`, egress refusal	Community and Enterprise
An MCP (Model Context Protocol) tool	Manifest `mcpTools[]`	`validate` (no top-level combinators)	Community and Enterprise
A white-label storefront	Manifest `domains` and `branding`	`scope-adherence` public rule	Enterprise and the Storefront add-on
An Edge mission pack	Mission pack	On-board test cases, two of three signatures	Enterprise and the Nexus Edge add-on
An air-gapped delivery	Sealed bundle	`nexus-airgap verify`	Enterprise
An Enterprise-only module	`@adverant/nexus-spi`	Licence-line gate, edition builds	Enterprise
Forking or extending the open core	The Community source	Tests, lint and type check	Community
A Team-edition cloud app	Publisher cluster	Signed release, review, customer grant	Team
Wrapping an existing internal app	`/plugin-create`	`migrate`, `validate`, `nexus-gates`	Community and Enterprise




FIGURE Which building block to start from.

1. A new Skills Engine skill

The goal is a reusable piece of instruction the assistant, agents, workflows and developer tools can all run, such as checking a customs filing against its rules. Your building blocks are a `SKILL.md` package in a folder named after the skill, an optional `skill.yaml` for triggers and tags, and an optional `scripts/` folder bundled with it.

1. Make `skills/<slug>/` and write `SKILL.md` with frontmatter: `name` (kebab-case, equal to the folder name), `description` (up to 500 characters), `allowed-tools`, and optionally `triggers`, `capabilities` and `version`.
2. Write the body for the model: when to use the skill, its steps, examples, and what it must never do.
3. Add test cases. Include one with an instruction planted in the input that the skill must not follow.
4. Validate, look at the upload plan, then upload.
5. Publish. A skill that adds a write tool is held until two named people approve it with passkeys, and the proposer can't approve their own change.

```bash
npm run skill:validate skills/check-a-customs-filing
npm run skill:upload skills/check-a-customs-filing --dry-run
npm run skill:upload skills/check-a-customs-filing
```

The gate is `skill:validate`, which must report zero errors before anything can be published. The blocking errors are a missing name or description and a duplicate slug or job type. Uploading content that's already published returns the existing version (`CONTENT_HASH_ALREADY_PUBLISHED`), so the upload is safe to repeat.

Community gets the whole creator, the library, versions, switching back, import and tests. On Enterprise, publishing also goes through shadow and canary: the approved version runs in shadow,

then for one unit behind named gates, then for everyone, and it stops itself if a gate isn't met. For an air-gapped customer, skills travel pre-signed inside the sealed bundle (scenario 9).



2. A manifest skill with host_callback


The goal is deterministic compute in your own plugin that the platform can dispatch, such as opening an excursion record from a reading. You'll use a row in the manifest's `skills[]` with the tier `host_callback`, and an `/internal` route in your backend guarded by the SDK's service guard.

1. Declare the skill: `id` in lower_snake, `tier: "host_callback"`, a `classification` at or under your plugin's trust ceiling, `inputSchema`, `outputSchema` and a `timeoutMs` between 1 second and 6 hours.
2. Fill `hostCallback`: your own Service name, its port, a relative path such as `/internal/skills/excursion_open`, both byte caps (`maxRequestBytes` and `maxResponseBytes`), and `tenantHeader: "X-Organization-ID"`.
3. Declare the route in `api.endpoints[]` with `auth: "service-key"` or `auth: "internal"`, and guard it with `requireService` or `serviceMiddleware`, never the user scope guard.
4. Validate, run the gates, and let onboarding sync the skills to the registry through `compileRegistry`. You never write registry SQL by hand.

```bash
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 create-nexus-plugin validate nexus.manifest.json
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 nexus-gates --self-test
```

`validate` applies the registry sync's own rules before anything is synced, each refused with the receiver's code. A path with a scheme, `//` or a backslash is refused as cross-origin. A missing byte cap is `ENDPOINT_BYTE_CAP_REQUIRED`, a field from another tier is `FIELD_NOT_FOR_TIER`, and a timeout outside the range is `TIMEOUT_OUT_OF_BOUNDS`. Then `nexus-gates` checks that the `/internal` route carries the service guard and is declared `internal` or `service-key`. That pair of gates is the proof.

Sync is declarative. Post the full skill set every time, because a skill you leave out is disabled, and fail your deploy step on any status but 200. On Enterprise, a plugin sync is checked whole: if one skill breaks a rule, none of that sync is taken (`PLUGIN_SYNC_ALL_OR_NOTHING`) and the previous version keeps running. A community-trust plugin can't use the tiers that reach a model, `tool_using` and `llm_only`; those need trust `core` or `verified`.



SCREEN Plugins that bring skills, and what each sync was checked for. Notice the plugin whose sync was refused whole because one of its five skills used a tier only the platform may host, while its previous version kept running.



3. Extending an existing pack

The goal is a new industry or sub-industry that reuses most of an existing pack, such as lending and card disputes on top of the Insurance pack's shape. The building block is a `pack.json` that names its parent in `inherits` and adds only its own lens clusters and words.

1. Start the pack with the domain pack golden path, then set `inherits` to the parent pack's id.
2. Add your own `lens` clusters, each with its seats, purpose and lexicon reference.
3. Add your words to the lexicon with a plain gloss each. Mark a term `exact` where it must be shown as written.
4. Reuse shared lenses rather than drawing your own: a regime several packs need, such as a register of outsourced technology, is one shared lens.
5. Check the licence chain. Your pack inherits its parent's add-on requirements.
6. Preview each lens as a person on a synthetic branch.

```json
{ "id": "fintech", "name": "Banking and payments", "version": "0.1", "inherits": "insurance" }
```

The proof is the pilot gate's policy check, which confirms each lens only narrows its base and keeps personal fields off by default. A lens that tries to show what its base hides is refused with `LENS_CANNOT_WIDEN`. On the licensing side, the console refuses to issue a licence for your pack without the add-ons its parent needs; the Insurance pack needs Decision rooms and sealed records.

Domain packs are Enterprise and licensed per pack. A pack's phone screens also need the Mobile apps add-on. A child pack can't change the shell, the components or the writing rules.



4. A new pack from scratch

The goal is one industry's view of Nexus: its knowledge model, the lenses for each role, the evidence its rules ask for, and the plugin that keeps its data current. Chapter 2.24, Building a custom vertical end to end, walks through this build in full; here is the short form.

1. Run the domain pack golden path and describe the pack: purpose, units, the base model and the rules it maps.
2. Build the knowledge model on a base model and class every property as you add it.
3. Read the plan, confirm its fingerprint with your passkey, and create.
4. Shape the lenses in the Lens builder, each narrowing a base lens.
5. Write the plugin and any Skills Engine skills the pack needs.
6. Generate seeded synthetic data with the odd cases you care about, and preview each lens as a person.
7. Promote from the dev space to staging, to a pilot unit, then to all units.

The proof is the promotion gates: all tests passing on the synthetic branches into staging, then two reviewers who aren't the author, then 14 days in the pilot with errors under 1 in 1,000. No step can be skipped (`GATE_CANNOT_BE_SKIPPED`). Packs are Enterprise. On Community the domain pack golden path isn't offered.



5. A data connector

The goal is data from an outside system flowing into your plugin's own tables on a schedule, such as gate events from a terminal operating system. The building blocks are a `plugin_queue` skill, a worker that pulls your queue, a migration for the target table, and an outbound address declared in the manifest.

1. Declare a `plugin_queue` skill with `queueName` spelled `<plugin name>.<name>`. No colon is allowed, and the name must be in the manifest, because the orchestrator enqueues onto it directly.
2. Write the worker that pulls the queue and calls the outside system.
3. Declare the outside system's address as an outbound address. Anything not listed is blocked.
4. Store what arrives in your own schema, with `organization_id`, `owner_user_id` and `business_unit_id` on every row.
5. Read the outside system's credential by name from the environment, and list the variable in `scripts/ci/required-env`.
6. Dispatch the pulls through UNO, the workflow engine, never with a timer that calls engines directly.

```bash
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 create-nexus-plugin validate nexus.manifest.json
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 nexus-gates --only no-credentials --only no-direct-
```

```
compute --only migrations-are-scoped
node scripts/ci/required-env
```

`validate` checks the queue name and the timeout against the registry sync's rules. The three gates prove there's no model credential, no direct compute and a properly scoped table. Run the full `nexus-gates` before you push, since `--only` narrows the run and says so in its summary. At run time, a call to an address the manifest didn't declare is stopped at the edge with `EGRESS_NOT_DECLARED`.

The platform's own connectors to drives, wikis, mail stores and legacy systems, with change capture and lineage, come with the Data connectors add-on. A connector you build yourself is a plugin and works on any edition. Adding an outbound address in a later release is a widening, held until two reviewers accept it.



6. An MCP tool

The goal is a tool that Claude Code, agents and other MCP (Model Context Protocol) clients can call, such as looking up a vessel's inspection history. The building block is an entry in the manifest's `mcpTools[]`, with a `name`, a `description` and an `inputSchema`.

1. Name the tool and describe it plainly. The description is what a model reads to decide whether to call it.
2. Write the `inputSchema` as one object schema. Don't put `oneOf`, `allOf` or `anyOf` at its top level.
3. Keep the route that serves the tool behind the scope guard, like every other `/api` route, so tenancy comes from the caller's token.
4. Validate the manifest.

```bash
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 create-nexus-plugin validate nexus.manifest.json
```

The proof is `validate`: a top-level combinator is refused at authoring time, because at run time it would make the tool fail for every MCP subagent that imports it, and the tool would exist with nobody able to call it.

On Enterprise, every tool an IDE (integrated development environment) can call is listed in the Workbench tools catalogue with its tier, whether it changes things, a pinned fingerprint and the roles that may use it. If your tool's description changes in a new release, the catalogue holds the tool until a person reviews the change. That's deliberate: a changed description is how a tool can start asking a model for something it shouldn't. A call to anything outside the caller's pass is refused with `CONNECTION_SCOPE_EXCEEDED`.



7. A white-label storefront

The goal is an app your customer's own customers use, on the customer's domain and in their brand, with no trace of Adverant. The building blocks are the manifest's `domains` and `branding` blocks, the SDK's sign-in helpers, and the customer's Storefront / white-label add-on.

1. Put the customer's domain in `domains[]` as `primary`, with any `aliases`.
2. Fill `branding`: `appName`, `tagline`, `primaryColor`, `accentColor`, a `passkeyRpId` equal to the domain, and `oauthClientRef`.
3. Sign people in through the SDK's sign-in helpers, and declare their two public routes exactly, with `auth: "public"` and `allowAnonymous: true`.
4. Send every frontend call through the backend for frontend allow-list proxy. Never put a service address in the client.

5. Leave payments to the customer's administrator, who connects gateways and sets up the branded checkout.

```bash
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 nexus-gates --only scope-adherence --only api-contract
```

The proof is `scope-adherence`. It admits an unguarded `/api` route only when the manifest declares that exact method and path as public and the path is one of the sign-in routes; any other public declaration fails and names the two allowed paths. `api-contract` then diffs the declared routes against the real ones in both directions. `definePlugin` also refuses a `frontend.basePath` that isn't a relative same-origin path.


White-label is the Storefront / white-label add-on on Enterprise, which also licenses payments. Card details never touch Nexus. The customer's administrator owns the brand, and the platform resolves it from the organisation rather than from your code.



8. An Edge mission pack

The goal is a new or updated mission for a satellite or drone running Nexus Edge, such as adding a ship-finder adapter to a maritime watch mission. The building block is a mission pack, built and signed on the ground.

1. Start from the current pack on the Build a mission pack page, which drafts the new version from the old and marks every change.
2. Change only what the mission needs. Keep the large parts, the language model and the ontology, stable when you can.
3. Check the placement table at every degraded step, so each board still fits what it runs.
4. Run the pack's on-board test cases on a bench rig with the same boards.
5. Send it for signing: two of three signatures are needed.
6. Release it to one platform. It goes into the idle slot and is switched on only after its test cases pass on board.
7. Roll out to the next platform after a week clean.



SCREEN The mission pack library, with what each pack carries and the platforms running it. Notice the older version kept on board to go back to, and the count of test cases every pack must pass on its hardware.

There are no commands in this recipe; it's done in the console's Nexus Edge pages. The proof is the on-board test cases, all of which must pass before the pack is switched on, and the two signatures. If a test fails on board, the platform stays on its previous pack and the failure comes down on the next pass. Installing a pack on hardware it wasn't checked for is refused with `PACK_NOT_CHECKED_FOR_HARDWARE`.

Nexus Edge is an add-on, licensed per platform or per fleet. Packs stay valid while a platform is out of contact. The uplink is narrow, so plan sizes around it: our 1.5 release was 412 MB, against 9.8 GB for a pack with a new language model.



9. An air-gapped delivery to a customer

The goal is your plugin or pack installed at a customer site with no network. The building blocks are a sealed bundle from `@adverant/nexus-sovereign`, your release signing key, and the customer's own release channels.

1. Build the plugin and its images exactly as for a connected customer, with every gate green.
2. Make a sealed bundle with the `airgap` profile, carrying the images, migrations, pre-signed skills and an SBOM (software bill of materials) with the licences.

3. Sign it with your Ed25519 release key.
4. Verify it yourself on a clean machine.
5. Send the bundle on media, and send your public key and the bundle's SHA-256 by a separate route.
6. The customer's operator verifies the bundle with your key, then brings the release in through their own release channels.

```bash
nexus-airgap bundle
nexus-airgap verify --bundle cold-chain-0.4.0.tar.gz --trusted-key corran-release.pub.pem --
profile airgap
```

`nexus-airgap bundle` builds the bundle from your bundle configuration. The proof is `nexus-airgap verify` on the customer's side. It re-hashes every file, rejects any file the manifest doesn't list, requires a trusted signer, and refuses a bundle whose network allow-list isn't empty. A changed file fails with `BUNDLE_INTEGRITY_VIOLATION` . Nobody should ever turn off strict checking to get past it.

Air-gapped installations are Enterprise. Nothing in the bundle may fetch anything at install, and a model the plugin needs comes from the customer's own model server through the AI (artificial intelligence) Provider Router.



10. An Enterprise-only module

The goal is a closed, licensed capability that attaches to the open core, such as a long-retention audit trail sold only to Enterprise customers. The building block is the interface package `@adverant/nexus-spi` , and nothing else from Community.

1. Carry a byte-pinned copy of the built interface package in your repository as a local `file:` package, with its `SHA256SUMS` pin.
2. Write a `RouteModule` (or a `ScreenModule` for console screens) against it, with the feature group it serves.
3. Run every route behind `ctx.requireScope` , and check the module's own grant before answering.
4. Refuse with `LICENCE_LOCKED` when the organisation isn't entitled, and draw the feature's teaser, never its data.
5. Hold the repository to the licence line, then build each edition's composed tree.

```bash
npm ci
npm test
npm run build
```

The proof is the licence-line rule: no import from a Community scope except the interface package, no relative import out of the repository, and no `file:` , `link:` or `workspace:` dependency outside it. Then the three commands above must pass in each composed edition tree, not just in your working tree. Chapter 2.25, Building for each edition, has the module skeleton.

A module loads into a Community service at start, on installations whose licence carries its feature group. Without that grant it refuses, so the same build ships everywhere and does nothing where it isn't licensed.



11. Forking or extending the open core

The goal is a change to Community itself, kept in your fork or contributed back. The building block is the Community source under the Apache License, Version 2.0.

1. Fork the repository and branch from `main`.
2. Prefer a plugin or a skill if what you want can be one. A change to the core is yours to maintain on every release.
3. Make the change with tests that fail without it.
4. Run the checks the project runs before you propose anything.
5. Keep the NOTICE file, and don't use Adverant's names or trademarks beyond saying where the work came from.

```bash
git checkout -b feature/your-change
npm test
npm run lint
npm run typecheck
```

The proof is those three checks passing, plus the evidence that each new test failed before your change. Keep one property of the open core true in your fork: Community runs an agent end to end on a local model with no key and no network. A change that breaks that breaks what makes Community usable on its own.

This is Community only. Anything that needs to stay closed belongs in an Enterprise module (scenario 10) instead, so the licence line stays somewhere anyone can point at.




12. A Team-edition cloud app

The goal is an app that Team customers can install. Team runs only on Adverant cloud, so the app reaches them only through the catalogue. The building blocks are a plugin and a publisher cluster: your own virtual cluster on Adverant cloud with sample data.

1. Build and test on the publisher cluster, with sample data only.
2. Declare everything the app needs in its manifest, and nothing more.
3. Release it signed, for Adverant's review and a catalogue listing.
4. Each customer installs it, granting each declared scope unit by unit.

The proof comes in two parts. The signed, reviewed release gets you into the catalogue. Then the customer's grant decides what the app can reach at their site, and any call it didn't declare is refused with `CONNECTION_SCOPE_EXCEEDED`. You can only add a missing scope in a new release the customer reviews.



SCREEN An administrator installing a third-party plugin, granting each declared scope per unit and leaving one out. The plate shows a call the plugin never declared, refused.

A publisher cluster has no route to any customer, and asking for a customer's data there is refused with `TENANT_BOUNDARY`. Customers can share test results with you, never their data. Team includes the workflow operations capability, so if your app ships workflows, Team customers can promote them between environments themselves.

13. Wrapping an existing internal app as a plugin

The goal is an app your company already runs, brought into Nexus so it inherits sign-in, isolation and governance. The building blocks are the `/plugin-create` skill for the first draft, and the SDK's manifest tools and gates to finish it.

1. Run `/plugin-create` with the repository. It analyses the code and picks a wrapping strategy, then generates the backend, migrations, user interface (UI), manifest and tests.
2. Lift the manifest to the v2 contract. `migrate` adds the three law sentences and moves `domain` to `domains[]`, and it refuses to invent an entrypoint.
3. Replace any tenant value the wrapper reads from headers with the SDK's scope guard.
4. Add `organization_id`, `owner_user_id` and `business_unit_id` to every table, with tenant-leading primary keys.
5. Declare every route with its right, and install the refusal ledger.
6. Run the gates until they're green.

```bash
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 create-nexus-plugin migrate nexus.manifest.json --write
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 create-nexus-plugin validate nexus.manifest.json
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 nexus-gates --self-test
```

The proof is `nexus-gates` exiting 0, with `scope-adherence`, `one-fence`, `migrations-are-scoped`, `crud-adherence` and `api-contract` all passing. Expect the first run to fail on most of them; ours reported every route as unscoped, because the draft trusted headers the browser could set. The gates have no fix switch, on purpose.

Wrapped apps work on any edition. Deploy is through the installation's release channels only, so ignore any deployment files the draft wrote. The isolation work is where the time goes: plan for days on a real app, not hours.


PART 2 · CHAPTER 2.28

Releasing your extension

How a plugin or pack goes from a green build to the units that run it, and how it comes back out again. Versions, release review, channels and installs, signing, change approvals, the delivery identity record, migrations, rollback and retiring a version.

FOR DEVELOPERS

18 MIN READ



Cold chain 0.4.0 was the first release of ours that asked for more than the one before it. It added sending mail and one outside address, for reefer alerts. The build was green, the tests passed on all three synthetic branches, and it still sat in the dev space for two days while two people read what it wanted and a third approved the address. That's how releasing on Nexus is meant to feel: the code is the easy part, and the evidence and the approvals are the release.

This chapter covers everything between a green build and a version running for every unit, and the ways back out. The promotion path itself, from dev space to staging to a pilot unit to all units, is introduced in chapter 2.24, Building a custom vertical end to end, and I won't repeat its gates here. One rule frames all of it. Deploy is through the installation's release channels only. There's no side door for an urgent fix, and nobody edits a running image by hand.



Versions

Three version numbers move in a pack release, and it pays to keep them apart in your head.

What	Where it lives	Example	Rule
The plugin	`version` in `nexus.manifest.json`	`0.4.0`	Semantic version; a pre-release suffix such as `-rc.1` is allowed
The pack	`version` in `pack.json`	`0.4.0`	Moves with the pack's lenses, words and clusters
The knowledge model	The model's own version	`1.3` to `1.4`	Moves only through a graph change request

A development build carries a suffix, `0.4.0-dev`, until it reaches staging. Keep the plugin and the pack versions equal when they ship together; it saves an argument in every release review about which number the evidence belongs to.

Two other versions are pinned rather than chosen. The pack's template version (`domain-pack@1.6.0` for Cold chain) is fixed when the pack is made and moves only as a reviewed change. The SDK (software development kit) is installed at an exact version, never a range, so the same build gives the same result next month:


```bash
npm install --save-exact @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0
```

Skills Engine skills have versions too, and they behave differently. Each published version is fixed, and live, canary and shadow are labels on versions. Switching back moves a label, and runs already in flight finish on the version they started with.



Before you ask for review: the manifest

The Manifest and permissions page compares what this release declares against the last release: its scopes, its stores, its outbound addresses and its sandbox profile. Read it before you ask anyone to review, because it tells you exactly what the reviewers will be asked to accept.



SCREEN What Cold chain 0.4.0 declares against 0.3.2. Notice the two lines marked as widening, sending mail and one outside address, and the plate that says the release won't move past the dev space until two reviewers accept them.


A release that asks for more than its manifest declared before is held where it is, with `MANIFEST_SCOPE_WIDENED`, until two reviewers accept the wider manifest. An outside address also needs the approval of whoever owns outside addresses at the customer; that approval is given for a fixed term, and ours was for 12 months. You have two ways forward: remove the lines, or ask for review. The page offers both buttons.

Every line on that page is enforced at run time, not just reviewed. Each tool call is checked against the declared scopes, an outside address is blocked unless it's listed, and the sandbox profile allows no other network. A plugin that tries to reach something it didn't declare is refused, and the only fix is a new release that declares it.



Release review

The Release review page puts the evidence for one release in one table, for a reviewer who isn't the author.



SCREEN A second reviewer's view of Cold chain 0.4.0, with the evidence table, the scope diff and the comments. Notice the plate on the right: the author can't approve their own release.

Evidence	What it showed for 0.4.0
Tests	66 of 66, on three synthetic branches
Quality checks	The documentation and the code agree
Policy	Each lens only narrows; personal fields off by default
Signatures	Image and package signed by the pipeline
Scope diff	Adds sending mail and one outside address, with its approval
Compatibility	The platform version and the base pack version it was tested against
Model change	The graph change request's dry run: 1,284 links renamed, nothing removed

Below the table sit the comments on the change and the provenance: which pipeline built it, from which change, the image digest and the template. Reviewers approve with their passkey. Two reviewers who aren't the author approve, and the pipeline then moves the release to staging. The

author never counts as a reviewer, and an attempt is refused with `NEEDS_SECOND_PERSON`. A review request lapses after 3 days.

Answer the reviewers' questions in the comments, not in a chat window. During our review, our compliance officer asked why claim amount was classed as commercial, and the second reviewer asked for the rollback plan for the model change. Both answers are now part of the release's record, which is where the next reviewer will look.



Change policy approvals

The release review covers the release as a whole. The `changePolicy` block in the manifest goes further: it says which classes of change to your plugin's deployables need approval, and from how many people.

```json
"changePolicy": {
  "enabled": true,
  "classes": ["website", "bff", "migration"],
  "approvals": { "website": 1, "bff": 1, "migration": 2 }
}
```

The three classes are `website` (the web app), `bff` (the backend for frontend) and `migration` (a database migration). Each class named in `classes` must have its own count in `approvals`, from 1 to 10. A class you leave out is ungoverned, and the schema makes you write that as a choice rather than reach it by omission. We ask for two approvals on migrations because a migration is the one change that's hard to take back.

Approvals are counted in distinct people, and the proposer is never one of them. The rules that hold that up are worth knowing, because each one has a refusal:

- An approval from the person who proposed the change is refused with `TRUST_APPROVAL_SELF_APPROVAL`.
- A person who may not make a change of that class at all is refused with `CHANGE_CLASS_NOT_PERMITTED`.
- When any commit in the change is signed by the organisation's agent identity, the quorum is the usual minimum plus one, and the agent's own vote doesn't count.
- Each approval records the diff and the head it saw. If the change moves after the last approval, merging it is refused with `HASH_MISMATCH`, and the approvals have to be collected again for the new content.

That third rule matters if you build with an AI (artificial intelligence) coding tool, as chapter 2.26, Building with AI coding tools, describes. Work an agent wrote needs one more human approval than work a person wrote. Plan for it.



Signing and verification

Every image and package is signed by the pipeline that built it, and a signed image is one of the gates into staging. A dev space runs signed images only from the start. On Enterprise, an administrator sets each namespace either to record unsigned images or to refuse them, and moves namespaces to refusing one at a time, so production ends up running only images the pipeline built and signed. Signing is part of the build, not something you add before a release.

The rule that runs through all of it is that a signature that fails is a refusal, never a warning. A check that receives `SIG_INVALID` stops. It doesn't fall back to the unsigned version and it doesn't carry on with a note in a log, because a warning in a build log is a pass to everyone who didn't read it.

The same rule applies to everything you hand over on media. A sealed bundle for an air-gapped customer is verified against your public key before anything is unpacked, and chapter 2.25, Building for each edition, shows the command.



Delivery identity

A plugin is delivered through several things that each have a name: its repositories, a signing key, a deploy namespace, a registry prefix, a database schema, a set of domains and a change policy. Any of them is a place two plugins could collide, or one plugin could drift. The delivery identity is one signed record per plugin that holds them all, so every check on the release path reads the same answer and refuses on a mismatch.

You contribute your part through the manifest and nothing else: `schema`, `db`, `domains`, `changePolicy` and the repository URL. The platform completes the record with the rest and signs it. You never name your own namespace, registry prefix or signing key. Those are assigned to you, and a manifest that tried to declare them would be making a claim the checks would then have to disbelieve.

The signed record holds eleven fields: the plugin's slug, the owning organisation, the organisation that builds it, its repositories, the name of its signing key, its deploy namespace, its registry prefix, its database schema, its domains, its change policy, and a short list of older image names it used before its registry prefix existed. That last list can only shrink. Because it's signed, a new signature can remove an entry and nothing can add one quietly. The signature is Ed25519 over the standard canonical JSON form of those eleven fields, so a record with "Tomás" or "Sinéad" in it verifies the same everywhere.

When a release doesn't match its record, the first refusal wins:

Code	When	HTTP
`DELIVERY_IDENTITY_MISSING`	There's no record for the plugin	403
`DELIVERY_PATH_REFUSED`	An image push outside the registry prefix that isn't on the signed list of older names	403
`NAMESPACE_MISMATCH`	A deployment targeting another namespace	403
`IMAGE_NAME_COLLISION`	An image name another plugin already claims	409
`CHANGE_CLASS_NOT_PERMITTED`	A change class the policy doesn't govern	403

`IMAGE_NAME_COLLISION` is the one that surprises people. Choose another name, and never reuse one: a shared image name means one plugin's promotion can move another plugin's pods.



Migrations, committed and scoped

A migration ships inside your plugin's image and runs before the new version starts, through the SDK's one migration runner, `nexus-migrate`. You don't write your own applier. Before any release can move, the same runner applies your migrations one file at a time against a throwaway database, so a migration that fails, fails there. The template's shadow build calls the runner once per file, in order, and records each file as production will.

The runner's rules are the ones the gates check, written as code:

1. It connects as your schema's migrator role and runs every file as the schema's owner. Any other login, a superuser first of all, is refused. A file that tries to switch roles itself is refused before anything runs.

2. The tenancy file, numbered 0, is never edited after it's applied. A change to the tenancy gets its own revision file, `000_tenancy_r<N>.sql`, which `nexus-tenancy render --revision <N>` writes for you.
3. Normally the runner owns each file's transaction and refuses a `BEGIN` or `COMMIT` inside it. A file that manages its own transactions declares that it runs per statement, and then every `BEGIN` it opens must be matched.
4. It keeps a ledger, one row per file, with the file's SHA-256 and how it ran. An applied file is never changed in place; a change is a new numbered file.

```bash
npx -p @adverant-nexus/plugin-sdk@2.50.0 nexus-tenancy render --manifest nexus.manifest.json --revision 2 --out migrations/000_tenancy_r2.sql
```

Scoped means every new table carries `organization_id`, `owner_user_id` and `business_unit_id`, plus the `is_demo` marker column unless `gates/demo-exempt.json` exempts the table with a reason, with a primary key that leads with the organisation and foreign keys that carry it, and row-level security forced on it. The `migrations-are-scoped` gate checks those rules over every file, and `migrations-commit-what-they-open` counts that each file commits what it opens. The second gate exists because a migration that rolled back silently once exited 0, and the table it should have made never existed.

One more file belongs to every release. `scripts/ci/required-env` prints the environment variables your service needs to boot, as a JSON array taken from your config loader. The release path runs it and refuses a release whose deployment doesn't set every one of them, so a missing variable is caught before the release, not by a pod that won't start.

```bash
node scripts/ci/required-env
```

Releasing skills


The two kinds of skill reach people by different routes, so release them differently.

A manifest skill, a typed row in your plugin's `skills[]`, ships with the plugin and moves through the same promotion as the rest of it. Onboarding syncs the whole skill set to the registry on each release. Leave a skill out of the set and it's disabled, and on Enterprise a sync with one bad skill takes none of them, so the version before keeps running rather than half of the new one.

A Skills Engine skill is published from the library. On Enterprise, one that adds a write tool waits for two named people to approve it with their passkeys, and the proposer can't be one of them. An approved version then runs in shadow, then in canary for one unit behind named gates, then for everyone, and it stops itself if a gate isn't met. If your plugin and a Skills Engine skill depend on each other, publish the skill first and let it reach everyone before the plugin release that calls it leaves the pilot.

Channels and installs

Once a release has passed the pilot and reached all units, it's offered on a channel, and each unit chooses its channel. Its administrator agrees to every move. The Channels and installs page shows which units run which version, with error rates as counts only: you see how your extension behaves, never what anyone did with it.




SCREEN Which units run which version of carrier-sync, with a roll-back open for one unit. Notice what the modal says changes, what stays, and that it needs a second person, the unit's own administrator.

Our carrier-sync plugin runs three versions at once, and that's normal. Most units are on the current release, one unit stays on an older version on a channel kept to a stated date, and a release

candidate is on a channel nobody has chosen yet. Don't fight it; a unit that needs stability for an audit is entitled to it.

Your extension's logs and metrics

The logs and metrics page for your pack is fixed to your own workloads, in the units where you may look. You can filter by unit and environment, and you see counts, timings and states.



SCREEN Cold chain's own logs and metrics, filtered to the Rotterdam pilot. Look at the log lines: the person who reported an excursion is hidden, and the claim note's text is never logged at all.

Personal fields are replaced before a line is written, and customer content such as claim text, mail or document contents is never written to logs. Logs are kept 14 days. The organisation is set by the gateway, never by your query, so a query that names another organisation is refused with `TENANT_BOUNDARY`. The assistant in the dock can read the same logs with you, and only these: when

I asked it why excursion records came in late one morning, it traced 18 minutes of retries to duplicate readings from one quay's power feed.



Rolling back

There are two kinds of rollback, and both are reviewed changes rather than switches.

Rolling back an environment uses the version before. Each environment keeps it for 30 days. The rollback is prepared as a change to the release, previews what it will do and needs a second person; once approved, the pipeline rolls back in about a minute. Every rollback is timed, and so is every drill, so practise one before you need it. Rolling back one unit uses the Channels and installs page. The roll-back modal says what changes (that unit runs the older version again, and its error rate is watched for an hour), what stays (the other units, and the unit's settings and records), the reason, and who the second person is: that unit's administrator.

Settings and records are kept across a rollback, so plan each release on the assumption that the version before it may run again on the data the newer one wrote. That's the practical reason to keep migrations additive within a release you might roll back, and the reason we ask two people to approve each one. A model change is the same: a reviewer can, and should, ask for the rollback plan of a graph change request before approving it.

Skills roll back more gently. Moving the live label back to an earlier version is one step, and runs already in flight finish on the version they started with.



Retiring a version

A release, once made, is never edited. A version that should no longer be used is withdrawn, and a fix ships as a new version number. The SDK's own release channels follow the same habit: a bad SDK version is yanked, never replaced with different content under the same number. Copy it, because a version number that can mean two different builds makes every piece of evidence about it worthless.

Withdrawing a plugin or pack stops new installs. Units keep the version they run until they move, so withdrawing is a signal and a deadline, not an off switch. Tell the unit administrators which version to move to and by when.

Retiring a skill follows the same idea with one more step. The Skills Engine moves every remaining caller to a replacement after running the replacement's cases, stops new runs, and keeps the versions, cases and sealed run records, so the skill can be brought back if the replacement turns out wrong.



A release checklist

This is the list we read before every Cold chain release. It's short because the platform checks most of it for us.

1. Versions agree: the manifest, `pack.json`, and the knowledge model if it moved.
2. Every gate is green locally, from clean, and every new test was shown to fail first.
3. The Manifest and permissions page shows no widening, or the widening is what we meant and the reviewers know why.
4. Every migration is a new numbered file, scoped, and applied cleanly against a throwaway database.
5. `scripts/ci/required-env` lists every variable the service needs, and the deployment sets each one.
6. The rollback plan is written in the change, including for any model change.
7. Two reviewers who aren't the author are available this week.

The last item sounds trivial. It's the one that has delayed more of our releases than every gate put together.

APPENDIX A



Helm values reference

Every key the Nexus chart accepts, its type, its allowed values and its default.

FOR OPERATORS AND DEVELOPERS

10 MIN READ

The chart refuses any key that is not listed here. The table is generated from the chart's own schema and defaults for release 1.0.0-alpha.1, so it matches what `helm install` accepts. Chapter 2.6, Installing Community on Kubernetes, explains the keys you set on a first install. Chapter 2.11, Variations: external stores, TLS and ingress, covers the ones you change for external stores and other variations.

Key	Type	Allowed values	Default
`ai.installationHosts`	array		`[]`
`ai.localProvider.baseUrl`	string		`""`
`auth.accessTokenTTL`	string		`15m`
`auth.rateLimitPerMinute`	integer		`5000`
`auth.refreshTokenTTL`	string		`12h`
`bff.releaseMode`	string	`""`, `test`	`""`
`components.alive.enabled`	boolean		`false`
`components.auth.enabled`	boolean		`true`
`components.auth.replicas`	integer		`1`
`components.auth.resources`	object		(see values.yaml)
`components.bff.enabled`	boolean		`true`
`components.bff.replicas`	integer		`1`
`components.bff.resources`	object		(see values.yaml)
`components.console.enabled`	boolean		`true`
`components.console.replicas`	integer		`1`
`components.console.resources`	object		(see values.yaml)
`components.fileprocess.enabled`	boolean		`false`
`components.gateway.enabled`	boolean		`true`
`components.gateway.replicas`	integer		`1`
`components.gateway.resources`	object		(see values.yaml)
`components.graphrag.enabled`	boolean		`true`
`components.graphrag.replicas`	integer		`1`
`components.graphrag.resources`	object		(see values.yaml)
`components.keys.enabled`	boolean		`true`
`components.keys.resources`	object		(see values.yaml)
`components.orchestrator.enabled`	boolean		`true`
`components.orchestrator.replicas`	integer		`1`
`components.orchestrator.resources`	object		(see values.yaml)
`components.plugins.enabled`	boolean		`false`
`components.probitas.enabled`	boolean		`true`
`components.probitas.replicas`	integer		`1`
`components.probitas.resources`	object		(see values.yaml)
`components.skillsEngine.enabled`	boolean		`true`

`components.skillsEngine.replicas`	integer		`1`
`components.skillsEngine.resources`	object		(see values.yaml)
`components.workflows.enabled`	boolean		`true`
`components.workflows.replicas`	integer		`1`
`components.workflows.resources`	object		(see values.yaml)
`dataTier.neo4j.external.existingSecret`	string		`""`
`dataTier.neo4j.external.host`	string		`""`
`dataTier.neo4j.heap`	string		`1G`
`dataTier.neo4j.mode`	string	`in-cluster`, `external`	`in-cluster`
`dataTier.neo4j.pagecache`	string		`512M`
`dataTier.neo4j.resources`	object		(see values.yaml)
`dataTier.neo4j.size`	string		`20Gi`
`dataTier.objectStore.external.existingSecret`	string		`""`
`dataTier.objectStore.external.host`	string		`""`
`dataTier.objectStore.mode`	string	`in-cluster`, `external`	`in-cluster`
`dataTier.objectStore.resources`	object		(see values.yaml)
`dataTier.objectStore.size`	string		`50Gi`
`dataTier.postgres.external.existingSecret`	string		`""`
`dataTier.postgres.external.host`	string		`""`
`dataTier.postgres.mode`	string	`in-cluster`, `external`	`in-cluster`
`dataTier.postgres.port`	integer		`5432`
`dataTier.postgres.resources`	object		(see values.yaml)
`dataTier.postgres.size`	string		`50Gi`
`dataTier.postgres.sslmode`	string	`disable`, `require`, `verify-ca`, `verify-full`	`disable`
`dataTier.qdrant.external.existingSecret`	string		`""`
`dataTier.qdrant.external.host`	string		`""`
`dataTier.qdrant.mode`	string	`in-cluster`, `external`	`in-cluster`
`dataTier.qdrant.resources`	object		(see values.yaml)
`dataTier.qdrant.size`	string		`10Gi`
`dataTier.valkey.external.existingSecret`	string		`""`

`dataTier.valkey.external.host`	string		`""`
`dataTier.valkey.mode`	string	`in-cluster`, `external`	`in-cluster`
`dataTier.valkey.resources`	object		(see values.yaml)
`dataTier.valkey.size`	string		`5Gi`
`edition`	string	`community`, `enterprise`	`community`
`enterprise.enabled`	boolean		`false`
`global.domain`	string		`""`
`global.imageRegistry`	string		`""`
`hosts.api`	string		`""`
`hosts.auth`	string		`""`
`hosts.console`	string		`""`
`ingress.annotations.<name>`	string		
`ingress.className`	string		`""`
`ingress.enabled`	boolean		`true`
`istio.enabled`	boolean		`false`
`keys.cacheTTLSeconds`	integer		`60`
`keys.custody.recipients`	array		`[]`
`keys.epochDays`	integer		`7`
`keys.horizonDays`	integer		`35`
`keys.installationName`	string		`""`
`keys.openbao.resources`	object		(see values.yaml)
`keys.openbao.storage.keystore`	string		`5Gi`
`keys.openbao.storage.unsealer`	string		`1Gi`
`keys.pendingHours`	integer		`72`
`keys.pluginBackupHorizonDays`	integer		`186`
`keys.receiptsStorage`	string		`1Gi`
`networkPolicy.apiServerCIDRs`	array		`[]`
`networkPolicy.enabled`	boolean		`true`
`networkPolicy.externalEgressCIDRs`	array		`[]`
`networkPolicy.ingressNamespace`	string		`kube-system`
`orchestrator.platformServiceUserId`	string		`ba64e6b1-6b96-400d-9bbc-e1b0c83fde83`
`probes.startupFailureThreshold`	integer		`60`
`probitas.flags.<name>`	string		
`proxy.trustedCIDRs`	string		`10.42.0.0/16`
`schemaWait.intervalSeconds`	integer		`3`
`schemaWait.timeoutSeconds`	integer		`1800`

`smtp.existingSecret`	string		`""`
`storage.className`	string		`""`
`telemetry.enabled`	boolean	`false`	`false`
`tls.clusterIssuer`	string		`""`
`tls.existingSecret`	string		`""`
`tls.mode`	string	`existing`, `cert-manager`, `none`	`existing`
`workflows.concurrency`	string		`4`

APPENDIX B



Edition matrix

Which edition, add-on or domain pack includes each capability.

FOR OPERATORS AND DEVELOPERS

10 MIN READ

Community is free and open source under the Apache License 2.0. Team and Enterprise are licensed by Adverant, and an Enterprise licence names the add-ons and domain packs it includes. A capability marked Add-on or Domain pack needs Enterprise as well as that add-on or pack. The table is generated from the edition matrix that the licence check itself reads.



Editions

Edition	Licence
Community	Apache-2.0 (open core)
Team	Adverant Enterprise licence (EULA, closed modules): the Team edition, Community plus the Team set, on Adverant cloud
Enterprise	Adverant Enterprise licence (EULA, closed modules), per feature group



Shell and experience

Capability	Where it is included
Console shell: one menu, Go to ⌘K, progress stripe, figures strip, light/dark, phone layout	Community
Alpha marking, release channel display	Community
Consolidated work panel docked beside every record	Team
One organisation	Community
Several organisations, business units, organisation switching	Enterprise
White-label: brand, colours, own domain, branded sign-in	Add-on: Storefront / white-label
Today and notifications: the Today home and the person's notifications	Community
Accessibility WCAG 2.2 AA, keyboard shortcuts with visible buttons	Community
Languages	Community



AI and models

Capability	Where it is included
AI Provider Router (basic): organisation key pool, local OpenAI-compatible models, one model per job, ordered fallback list, no raw keys on screens	Community
AI Gateway at scale: load balancing across replicas and providers, autoscaling, admission control, priority queues, per-team budgets, cache, several clusters; capacity proven step by step	Add-on: AI Gateway at scale
Assistant (one person): cited answers, "read with" chips, `/` skills palette	Community
Assistant shared contexts, result-beside-conversation view	Team
Skills: run, AI-assisted buttons ("About this button"), personal changes, test	Community
Skills library administration, team suggestions review, spend per skill	Team

Teaching the assistant: personal memory view, export, erase, consent	Community
Memory and consent policy for the organisation	Team
Custom models: tuning, model lifecycle, runs on own GPUs	Add-on: Model factory
Ideas (ideation): framing, rounds, blind comparison, critics, shortlist, prior art, team approval, run budgets	Add-on: Ideas



Working together

Capability	Where it is included
Channels, threads, direct messages	Community
Team-chat governance: retention, legal hold, export, guests, reports queue	Enterprise
Huddles, live calls with transcript, warm transfer, campaigns, consent by country, voices and languages, phone numbers	Add-on: Calls and voice
Mail: inboxes, team inbox, rules, before-it-leaves checks, "ask all of it", mail into the record	Add-on: Mail
Other firms and walls: shared conversations with another firm, cleaned copies, walls, external seats	Add-on: Other firms and walls
What changed since you were last here (no toasts)	Community
Bridges to Slack, Microsoft Teams or Discord: mirrored channels, what crosses, the assistant answering there	Add-on: Data connectors



Knowledge

Capability	Where it is included
Files: upload, file processing (documents, images with OCR), one shared viewer, missing papers being chased	Community
Knowledge graph (GraphRAG core): entities, links, timeline, retrieval	Community
Search everything inside one organisation	Community
Federated, permission-aware search across sources and organisations	Enterprise
Personal notebooks: pick papers, cited answers, compare papers	Community
Shared notebooks with read / ask / change rights	Team
Notebook studio (slides, audio summary, one-page sheet, quiz) and papers from outside (research runs)	Add-on: Notebook studio
Versions: history, compare two versions, restore	Community
Pin a decision to its versions, legal hold on versions	Enterprise
One map engine with offline tiles, layers drawn by apps	Community
GeoAI layers, drone and imagery layers	Add-on: Map and GeoAI

Data connectors (external drives, wikis, mail stores, legacy systems), change capture, data quality, lineage	Add-on: Data connectors



Automation and decisions

Capability	Where it is included
Workflows (UNO): runs, one run, builder, schedules, tasks waiting on a person, errors in plain words, approve/stop own runs	Community
Workflow operations: promotion between environments, alert rules, queues, per-environment settings, organisation-wide oversight	Team
Connect AI tools (MCP connections)	Community
Agent-to-agent: registry and cards, live flow map, who-may-ask-whom, step-by-step trace, refusals at walls	Add-on: Agent-to-agent
Check a sealed record yourself (Probitas open verifier)	Community
Decision rooms and sealed records: rooms, seats and evidence slices, rule and sign, seal receipts, key sets and witnesses, decision passport, customer view	Add-on: Decision rooms and sealed records
Company policies: library, drafting, dry run on last quarter, read and understood	Enterprise
Revenue operations: pipeline, accounts, forecast, deal desk, quotes and contracts, leakage, quota and territories, revenue inside other core features	Add-on: Revenue operations
Workforce, basic: one node, autonomy up to level 2 (watch, suggest, ask first), no chamber	Community
Workforce: always-on agents under autonomy levels 0–5, chambers ruled by a person, sealed records of every act, skip and refusal, quality over time, budgets, triggers, kill switches and fleet watch	Add-on: Workforce
Sandboxed execution: each code, browser or untrusted-file step in its own microVM with default profiles; one off / shadow / enforce switch; a refusal (SANDBOX_OFF, SANDBOX_NO_KVM) instead of a silent fallback	Community
Sandbox administration: profiles and their editor, per-platform and per-pack policy, warm pools and nodes, quotas per unit and tenant, use and refusals, shadow-to-enforce rollout	Add-on: Sandboxes
Payments: payment gateways per platform and brand (Stripe first; Adyen, GoCardless, PayPal, Mollie), routing, products and prices, refunds, disputes, payouts and reconciliation, tax, the checkout's look, revenue sharing, payments recorded on air-gapped sites; card details never touch Nexus	Add-on: Storefront / white-label



Apps

Capability	Where it is included
Install apps from the catalogue; one generic app host; declared outbound addresses approved by admins	Community
Plugin SDK, publishing an app	Community
Private catalogue / mirror of approved apps	Enterprise

Quality (NexusQA) setup: plan and limits, projects and testers, outside testers, connections, test runners, recordings and screenshots, AI in testing, schedules and alerts, brand and billing, health	Add-on: Quality (NexusQA)



People, security and governance

Capability	Where it is included
Members, invitations, fixed roles	Community
Sign-in: passkeys, password, one company sign-in (OIDC), second check (MFA), sessions	Community
Sign-in security administration: suspicious sign-in review, allowed and blocked addresses	Enterprise
SAML with enforcement, directory sync (SCIM)	Enterprise
Custom roles, four-eyes approvals for sensitive changes	Enterprise
Audit log: read, filter, 30 days, spreadsheet export	Community
Long audit retention, streaming to a security-monitoring system	Enterprise
Running the core features (admin pages): Community core features, one organisation	Community
Running the core features (admin pages) for the core features the edition has	Enterprise
Personal data: own export and erase	Community
Data protection: impact assessments, consent records, portability and erasure requests (Erase), retention policies, residency	Enterprise
Compliance: coverage packs and evidence (no scores)	Enterprise
Keys and certificates register, key custodians	Enterprise
Shield: DNS with DNSSEC, certificates, web application firewall, rate limits, bot checks, waiting room and DDoS defence for every platform, tenant and domain; agents propose rules, a person rules on them, each ships in stages with automatic rollback	Add-on: Shield
Tenant separation, data export, sign-out, refusal screens	Community
External data keys: an organisation's own keys for outside data sources, never AI model keys	Community



Delivery and operations

Capability	Where it is included
Adverant cloud (free tier, with usage caps)	Community
Self-host: download, check, preflight, install, upgrade, backup and restore, support bundle (`nexusctl`)	Community
Licence import, Enterprise artefacts fetched after licence, staged upgrade with rollback window	Enterprise
On-prem connected, air-gapped import from media, machine image, appliance	Enterprise
This installation: version, health	Community
Operator pages: licence and what it unlocks with protection per group, expiry ladder, compiled modules, usage statement, keys and erasure, incidents, retiring soon	Enterprise
Your cluster (k3s or Kubernetes): nodes, namespaces and tenants, workloads, storage, config and secrets, autoscaling, cluster upgrade, events and logs, access, cost and capacity; previews, and a second person for dangerous changes	Enterprise
Nexus Edge: payload runtime, fleets, mission packs, passes, downlink queue, alerts from orbit, requests to the flight computer, attestation	Add-on: Nexus Edge



Domain packs

Capability	Where it is included
Insurance	Domain pack: Insurance
Banking and payments	Domain pack: Banking and payments
Life sciences	Domain pack: Life sciences
Critical infrastructure and energy	Domain pack: Critical infrastructure and energy
Government and public sector	Domain pack: Government and public sector
Healthcare	Domain pack: Healthcare
Defence and security	Domain pack: Defence and security
Capital markets and asset management	Domain pack: Capital markets and asset management
Legal and professional services	Domain pack: Legal and professional services
Logistics and maritime	Domain pack: Logistics and maritime



Native mobile: iPhone and Android

Capability	Where it is included
The web console in a phone's browser (phone layout of every page)	Community
Native iPhone and Android apps with every licensed core feature: Today, notifications, assistant, channels, threads and direct messages, notebook, ideas, decision rooms and seal receipts, mail, files and search, approvals, what's running, agent-to-agent trace (read-only), offline work	Add-on: Mobile apps

Mobile gateway: device registry, device-bound mobile tokens, end-to-end encrypted notifications through the push relay, offline sync	Add-on: Mobile apps
Company device management: managed app settings, Intune / Workspace ONE app protection, app-integrity checks, remote removal of the app's data	Add-on: Mobile apps
Insurance phone screens	Domain pack: Insurance
Banking and payments phone screens	Domain pack: Banking and payments
Life sciences phone screens	Domain pack: Life sciences
Critical infrastructure and energy phone screens	Domain pack: Critical infrastructure and energy
Government and public sector phone screens	Domain pack: Government and public sector
Healthcare phone screens	Domain pack: Healthcare
Defence and security phone screens	Domain pack: Defence and security
Capital markets and asset management phone screens	Domain pack: Capital markets and asset management
Legal and professional services phone screens	Domain pack: Legal and professional services
Logistics and maritime phone screens	Domain pack: Logistics and maritime



Add-ons

Add-on	Also needs
AI Gateway at scale	Enterprise
Model factory	Enterprise
Ideas	Enterprise
Calls and voice	Enterprise
Mail	Enterprise
Other firms and walls	Enterprise
Notebook studio	Enterprise
Map and GeoAI	Enterprise
Data connectors	Enterprise
Agent-to-agent	Enterprise
Decision rooms and sealed records	Enterprise
Revenue operations	Enterprise
Storefront / white-label	Enterprise
Nexus Edge	Enterprise
Mobile apps	Enterprise

Workforce	Enterprise
Shield	Enterprise
Sandboxes	Enterprise
Quality (NexusQA)	Enterprise



Domain packs

Domain pack	Also needs
Insurance	Decision rooms and sealed records (phone screens also need Mobile apps)
Banking and payments	Enterprise (phone screens also need Mobile apps)
Life sciences	Enterprise (phone screens also need Mobile apps)
Critical infrastructure and energy	Enterprise (phone screens also need Mobile apps)
Government and public sector	Enterprise (phone screens also need Mobile apps)
Healthcare	Enterprise (phone screens also need Mobile apps)
Defence and security	Enterprise (phone screens also need Mobile apps; platform alerts need Nexus Edge)
Capital markets and asset management	Decision rooms and sealed records (phone screens also need Mobile apps)
Legal and professional services	Decision rooms and sealed records, Mail (phone screens also need Mobile apps)
Logistics and maritime	Map and GeoAI (phone screens also need Mobile apps)

APPENDIX C



Error codes

Every refusal code an operator or developer meets, what it means and what to do.

FOR OPERATORS AND DEVELOPERS

10 MIN READ

Nexus refuses with a named code and a sentence, never a bare status. Search this table for the code you see in a response body, a log line or the console.

Code	Status	Meaning	What to do
`ACTOR_NOT_A_PARAMETER`	403	The body or query named the person acting, which only the sign-in token may say.	Remove the person field; the actor is the person the token was issued to.
`AI_PROVIDER_KEYS_BELONG_TO_ORG_POOL`	422	An AI model key was offered as an external data key, and model keys live only in the organisation's AI pool.	Add the key in the organisation's AI pool on the AI switchboard instead.
`APPROVAL_ALREADY_DECIDED`	409	The approval has already been decided, by its quorum or by this person.	Read the approvals again and act on the decision that stands.
`APPROVAL_INVALID`		A manifest skill's approval block is not required true with a reason of 1 to 500 characters.	Set required to true and give a reason, or remove the block.
`AUTHORITY_EXCEEDED`	403	The caller is signed in but lacks the authority for this act, such as changing the AI key pool without being an owner or administrator.	Ask an owner or administrator of the organisation to do it.
`BRANCH_LIFE_EXCEEDED`	422	A data branch or masked copy was asked to live longer than the limit of 14 days, so no branch was made or kept.	Keep the seed and make a fresh branch from it when you need one.
`BUNDLE_INTEGRITY_VIOLATION`		nexus-airgap found a file in a sealed bundle that changed after the bundle was signed.	Stop and do not use the bundle, and never pass –no-strict to get past the check.
`CALLER_IDENTITY_UNVERIFIED`	401	The skill sync arrived with no readable client identity from the workload's mutual TLS certificate.	Call the sync from the plugin's own workload over mutual TLS.
`CANARY_GATE_NOT_MET`	409	A skill version in canary has not met its gates yet.	Wait for the canary, or give a reason and a second approver to send it early.
`CHANGE_CLASS_NOT_PERMITTED`	403	The change is of a class the plugin's change policy does not govern, or the person may not make a change of that class.	Add the class to the change policy with its approval count, or have someone allowed to make that class of change propose it.
`CHECKSUM_DRIFT`		A migration file that was already applied has changed since it ran.	Restore the applied file and put the change in a new numbered migration.

`CLAIM_CODE_EXPIRED`	410	The claim code's 30 minutes have passed, so nothing was claimed and nothing changed.	Make a new code with nexusctl claim-code – administrator and enter it.
`CLAIM_FINGERPRINT_MISMATCH`	403	The installation answering at this address does not show the fingerprint the terminal printed, so nothing was claimed.	Do not claim; check the address and certificate with whoever installed it and with your security team.
`COMPANY_SIGNIN_STEPS_MISSING`		Company sign-in cannot be required until the earlier set-up steps, including an administrator's own test, are done.	Finish the missing steps the page lists, then require company sign-in.
`CONFIRMATION_UNAVAILABLE`		A change outside the sandbox was asked for from a script with nobody at the keyboard to confirm it, so nothing happened.	Run the change in an interactive session where the confirmation can be shown.
`CONNECTION_SCOPE_EXCEEDED`	403	An installed plugin or connection asked for something outside what it declared or was granted.	Publish a new release that declares the scope, for an administrator to review and grant.
`CONTENT_HASH_ALREADY_PUBLISHED`		The same skill content was already published, so the existing version is returned.	Use the returned version; change the content to make a new one.
`COPY_NOT_ALLOWED_HERE`	—	The company's device rules don't allow copying out of the app on this phone.	Keep the work in the app, or ask the administrator the plate names.
`CREDENTIALS_IN_WRONG_PLACE`		Model keys were found somewhere they never belong, and the finding was recorded.	An administrator removes the keys from where they were found and replaces them.
`DB_PODS_UNDECLARED`		The manifest's db block has no pods value, so each role's connection limit covers only one pod's pool.	Declare db.pods as replicas plus a rolling update's surge.
`DB_ROLE_BYPASSES_ISOLATION`		The database role the plugin connects as bypasses row-level security, so the process refuses to boot.	Connect the request path as the schema's app role, as the rendered tenancy file provides.
`DB_ROLE_SETS_SCOPE_DIRECTLY`		Probitas refuses to start because its database role could set the tenant settings that row-level security reads.	Remove that right from the role; the bootstrap Job revokes it on every install and upgrade, so the scope can only be set through the service's binder.

`DB_SEAT_ROLE_INVALID`		The read seat's connection is not the seat role, or the seat holds privileges it should never have.	Point seat.url at the seat role written by nexus-migrate provision.
`DELIVERY_IDENTITY_MISSING`	403	The namespace the sync came from belongs to no registered plugin.	Register the plugin's delivery identity for its namespace before syncing.
`DELIVERY_PATH_REFUSED`	403	An image was pushed outside the plugin's registry prefix and is not on the signed list of older image names.	Push the image under the registry prefix the delivery identity assigns.
`DEVICE_CHECK_FAILED`	—	This phone failed its genuine-device check, so the app won't open company data on it.	Use a phone that passes the check, or ask the administrator the plate names.
`DEVICE_WITHDRAWN`	—	The phone was withdrawn after it was reported lost. Its passkey is refused, and its encrypted files are erased the next time it connects.	Sign in from your new phone.
`DUPLICATE_ENDPOINT`		Two entries in the route table are the same route spelt differently, such as :id and :recordId.	Keep one entry for the route.
`EGRESS_DENIED`	403	A call tried to leave for a destination that is not on the installation's allowed list.	Add the destination deliberately on Where calls can leave, or stop calling it.
`EGRESS_NOT_DECLARED`	403	An app tried to reach an address its manifest never declared, and the call was stopped.	Declare the address in the app's manifest, or turn off the setting that made the call.
`ENDPOINT_BYTE_CAP_REQUIRED`		A host callback manifest skill names an endpoint with no byte cap, which the registry sync refuses.	Add the byte cap to the skill's endpoint and validate again.
`ENDPOINT_RIGHT_MISSING`		A route the scope guard serves names no right from the manifest's rights register.	Add a right to the route in api.endpoints and declare it in rights.
`ENDPOINT_RIGHT_NOT_REGISTERED`		A route names a right that the manifest's rights register does not declare.	Declare the right in rights or correct the name on the route.
`ENDPOINT_RIGHT_UNGUARDED`		A route that no rights guard serves, such as a public or service-key route, names a right.	Remove the right from that route.

`ENTITLEMENT_DENIED`	403	The platform answered that the caller's organisation is not entitled to the feature.	Show the refusal with who can grant the feature; do not retry.
`ENTITLEMENT_UNREACHABLE`	502	No entitlement verdict could be obtained, so nothing was assumed.	Refuse the surface and retry later; never treat it as "not entitled" and never cache it.
`EPHEMERAL_POSTGRES_UNAVAILABLE_IN_CI`		A test suite in continuous integration found no Postgres server to start for its database tests.	Run the job on an image that carries the Postgres server, or give it a throwaway database's address.
`EXECUTOR_NOT_PERMITTED`		A tool in a tool_using skill names an executor outside the six a plugin may use.	Use one of the six permitted executors, or reach your own code through standing_service_call.
`EXTERNAL_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_INVALID`		The Secret nexus-generated holds the external key encryption key in a shape the chart cannot use, so the render stopped.	Put back the key the installation's data is sealed under, as base64 of its 32 bytes, and upgrade again.
`FIELD_NOT_FOR_TIER`		A manifest skill carries a field that belongs to another skill tier.	Remove the field, or change the skill's tier to the one that uses it.
`GATE_CANNOT_BE_SKIPPED`	403	A promotion tried to skip a step between dev space, staging, pilot unit and all units.	Promote to the next step of the path instead.
`HASH_MISMATCH`	409	The change moved after the last approval, so what was approved no longer matches what would be merged.	Collect the approvals again for the new content.
`IDP_UNREACHABLE`	503	The company sign-in is not answering, so no new sign-in was made while people already signed in stay signed in.	Retry later and tell the team that owns the sign-in; an administrator can use the emergency administrator sign-in meanwhile.
`IMAGE_NAME_COLLISION`	409	The image name is already claimed by another plugin.	Choose another image name and never reuse one.
`INSTALLATION_CLAIMED`		The key service refused a preflight report because the installation has already been claimed.	Keep the report files on your workstation; the console's preflight page is only for an unclaimed installation.

`INSTALLATION_NAME_EXAMPLE`		The chart refuses to render because keys.installationName is the name from its own example values.	Replace it with this installation's own name, since the first key-store bootstrap fixes it for good.
`INSTALLATION_NAME_MISSING`		keys.installationName is empty, and the chart will not install without the installation's permanent name.	Set keys.installationName to this installation's own name.
`INVALID_SERVICE_KEY`	403	The X-Service-Key presented does not match the key held for this plugin.	Make the deployment's PLATFORM_SERVICE_KEY match the key the platform holds.
`JWT_LIFETIME_EXCEEDED`	401	A session token lives longer than one hour, which plugins built with the SDK refuse.	Set auth.accessTokenTTL to one hour or less and sign in again.
`KEYS_CUSTODIAN_EXAMPLE`		A recipient in keys.custody.recipients is the example custodian from the chart's values files, whose private key nobody holds.	Replace it with your custodians' own recipients, made with age-keygen or age-plugin-se.
`KEYS_CUSTODIAN_MISSING`		keys.custody.recipients is empty, so no custodian could unseal the key store after a restart.	Add the public age recipient of each person who will hold the recovery keys.
`LENS_CANNOT_WIDEN`	422	A lens tried to show something its base lens does not show, and nothing was saved.	Build the lens on a wider base, which the base lens's owner decides.
`LICENCE_CLOCK_BEHIND_FLOOR`	409	The installation's clock reads earlier than the latest time it has seen, so the licence is read at that later time.	Nothing, unless the clock is wrong; only a time-reset token signed by Adverant lowers the floor.
`LICENCE_ENDS_SOON`		The licence is in its warning period and ends on the date the notice names.	Renew the licence through your Adverant account before its end date.
`LICENCE_FORMAT_INVALID`	422	The file is not a licence this release can read, so nothing was imported.	Send the licence file exactly as Adverant gave it.
`LICENCE_IN_GRACE`		The licence has ended and is in its grace period, so everything still works and nothing is deleted.	Renew the licence before the grace period ends.
`LICENCE_LOCKED`	403	The licence has not begun yet, or a licence in RESTRICT does not carry	Import the licence on or after its first day, or

		new work under a licensed feature group.	renew a licence that has run out.
`LICENCE_MATRIX_MISMATCH`	422	The licence is written against an edition matrix this release does not read, or grants a group this release does not know.	Upgrade the installation, or ask Adverant for a licence written against this release.
`LICENCE_OTHER_INSTALLATION`	409	The licence is genuine but was issued for another installation.	Give Adverant this installation's id and ask for a licence issued for it.
`LICENCE_REQUEST_SIGNATURE_INVALID`		A licence request file from the offline exchange was changed after the installation signed it, or another installation signed it.	Make a new request on the installation and carry it to your account unchanged.
`LICENCE_REVOKED`	403	Adverant withdrew this licence by a signed revocation, so Enterprise parts stop being offered while Community and export remain.	Ask Adverant for another licence rather than retrying.
`LICENCE_ROOT_UNKNOWN`	422	The licence is signed with a key this release's trust roots do not hold.	Upgrade the installation, or ask Adverant for a licence signed for this release's trust roots.
`LICENCE_SIGNATURE_INVALID`	422	One of Adverant's two signatures on the licence is missing or does not verify, so the file was changed after signing and nothing was imported.	Ask Adverant for the licence file again and import it without editing it.
`MANIFEST_SCOPE_WIDENED`	409	A release asks for more than its manifest declared before, and is held for review.	Remove the new scopes, or ask two reviewers to accept the wider manifest.
`MEDIA_SIGNATURE_INVALID`	422	The release files on the media are not signed by the release key installed on this site, so nothing was loaded and the running release keeps running.	Keep the media for your security team and ask Adverant for new media.
`MIDDLEWARE_ORDERING_ERROR`	500	A handler was reachable before the scope guard had resolved the request.	Register the scope guard after body parsing and before every handler, on the route itself.
`MISSING_CALLER_IDENTITY`	403	A call to the AI Provider Router's internal routes carried no caller identity.	Send the work through UNO dispatch instead of calling the router directly.

`MISSING_ORG_ID_HEADER`	400	A platform callback arrived without a usable organisation header, so no tenant could be asserted.	Send `X-Organization-ID` with a real organisation id; the receiver refuses rather than guessing.
`MISSING_SERVICE_KEY`	401	A call to an internal route arrived without the X-Service-Key header.	Only the platform calls these routes; check the caller is the platform.
`MODEL_CAPABILITY_UNAVAILABLE`	422	No provider the organisation has enabled offers a model that meets the requested capability profile.	Relax the profile, or have an organisation administrator enable a provider that can meet it.
`MODEL_NOT_CONNECTED`	503	No model is connected for this organisation, so the assistant cannot answer and nothing was sent to a model.	An organisation administrator connects a model key or a local model.
`MODULE_SIGNATURE_INVALID`		A compiled module's signature did not match the release's signed parts manifest, so it was never loaded.	Find out why the module on disk changed; the signed copy keeps running and a genuine copy can be fetched again.
`NAMESPACE_MISMATCH`	403	A deployment targeted a namespace other than the one the plugin's delivery identity assigns.	Deploy only to the plugin's own assigned namespace.
`NEEDS_SECOND_PERSON`		An approval that needs a second person was attempted by the author or proposer, who never counts as a reviewer.	Ask a reviewer who is not the author to approve.
`NEXUS_EDITION_INVALID`		The edition value is empty or is not community or enterprise, so the chart will not render.	Set edition to community or enterprise, with enterprise.enabled agreeing.
`NOT_AN_ADMINISTRATOR`		A member opened an administrator's page, which they can read about but not change.	Ask one of the administrators the page names.
`NOT_IN_YOUR_PLAN`	—	The organisation's licence doesn't include this capability, for example the native app on a Community installation or a studio the organisation hasn't licensed.	Use the web console, or ask an administrator about the licence; the plate names who can help.
`NO_MODEL_FOR_ROLE_AND_PROVIDER`	422	A provider was resolved but its catalogue has no model for the role.	Show the remediation so an administrator assigns a model.

`NO_PROJECT_COMPILER`		The project has no UI compiler of its own, so the mockup compiler's compile, join and world modes cannot run.	Use the modes that do not need a project compiler, or add the project's own UI compiler first.
`NO_PROVIDER_FOR_ROLE`	422	The organisation's AI pool has no key in use for the role, and no assignment or catalogue match can serve it.	An owner or administrator adds an organisation key or assigns a provider to the role.
`PACK_NOT_CHECKED_FOR_HARDWARE`	409	A mission pack was installed on a device whose hardware type it was not checked for, so nothing was installed.	Check the pack on that hardware type, then install it again.
`PASSKEY_CANCELLED`		The passkey prompt was closed or nothing was chosen in time, and nothing was sent.	Press the set-up button again and choose a passkey.
`PASSKEY_UNSUPPORTED`		This browser cannot make a passkey, so the second check was not set up.	Open the page in a browser that supports passkeys, on the same computer.
`PASS_TIER_REQUIRED`		Time-boxed elevated access from a developer's tools is asked for on Community, which has no separate production to elevate into.	Administer the server directly, or move to Enterprise for elevated access with named approvers.
`PLAN_FINGERPRINT_MISMATCH`		An apply named a plan this session never made, or a plan that changed after it was made, so nothing ran.	Make the plan again in this session and apply that plan.
`PLUGIN_ID_MISMATCH`	403	The sync body or one of its skills names a different plugin from the calling workload.	Send the sync with the plugin's own id from its own workload.
`PLUGIN_SYNC_ALL_OR_NOTHING`	409	One skill in a plugin's sync broke a rule, so the sync took none of the skills and the previous version keeps running.	Fix the refused skill and post the full skill set again.
`PREFLIGHT_FAILED`	409	Preflight found at least one failing check, so the install did not start and nothing was installed.	Fix each failing row using its fix line, then run preflight or the install again.
`PRIVATE_TO_ITS_OWNER`	403	The mail or item is private to its owner. Nothing was opened, and the owner isn't told that you asked.	Ask the owner to share it, or start a legal matter, which opens it with a second person.

`PROFILE_OUTSIDE_EDITION`		The BFF refuses to start because its image was built with code the installation's edition does not hold.	Deploy the image built for this installation's edition.
`PROVIDER_KEY_SWITCHED_OFF`		A provider key was switched off after five failures in a row, and its share moved to the other keys.	Check the key with the provider and add a fresh key if it no longer works.
`PUBLISH_NEEDS_APPROVAL`	409	Publishing this skill needs approval from people other than the one who proposed it.	Ask the named approvers to approve with their passkeys.
`RATE_LIMITED`	429	Too many attempts were made in the current window, so nothing was sent.	Wait the number of seconds given in Retry-After, then try again.
`RECORD_NOT_FOUND`	404	The record asked for does not exist, such as a preflight report never handed over or a licence import before the installation was declared.	Hand over a preflight report, or finish the first administrator's step, and try again.
`REGISTRY_CONFLICT`	409	A job type in the sync is owned by another plugin or was registered outside the sync, and nothing was written.	Rename the skill or resolve the existing registration with the installation's administrators.
`RELEASE_VERSION_MISSING`		The chart's images lock names no release version, so the chart cannot tell which release it installs.	Fetch the chart again from Adverant and verify it before installing.
`RESTORE_TEST_OVERDUE`		A store has not had a tested restore within the organisation's rule.	Run a test restore of that store from Back up and restore.
`ROUTE_NOT_FOUND`	404	The route no longer answers, as the preflight and claim routes do once the installation is claimed.	Nothing is wrong; read the saved report files instead.
`SANDBOX_NO_KVM`	—	The device has no hardware virtualisation, so a code step can't run in a sandbox there.	The step is sent to run where a sandbox exists at the next contact.
`SANDBOX_OFF`	—	A code, browser or untrusted-file step was refused because its sandbox tier is set to off. The refusal is recorded and the run is held.	An administrator switches the sandbox back on; the step never runs unsandboxed.

`SCOPE_ALREADY_BOUND`	500	One database transaction tried to bind a scope twice.	Fix the plugin code that bound the scope a second time; the caller did nothing wrong.
`SCOPE_PREDICATE_INVALID`	403	An axis was present but carried a value that must never scope a query, such as the zero UUID or a non-UUID.	Do not retry; the credential itself is malformed and must be fixed where it was issued.
`SCOPE_PREDICATE_MISSING`	403	The request could not state which tenant, owner and unit the data belongs to, so nothing was read.	Read the resolved and missing lists in the body and supply what is missing through the authenticated session.
`SCOPE_REFUSED`	403	The axes resolved, but the resolved scope does not permit this row or action, for example a job row belonging to another tenant.	Refuse and show the refusal; signing in again does not help.
`SEATS_OVER_LICENCE`		More people use Nexus than the licence has seats, and nobody is locked out.	Within 30 days remove people who do not need Nexus or ask Adverant for more seats, which needs a second person.
`SECRET_NEVER_SHOWN`	403	A coding tool or person asked for a Secret's value, which is never shown, so the value was not read.	Use the Secret's name and last four characters to identify it, and reference it from the deployment instead of reading it.
`SESSION_TAINTED`		A coding session that has read untrusted content, such as a document, ticket, mail or graph source text, tried to make a write.	Confirm that one write after reading its plan, or start a fresh session that has not read the content.
`SIGNUP_REQUIRES_APPROVAL`	403	A stranger's own sign-up on an installation is held for an administrator's approval instead of creating a working account.	Wait for an administrator to approve the sign-up, or ask to be invited.
`SIG_INVALID`	409	A signature failed verification under the named key, and the check stopped rather than carrying on.	Get a correctly signed copy from its source; never fall back to an unsigned version.
`SKILLS_ENGINE_BINDING_MISSING`	400	A skill run arrived without a model route, which the engine never guesses.	Send the run through dispatch, which chooses the route.
`SKILL_APPROVAL_NOT_HOLDABLE`	409	A batch, map or chain dispatch named a skill that must be held for approval.	Dispatch the held skill on its own, one item at a time.

`SKILL_CANNOT_WIDEN_TOOLS`	403	A Skills Engine skill tried to use a tool outside the allowlist of whoever runs it.	Register the tool on the runner first, or remove it from the skill.
`SKILL_NOT_ALLOWED`	403	The job type exists but is not on this surface's dispatch allow-list.	Fix the caller, or add the job type to the allow-list in code deliberately.
`SSO_REQUIRED`		The organisation requires company sign-in, so a password attempt was refused without the password being checked or kept.	Sign in with the company sign-in button the page offers.
`SYNC_CONTRACT_VIOLATION`	400	The skill sync body broke one or more rules, every one listed, and nothing was written.	Fix each listed violation and send the whole skill set again.
`TENANT_BOUNDARY`	403	The request reached for data that belongs to another organisation, which is never on this path.	Work only with your own organisation's data; another organisation can share test results with you, never its data.
`TENANT_NOT_A_PARAMETER`	403	The request body or query named the organisation in a field such as `orgId`, `organizationId`, `organization_id`, `tenant` or `tenantId`.	Remove the field; the organisation always comes from the caller's sign-in.
`TIMEOUT_OUT_OF_BOUNDS`		A manifest skill's timeoutMs is outside one second to six hours.	Set timeoutMs between 1000 and 21600000.
`TOKEN_ORG_MISSING`	403	An API key or token has no organisation, so services that check keys through nexus-auth refuse it.	Give the key an organisation, or issue a new key.
`TRANSITION_NOT_PERMITTED`	409	A first-run step was asked for when it no longer applies, such as a claim on a claimed installation, a second first administrator, or a passkey setup after its ten minutes.	Sign in at the console if you are the administrator, or ask the operator who ran the install if the passkey step was missed.
`TRUST_APPROVAL_SELF_APPROVAL`	403	The person approving the change is the person who asked for it.	Ask a different person to approve.
`UNAUTHORIZED`	401	The skill sync arrived with a bad or missing service key.	Fix the service key the deployment presents.
`UNAUTHORIZED_CALLER`	403	The calling service is not on the router's list of allowed callers for that route.	Stop; the router refuses this caller by design.

`UNHANDLED_ERROR`	500	A defect on the answering side, logged there with its cause.	Retry once if the request is safe to repeat, and report the time of the request if it keeps failing.
`UPGRADE_ROLLED_BACK`		A step of the upgrade failed, so the previous release is running again and data was not changed.	Fix the step the page names, then plan and apply the upgrade again.
`USAGE_FILE_SIGNATURE_INVALID`		A usage file from the offline exchange was changed after it was signed.	Make a new usage file on the installation and bring it unchanged.
`VALIDATION_FAILED`	400	The import body was unreadable or larger than 1 MiB, or the request carried a query string.	Send the licence file as the whole body, with no query string.

APPENDIX D



Services and ports

Every service the chart runs, its ports and the values key that configures it.

FOR OPERATORS AND DEVELOPERS

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Each row is one Deployment in the `nexus` namespace. The service port is what other services call; the container port is what the process listens on inside its pod. The values key is the entry under `components` that sets replicas and resources. The table gives each service's main port; chapter 2.1, Architecture, lists the second listeners (nexus-auth's mutual TLS port 8443, the WebSocket ports of nexus-gateway and nexus-graphrag) and the data tier's StatefulSets with their ports.

Service	Service port	Container port	Values key	On by default
nexus-alpha	3000	3000	`components.console`	yes
nexus-alpha-bff	8080	8080	`components.bff`	yes
nexus-auth	9101	8080	`components.auth`	yes
nexus-orchestrator	8080	8080	`components.orchestrator`	yes
nexus-workflows	8081	8081	`components.workflows`	yes
nexus-gateway	9092	8092	`components.gateway`	yes
nexus-graphrag	8090	8090	`components.graphrag`	yes
nexus-probitas	9151	9151	`components.probitas`	yes
nexus-skills-engine	8095	8095	`components.skillsEngine`	yes
nexus-fileprocess	9109	9109	`components.fileprocess`	no
nexus-plugins	9111	9111	`components.plugins`	no
nexus-alive	8080	8080	`components.alive`	no
nexus-keys	8080	8080	`components.keys`	yes

APPENDIX E



Glossary

The terms used in both parts, in plain words.

FOR OPERATORS AND DEVELOPERS

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Term	Meaning
access pass	The time-limited grant that lets a person's IDE or coding agent use the Workbench tools, with its tiers and hard limits.
Add-on	One of 19 separately licensed Enterprise capabilities that sit on the Enterprise base.
adherence gate	One of the twenty-two build-failing checks run by nexus-gates, each encoding one class of defect.
age recipient	The public half of an age key, beginning age1 or age1se1, that names a custodian in keys.custody.recipients.
AI Provider Router	The part of the gateway that holds an organisation's model keys and makes the final choice of provider and model for every AI request.
AI switchboard	The console's name for the AI Provider Router, and the Enterprise page that shows its providers, keys and traffic. Part 1 calls the router the switchboard; Part 2 uses its component name.
all-in-one image	The installer disk image with one edition's offline bundle added as a partition labelled NEXUS-BUNDLE.
approval hold	The state of a dispatched skill that waits for a named person's approval before it runs.
base lens	The lens another lens narrows, which bounds everything the narrower lens may show.
Boundary list	The list that assigns every source file to the Community or Enterprise edition, or to neither with a reason.
Build profile	The set of code classes compiled into a console or BFF image, which must fit inside the installation's edition.
build target	The edition or delivery form an extension is built for, which sets what it builds against and how it reaches the customer.
CA pin	The base64 SHA-256 of the chart CA's public key, given to a separate Chrome profile so it trusts certificates from that CA only.
canary	A stage in which a new skill version runs for one unit behind named gates before it reaches everyone.
Capability profile	Constraints a model must meet, such as context length or tool use, which filter the router's choice and never select a model on their own.
change class	One kind of change a change policy governs, one of website, bff or migration.
change policy	The manifest block that says which classes of change to a plugin need approval, and from how many people.
channel	A named stream of releases that each unit chooses, with its administrator agreeing to every move.
claim code	A one-time code in three groups of four, valid 30 minutes with 5 tries, made by someone with cluster access to claim a new installation.
claim key	A key printed on an appliance or edge kit's box that claims a device with no screen to the customer's Adverant account.
classification ceiling	The most sensitive classification a plugin's skills may declare, restricted for core and verified, tenant for community and public for untrusted.
clock floor	The latest time an installation has seen, below which its clock is never read, so setting the clock back cannot revive an expired licence.
Community floor	What every installation keeps with no licence in force, the open-source Community capabilities.

compiled brain	A pack's deciding server module, compiled and licensed, which verifies its own licence grant and never ships to a phone or browser.
connector	A read-only link that brings records from an existing system into a pack's knowledge model on a schedule.
Custodian	A person whose age recipient is listed in keys.custody.recipients and who can unseal the unsealer with their own identity.
custody Job	The install hook nexus-openbao-custody-init, which initialises the key store, encrypts its shares to the custodians and mints the installation identity.
data branch	A short-lived copy of a database filled with seeded synthetic data, used for tests; it lives 72 hours by default and 14 days at most.
delivery identity	One signed record per plugin holding its repositories, signing key, namespace, registry prefix, schema, domains and change policy, which every release check reads.
dev space	A developer's own working environment in the installation, where a plugin or pack is built and tested before promotion.
dispatch allow-list	The closed constant of namespaced job types a plugin surface may dispatch through UNO.
domain pack	One industry's knowledge model, lenses, templates, skills, connectors and phone screens, licensed as a unit and switched on per unit.
Edition matrix	The single file listing every capability with its tier, from which the licence catalogue, menu rules and code boundary are generated.
effective route	The provider and model the AI Provider Router would choose for an organisation, read without making an AI call.
emergency administrator sign-in	A sealed sign-in made with the first administrator, kept in a safe, usable only when company sign-in is down and announced on every use.
Enterprise base	The closed core of Enterprise on which every add-on and domain pack depends.
External egress ranges	The address ranges in networkPolicy.externalEgressCIDRs that pods may reach outside the namespace.
external store	A data store such as PostgreSQL that the organisation runs itself, named with mode external, a host and a Secret.
Feature group	A named set of capabilities from the edition matrix that a licence grants, such as enterprise-base or map-and-geoai.
first administrator	The first person on an installation, created with the organisation right after the claim, who adds everyone else.
Floor	What every edition keeps under any licence state, from administration and security basics to data export and every refusal screen.
Four-eyes approval	A sensitive change held until a second person, other than the one who asked, approves it.
generator attribution	The trailer line in a commit message that says which tool wrote the commit.
golden path	A guided start for a plugin, pack, lens, platform, skill or workflow that creates a repository, manifest, tests, dev space and data branches from a template.
Grace days	The number of days after a licence ends during which everything keeps working; an evaluation has none.
Grant scope	Whether a licensed capability attaches to an organisation (tenant scope) or to the installation as a whole (deployment scope).

graph change request	The reviewed change that moves a knowledge model to a new version, with a dry run that counts what it would touch.
hook	A Job the chart runs at a set weight after install or before upgrade, such as the database bootstrap or a service's migrations.
HTTPS front	A local HTTPS listener with a certificate from the chart's own CA that lets a laptop browser reach the console at its real address.
Image lock	The chart's list of every image in a release by digest, belonging to one edition.
images lock	The file in the chart, files/images.lock.json, that lists every image of one edition by its signed index digest.
Import from media	The console page that loads a release from a disk, checking every file and the signature against the key already installed.
ingress namespace	The namespace of the ingress controller, set in networkPolicy.ingressNamespace, which the network policy admits to the three public services.
installation administrator	An owner or administrator of the organisation that owns the installation, or a full platform administrator, who may import its licence.
installation fingerprint	Eight groups of four characters identifying an installation, compared between the terminal and the browser before claiming.
Installation hosts	Host names and ranges listed in ai.installationHosts that the router treats as inside the installation.
Installation identity	The permanent id the key service mints at the first install, under keys.installationName, which every licence for that installation names.
installation name	The permanent name, set in keys.installationName, under which the key store mints the installation's identity on its first start.
installer-only image	The edition-agnostic installer disk image that holds the operating system, k3s, cert-manager and the first-boot installer, without Nexus images.
isolation harness	The SDK test tool that attacks every route as another organisation and as a colleague, with each fence removed in turn.
isolation level	A number from 1 to 4 in a plugin's manifest that fixes how it runs, from an external HTTPS service up to a microVM.
job type	The namespaced dispatch key of a manifest skill, written as the plugin name, a dot and the skill id.
k3d	A tool that runs k3s inside Docker containers, used to evaluate Nexus on a laptop.
Key hint	The masked last four characters at most by which a stored key is shown after it is added.
Key store	The OpenBao server, openbao, that holds every key Nexus uses on an installation.
knowledge model	The versioned set of kinds of thing a pack knows and how they link, often built on a base model from another pack.
lens	What one role sees inside a pack or platform, defined as a narrowing of a base lens and never a widening.
licence document	The signed JSON file in the nexus-licence/v1 format, issued for one installation's identity and signed twice by Adverant.
Licence line	The rule that Enterprise code may reach Community code only through the @adverant/nexus-spi package.
Licence request	A file an installation signs with its own key to tell Adverant which installation a licence is for.

Licence state	One of ABSENT, VALID, WARN, GRACE, RESTRICT or TERMINATE, recomputed from the licence and today's date on every read.
Local certificate authority	The certificate authority the chart creates in its own namespace through cert-manager to issue every internal TLS certificate.
manifest	The nexus.manifest.json file that declares a plugin's identity, runtime, routes, rights, data and skills to the platform.
manifest skill	A typed row in a plugin's skills array, compiled into the skill registry and run through UNO dispatch.
masked copy	A copy of a unit's real data with personal and commercial fields replaced, made only with the data owner's agreement.
mission pack	The signed package a Nexus Edge device runs for one mission, holding its models, adapters, ontology, rules and on-board test cases.
mobile overlay	The part of a pack manifest that says which cards and capture steps appear on phones and for which roles.
mockup compiler	A tool that turns a project's screen mockups into code using a project-specific adapter file, .mockup-compiler.json.
must-pass check	A preflight check whose miss is a failure that blocks the install, as against a should-pass check whose miss is a warning.
NEXUS-BUNDLE	The volume label the installer looks for to find the offline bundle, on the all-in-one image or on a separate disk.
NEXUS-SEED	The label of a small volume holding seed.yaml, and licence.json for Enterprise, that answers the installer's questions in advance.
offline bundle	One uncompressed tar file per edition holding the images, the chart, the images lock, the SBOMs and a signed checksum file.
Offline exchange	The account page where files such as licence requests, licences and usage files cross to and from an installation with no outside connection.
offline field class	The declared behaviour of a phone field without signal, either authored offline, proposed offline or never offline.
Organisation AI pool	The encrypted set of model keys an organisation owns, kept by its owners and administrators and used only by the router.
pack.json	The pack manifest file that declares a pack's clusters, words, sample world, seats and lenses.
Parts manifest	The release's signed list of compiled modules, against which nexus-keys checks every module at start-up and nightly.
pilot unit	The single business unit that runs a new release before every other unit does.
plugin sync	The nexus.plugin-sync/v1 call that sends a plugin's whole skill set to the skill registry from its own workload.
plugin tier	Which halves a plugin has, one of skills-only, ui-only or full-service, declared in its manifest.
preflight	The read-only check nexusctl preflight makes of a cluster and a values file before an install, ending in a report and an exit code.
preflight report	The two files a preflight run saves, a text transcript and a JSON report in the nexus.preflight/v1 schema.
promotion	The one path every release takes, from the dev space to staging, to a pilot unit, then to all units, with gates at each step.

Protection class	A grouping of Adverant's code that sets, for each delivery form, how far that code may travel and at which protection level.
provenance attestation	A signed SLSA statement attached to each image that names the source commit, the base images and the build tools it was made from.
publisher cluster	A virtual cluster on Adverant cloud, holding sample data only, where outside publishers build extensions for many customers.
pull token	A credential from the Adverant account, limited in what it may fetch and with an end date, that lets a cluster pull Enterprise images.
read seat	The database role that performs reads under a recorded grant and can select only the tables the manifest declares granted.
recorded grant	The one way across the tenant boundary, a read-only permission the holding organisation records, with every look logged in both organisations.
refusal body	The standard error shape with error, code, message, resolved, missing and troubleshooting fields.
refusal ledger	The SDK middleware and table that record every refusal a person receives before the answer is sent.
release ledger	The table nexus_release.schema_applied in which each migration hook records its chain and image digest once it has finished.
release public key	Adverant's key, published on downloads.adverant.ai with a fingerprint you check by a second route, that verifies every image, chart and download.
release review	The page and step where two reviewers who are not the author approve a release from its evidence table.
revocation list	A cumulative, signed list of withdrawn licences that an air-gapped installation learns of only when someone imports it.
rights register	The rights block of a manifest, which says per right which roles hold it, which never may, and whether a seat or licence feature is needed.
route table	The api.endpoints list in a manifest, checked by a gate against the routes the plugin's code really registers.
Routing role	The kind of job a request is for (default, fast, reasoning, code or long_context), which the organisation maps to providers.
Routing-policy ladder	The organisation's ordered list of providers the router falls back through when one fails.
Runtime role	A service's own PostgreSQL login, never a superuser and never a table owner, so row-level security always applies to it.
Schema ledger	The table nexus_release.schema_applied, holding one row per migration chain and image digest once that migration has run.
Schema wait	The wait-for-schema init container that holds a service's pod until its migrations show in the release ledger.
scope guard	The SDK middleware that verifies the token, resolves tenant, owner and unit, refuses a body naming a tenant and applies the route's right.
sealed bundle	A single Ed25519-signed tarball for sovereign sites, checked and installed with the nexus-airgap tool.
second check	The passkey an administrator signs in with, since an administrator never signs in with a password alone.
Secure Enclave key	An age key made with age-plugin-se whose private half stays in a Mac's Secure Enclave and asks for a fingerprint on each use.

seed	A saved set of counts and shapes for synthetic data, with a fingerprint, so the same seed always gives the same data.
seed.yaml	The settings file on the NEXUS-SEED volume, with keys domain, adminEmail, edition, timeout, and optionally disk and wipe.
Service identity registry	The ConfigMap nexus-service-identities, which maps each namespace and service account to a service or plugin name.
Service provider interface	The Apache-2.0 package @adverant/nexus-spi, holding the interfaces an Enterprise module compiles against and nothing else.
shared lens	A lens for a regime that several packs use, written once and included by each pack that needs it.
single-node install	An install where nexusctl builds a k3s cluster on one Linux server and installs cert-manager and Nexus on it with one command.
Six things before anyone signs in	The readiness page listing licence, address and certificate, backups, company sign-in, mail and AI model, done in any order before inviting people.
Skills Engine skill	A SKILL.md package of instructions, allowed tools and optional files that the assistant, agents, workflows, AI buttons and coding tools run.
SKU	One of the six delivery forms in the edition matrix, from Adverant cloud to Nexus Edge.
source offer	The source files of every copyleft data-tier image, carried in the bundle and listed with their checksums.
SPIFFE identity	The name a service carries in its client certificate, in the form `spiffe://cluster.local/ns/<namespace>/sa/<service-account>`.
Support bundle	A redacted file of logs, health details and reports that an operator previews and sends to Adverant support.
Teaser	A greyed, locked control that, when opened, explains what the feature does and who can turn it on, with no price.
tenant fence	The SQL predicate the SDK's tenantFence function builds from a resolved scope, used in every statement on a scoped table.
Three axes	Tenant, owner and unit, the scope on which every read, write, tool call and dispatch in Nexus is fenced.
Time-reset token	A small document Adverant signs for one installation to lower its clock floor once.
trust level	A plugin's declared standing, core, verified, community or untrusted, which sets its isolation posture and the most sensitive data its skills may touch.
Trust roots	The public keys baked into each image at release build, which an installation uses to check licence signatures offline.
unsealer	The small OpenBao server, openbao-unsealer, that the key store unseals itself through and that starts sealed after a node restart.
verify-bundle.sh	The script that checks an offline bundle in six steps against the release public key and ends with VERIFY-BUNDLE PASS.
wait-for-schema	The init container on each database-using Deployment that holds the pod until the release ledger shows its schema is in place.
Warn days	The number of days before a licence ends during which administrators see an in-product warning.
Way back	The window after an upgrade during which the previous release can be restored without a backup restore.

Wish	A caller's preferred provider, preferred model or capability profile, which the router honours only when the organisation can serve it.

APPENDIX F



Architecture at a glance

The whole platform, the open core and what's licensed on top of it, each way of running Nexus, and each of the ten domain packs, one diagram each.

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These diagrams put the whole of Nexus on a page or two. The first shows every service and store an installation runs. The second shows which parts are open source and which are licensed. Seven more show the ways of running Nexus, and the last ten show what each domain pack adds to the shared core. Each one points back to the chapter that explains it in full.

The whole platform

Every installation runs the same set of services from one Helm chart, in the `nexus` namespace. People and tools reach three public addresses. Everything else stays inside the cluster. Chapter 2.1, Architecture, walks through each service, and Appendix D: Services and ports, lists the ports.



FIGURE Every service and store of an installation, from the three public addresses down to the data tier and the key store.

The open core and what's licensed on top

Community is the open core, free under the Apache-2.0 licence. Enterprise adds closed modules, which reach the open core through one published interface and nothing else. Add-ons and domain packs are licensed on top of Enterprise. Chapter 2.2, Editions under the hood, explains the licence line and how a licence switches feature groups on, and Appendix B: Edition matrix, lists every capability by edition.



FIGURE The open core at the bottom, the one shared interface in the middle, and the licensed layers above it.

Ways of running Nexus

The release is the same signed release wherever it runs. What changes is who runs the hardware, how updates arrive and how the licence gets there. Chapter 1.8, Where Nexus runs, compares them for a buyer. The installation chapters, 2.6 to 2.10, are the hands-on guides.




FIGURE Adverant's cloud in the European Union. Adverant runs it, and each organisation has its own private space.




FIGURE Your own Kubernetes cluster, connected. Your platform team installs the chart after preflight passes and chooses when to upgrade.




FIGURE A fully offline site. The release key crosses once by a separate route, and every release after it arrives on a signed disk.




FIGURE One Linux server, set up with nexusctl or from the installer disk image. Chapters 2.8 and 2.9 cover both.




FIGURE A machine image in your own cloud account, bought through the cloud's store.




FIGURE A hardware appliance from one of Adverant's hardware partners, which checks its own custody before it starts.




FIGURE Nexus Edge on the computers aboard a craft in the field. It works on its own between contacts and brings results home at the next one.

Domain packs

A domain pack adds one industry's lenses and templates to the shared core, along with its knowledge model and phone screens. It never changes the shell. Each diagram below shows what the pack brings, what it needs besides Enterprise, and the shared core it sits on. Chapter 1.7, Domain packs and verticals, explains packs in plain terms, and chapter 2.23, Domain packs, shows how one is built.




FIGURE The Insurance pack and what it needs.




FIGURE The Banking and payments pack and what it needs.




FIGURE The Life sciences pack and what it needs.




FIGURE The Critical infrastructure and energy pack and what it needs.




FIGURE The Government and public sector pack and what it needs.




FIGURE The Healthcare pack and what it needs. It holds no clinical decision support.




FIGURE The Defence and security pack and what it needs. Its platform alerts need Nexus Edge as well.




FIGURE The Capital markets and asset management pack and what it needs.




FIGURE The Legal and professional services pack and what it needs.




FIGURE The Logistics and maritime pack and what it needs.

APPENDIX G



Data dictionary and knowledge models

The fields on every record, and what each domain pack is made of.

FOR OPERATORS AND DEVELOPERS

15 MIN READ

This appendix lists the data a customer meets, from the fields on every record up to each domain pack's working parts. It's generated from the same sources as the rest of the book, so it changes when they do. On the support site the same content is an interactive map: pick a pack, then click any part to see how it works.

Fields on every record

Every table a plugin or pack owns carries the scope fields below. Reads and writes are fenced on them, and there's no public shape without them.

Field	Type	Meaning
`organization_id`	uuid, never empty	The tenant. Every primary key and every index starts with it.
`owner_user_id`	uuid, never empty	The person. On a personal record (a mailbox, a private view) it is the fence; on an organisation record (a decision, an approval) it records who acted.
`business_unit_id`	uuid, may be empty	The unit fence. The column must exist even where no unit is set yet.
`is_demo`	boolean, default `false`	Marks seeded sample rows so they can be removed by the marker alone. The `migrations-are-scoped` gate requires it unless `gates/demo-exempt.json` exempts the table.

Foreign keys carry the organisation too, so a link can never point into another tenant's rows.

The shared core

Every pack builds on the same core. These are the parts of it a pack and its lenses refer to.




FIGURE The shared core. An organisation holds its units and people. A domain pack brings its own parts on top of the core, and every record carries the three axes.

Part	What it is
Organisation	The tenant. Every record carries it. Only a recorded grant crosses it, and that grant is read-only.

Business unit	The optional unit fence inside an organisation. A pilot release or a pack can be set per unit.
Person	One of the organisation's people. Owner of personal records, and the one who acted on organisation records.
Lens	What one role sees inside a pack or platform, defined as a narrowing of a base lens and never a widening.
Base lens	The lens another lens narrows, which bounds everything the narrower lens may show.
Domain pack	One industry's knowledge model and lenses, licensed as a unit together with the templates and connectors for that work.
Knowledge model	The versioned set of kinds of thing a pack knows and how they link, often built on a base model from another pack.
Connector	A read-only link that brings records from an existing system into a pack's knowledge model on a schedule.
Skills Engine skill	A SKILL.md package: instructions plus the tools it may call. The assistant and agents run it.
Mobile overlay	The part of a pack manifest that says which cards and capture steps appear on phones and for which roles.
Recorded grant	The one way across the tenant boundary, a read-only permission the holding organisation records, with every look logged in both organisations.
Three axes	The scope every read and write is fenced on: the tenant and the owner, plus the unit where one is set.



Insurance

Needs Enterprise. It also needs the add-on called Decision rooms and sealed records. Phone screens also need Mobile apps.



FIGURE The Insurance pack's modules, from what goes in to who signs off.

Lens	What it shows
Claims handler	The claim, the policy, every document and a drafted next step. Questions answered with sources.
Claims lead	Claims waiting on a decision, decision rooms to chair, and the reasons behind each recommendation.
Fraud investigator	Signals across claims: shared phones, addresses, repairers and bank accounts, on a graph and a map.
Underwriter	What the claims are saying about a book of business, with the wording that caused it.

Compliance and audit	Sealed records, the rules each one answers, and evidence packs for the supervisor.

Module	What it does	Goes in	Comes out	Signs off
First notice of loss	Takes the claim by phone, web, app or email, checks cover and asks only for what is missing.	Calls, forms, emails, photos	An open claim with cover checked and a list of what is still needed	Claims handler
Document reader	Reads reports, invoices, surveys and photos and files each fact with a link to its page.	PDFs, scans, images, spreadsheets	Facts with sources, and where documents disagree	Nobody: it only files facts
Coverage check	Compares the facts with the policy wording and endorsements and drafts a coverage view.	Policy wording, schedule, facts	A coverage view with the clauses that decide it	Claims handler
Fraud signals	Looks for links between claims, people, phones, addresses, repairers and accounts.	Claims history, third-party data you allow	Signals with reasons and a drafted investigation	Fraud investigator
Decision rooms	For larger or disputed claims, AI (artificial intelligence) argues for and against paying, and a chair rules.	The claim file and the questions in dispute	A ruling with reasons, ready to seal	Chair, usually the claims lead
Payments and recovery	Prepares payments, reserves and subrogation steps once a decision is sealed.	Sealed decision, bank details	A payment request and a recovery file	Two people, under the four-eyes rule
Customer app	A branded app for policyholders to report, track and talk to a person.	Your brand, your products	A storefront per brand, built from one template	Marketing and compliance
Evidence packs	Gathers sealed records and maps them to rules for supervisors, auditors and reinsurers.	Sealed records	A pack with every record checkable	Compliance lead

Rule	Reference	What the records answer
Solvency II	Directive 2009/138/EC, as amended by (EU) 2025/2	Governance, risk management and reporting. Reviewed rules apply from 30 January 2027.
Insurance Distribution	Directive (EU) 2016/97 (IDD)	Acting honestly, fairly and in the customer's best interests, and keeping the records to show it.
DORA (Digital Operational Resilience Act)	Regulation (EU) 2022/2554	ICT risk, incident reporting and the register of tech suppliers.
EU AI Act	Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, Annex III 5(c)	Risk assessment and pricing in life and health insurance is high-risk AI from 2 December 2027.
GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation)	Regulation (EU) 2016/679	Purpose, access, erasure and where claimants' data lives.

EIOPA opinion on AI	Opinion on AI governance and risk management, August 2025	Supervisors' expectations for fairness, explainability and human oversight of AI in insurance.

What is sealed with each decision:

- Who decided, in which role, and when
- The facts used, each with a link to its source
- Which AI helped, with what model and what it was allowed to read
- The rules the decision answers, by article
- The time stamp, witnessed outside Adverant

Knowledge model: Insurance schema




FIGURE The kinds of thing in the insurance schema and the links between them.

From	Link	To
Claim	under	Policy
Claim	made by	Party
Claim	caused by	Peril
Claim	surveyed by	Adjuster firm
Claim	paid	Payment
Claim	evidenced by	Document
Fraud signal	raised on	Claim

Kind	Note
Policy	14 fields
Claim	22 fields
Party	policyholder, broker
Peril	storm, flood...

Adjuster firm	—
Payment	—
Document	every source
Fraud signal	proposed for schema 1.5

Banking and payments

Needs Enterprise. Phone screens also need Mobile apps.




FIGURE The Banking and payments pack's modules, from what goes in to who signs off.

Lens	What it shows
Relationship manager	The customer, the application and what is still missing. Drafted requests to the customer.
Credit analyst	The credit file: figures with sources, policy tests, ratios and the drafted recommendation.
Credit committee	Files waiting on a decision, the case for and against, and a room to rule in.
AML and onboarding	Alerts with reasons, ownership chains, screening hits and the evidence to close or escalate.

Risk and compliance	The AI register, incidents with their DORA clocks, and sealed decisions mapped to the rules.

Module	What it does	Goes in	Comes out	Signs off
Application intake	Takes applications from web, branch and brokers and opens one file per customer.	Forms, uploads, broker packs	A file with what is missing and a drafted request	Relationship manager
Customer due diligence	Checks identity, ownership and screening, and keeps the evidence for each.	eID, registries, screening lists	Checks with findings and reasons	Onboarding reviewer
Transaction monitoring	Flags unusual payments with the pattern and the history behind them.	Payments, customer profile	Alerts with reasons and a drafted report	AML analyst, then the MLRO
Credit file builder	Reads accounts, ledgers and bank data and tests them against your credit policy.	Accounts, ledgers, open banking data	A credit file with sources and policy tests	Credit analyst
Credit committee	Runs the committee: papers, the case for and against, votes and the ruling.	Credit files waiting on a decision	A ruling with reasons, ready to seal	Committee chair
Model oversight	Keeps each scoring model with its owner, tests, drift and explanations.	Models, outcomes, overrides	Evidence for model risk and the AI Act	Model risk owner
DORA register and incidents	Keeps the supplier register and runs the reporting clocks when something breaks.	Suppliers, contracts, incidents	Register entries and reports with proof of timing	Head of ICT risk

Rule	Reference	What the records answer
DORA	Regulation (EU) 2022/2554	ICT risk, incident reporting, testing and the register of tech suppliers.
EU AI Act	Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, Annex III 5(b)	Credit scoring of people is high-risk AI from 2 December 2027. Fraud detection is not.
Anti-money laundering	Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 (AMLR)	One EU rulebook for customer checks, applying from 10 July 2027.
Consumer credit	Directive (EU) 2023/2225	Creditworthiness checks and a right to human review of automated decisions, from 20 November 2026.
Loan origination	EBA/GL/2020/06	How loans are assessed, approved, priced and monitored, including automated models.
GDPR	Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Art. 22	Limits on decisions based solely on automated processing.

What is sealed with each decision:

- Who decided, with which mandate and limit
- The figures used, each with its source page
- The model and version that scored it, and what it could read
- Policy exceptions and who approved them
- The time stamp, witnessed outside Adverant

Capital markets and asset management

Needs Enterprise. It also needs the add-on called Decision rooms and sealed records. Phone screens also need Mobile apps.




FIGURE The Capital markets and asset management pack's modules, from what goes in to who signs off.

Lens	What it shows
Surveillance analyst	Alerts, the orders and communications behind them, and the case to build.
Head of compliance	Cases waiting for a decision, and reports to the regulator ready to send.
Research analyst	Research files, sources and the wall around them.
Sales and trading	Clients, orders and their own calls, with walled research hidden.
Best execution committee	Venue results, outliers and the reasons behind them.

Module	What it does	Goes in	Comes out	Signs off

Communications capture and review	Keeps calls and chats, transcribes them and flags what needs a look.	Calls, chats, mail	Kept recordings and flagged items	Surveillance analyst
Market-abuse surveillance	Finds unusual orders and trades and links them to the communications around them.	Orders, trades, market data	Alerts with reasons	Surveillance analyst
Suspicious order reports	Drafts the report to the regulator from the case file.	A case marked suspicious	A report ready to file	Head of compliance
Research walls	Builds information walls and tests them before they go live.	Wall decisions	Walls on files, chat, calls and the assistant	Compliance
Insider lists	Keeps insider lists current as people are brought over the wall.	Wall crossings, deal teams	Insider lists ready to send	Compliance
Best execution	Compares execution with a benchmark by venue and explains outliers.	Orders, fills, market data	A quarterly review	Best execution committee
Transaction reporting checks	Checks reports before they are sent and finds what is missing or wrong.	Transaction reports	Errors and gaps, with fixes	Operations lead
Client onboarding	Reads onboarding documents and checks them against the firm's rules.	Client documents	A file ready for approval	Onboarding officer

Rule	Reference	What the records answer
MiFID II	Directive 2014/65/EU	Recorded calls and chats (Art. 16(7)) and best execution (Art. 27)
MiFIR	Regulation (EU) No 600/2014	Transaction reporting and transparency
MAR	Regulation (EU) No 596/2014	Suspicious orders reported (Art. 16) and insider lists (Art. 18)
DORA	Regulation (EU) 2022/2554	ICT risk, incident reports and third-party providers
EU AI Act	Regulation (EU) 2024/1689	AI literacy for staff and transparency for AI-made content
GDPR	Regulation (EU) 2016/679	Client and staff data in recordings, used for a stated purpose

What is sealed with each decision:

- The alert, the orders and communications linked, the analyst's review and the final decision.



Government and public sector

Needs Enterprise. Phone screens also need Mobile apps.




FIGURE The Government and public sector pack's modules, from what goes in to who signs off.

Lens	What it shows
Case officer	The case, facts from the registers with their sources, the eligibility view and a drafted letter.
Team lead	Cases waiting, second checks to sign, and patterns across the team's decisions.
Oversight officer	AI decisions waiting for review, refusals of outside connections, and the AI register.
Appeals officer	The sealed record of the original decision and everything it rested on.
Citizen	Their own application, what was used, the decision and the reason, in their language.

Module	What it does	Goes in	Comes out	Signs off
Citizen intake	Takes applications online with the national eID and records exactly what the citizen agreed to share.	Forms, eID, consent	A case with its consent record	Nobody: it only opens the case
Register reader	Reads national registers inside the country and keeps the time and source of each fact.	Registers you connect	Facts with sources	Nobody: it only reads

Rules engine	Holds your scheme rules in plain words and tests each case against them.	Facts, scheme rules	An eligibility view with the rules that decide it	Case officer
Second check	Adds a second officer where the amount, risk or your rules require it.	Decisions above a threshold	A checked decision	Team lead
Letters	Drafts the decision letter from the sealed record, in the citizen's language.	The decision and its reasons	A plain-language letter with appeal rights	Case officer
Appeals	Opens an appeal on the exact record the first officer saw, for a different officer.	An appeal request	A new decision linked to the first	Appeals officer
Oversight and register	Lists every AI use, its risk class and its impact assessment, and queues outputs for review.	AI uses, outputs, refusals	Evidence for the AI Act and audits	Oversight officer

Rule	Reference	What the records answer
EU AI Act	Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, Annex III 5(a)	AI used to decide eligibility for public benefits and services is high-risk, with human oversight required.
Rights impact assessment	EU AI Act, Article 27	Public bodies must assess the effect on people's rights before using high-risk AI.
Systems already in use	EU AI Act, Article 111(2)	High-risk AI already used by public authorities must comply by 2 August 2030.
GDPR	Regulation (EU) 2016/679	Lawful basis, purpose limits, access and the citizen's rights.
NIS2 (Network and Information Security Directive 2)	Directive (EU) 2022/2555	Security and incident reporting for public administration bodies in scope.
Interoperable Europe Act	Regulation (EU) 2024/903	Assessing and sharing interoperable public services across borders.
European Digital Identity	Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 (eIDAS 2)	Citizens signing in and sharing proofs with a digital identity wallet.

What is sealed with each decision:

- Which officer decided, and who checked it
- Each fact with the register and time it was read
- What the AI suggested and whether the officer agreed
- The rule applied and the letter sent
- The time stamp, witnessed outside Adverant



Healthcare

Needs Enterprise. Phone screens also need Mobile apps.




FIGURE The Healthcare pack's modules, from what goes in to who signs off.

Lens	What it shows
Consultant	Referrals waiting on a priority, with a sourced summary and what is missing.
Booking team	Who needs an appointment and when, without the clinical detail.
GP and referrer	Whether the referral was accepted, what was asked for, and the outcome letter.
Information governance	Who opened which record, for what purpose, and any access that looks wrong.
System administrator	Health, settings and users. Never a patient's record.

Module	What it does	Goes in	Comes out	Signs off
Referral intake	Receives referrals from GPs and services, files them and records the purpose of care.	Referral letters, e-referrals	A filed referral with its purpose	Nobody: it only files
Referral summary	Drafts a sourced summary and flags what is missing for the receiving team.	Letter, results, medicines	A summary with links and a missing-items list	Consultant
Clinic letters	Drafts clinic letters from the consultation notes for the clinician to edit and sign.	Notes, results, plans	A letter ready to sign	Treating clinician

Purposes and access	Holds the purposes of use and checks each access against them.	Roles, purposes, requests	Allowed or refused access, logged	Information governance
Patient requests	Handles patients' requests to see, correct or move their records.	Requests from patients	A response with what was shared	Data protection officer
Audit and research copies	Makes pseudonymised copies for audit and approved research, with the approval kept.	Approved study or audit	A pseudonymised data set	Approval committee

Rule	Reference	What the records answer
GDPR	Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Art. 9	Health data is a special category, with strict conditions on its use.
European Health Data Space	Regulation (EU) 2025/327	Patients' access to their records, health record systems and secondary use of health data.
Medical devices	Regulation (EU) 2017/745 (MDR)	Software meant for a medical purpose, including AI, can be a medical device.
In vitro diagnostics	Regulation (EU) 2017/746 (IVDR)	Rules for diagnostic devices and the software that runs them.
EU AI Act	Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, Annex I	AI in medical devices is high-risk. Those duties apply from 2 August 2028.
NIS2	Directive (EU) 2022/2555	Security and incident reporting for healthcare providers in scope.

What is sealed with each decision:

- Which clinician decided, and when
- The summary they read, with each source
- What the AI suggested and whether it was followed
- Every access to the record, with its purpose
- The time stamp, witnessed outside Adverant



Life sciences

Needs Enterprise. Phone screens also need Mobile apps.




FIGURE The Life sciences pack's modules, from what goes in to who signs off.

Lens	What it shows
Case processor	New safety reports, extracted facts, duplicate checks and narratives to finish.
Medical reviewer	Serious cases, causality to assess and the evidence behind each fact.
Clinical operations	Deviations by site, possible serious breaches and their deadlines.
Quality assurance and Qualified Person	Batch records, findings and what stands between a batch and release.
Validation lead	Each AI use, its tests, its limits and every change made to it.

Module	What it does	Goes in	Comes out	Signs off
Case intake	Reads safety reports from email, calls, partner feeds and literature, and checks the minimum criteria.	Reports, attachments	A draft case with facts and sources	Case processor

Coding and duplicates	Codes events and products and looks for duplicate reports.	Draft cases	Coded cases, possible duplicates	Case processor
Narratives	Drafts the case narrative from the facts, with a source for every sentence.	Coded case	A narrative ready for review	Medical reviewer
Signal detection	Looks for patterns across cases and literature and explains each one.	Case database, literature	Possible signals with evidence	Safety physician
Trial deviations	Reads site files and monitoring notes and flags possible serious breaches.	Site files, monitoring reports	Deviations with deadlines	Clinical operations
Batch record review	Checks electronic batch records before QA review.	Batch records, calibration logs	Findings for QA	Qualified Person
Validation pack	Keeps intended use, tests, results and limits for each AI use, versioned.	Test data, change requests	A validation file ready for inspection	Validation lead
Inspection room	Gathers sealed records for an inspector, linked to the rule they answer.	Sealed records	An evidence set an inspector can verify	Head of quality

Rule	Reference	What the records answer
EU GMP Annex 11	EudraLex Volume 4	Computerised systems: validation, audit trails and e-signatures
EU GMP Annex 22, draft	Consultation draft, July 2025	AI in GMP: intended use, test data and explainability
Clinical Trials Regulation	Regulation (EU) No 536/2014	Trial conduct, transparency and serious breach notice
ICH E6(R3)	Good clinical practice	Risk-based quality and data integrity, in effect from 23 July 2025
Pharmacovigilance	Implementing Regulation (EU) No 520/2012	Pharmacovigilance systems and their quality
MDR and IVDR	Regulations (EU) 2017/745 and 2017/746	Software that is a medical or diagnostic device
EU AI Act	Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 · Annex I	High-risk rules for AI in medical devices from 2 August 2028
GDPR	Regulation (EU) 2016/679 · Art. 9	Health data handled with a legal basis and safeguards

What is sealed with each decision:

- The source documents, the facts extracted, every edit, the assessment and who signed it.



Critical infrastructure and energy

Needs Enterprise. Phone screens also need Mobile apps.




FIGURE The Critical infrastructure and energy pack's modules, from what goes in to who signs off.

Lens	What it shows
Control-room engineer	Live alarms, the likely cause with its sources, and the switching plan to approve.
Asset manager	Health scores, the maintenance backlog, and what failed before and why.
Security officer	Incident clocks, the evidence gathered, and reports ready for the national CSIRT.
Market compliance	Outages that may be inside information, and the notice to publish.
Regulatory affairs	Sealed records and evidence packs, ready to hand to an auditor or regulator.

Module	What it does	Goes in	Comes out	Signs off
Incident desk	Opens an incident from alarms and logs, groups related alarms and starts the reporting clocks.	Alarms, control-system logs, tickets	An incident file with a timeline	Shift lead
NIS2 reporting	Drafts the early warning, the notification and the final report in the format your CSIRT expects.	The incident file	Report drafts with their deadlines	Security officer

Switching and outage planning	Proposes switching steps and checks each one against network limits and the outage plan.	Network model, outage plan, live readings	A checked switching plan	Control-room engineer
Asset health	Combines inspections, sensor trends and failure history into a ranked list of what to look at.	Inspection reports, sensor data, history	A maintenance list with reasons	Asset manager
Market notices	Flags outages that may be inside information and drafts the notice.	Outage plans, capacity changes	A draft notice and an assessment	Market compliance
Grid connection requests	Reads applications, checks them against capacity and the rules, and drafts the reply.	Applications, capacity maps	A drafted offer or refusal, with reasons	Connections engineer
Evidence packs	Gathers sealed records for an audit or an inspection, linked to the rule they answer.	Sealed records	An evidence pack an auditor can verify	Regulatory affairs

Rule	Reference	What the records answer
NIS2	Directive (EU) 2022/2555	Early warning in 24 hours, notification in 72, final report within a month
Network Code on Cybersecurity	Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1366	Cyber risk in cross-border electricity flows
REMIT	Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011, as amended by (EU) 2024/1106	Inside information published on time, no market manipulation
CER Directive	Directive (EU) 2022/2557	Resilience of critical entities
EU AI Act	Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 · Annex III, point 2	AI as a safety component of electricity supply is high-risk
GDPR	Regulation (EU) 2016/679	Smart-meter and customer data, used for a stated purpose

What is sealed with each decision:

- The alarms and logs read, the plan as approved, the reports sent and their times.



Defence and security

Needs Enterprise. Phone screens also need Mobile apps. Platform alerts need Nexus Edge.




FIGURE The Defence and security pack's modules, from what goes in to who signs off.

Lens	What it shows
Commander	Plans and reports waiting for a signature, the sources behind them and the challenge raised.
Staff officer	Taskings, sources and drafted plans, with every line linked to its source.
Operator	The mission pack on each device, its limits and what it is waiting to be allowed to do.
Legal adviser	Plans flagged for review, the rules they cite and space to record advice.
Security officer	Who opened what, at which classification, and every refused request.

Module	What it does	Goes in	Comes out	Signs off
Tasking intake	Receives taskings by signed message or signed media and checks the signature before anything else.	Signed taskings	An open plan with its tasking	Staff officer
Source reader	Reads orders, notices, maps and reports held on site and keeps the classification of each fact.	Documents and data on site	Facts with sources and classifications	Nobody: it only reads
Plan drafting	Drafts plans, reports and messages from the sources, marked as drafts.	Tasking and sources	A draft with every line sourced	Commander
Challenge	A second AI on a different model argues against the draft and lists the risks.	The draft and its sources	A list of challenges to answer	Staff officer

Mission packs	Bundles models, knowledge, agents and rules for each device, signed and size-checked.	Approved models and rules	A signed pack for each device	Fleet officer
Autonomy limits	Sets what each device may do alone and what must wait for a person, with locked limits.	Your rules for each device	Limits the device enforces	Commander
Edge sync	Syncs records during contact windows, most important first, and re-witnesses seals.	Records waiting on devices	Records home, seals re-witnessed	Nobody: it runs on its own

Rule	Reference	What the records answer
EU AI Act scope	Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, Article 2(3)	AI used only for military, defence or national-security purposes is outside the Act. Dual-use and civilian uses are not.
Dual-use export control	Regulation (EU) 2021/821	Controls on exporting dual-use items, software and technology, with the records to show it.
Defence transfers	Directive 2009/43/EC	Licences for moving defence-related products between EU countries.
Defence procurement	Directive 2009/81/EC	Contracts in defence and security, including security of supply and information.
Information security	ISO/IEC 27001:2022	A management system for keeping information safe, with evidence.
AI management	ISO/IEC 42001:2023	Policies, roles and controls for AI in use.

What is sealed with each decision:

- Who signed, with which authority
- Each source with its classification
- What the AI drafted and what the commander changed
- The challenge raised and how it was answered
- A local time stamp, witnessed again when a link returns



Legal and professional services

Needs Enterprise. It also needs the add-on called Decision rooms and sealed records. It also needs the add-on called Mail. Phone screens also need Mobile apps.



FIGURE The Legal and professional services pack's modules, from what goes in to who signs off.

Lens	What it shows
Partner	Matters, deadlines, drafts waiting for sign-off, and risks the AI has flagged.
Associate	The matter file, research with sources, and drafts to work on.
Conflicts team	New enquiries, search hits and the decisions waiting for them.
Risk and compliance	Walls, blocked attempts, privilege marks and sealed decisions.
Knowledge lawyer	Precedents and clause banks, kept current from sealed final versions.

Module	What it does	Goes in	Comes out	Signs off
Matter intake	Reads enquiries from mail, web forms and calls, and lists the parties and the work asked for.	Enquiries, engagement letters	A draft matter with parties	Business intake team
Conflict search	Searches every party across matters, contacts, calls and mail, including former names.	The draft matter	A list of hits with where each was found	Conflicts partner
Ethical walls	Builds a wall from a decision and tests it first, showing who would be blocked and from what.	A clearance decision	A wall that applies to files, chat, calls and the assistant	Risk and compliance
Privilege review	Suggests privilege marks on documents and notes, with the reason for each.	Documents, call notes, mail	Marked items, ready for review	Supervising associate
Drafting with sources	Drafts clauses and letters from the matter file, with a source for every sentence.	Matter documents, precedents	A draft with sources and gaps flagged	Partner
Calls and notes	Records calls with consent, writes notes and applies walls and privilege marks.	Calls, consent	Call notes linked to the matter	Fee earner on the call
Disclosure and review	Groups large document sets, finds the relevant ones and explains why.	Document sets	A review set with reasons	Review lead
Knowledge bank	Keeps precedents current from sealed final versions, never from drafts.	Sealed final documents	Updated precedents and clauses	Knowledge lawyer

Rule	Reference	What the records answer
GDPR	Regulation (EU) 2016/679	Client and staff personal data, used for a stated purpose
AML Regulation	Regulation (EU) 2024/1624	Customer checks when lawyers act in certain transactions, from 10 July 2027
EU AI Act	Regulation (EU) 2024/1689	AI literacy for staff and transparency when people deal with AI
eIDAS	Regulation (EU) No 910/2014, as amended by (EU) 2024/1183	Qualified electronic signatures and seals
CCBE Code of Conduct	Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe	Confidentiality and conflicts of interest

What is sealed with each decision:

- The parties searched, the hits found, the decision, who made it, and the wall as built.



Logistics and maritime

Needs Enterprise. It also needs the add-on called Map and GeoAI. Phone screens also need Mobile apps.



FIGURE The Logistics and maritime pack's modules, from what goes in to who signs off.

Lens	What it shows
Customs declarant	Declarations, holds, the documents behind them and what customs asked for.
Carrier onboarding	New carriers, their checks and the findings that need a decision.
Port operations	Berths, yard moves and which containers are cleared to leave.
Quality lead	Temperature records, excursions and the stability data to judge them.
Port security officer	Security checks, access and incidents at the port facility.

Module	What it does	Goes in	Comes out	Signs off
Carrier onboarding	Checks sanctions lists, licences, insurance and bank details for every new carrier.	Carrier details, certificates	A check report with findings	Carrier onboarding lead

Document reader	Reads invoices, packing lists, bills of lading and certificates, and compares them.	Shipping documents	Extracted data and a list of mismatches	Customs declarant
Customs declarations and holds	Drafts declarations and tracks holds, inspections and what customs asked for.	Extracted data, customs messages	Draft declarations and hold files	Customs declarant
Safety and security filing	Prepares the entry summary data customs needs before goods arrive.	Booking and carrier data	Filing data ready to submit	Customs declarant
Cold chain monitor	Watches reefer readings and judges excursions against stability data.	Sensor feeds, stability data	Excursion assessments	Quality lead
Berth and yard planning	Suggests yard moves and berth slots around holds and inspections.	Vessel calls, yard state	A suggested plan	Port operations
Claims and damage	Builds a claim file from photos, survey reports and the sealed shipment record.	Photos, survey reports	A claim file with sources	Claims handler
Emissions data	Gathers embedded emissions data from suppliers for CBAM declarations.	Supplier reports	Declaration data with gaps flagged	Trade compliance

Rule	Reference	What the records answer
Union Customs Code	Regulation (EU) No 952/2013	Declarations, controls, holds and release of goods
ICS2	Import Control System 2	Safety and security data filed before goods arrive
eFTI	Regulation (EU) 2020/1056	Authorities accept electronic freight information from 9 July 2027
CBAM	Regulation (EU) 2023/956	Embedded emissions declared for steel, cement, aluminium and more
Ship and port facility security	Regulation (EC) No 725/2004	ISPS Code measures at port facilities
NIS2	Directive (EU) 2022/2555	Port and transport operators report significant incidents
Good Distribution Practice	Guidelines 2013/C 343/01	Temperature control for medicines in transit

What is sealed with each decision:

- The hold, what customs asked for, the documents compared, the decision and who made it.

Knowledge model: Logistics base model




FIGURE The kinds of thing in the logistics base model and the links between them.

From	Link	To
Vessel	calls at	Port
Port	served by	Carrier
Container	carries	Shipment
Shipment	with	Carrier

Also in the model, with their links set by the pack: Berth, Contract, Customs entry.

Kind	Note
Vessel	—
Port	—
Carrier	—
Container	—
Shipment	—